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Abstract 
 
Community action, centred on everyday issues affecting life at neighbourhood level, was a 
new form of political activism that flourished across urban Britain from the 1960s to the 
1980s. Existing historical narratives of politics in late twentieth century Britain overlook 
this development due to the low profile of community action nationally and activists’ lack 
of interest in recording their work for posterity. This thesis recovers part of the forgotten 
history of community action through a case study of Leeds. In so doing it rebalances a 
historiography concerned largely with established political institutions. The thesis builds 
upon the work of historians who have sought to broaden our understanding of the political 
and scholars who have stressed the importance of the local and the quotidian. In 1960s and 
1970s in Leeds, the growth of community action was a response to the failure of traditional 
political organisations to represent those who disagreed with various aspects of urban 
policy. Community action challenged the centralising tendencies of the British state, 
pushing for more direct citizen involvement in policy making. Over the 1970s, activists re-
shaped policy on urban renewal, housing and transport. The Leeds experience shows how 
community activists forged a partnership with local government and together they 
pioneered new forms of urban policy. Activists developed an infrastructure of grassroots 
institutions managed by local people, only for it to wither in the 1980s as the Thatcher 
governments advanced a neo-liberal policy agenda. With the exception of a handful of full-
time organisers, Leeds activists were unable to act local and think national. As such, 
community action was unable to mature into a true social movement. It lacked strong 
national networks, a set of unifying institutions and a clear ideology. It did, however, 
survive as an approach to politics and its contribution to public policy remains visible today.  
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Introduction 
 
 
1. A forgotten mobilisation 
 
Writing in Community Politics in 1976, Peter Hain, the Young Liberal and anti-apartheid 
activist, commented on the rise of a new political movement: 
 
It is impossible to pick up a newspaper these days without reading of people up in arms about some community issue. This may be a planning decision, housing problem, traffic jam-up, children’s playspace, environmental destruction, or any other of the countless problems afflicting local communities. The cumulative effect of this eruption of activity has been to signal the emergence of a new style of political action, constituting an alternative to orthodox party politics. The community action movement has challenged local government, swept aside the pontifications of politicians and promised new hope to the poor, the dispossessed and the powerless.1  
Hain was not alone in believing the growth of community action was politically significant. 
This view was shared widely across the political spectrum as revealed in the diverse range 
of contributors to this edited collection. Political activists had observed the growth of 
community action from the beginning of the decade. In 1970, it was the subject of a Fabian 
Society pamphlet in which Ray Gosling, then a detached youth worker, contributed a 
chapter on community action in Nottingham.2 In 1972, a group of radical planners based in 
London with contacts throughout the country established the bi-monthly publication 
Community Action which functioned as a national journal and information exchange for 
community activists.3 The national media covered the emergence of community action. In 
1973 an article in The Observer magazine by Des Wilson, the founder of Shelter, profiled 
the rise of community action, focusing in particular on Notting Hill in London.4 Wilson 
wrote of the ‘ongoing community action movement,’ which he believed ‘has created a new 
confidence in areas which before felt beaten.’5 Between 1974 and 1983, community action 
was the subject of a series of eight books written by professionals working in local 
                                                          1 Peter Hain, ‘Introduction,’ in Peter Hain, ed., Community Politics (London, 1976): 9. See also: Peter Hain, Radical Regeneration: Protest, Direct Action and Community Politics (London, 1975) 2 Anne Lapping, ed., Community Action, Fabian Tract 400 (London, 1970); Ray Gosling, ‘St Ann’s, Nottingham,’ in Lapping, Community Action, 22-27; Ray Gosling, ‘St Ann’s, Nottingham,’ in Lapping, Community Action, 22-27 3 ‘Editorial,’ Community Action, No. 1, February 1972, i  4 Des Wilson, ‘Neighbourhood muscle,’ Observer Magazine, Sunday 26 August 1976, 17-22 5 Wilson, ‘Neighbourhood muscle,’ 17, 22 
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government, planning, social work and community work.6 This series profiled local 
examples of community action across urban Britain. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
several activists wrote historical accounts of their experiences as community activists in 
particular districts.7 Seasoned activists wrote self-help guides for budding community 
activists.8 Community action was the subject of scholarly analysis. As early as 1970, Ken 
Coates and Richard Silburn concluded their study of inner city poverty in Nottingham with 
a discussion of the potential of community action.9 They were followed by several other 
sociologists and political scientists.10 The work of Manuel Castells, who used the term 
‘urban social movement’ to describe community action groups and similar urban political 
actors, was particularly influential.11  
 
This literature generated lively debate among activists from different backgrounds regarding 
the role of community action and its relationship with more established political 
movements. For advocates of community action like Hain, it was an insurgent movement 
that would increase the political leverage of the poor and dispossessed. Many writers, while 
excited by the rapid ascent of community action, were concerned by its apparent 
parochialism.12 Marxist critics challenged the notion that community action could be 
distinguished from the wider struggle of working-class people.13 For some left-wing 
sceptics, community action was at best an appendage to the working class labour movement 
and at worst an attempt by the capitalist state to defuse class conflict.14 O’Malley’s book on 
                                                          6 David Jones and Marjorie Mayo, ed., Community Work One (London, 1974); David Jones and Marjorie Mayo, ed., Community Work: Two (London, 1975); Marjorie Mayo, ed., Women in the Community (London, 1977); Paul Curno, ed., Political Issues and Community Work (London, 1978); Gary Craig, Marjorie Mayo and Nick Sharman, ed., Jobs and Community Action (London, 1979); Leo Smith and Dan Jones, ed., Deprivation, Participation and Community Action (London, 1981); Gary Craig, Nick Derricourt and Martin Loney, ed., Community Work and the State (1982) 7 Jan O’Malley, The Politics of Community Action: A Decade of Struggle in Notting Hill (London, 1977); Cedric Jackson, The Lambeth Interface: Housing, Planning and Community Action in an Inner London Borough (London, 1975); Nick Wates, The Battle for Tolmers Square (London, 1976); Terry Christensen, Neighbourhood Survival: the Struggle for Covent Garden’s Future (London, 1979); John Ferris, Participation in Urban Planning: The Barnsbury Case  (London, 1972) 8 Tony Gibson, People Power: Community and Work Groups in Action (Middlesex, 1979); Des Wilson, ed., Citizen Action: Taking Action in Your Community (Harlow, 1986) 9 Ken Coates and Richard Silburn, Poverty: The Forgotten Englishman (Nottingham, 1983): 236-247 10 Peter Leonard, ed., The Sociology of Community Action (Stoke-on-Trent, 1975); Sean Baine, Community Action and Local Government (London, 1975); Martin Adeney, Community Action: Four Examples (London, 1972); Stuart Lowe, ‘Local Politics and Community Groups in Sheffield’ (Department of Political Theory and Institutions, University of Sheffield, 1978) 11Manual Castells The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-cultural theory of social urban movements (London, 1983); Stuart Lowe Urban Social Movements: The City After Castells (New York, 1986) 12 Irene Binns, ‘What are we trying to achieve through community action?’, Community Action, No. 6, Jan-Feb 1973, 11-12 13 John Cowley, Adah Kaye, Marjorie Mayo and Mike Thompson, ed., Community or Class Struggle? (London, 1977) 14 Cynthia Cockburn, The Local State: The Management of Cities and People (London, 1977): 158-63 
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Notting Hill was a rejoinder to this view; she aimed ‘to force socialists take seriously the 
experience of community struggle’ rather than focusing purely on industrial struggles.15 The 
lesson for O’Malley and others advocates was that workplace campaigns were not the only 
valid form of activism. Both O’Malley and the editors of Community Action argued that 
alliances between community and labour activists would be integral to its long-term 
success.16  
 
Most of those who wrote about community action in this period agreed that it was an 
innovative and disruptive political mobilisation that challenged existing approaches to and 
assumptions about politics. The ubiquity of community action was viewed as one of its 
most striking features. It was seen to be reconfiguring the relationship between people and 
government, especially at the local level. While it generated considerable excitement and 
prompted extensive analysis in the 1970s and 1980s, there are no comprehensive scholarly 
historical studies of community action. It has received no more than a passing mention in 
the mainstream histories of this increasingly popular period and it has not been considered a 
suitable candidate for a television documentary.17 The starting point for this thesis is the 
observation that a political phenomenon considered significant in the 1970s and 1980s has 
largely faded from the national memory. This raises several questions. Why did community 
action excite contemporaries? Did it reinvigorate politics in this period? If so, why is it 
absent from histories of this period? What is the long-term legacy of community action and 
why should it interest us today? 
  
In addressing this neglected topic, this thesis fills four significant gaps in the political 
history of twentieth-century Britain. First, while the field has diversified greatly in the last 
decade, politics at the local and neighbourhood level has been overlooked by historians 
working on twentieth-century Britain. Historians have privileged organisations, institutions 
and movements with a national presence. National government, the politics of the welfare 
state and the major political parties remain popular subjects for historians of post-war 
Britain.18 While politics beyond the ballot box is a historiographical growth sector, national 
                                                          15 O’Malley, The Politics of Community Action, 173 16 O’Malley, The Politics of Community Action, 179-80; ‘The Last Five Years: The Struggles Ahead,’ Community Action, No. 30, March-April 1977, 16 17 Alwyn Turner, Crisis? What Crisis?: Britain in the 1970s (London, 2013), Dominic Sandbrook, White Heat: A History of Britain in the Swinging Sixties, 1964-1970 (London, 2009); Dominic Sandbrook, Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974-1979 (London, 2013). Community action in London did feature in ‘The Secret History of Our Streets,’ Series 1, June-July 2012, BBC2, television broadcast  18 Lawrence Black, Hugh Pemberton and Pat Thane, ed., Reassessing 1970s Britain (Manchester, 2013); Laura Beers, Your Britain: Media and the Making of the Labour Party (London, 2010); Andrew Thorpe, 
10  
pressure groups, national campaigns and activists with a national profile are the dominant 
topics.19 Perhaps guided by the availability of source material, historians have prioritised 
organisations and individuals who sought to influence national government, engaged with 
the national media and possessed a strong nationwide organisation.20 Community action, 
which operated at the grassroots level and engaged mainly with local government and the 
local media, has been largely passed over. The major exception to this national bias in the 
historiography is the more extensive literature on activism in London, but community action 
was a nationwide phenomenon. Matthew Hilton has acknowledged that the activities of 
non-governmental organisations operating at the local level deserve ‘separate treatment,’ 
but even his work has largely focused on national and transnational NGOs.21 This thesis 
redresses this imbalance by focusing on politics at the neighbourhood level. This was the 
level at which most people encountered politics and a place where most people’s experience 
of politics was particularly meaningful and intimate.  
 
Second, historians working on political activism have tended to focus on the more visible 
and dramatic forms of political activism – those which left a deeper impression on the 
national consciousness and subsequently the national memory.22 There has been extensive 
research into the radical political groups associated with pan-European uprisings of 1968, 
which cast a shadow over the 1970s.23 Far left groups have been the subject of numerous 
studies.24 Student activism in the post war period is well-documented.25 Trade union 
                                                                                                                                                                                 Parties at War: Political Organisation in the Second World War (Oxford, 2009); Martin Pugh, Speak for Britain! A New History of the Labour Party (London, 2012); Oliver Daddow, ‘New Labour: A Witness History,’ Contemporary British History, 29:1 (2015): 106-36 19 Nicholas Crowson, Matthew Hilton and James McKay (eds.), NGOs in Contemporary Britain Non-state Actors in Society and Politics Since 1945 (Basingstoke, 2009); Christopher Moores, ‘The Progressive Professionals: the National Council for Civil Liberties and the Politics of Activism in 1960s Britain,’ Twentieth Century British History, 20:4 (2009) 20 Nicholas Crowson, ‘Re-visiting the 1977 Housing (Homeless Persons) Act: Westminster, Whitehall and the Homelessness Lobby,’ Twentieth Century British History, 24:3 (2013), 424-447 21 Matthew Hilton, ‘Politics is Ordinary: Non-governmental organisations and political participation in contemporary Britain,’ Twentieth Century British History, 22: 2 (2011), 233 22 Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural and Social Transformation in Britain, France, Italy and the United States (Oxford, 1998); Sheila Rowbotham, Promise of a Dream: Remembering the Sixties (London, 2001); Katrina Navickas, ‘Protest History or the History of Protest?’ History Workshop Journal, 73:1 (2012): 302-307; John Davis and Anette Warring ‘Living Utopia: Communal Living in Denmark and Britain,’ Cultural and Social History, 8:4 (2011): 511-28; Klimke Klimke and Joachim Scharloth, ed., 1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956–1977 (New York, 2008); Nick Thomas, ‘Protests Against the Vietnam War in 1960s Britain: The Relationship between Protesters and the Press,’ Contemporary British History, 22:3 (2008): 335-354 23 Robert Gildea, James Mark and Anette Warring, ed., Europe’s 1968: Voices of Revolt (Oxford, 2013) 24 Evan Smith and Matthew Worley, Against the Grain: The British Far Left from 1956 (Manchester, 2014); N. Redfern, ‘No Friends to the Left: The British Community party’s Surveillance of the Far Left, c.1932-1980,’ Contemporary British History, 28:3 (2014), 341-360 
11  
militancy in the post-war period has begun to interest historians and there is a growing body 
of work on the 1972 and 1984-5 miners’ strikes.26 Community action groups usually 
operated under the radar of the national media and, although they left a significant mark in 
their localities, their activity was rarely glamorous or dramatic. Historians researching 
political activism have focused on a narrow range of sites – central London, large factories, 
conference halls and university campuses – and they have overlooked more quotidian 
locations. We need to look to housing estates, town centres, schools, residential streets, 
playgrounds, bus stops and community centres across Britain to fully understand political 
change in this period. 
 
Third, there has been a strong emphasis in recent literature on the politics of identity and 
other post-material causes. The rise of the new social movements was a defining feature of 
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Accordingly, movements concerned with women, ecology, 
sexuality, disability and peace have received extensive treatment.27 Community action has 
yet to find a place in this narrative. It does not fit neatly into the frameworks normally used 
to classify and describe social movements. It is not clear whether community action was a 
movement, as we shall discuss later. Community action groups were not usually associated 
with a particular identity group or post-material cause: they tended to straddle these 
categories. Community activists were concerned with material issues, such as housing and 
transport, post-material issues such as community and heritage, but they also championed 
the interests of particular social groups like council tenants, women and working-class 
people. Social movements remain popular amongst political historians because issues like 
the environment, civil liberties and peace remain salient in the early twenty-first century. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 25 Nick Thomas, ‘Challenging the Myths of the 1960s: the Case of Student Protest,’ Twentieth Century British History, 13:3 (2002). L. Black, ‘The Lost Worlds of Young Conservatism,’ Historical Journal, 50: 4 (2008): 911-1024 26 John Callaghan, ‘Industrial Militancy 1945-79: The Failure of the British Road to Socialism,’ Twentieth Century British History, 15:4 (2004): 388-409; Jack McGowan, ‘‘Dispute,’ ‘Battle,’ ‘Siege,’ ‘Farce’ – Grunwick 30 Years On,’ Contemporary British History, 22:3 (2008): 383-406; Jim Phillips, ‘The 1972 Miners Strike: Popular Agency and Industrial Politics in Britain,’ Contemporary British History, 20:2 (2006): 187-207; Jim Phillips, ‘Workplace Conflict and the Origins of the 1984-5 Miners’ Strike in Scotland,’ Twentieth Century British History, 20:2 (2009): 152-172 27 Lucy Robinson, ‘Three Revolutionary Years: the Impact of the Counter-Culture on the Development of the Gay Liberation Movement in Britain, Cultural and Social History, 3 (2006), 445-471; Jeska Rees, ‘‘Are you a Lesbian?’ Challenges in Recording and Analysing the Women’s Liberation Movement in England,’ History Workshop Journal, 69:1 (2010): 177-187; Cook, Matt, ‘“Gay Times” Locality, Identity, Memory in the Brixton Squats in 1970s London, Twentieth Century British History, 23:2 (2012): 84-109; Eve Setch, ‘The Face of Metropolitan Feminism: the London Women’s Liberation Workshop, 1969-79,’ Twentieth Century British History, 13:2 (2002): 171-190; Sarah Browne, ‘‘A Veritable Hotbed of Feminism’: Women’s Liberation in St. Andrew’s, Scotland, c.1969-79,’ Twentieth Century British History, 23:1 (2012): 100-123; Matthew Waites, ‘Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual NGOs in Britain: Past Present and Future,’ in Crowson, NGOs in Contemporary Britain; Jane Campbell, Mike Oliver, Disability Politics: Understanding Our Past, Changing Our Future (London 1996); Meaghan Kowalsky, Disability and British Social Policy Since 1750: A History of Exclusion (Basingstoke, 2003) 
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The gay rights movement continues to make legislative progress and feminism has enjoyed 
a renaissance in the last decade.28 This has motivated several historians to explore the 
antecedents of contemporary political concerns. Several recent studies have used historical 
analysis to contextualise present day politics.29 By contrast, community action is a less 
obvious candidate for the history of the present day. There are numerous parallels to be 
drawn between contemporary concerns and the issues raised by community activists in the 
long 1970s, but they are not as well understood. The history of community action also helps 
us to understand the origin of contemporary political culture and aspects of public policy.  
 
Fourth, historians of political radicalism and developments in political thought since 1945 
have tended to favour organisations and individuals with a clear ideology. The political Left 
looms large in this historiography: there is an extensive body of work on the New Left, 
British Communism and the multitude of non-aligned left groups that flourished in the 
1960s and 1970s – socialists, communists, Trotskyites and libertarians.30 There is a 
burgeoning historiography of the New Right, too, which traces the rise of neo-liberal 
thought and its impact on public policy.31 Labour Party history remains popular, as we saw 
above. The history of the Conservative Party and conservatism is an expanding field.32 Post-
war Liberalism is beginning to attract attention and, as we saw above, new ideologies like 
feminism and environmentalism have received extensive treatment.33 Community action 
was intellectually heterogeneous and the ideas that animated community action do not map 
onto the standard matrices of political ideology. Community action was not associated with 
                                                          28 Kate Banyard, The Equality Illusion: The Truth about Women and Men Today (London, 2011); Laura Bates, Everyday Sexism (London, 2014) 29 Janet Clark, ‘Sincere and Reasonable Men? The Origins of the National Council for Civil Liberties,’ Twentieth Century British History, 20:4 (2009): 513-537 30 Celia Hughes, ‘Young Socialist Men in 1960s Britain: Subjectivity and Sociability,’ History Workshop Journal, 73:1 (2012): 170-192; Madeleine Davis, ‘Arguing Affluence: New Left Contributions to Socialist Debate, 1957-63,’ Twentieth Century British History, 496-528 (2012): 496-528; Alistair Reid, ‘The dialectics of liberation: the Old Left, the New Left and the counter-culture,’ in David Feldman and John Lawrence, Structures and Transformations in Modern British History (Cambridge, 2011); Scott Hamilton, The Crisis of Theory: EP Thompson, the New Left and Postwar British Politics (Manchester, 2011); Kevin Morgan, Gidon Cohen and Andrew Flinn, Communists in British Society 1920-1991 (London, 2007); Keith Laybourn, Marxism in Britain: Dissent, Decline and Re-emergence, 1945-c.2000 (Oxford, 2006); John Callaghan, Cold War, Crisis and Conflict: The CPGB 1951-68 (London, 2003)  31 Noel Thompson, ‘Hollowing out the State: Public Choice Theory and the Critique of Keynesian Social Democracy,’ Contemporary British History, 22:3 (2008): 355-382; Ben Jackson, ‘At the Origins of Neo-Liberalism: the Free Economy and the Strong State, 1930-1947,’ Historical Journal, 53:1 (2010): 129-151; Ben Jackson, ‘An Ideology of Class: Neo-Liberalism and the Trade Unions, 1930-79,’ in Clare Griffiths, James Knott and William Whyte, Classes, Culture and Politics: Essays on British History for Ross McKibbin (Oxford, 2011): 263-281; Mark Pitchford, The Conservative Party and the Extreme Right, 1945-75 (Manchester, 2011)  32 Tim Bale, The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Cameron (London, 2011); Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders, ed., Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge, 2013) 33 Tudor Jones, The Revival of British Liberalism from Grimmond to Clegg (Basingstoke, 2011) 
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a canon of theory or any individual theorists. Community activists were pluralists and 
pragmatists. Their ideas were purposefully elastic and few community activists elaborated a 
political philosophy. The history of community action complicates our understanding of the 
ideas that drove activism in this period.  
 
Fifth, there is an emerging historiography of the new generation of voluntary organisations 
that rose to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s, but this too has overlooked community 
action. This body of work has covered organisations like Shelter, Greenpeace, Release, 
Gingerbread and the Child Poverty Action Group.34 These organisations framed the national 
discourse on social issues and pioneered new forms of service provision. This literature 
nuances the traditional historiography on the welfare state by emphasising the role of non-
governmental organisations in the provision of welfare in the post war period.35 It 
emphasises the links between political activism and alternative service provision in the 
1960s and 1970s. There were close links between the new voluntary organisations and 
community action groups, but the latter have so far been omitted from this story. The 
tendency to focus on bodies that remain active in the present day has militated against the 
inclusion of community action groups in these histories. Community action groups were 
often short-lived and their long term impact on public policy is less obvious. As grassroots 
organisations, the records of community action groups tend not to appear in archives of 
NGOs.36 Community activists made interventions into service provision that nuance our 
understanding of non-state actors. 
 
2. Foundations for the study of community action 
 
This thesis explores a form of political activism which occupies a smaller space in the 
shared national memory of the period and one that is missing from academic histories. It 
covers new historiographical terrain, but it does not travel in entirely unchartered waters. In 
introducing community action to narratives of British politics since 1945, the thesis will 
follow the precedent set by Curtis and Sanderson who studied examples of political 
                                                          34 Christopher Rootes, ‘Environmental NGOs and the Environmental Movement in Britain,’ in Crowson et al, NGOs in Contemporary Britain; T. Evans, ‘Stopping the Poor Getting Poorer: the Establishment and Professionalisation of Poverty NGOs 1945-95’ in Crowson et al., NGOs in Contemporary Britain; Alex Mold, ‘“The Welfare Branch of the Alternative Society?” The work of the Drug Voluntary Organisation Release, 1967-78,’ Twentieth Century British History, 17:1 (2006): 50-73 35 Katherine Bradley, Poverty, Philanthropy and the State: Charities and the Working Class in London, 1918-1979 (Manchester, 2009); Matthew Hilton and James McKay, Ages of Voluntarism – How we got to the Big Society (Oxford, 2011) 36 Database of Archives of Non-Governmental Organisations (DANGO), University of Birmingham, http://www.dango.bham.ac.uk/, accessed 11 June 2012  
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activism and ‘social innovation’ in the 1960s that were previously overlooked.37 Their 
collection covers organisations like Centrepoint, the Pre-School Playgroup Association and 
the North Kensington Law Centre. These organisations, which had links to community 
action groups and used similar methods, were often moderate, consensual and self-
consciously ‘non-political’ in the sense that did not choose to affiliate to political parties or 
align themselves with particular ideologies. These attributes make them no less worthy as 
subjects for the political historian. Building on this theme, the thesis follows Hilton and 
McKay’s call for historians to adopt a ‘broader notion of the political,’ one that extends 
beyond party politics and government to encompass ‘all those seeking to influence society 
in some way.’38 Individual community action groups had little direct contact with 
Parliament or government ministers, but in providing alternative forms of service provision, 
challenging the status quo and agitating for more resources for housing, education, transport 
and children’s play, they were significant political actors and their activities at a grassroots 
level filtered up to national policy making. At the neighbourhood level, community action 
groups easily rivalled the political party as a focus for the political activity. In developing 
this argument, the thesis is informed by Hilton’s notion of ‘ordinary politics.’39 For Hilton, 
the bulk of political activity in the post war period took place in ‘ordinary’ organisations, 
not the more militant, radical or confrontational groups that loom large in historiography 
and national memory. Community action groups mobilised those who were not overtly or 
self-consciously “political.” Like the more famous social movements, community action 
politicised areas of everyday life, which had lain beyond the realm of party politics. 
Although existing historiography does not explore community action directly, the wider 
themes and critical issues it addresses are pertinent to the study of community action. The 
thesis contributes to the body of work that stresses the significance of the civil society, the 
voluntary sector and NGOs in the post war period.40 Despite the development of the welfare 
state in the post-war decades, non-statutory bodies remained major service providers and 
civil society remained vibrant. As McKay has argued, the voluntary sector became a ‘major 
                                                          37 Helene Curtis and Mimi Sanderson, The Unsung Sixties: Memoirs of Social Innovation (London, 2004). See also: Pat Thane, ‘The ‘Big State’ versus the ‘Big Society’ in twentieth-century Britain,’ in Chris Williams and Andrew Edwards (eds.) The Art of the Possible: Politics and governance in modern British history, 1985-1997: Essays in memory of Duncan Tanner (Manchester, 2015): 32-44 38 Matthew Hilton and James McKay, ‘Introduction,’ in Crowson, et al, NGOS in Contemporary Britain, 9 39 ibid 40 Nicholas Deakin, ‘The perils of partnership: The voluntary sector and the state, 1945-1992,’ in Justin Davis Smith, Rodney Hedley and Colin Rochester, An Introduction to the Voluntary Sector (London, 1995). See also: Curtis and Sanderson, The Unsung Sixties; Crowson et al, NGOs in Contemporary Britain; Melanie Oppenheimer and Nicholas Deakin, ed., Beveridge and Voluntary Action in Britain and the Wider British World (Manchester, 2011)  
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player in British politics’ by developing ‘new forms of social welfare.’41 This thesis applies 
this argument to the neighbourhood level where community groups helped to run 
community services. The thesis draws on Mold’s argument that the innovative voluntary 
organisations of this period were characterised by ‘a continuous interplay between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ politics.’42 Community action campaigns bridged the gap between older political 
issues like the distribution of wealth and new concerns such as community and the 
environment. 
 
A wide range of historical literature has discussed the complex and evolving relationship 
between the state and the voluntary or non-statutory sector. Rowbotham has observed in the 
‘do-it-yourself-politics’ of the period engaged in ‘innovation against the state’ while 
recognising that ‘people need the state – or…the resources, skills and protection which are 
tucked away in bits of the state.’43 Through her work on Release, Mold has shown that 
campaigning charities were able to challenge government policy while working with it to 
provide a service.44 Community action groups also performed this dual function. Deakin 
contends that the state’s tolerance for radical voluntary organisations, and its willingness to 
fund them, waned in the 1980s when grant-aided bodies were penalised for criticising the 
government.45 The thesis investigates the way in which the changing relationship between 
the state and civil society influenced the fortunes of community action groups. 
 
Crowson, Hilton and McKay’s extensive body of work on non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) which emerged from the Database of Archives of NGOs (DANGO) project at the 
University of Birmingham has invigorated the study of socio-political activism and 
provided historians with a wealth of source material.46 The term NGO is defined by these 
historians as those ‘bodies seeking or exerting socio-political influence, while belonging to 
neither the government nor business sectors,’ which provide a bridge between the state and 
                                                          41 McKay, ‘Voluntary Politics,’ in Oppenheimer and Deakin, Beveridge and Voluntary Action, 89 42 Mold, ‘The Welfare Branch of the Alternative Society?’, Alex Mold and Virginia Berridge, Voluntary Action and Illegal Drugs: Health and Society in Britain (Basingstoke, 2010): 53 43 Sheila Rowbotham, ‘Introduction,’ in Curtis and Henserson, Unsung Sixties, xii 44 Mold, ‘The Welfare Branch of the Alternative Society?’ 45 Deakin, ‘The perils of partnership,’ in Davis Smith et al. An Introduction to the Voluntary Sector. For a more recent articles on this subject see: Nick Crowson, ‘Introduction: the Voluntary Sector in 1980s Britain,’ Contemporary British History, 26:1 (2012): 491-498; J. McKay, ‘Voluntary Politics: the Sector’s Political Function from Beveridge to Deakin,’ in Oppenheimer and Deakin, Beveridge and Voluntary Action and Georgina Brewis and Anjelica Finnegan, ‘Volunteering England,’ Contemporary British History, 26:1 (2012). 46 James McKay and Jean Francois Mouhot, DANGO: Database of Archives of UK Non-Governmental Organisations since 1945,’ Contemporary British History 21:4 (2007); Crowson, et al, NGOs in Contemporary Britain (2009); N. Crowson and M Hilton, The Politics of Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern Britain (Oxford, 2012); Matthew Hilton, Nick Crowson, James McKay and Jean Francois Mouhot, A Historical Guide to NGOs: Charities, Civil Society and the Voluntary Sector Since 1945 (Oxford, 2012).  
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society. 47 They distinguish NGOs, which are ‘socio-political actors,’ from more politically 
passive voluntary sector bodies.48 Hilton and McKay have claimed that in the post-war era 
‘the essence of voluntary sector power developed from being primarily applied to primarily 
discursive’ as organisations shifted from providing services to conceptualising problems 
and proposing new solutions.49 This argument overlooks the fact that voluntary 
organisations, including community action groups, remained important service providers, as 
we discussed above. Nonetheless, this emphasis on discursive function of NGOs helps us to 
understand a key function of non-state actors. The thesis explores how community action 
groups sought to change social attitudes and re-frame public policy problems. A broader 
limitation of the NGO approach is that these historians have based their research around 
organisational archives rather than tracing the broader, but perhaps more elusive, networks 
of activism.50 Another omission in the work of the Birmingham group is that these 
historians have not applied their insights to the community level: their focus so far has been 
on national or transnational NGOs. To study more ephemeral, less clearly constituted 
grassroots organisations historians must go beyond an institutional approach. This thesis 
focuses on the people, networks and groups that constituted community action. 
Organisations are a key part of this story, but this thesis is not a study of particular 
organisations or institutions. It is a study of a form of political activism. The approach taken 
in this thesis is closer to the methodology adopted by the ‘Around 1968’ project at the 
University of Oxford, which was structured around ‘activists, networks and trajectories,’ 
rather than formal institutions.51 
  
In seeking to explain the rise of new forms of political activism, historians have drawn on 
insights from social and economic history. Offer has argued that the producer identity of the 
working class was eroded in the post-war period as citizens were recast as consumers.52 
Political historians have taken a more positive approach to the rise of consumerism and 
related political activism to the emergence of several consumer identities in the post war 
                                                          47 Hilton and McKay, ‘Introduction,’ in Crowson, NGOs in Contemporary Britain, 4 48 ibid 49 Hilton and McKay, ‘Introduction,’ in Crowson, NGOs in Contemporary Britain, 10 50 DANGO, Birmingham 51 ‘Around 1968: Activism, Networks, Trajectories,’ accessed 14 June 2012, https://around1968.modhist.ox.ac.uk 52 Avner Offer, ‘British Manual Workers: From Producers to Consumers, C. 1950-2000’, Contemporary British History, 22 (2008), 537-571  
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period.53 Daunton and Hilton have explored the rise of ‘a more politically involved 
consumer activism.’ 54 For Shapely, consumer consciousness applied not only to goods and 
services consumed in the commercial marketplace, but also to public services in the welfare 
state, such as housing, education, healthcare and social security.55 He argues that tenants 
increasingly saw themselves as consumers of public housing with entitlements and when 
problems emerged they challenged public authorities for failing to guarantee their rights. 
Echoing Shapely, Hilton has argued the growth of consumer consciousness is linked to the 
welfare state, which challenged paternalistic, hierarchical social attitudes.56 For these 
scholars, consumerism was the key discourse through which discontent with services was 
expressed and the rise of a consumer consciousness was a key driver of activism. Consumer 
rhetoric did sometimes feature in community action campaigns and community activism 
was associated with the decline of deferential attitudes to public office holders. However, 
community action does not fit neatly into the framework of consumer politics and the 
consumer model does not provide a complete explanation for its development. Community 
action groups drew on a range of other discourses and they did not always see themselves as 
consumers. Community activists did not simply want to consume improved public services: 
they wanted to participate in the policy-making process and in the management of services.  
Although community action has not been studied systematically, this thesis will build upon 
the work of a small number of historians who have examined community action in passing 
as part of research into related issues in post-war British history. This literature includes 
Brewis’s study of the organisation Student Community Action; Davis’s work on the politics 
of the Greater London Development Plan; Shapely’s study of tenant activism in 
Manchester; Hanna’s work on urban preservationism and housing activism in Dublin; 
Jones’s research on slum clearance and working-class community publishing in Brighton; 
and Holmes’s study of the Notting Hill Housing Trust.57 These varied works underline the 
                                                          53 Matthew Hilton, Prosperity for all: Consumer Activity in an Age of Globalisation (Cornell, 2009); Martin Daunton and Matthew Hilton, ed., The Politics of Consumption: Material Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America (Oxford, 2001) 54 Daunton and Hilton, ‘Introduction,’ in The Politics of Consumption, 5 55 Shapely, Politics of Housing, 14-16 56 Matthew Hilton, ‘The Birmingham Consumer’s Group and Affluent Britain, in Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton (eds.), An Affluent Society? Britain’s Golden Age Re-visited (Aldershot, 2004): 167-184  57 Georgina Brewis, ‘From Service to Action: Students, volunteering and community action in mid-twentieth century Britain,’ British Journal of Educational Studies, 58:4 (2010): 439-449; Georgina Brewis, ‘Youth in action? British young people and voluntary service: 1958-1970,’ in Oppenheimer and Deakin, Beveridge and Voluntary Action, 94-118; John Davis, ‘‘Simple Solutions to Complex Problems’: the Greater London Council and the Greater London Development Plan, 1965-1973,’ in Jose Harris, Civil Society in British History: Ideas, Identities and Institutions (Oxford, 2003); Peter Shapely, The Politics of Housing; Erika Hanna, Modern Dublin: Urban Change and the Irish Past, 1957-1973 (Oxford, 2013); Ben Jones, ‘The Uses of Nostalgia: Autobiography, Community Publishing and Working-Class Neighbourhoods in Brighton,’ Cultural and Social History, 7 (2009): 355-374; Chris Holmes, The Other Notting Hill (London, 2005) 
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importance of this topic in three ways. First, community action was a key component of the 
new political activism that emerged in the 1960s. Second, the impact of community action 
upon the state, public services and civil society was far-reaching. Third, studies of political 
parties, governments, trade unions and national pressure groups do not provide a complete 
picture of Britain’s recent political history. The thesis will use the insights offered by these 
historians to answer the key critical questions.  
 
Recent scholarship has emphasised the spatial context to political activism in late twentieth 
century Britain. Historians have shown that political activists of various kinds were 
influenced by the way cities were changing in the post-war period and they sought to alter 
that process of change.58 Most of the issues that concerned community activists had a strong 
spatial component, such as housing and planning. Community activists explicitly questioned 
the way cities were governed and they sought to increase levels of citizen participation in 
urban government.59 Several historians have investigated political activism and its social 
context through urban case studies. Carter studied the relationship between race, class and 
social housing in the London Borough of Southwark.60 Hanna explored the growth of the 
urban conservation movement by focusing on Dublin and Wetherell investigated social 
change and working-class culture in a case study of Tower Hamlets.61 These historians do 
not only examine the specificity of their chosen locality: they also use their case studies to 
illuminate wider changes in a level of detail that would be impossible in a more general 
national survey. Carter argues that local case studies can provide a more meaningful 
account of how Britain was governed and how policies were implemented and experienced, 
beyond party politics at Westminster.62 This thesis will use Leeds as a case study to answer 
its key critical questions, an approach we will explore in more depth below. Following 
Hanna, the thesis will pay particular attention to the detail of built environment, planning 
and housing as these were key drivers of community action. It will explore the ideas 
articulated by community activists about how cities should function and what urban life 
should look like.  
 
                                                          58 Hanna, Modern Dublin 59 Shapely, The Politics of Housing Power, 16 60 Harold Carter, ‘Building the Divided City: Race, Class and Social Housing in Southwark, 1945–1995’, The London Journal, 33 (2008), 155-185; Erika Hanna, ‘Dublin’s North Inner City, Preservationism and Irish Modernity in the 1960s’, The Historical Journal, 53 (2010), 1015-1035 61 Erika Hanna, ‘Dublin’s North Inner City, Preservationism and Irish Modernity in the 1960s’, The Historical Journal, 53 (2010), 1015-1035; Sam Wetherell, ‘Painting the Crisis: Community Arts and the Search for the ‘Ordinary’ in 1970s and ‘80s London,’ History Workshop Journal, 76:1 (2013): 235-249 62 Carter, ‘Building the Divided City,’ 181 
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3. Towards a history of community action 
 
This thesis is more than a work of recovery. It seeks to make community action intelligible 
and to situate it within the political history of this period. As we have explored above, this 
period was characterised by the emergence and expansion of new social movements, such 
as environmentalism, consumerism, feminism and gay rights, and the evolution of older 
movements, like the labour movement and the peace movement. The wave of new 
voluntary organisations, pressure groups and NGOs were closely connected to the social 
movements and part of the new politics. The core function of this thesis is to assess whether 
community action amounted to a new movement, as Hain and many of his contemporaries 
claimed. Were they right to place it in this category? The literature on political and social 
movements is extensive.63 This thesis does not seek to interrogate or contribute to 
movement theory. It uses this body of work to isolate the core features of a movement in 
order to assess whether community action was a movement. According to this literature, 
activists in a movement subscribe to a coherent set of ideas about the world and how it 
needed to change. They peruse a set of broad goals that transcend the objectives of any 
individual campaign or single group. The members of a movement possess a shared sense 
of identity and they are aware that they are part of a movement. A movement might be 
composed of multiple organisations but they all work towards shared goals. In other words, 
inter-organisational networks are a key part of a movement. Activists and organisations are 
connected at the local, regional, national and even the transnational level. These networks 
are used to communicate information and to organise joint action. The key question for this 
thesis, then, is: did community action meet these criteria?  
 
Since this is the first dedicated study of community action, the thesis must perform two 
basic functions before it can answer this question. First, it must describe community action. 
Second, it needs to explain the progress of community action in Leeds between 1960 and 
1990. The first critical question it must answer is a simple one: what was community 
action? To describe the nature of community action, the project will tackle three subordinate 
questions. First, what ideas and objectives animated community action? Second, who 
participated in community action? Third, how did community action groups try to achieve 
their goals? These questions are closely connected to a fourth question, the answer to which 
will help to place community action in context: what was the relationship between 
                                                          63 Lent, British Social Movements; Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts (Chichester, 2009); Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements: an introduction (Oxford, 2006); Robin Cohen and Shirin Rai, ed., Global social movements (London, 2000) 
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community action and other growing movements and older political organisations? By 
engaging with these critical issues, the thesis furthers our understanding of the new forms of 
political activism that developed in Britain at the local level in a period that witnessed the 
rise of new ways of engaging with the political process and a transformation of political 
culture.  
 
The second basic goal of this project is to account for changing fortunes of community 
action over this period. To do this, the project will engage with four related questions. First, 
what explains the rise of community action in Leeds in the late 1960s? Second, what 
influence did community action exert on public policy and urban change? Third, how did 
community action evolve over this period in response to challenges and opportunities? 
Fourth, did community action decline over the 1980s? In answering these questions, the 
project will contribute to our understanding of the ebb and flow of political activism in the 
second half of the twentieth century. The project will shed light on the changing 
relationship between the state and its citizens and the changing role of non-state actors in 
British society. The underlying question of whether community action amounted to a 
movement can only be tackled once the critical issues outlined above have been 
investigated. 
 
In order to address these questions, we must define some key terms, explain the choice of 
period and examine how the thesis will approach community action. The term ‘community 
action’ originated in the United States in the early twentieth century. It was used to describe 
grassroots activism by people living in the same neighbourhood, though it was used less 
often than the closely related term community organising. The latter implied a particular 
approach to neighbourhood politics elaborated by influential activists like Saul Alinksy.64 In 
the 1960s, the term community action was popularised by the Community Action 
Programme, part of the federal government’s War on Poverty.65 The term was transmitted 
to Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s.66 It is likely that British community activists 
and scholars who had studied activism and public policy in America helped to disseminate 
                                                          64 Robert Slayton, Back of the Yards: The Making of a Local Democracy (1986); Neil Betten and Michael Austin, The Roots of Community Organizing, 1917-1939 (Philadelphia, 1990) 65 Edward James, America Against Poverty (London, 1970); Kenneth Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, A Relevant War on Poverty: A Study of Community Action Programmes and Observable Social Change (1968, 1969) 66 The Anne Lapping collection in 1970 is an early example of British activists from varied backgrounds in different cities discussing their work under the heading community action. 
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the term in the UK.67 As we shall discuss below, the relationship between British and 
American community action deserves further research.  
 
The thesis adopts a broad definition of community action, which incorporates a range of 
political actors, organisations and issues. This definition is partly based on negative 
assertions of what community action was not. Community action took place outside the 
workplace. Unlike trade unionists, community activists were not directly involved in labour 
struggles, but this did not preclude joint organising between community and labour 
activists. Community activists did not in general engage directly with electoral politics. 
Unlike political parties, community action was not located in or focused on elected 
institutions. The term community action is used to denote the way in which groups of 
people organised in their neighbourhoods to influence public policy and the process of 
urban change. These individuals are referred to as community activists. The definition is 
applied regardless of whether people self-consciously identified as community activists. It 
incorporates organisations – such as tenants associations or community associations – that 
may have chosen different labels.  
 
The ‘community’ in community action is defined as the physical neighbourhoods where 
people lived, worked, used services and socialised. These communities did not necessarily 
have fixed edges. Instead, community denotes the place with which people identified or 
over which they felt a sense of common ownership. The geographical boundaries of 
communities were malleable but community was used by activists to describe tangible 
places, composed of houses, shops, streets, playgrounds, public buildings and schools. The 
‘community’ in community action is derived from community activists’ intimate 
connections to particular places and spaces and the people living in them. Consequently, the 
term ‘community’ does not extend to mere communities of interest or communities based 
on forms of identity because such communities, by definition, transcended place. Even so, 
activists who engaged in identity politics often also participated in community action. The 
‘action’ in community action describes the fact that community activists sought to affect 
change by actively engaging with the political process beyond the electoral cycle. 
Community activists protested and campaigned; they lobbied and negotiated with decision 
makers. They sought to educate the general public and mobilise support for their cause. 
Motivated by an ethos of mutual aid or community self-help, community activists sought to 
                                                          67 For a discussion of the relevance of the American experience to Britain, see: Pru Chamberlayne, ‘Community Action in the United States,’ Community Action, No. 10, Sept-Oct 1973, 32-33 
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put their values into action by running their own services and institutions, participating 
directly in the creation of the society they wanted to see.  
There was disagreement among community activists in Britain about the meaning of 
community action: should the term be confined to only particular types of activism and how 
should it be distinguished from community work or community organising?68 The thesis 
will treat the terms community organising and community action as interchangeable, unless 
it specifies otherwise. This ignores the particular nuances that each term carried in different 
political and geographical contexts, but for most community activists in Britain in this 
period the two terms had near identical connotations. The thesis distinguishes between 
community action and community work: the former is a type of activism, while the latter 
refers to a professional discipline connected to social work.  
 
The thesis opens just prior to the dawn of community action to examine shifts in public 
policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s that set the scene for community action. The main 
analysis begins in the late 1960s when the first community action groups emerged in Leeds. 
The core focus of the thesis is the long 1970s, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, when 
community action flourished in the city. The thesis examines the evolution in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, before investigating its decline and eventual demise in the mid- to late 
1980s. This thirty year period bridges the two major political epochs in Britain since 1945: 
the post-war consensus and the Thatcherite consensus. These decades witnessed the 
country’s transition from a mixed economy with a large manufacturing base and a 
collectivist welfare state to a largely post-industrial economy governed according to the 
principles of the market and individualism. The thesis straddles these eras in order and 
shows how community action was shaped by this transition. The rise of community action 
was linked to the crisis of the post-war consensus and its decline is connected to the triumph 
of Thatcherism. This periodisation is informed by Adam Lent, an historian of social 
movements, who argues that there was a ‘long period of mobilisation, stretching from 1958 
to the mid-1980s’ during which new social movements shared people, networks, ideals, 
organisational forms and political strategies.69 Whether or not it was a movement, this thesis 
will argue that community action was part of this ‘great mobilisation.’ 
 
                                                          68  David Thomas, The Making of Community Work, 117-139; Cowley, Community or Class, 185-188; Community Action, No. 10, Sept-Oct 1973, 27-29 69 Adam Lent, British Social Movements Since 1945 Sex, Colour, Peace and Power (Basingstoke, 2001) , 5, 162, 167 
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Leeds is a fitting case study not only because the city hosted a wealth of community action 
in this period, but because a substantial body of source material on community action in 
Leeds survives. Since community action was a grassroots phenomenon focused on 
geographically specific issues and areas, it is logical to analyse it through a single city case 
study. Leeds is representative of other large British cities that dominated a wider 
conurbation, particularly those in the Midlands, the North of England and Scotland, which 
shared a similar urban structure, economic base and social composition. In cities like Leeds, 
Manchester, Newcastle, Glasgow and Nottingham, community action emerged in a similar 
political climate and engaged with similar public policies. As the pre-eminent metropolis in 
Britain and a key incubator of political activism, London hosted more community action 
groups than any other city. London would certainly offer fertile ground for the historian of 
community action, but London already looms large in historiography on twentieth century 
Britain, particularly in histories of political radicalism and urban change. In focusing on a 
provincial British city, the thesis joins a burgeoning group of historians who are looking 
beyond London to investigate twentieth century British history.70 The thesis is not a history 
of community action in urban Britain as a whole, but at crucial points it seeks to show how 
community action in Leeds mirrored community action elsewhere. To do this, it draws on 
national publication and primary sources on community action in other cities, particularly 
London and Nottingham. It is possible to extrapolate from this study of community action 
in Leeds to make a number of tentative generalisations about the history of British 
community action, but such points must be be corroborated with further research on other 
towns and cities. Finally, while this thesis is not a history of Leeds, it nonetheless 
contributes to our understanding of the specificity, or otherwise, of Leeds history in years 
since 1945. In doing so, the thesis fills a gap in the historiography on Leeds, which is 
largely centred on the Victorian city and the early twentieth century.71  
 
The main reason why community action has received so little attention from professional 
historians is that researching community action is methodologically challenging. The source 
base for community action is scattered and incomplete. As grassroots organisations with 
few formal structures, community action groups generated few of their own records. Unlike 
                                                          70 Daisy Payling, ‘‘Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire’: Grassroots Activism and Left-wing solidarity in 1980s Sheffield,’ Twentieth Century British History, 25:4 (2014), 602-627; Peter Shapely, ‘‘Tenants arise’: Consumerism, tenants and the challenge to council authority in Manchester,’ Social History, 31:1 (2006), 60-78; Stefan Ramsden, ‘Re-making Working-Class Community: Sociability, Belonging and ‘Affluence’ in a Small Town, 1930-1980, Contemporary British History, 29:1 (2015), 1-26 71 Derek Fraser ed., A History of Modern Leeds (Manchester, 1980); M. Beresford, East End, West End: Leeds During the Face of Urbanisation (Leeds, 1988); Stephen Burt and Kevin Grady, An Illustrated History of Leeds (Derby, 2002); F. Trowell, ‘Speculative Housing Development in the Suburb of Headingley, Leeds, 1838-1914, Publications of the Thoresby Society LIX (1985) 
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political parties or national pressure groups, community action groups did not possess the 
bureaucratic structures that produced and retained large quantities of formal documentation 
such as membership records, formal meeting minutes, annual reports and records of 
correspondence. Many of the written records that were produced have been lost since. Since 
many action groups were short-lived, they did not develop a sense of their own historical 
significance. Many community activists did not consider their work sufficiently important 
to warrant depositing their records in archives. Unlike established organisations, many 
community activists were unaware that they could formally deposit records with public 
bodies, while others associated archives and libraries with the local state against which they 
had campaigned. An additional deterrent to depositing records was the fact that there were 
few specialised archival organisations available to community activists in the region in the 
1970s and 1980s.  
 
For the records that survive, several contingent events had to occur. Crucially, a group had 
to produce written records in the first place and someone in the group needed to take 
responsibility for ensuring they were stored safety. Since community action groups engaged 
with a wide range of policy areas, the records that survived are stored in a range of 
institutions and their records are rarely filed under the heading ‘community action.’ Primary 
sources are therefore difficult to identify. They are found among collections relating to 
diverse subjects, from housing and local government to volunteering and childcare. It is 
often necessary to have detailed pre-existing knowledge of particular action groups, 
campaigns, individuals or neighbourhoods in order to locate community action records, 
which is another reason why the topic lends itself to a single city case study. A large 
proportion of community action records were never deposited but survive in the homes of 
community activists or in the institutional archives of active organisations. In order to 
research community action, it is necessary to make personal contact with community 
activists, community groups and NGOs.  
 
This thesis is based on sources drawn from a diverse range of institutions and private 
locations. It draws upon the surviving sources produced by community activists stored in 
public archives, local authority and university libraries, the archives of NGOs and the 
homes of community activists and retired professionals. Here, notwithstanding the problems 
outlined above, it is possible to find minutes of meetings, newsletters, research reports, 
campaigning literature, diaries, news clippings and letters. To compensate for the dearth of 
surviving material produced by community activists, the thesis investigates community 
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action through its contact with external organisations. The thesis uses documents generated 
by local and central government, voluntary organisations, political parties and pressure 
groups. The local and national press is another key source of data on community action. 
Mainstream newspapers covered community action, though less frequently and in less depth 
than the alternative or underground press.72 Journalists working for The Other Paper and 
Leeds Other Paper actively investigated community action groups and their reports are a 
major repository of data on community action. Community Action journal performed a 
similar function for community action across Britain. Interviews conducted by the author 
with community activists between 2009 and 2014 fill gaps in the written source base and 
provide a unique perspective on community action.  
 
The thesis draws on studies of community action written in the long 1970s, some of which 
we referred to above. This literature is a valuable source of information about community 
action, either because the original documents the authors consulted are lost or because the 
events they describe were never recorded elsewhere. Such texts blur the boundary between 
primary and secondary source material. There are obvious dangers in depending on second-
hand accounts of community action produced by participants writing immediately after the 
events. Although many purport to analyse and evaluate community action from an 
ostensibly detached standpoint, this was rarely the case. Many authors were either writing 
as promoters of community action or seeking to make a particular didactic point about the 
lessons that could be learned from their study. For these reasons – and because few of these 
texts cover Leeds – the thesis does not make heavy use of them. There is a need for a 
cultural or intellectual history of how contemporaries understood community action and the 
debates that took place about the relationship between community action and other forms of 
activism, but this is not the purpose of this thesis. 
 
4. Structure 
 
The thesis is divided into four chapters, each of which uses a particular aspect of 
community action in Leeds to answer the main critical questions in this thesis. Each chapter 
explores a different issue addressed by community activists: council housing (Chapter 1), 
housing renewal (Chapter 2), transport and mobility (Chapter 3), and community services 
(Chapter 4). While this is a useful analytical framework, community action was not divided 
into neat policy silos and the thesis emphasises the links between these different areas. 
                                                          72 Tony Harcup, A Northern Star: Leeds Other Paper and the Alternative Press (London and Pontefract, 1994); Tony Harcup, Alternative Journalism, Alternative Voices (London, 2013): 33-52 
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Chapter 1 is a detailed neighbourhood case study of community action on the Hunslet 
Grange estate in south Leeds where activists campaigned for improved housing conditions 
and increased tenant involvement in managing the estate. This chapter presents the thesis in 
microcosm. It contains a close analysis of the drivers of community action, the people 
involved and their relationship with the local state. It discusses the difficulties activists 
faced and how they sought to overcome them, before exploring why community action on 
the estate faded in the 1980s. Chapter 2 adopts a wider geographical focus, examining the 
growth of community action across inner city Leeds in response to the city’s housing 
renewal policies. The chapter first explores how community activists challenged the 
orthodox approach to housing renewal before investigating how and why community 
activists pioneered alternative forms of housing renewal. This chapter pays particular 
attention to the backgrounds of community activists and the ideas that animated community 
action. It also discusses the rise of citywide networks of community activists.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on community action concerned with transport and mobility. The chapter 
examines how the city’s transport strategy was a key driver of community action. It 
discusses community action campaigns over on road-building, pedestrian mobility and 
public transport, analysing the extent to which community activists were able to influence 
transport policy and urban change. It assesses why some community activists had more 
success than others and comments on the ingredients for effective community action. 
Chapter 4 shifts emphasis of the thesis from largely negative campaigns to positive 
community action to show that community action was not always reactionary, but could be 
a creative force. The chapter analyses positive community action in the fields of childcare, 
children’s play, advice and community facilities, looking at how community-led initiatives 
were organised and funded. The second part of the chapter examines how community 
activists built structures and institutions to support community action across the city. It then 
considers why community activists struggled to preserve these achievements in the 1980s.  
 
The conclusion draws together the responses to these key critical questions, before 
underlining the contribution the thesis has made to the fields of late twentieth century 
British history and the history of political activism. It then suggests how further research 
might expand upon the insights offered in this thesis. Finally, the conclusion returns to the 
core goal of the thesis, assessing the view, articulated by Hain and several of his 
contemporaries in the long 1970s, that community action was a movement. 
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Chapter 1 
 
A Community Born of Adversity: Community Action  
on the Hunslet Grange Estate, Leeds, 1967-1987 
 
This chapter will focus on the history of community action over the life of a single council 
estate, Hunslet Grange in Leeds, over a twenty-year period from the construction of the 
estate in the late 1960s to the redevelopment of the site in the mid-1980s. After exploring 
the political and public policy context to the Hunslet Grange estate, the chapter will use this 
case study to illuminate key themes in the history of community action in this period. 
Firstly, it will explore the foundations of community action, discussing how community 
action emerged and developed in the challenging circumstances of the estate. Secondly, it 
will examine what community action sought to achieve and how it pursued these goals. The 
chapter will demonstrate that community action was concerned not only with the material 
problems of the estate but also with urban governance. Thirdly, the chapter will discuss the 
internal and external problems faced by community activists to explain why they often 
struggled to have an impact on local policy makers. Fourthly, the chapter will show how 
community activists sought to overcome these problems. It will examine the local, regional 
and national level alliances forged by community activists on the estate. Fifthly, the chapter 
will show that community activists on Hunslet Grange eventually succeeded in forging a 
closer relationship with the council and the local Labour Party, which increased its 
influence in the early 1980s. It then explains why this partnership of the council and 
community action was ultimately unable to achieve the activists’ broader goals by 
investigating shifts in national policy in the 1980s. 
1. Hunslet Grange and the Re-making of the Inner City 
This section will explore the local and national policy context to the Hunslet Grange estate. 
Community action on the estate was framed by these policies. Hunslet Grange was a 
system-built housing complex of 1,250 dwellings constructed for Leeds City Council 
between 1967 and 1970 in Hunslet, a working-class, industrial district in south east Leeds. 
Hunslet expanded rapidly in the nineteenth century as an engineering and railway centre.1 
The district is best known as the childhood home of Richard Hoggart: the working-class 
                                                          1 Ron Weiner, The Economic Basis of Leeds (Leeds, 1977), 10-13 
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culture of the area in the interwar years was immortalised in his The Uses of Literacy 
(1956). Hunslet remained a major industrial centre in the middle of the twentieth century. 
The urban landscape was characterised by streets of back-to-back housing, high streets of 
small shops, churches, pubs and clubs intermingled with factories, warehouses and railway 
lines [see Figs. 1.1-1.2]. Hoggart’s memories of the area in the 1930s spoke of a place 
where every household was connected to a wider neighbourhood:  
Home may be private, but the front door opens out of the living room on to the street and when you go down the step or use it as a seat on a warm evening you become part of the life of the neighbourhood.2 
Hoggart’s account was published on the eve of a period of momentous change in Hunslet 
during which most of the built environment was redeveloped. 
The Hunslet Grange estate was a product of the mass housing drive of the 1960s.  The 
revival of slum clearance, population growth and an increase in the rate of household 
formation generated an acute need for new urban housing.3 When the private sector failed to 
respond to this need, the task was allocated to local authorities. Governments set ambitious 
house-building targets and, in the spirit of affluence, they set minimum space standards for 
all new council housing.4 However, both parties aimed to progressively reduce the central 
government subsidy for each new council house. This created a policy challenge: councils 
had to build more housing of a higher quality in a short time frame while simultaneously 
reducing the costs per unit. The solution would be industrialised building techniques.5 
Industrialised building, or system building, involved constructing the component parts of a 
structure – walls, floors, service units, living areas – in purpose-built factories and 
assembling them on site to form the structure.6 The technique was depicted by governments 
as a means by which councils could rapidly expand their building programmes while 
minimising labour costs, reducing delays and enabling effective central management and 
supervision of a building project.7 The ministry maintained that ‘40 per cent of public 
sector house building will need to be industrialised by 1970.’ Following government 
guidelines, in 1961 Leeds City Council formed a consortium with Sheffield, Leeds, Hull 
                                                          2 Richard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy (London, 1958), Second Edition, 58 3 Peter Malpass, Housing and the Welfare State: the Development of Housing Policy in Britain (Basingstoke, 2005), 76-100 4 Maplass, Housing and the Welfare State, 93; Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Homes for Today and Tomorrow (HMSO, 1961) 5 David McKay and Andrew C Cox, The Politics of Urban Change (London, 1979), 133; Peter Shapely, The Politics of Housing: Power, Consumers and Urban Culture (Manchester, 2007), 161 6 Keith Ross, ‘Non-traditional housing in the UK – a brief review’ (2002), accessed 17 November 2013, http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/filegrab/pdf_pub_misc_NontradhousingBR.pdf.pdf?ref=3595 7 Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Circular 75/76 in Leeds City Council, Hunslet Grange Estate, Leeds 10 (Leeds, 1982), 1. See also: Patrick Dunleavy, The Politics of Mass Housing: A Study of Corporate Power and Professional Influence in the Welfare State (Oxford, 1981), 107-123 
29  
and Nottingham, the Yorkshire Development Group (YDG) to research and deliver 
industrialised building projects. In 1966, Shepherd Construction of York was awarded the 
contract to design and build estates in all four cities. At 4500 dwellings, this was the biggest 
single building contract in Europe at the time. Shepherd’s design consisted of a series of 
quadrangular blocks, five to seven storeys high, with concrete decks at different levels 
providing access to the flats and maisonettes [see Fig. 1.5-1.6].8  
At a local level, the need for high density urban housing in Hunslet was partly determined 
by the city’s slum clearance programme, which resumed in the late 1950s as we will 
examine in Chapter 2.9 Hunslet was radically re-shaped by the clearance programme: by 
1966, 5182 houses had been cleared in the area—80 per cent of which were demolished 
after 1945.10 The Hunslet Grange site, which was largely cleared in 1964, had contained 
512 back-to-back houses.11 The majority of residents displaced by clearance in Hunslet 
were rehoused on peripheral council estates in south and east Leeds, but as these estates 
sprawled outwards, there was a growing demand for housing in Hunslet. Many households 
wanted to remain closer to central Leeds and to stay near to friends and neighbours.12 High 
density inner city estates like Hunslet Grange catered for this demand and sought to 
moderate the centrifugal effects of earlier rehousing policies. The council intended not only 
to save rural land, but also to revitalise the older parts of the city. The estate was designed to 
accommodate applicants from the city’s growing housing waiting list. The stock of cheap 
private rental housing had hardly been expanded since 1914 and since many private 
landlords were reluctant to modernise their properties council housing presented an 
attractive prospect especially to growing families.  
Hunslet Grange was designed to provide households from older housing with a superior 
standard of living accommodation [see Figs. 1.3-1.4]. The flats had not only indoor toilets 
and bathrooms, they were also equipped with warm air heating units, sound insulation, 
stainless steel sinks, and a built-in drying cabinet.13 Furnishings, doors and window fittings 
were chosen with a view to minimising residents’ ‘outlay on furniture and decoration.’14 
The space standards were generous, exceeding Parker Morris standards by 5 per cent. Laid 
out in quadrangles, the estate was designed to be light, green and open—in sharp contrast to 
                                                          8 ‘Leek Street, Leeds,’ Journal Information Library, The Architect’s Journal, 6 August 1969, 306-8 9 Leeds City Council, Redevelopment: Potential and Priorities (Leeds, 1971) 10 Michael Parkin, ‘Leeds Letter,’ The Guardian, 10 January 1966, 8 11 Yorkshire Development Group, Promotional Booklet, ii, Alison Ravetz Collection 12 Interview with Barbara Hancock (née Craig), Leeds and Southampton, 2014 13 YDG, Promotional Booklet, 7 14 YDG, Promotional Booklet, 7, 14 
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the narrow terraced streets of old Hunslet.15 A high proportion of the site was devoted to 
open space [see Fig. 1.7].16 Each phase of the development was portrayed as a separate 
“village” and the architect claimed that the paintwork was inspired by houses in the 
Yorkshire Dales.17 The estate layout incorporated the latest principles in environmental 
planning, separating pedestrian and vehicular routes in an effort to promote safety.18  
The planning and design of the estate sought to preserve and develop community. The 
Housing Director believed Hunslet had ‘one of the strongest local characters in Leeds,’ a 
facet he wished to preserve.19 Drawing on the lessons of contemporary sociology, the 
council claimed it was learning from the mistakes of earlier rehousing schemes which had 
allegedly broken up communities by scattering them across the city.20 The design 
philosophy was based on the view that the high rise block was inimical to the development 
of community because it removed the traditional street and isolated households from urban 
life. As a medium rise development, Hunslet Grange sought to counter this tendency. 
Following the example of the Park Hill estate in Sheffield, the raised decks were intended to 
function like streets by promoting social interaction between neighbours at different vertical 
levels, functioning as ‘a natural meeting place for young and old alike.’21 The provision of a 
wide variety of dwelling types from one bedroom flats to three bedroom maisonettes would 
enable a ‘socially integrated community’ to form on the estate by accommodating a range of 
different household types.22  
The development of Hunslet Grange was part of the broader re-structuring of urban space in 
Leeds in these years [see Fig. 1.8]. As we shall see in Chapters 2 and 3, this was informed 
as much by economic goals as the drive to raise living standards. Like the rest of the inner 
city, Hunslet was transformed not only by housing clearance, but also by motorway 
building, industrial restructuring and commercial redevelopment. The road network was 
reconfigured and overlaid with new roads. Streets of small shops were replaced by a district 
shopping centre. Public services were centralised in new buildings. Older factories gave 
way to new industrial premises and distribution centres. The residents of Hunslet Grange 
                                                          15 YDG, Promotional Booklet, 18 16 ‘Leeks Street,’ The Architect’s Journal, 308 17 YDG, Promotional Booklet, ii; Alison Ravetz, Meeting with Mr Clegg, 12 November 1968, ALC 18 Ministry of Transport, Traffic in Towns (HMSO, 1963). See also: Simon Gunn, ‘The Buchanan Report, environment and the problem of traffic in 1960s Britain,’ Twentieth Century British History, 22:4 (2011): 521-542 The estate was the setting for a film by the Hunslet Boys Club. See: Hunslet Club, ‘Super Smith! A 1970s Hunslet Boys Club Film,’ YouTube, 4 November 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vI-hFd7pRc0&list=FLxTRMn5EF6v9T0EoJR35jaw&index=3&feature=plpp_video, accessed 7 September 2015 19 Alison Ravetz, Meeting with Housing Director, 20 June 1968, ALC 20 Peter Wilmott and Michael, Young, Family and Kinship in East London (London, 1962) 21 YDG, Promotional Booklet, 4  22 YDG, Promotional Booklet, 4 
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were the inhabitants not only of an innovative housing type but an entirely new urban 
landscape.  
 
The construction of the estate was the product of an almost entirely top-down process of 
policy formulation and implementation. The direct involvement of tenants, workers and 
consumers was not seen to be necessary. It was assumed that residents would be grateful for 
the new housing it offered and supportive of the wider effort to modernise the urban 
landscape. The view that policy makers understood people’s needs,  now and in the future, 
was summed up by one Leeds housing official who claimed that ‘“[i]t would be a waste of 
time…to plan for pigeon keeping or other local peculiarities that may not prove to be 
permanent.”‘23 This was a political culture characterised by paternalism and a commitment 
to expertise.  
The Hunslet Grange estate was conceived as a means of ameliorating the housing shortage, 
modernising the city’s housing stock and improving the living standards of those who were 
rehoused from clearance areas. This was part of a national housing project in which the city 
council was an enthusiastic participant. The form, layout and appearance of the estate were 
unorthodox. The designers of the estate sought to create social spaces through architectural 
innovations that replicated the spirit of the cleared terraces and shopping streets. The 
construction of the estate was part of a wider process of urban renewal that fundamentally 
altered the physical landscape of Hunslet, but the overwhelming majority of the people who 
lived in the new Hunslet had played no part in the process that had produced it. It did not 
take them long to find their voice. 
2. Pillars of community action 
Hunslet Grange was the site of community action almost from its inception. Community 
action on the estate had a set of interlinked foundations that can be organised under five 
headings. This section will discuss each of these pillars of community action in turn, 
emphasising the links between them. The first pillar of community action was the failure of 
the estate to meet the expectations of its tenants in a range of areas. The flats did not raise 
living standards in the way that many tenants had hoped. A high proportion of the flats – at 
least 40 per cent –suffered from damp.24 Damp was caused either by condensation or, in 
                                                          23 Michael Parkin, ‘Leeds Letter,’ The Guardian, 10 January 1966, 8 24 Yorkshire Evening Post, 27 February 1976; Hunslet Grange Heating Action Group, Damp: Hunslet Grange: An Experiment and its Victims (Leeds, 1976): 6 
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more serious causes, rain penetration. 25 These problems arose from defects in the design of 
the estate and mistakes made in the construction phase. Damp was a health hazard for 
tenants, especially children and the elderly. It damaged tenants’ belongings and produced an 
unpleasant, fusty atmosphere in the flats that could not be removed through cleaning. A 
description of the conditions endured by a couple with three children whose flat suffered 
from ‘both penetrating damp and condensation’ reveals the effects of damp:  
Condensation on the widows is so bad that the sills have begun to rot. Wallpaper, covered in black mould, falls away from the walls under the windows. The ceilings are stained where water has penetrated through the blocks. The ceiling paper hangs loose in the hall…the four month old baby has already spent time in hospital with bronchitis.26 
Dampness was one of the key physical problems in the city’s older housing stock, but far 
from eradicating this problem, Hunslet Grange perpetuated it.  
A connected physical problem was the high cost of heating on the estate, which was 
estimated to be the most expensive of any Leeds estate. 27  For structural reasons the flats 
did not retain heat effectively. This was compounded by the highly inefficient warm air 
electric heating system.28 The estate was initially built with a gas central heating system but 
this was converted to electric following the Ronan Point disaster in Newham in 1968 where 
a gas explosion had caused part of a tower block to collapse.29 The heating problem became 
acute in the mid-1970s when the price of electricity rose at a far higher rate than gas 
prices.30  Tenants were unable to switch to gas. For the first quarter of 1976, electricity ‘bills 
of £90 and above’ were common.31 By 1982, many households were paying £200 per 
quarter on electricity.32 Fuel costs absorbed a growing share of tenants’ disposable income, 
pushing many households below the poverty line.33 Low-income households were affected 
disproportionately, with many spending up to 20% of their net disposable income on 
electricity.34 Many tenants fell into debt and a significant minority were disconnected from 
the electricity supply.35 Others suffered health complaints related to low temperatures.36 
                                                          25 HGHAG, Hunslet Grange, 11-12; Yorkshire Development Group Tenants Association, High and Dry: A Unique Action Guide Based on Successful Campaigns by Tenants Against Damp and Defects (London, 1983): 2  26 HGHAG, Hunslet Grange, 6 27 YDGTA, High and Dry, 4; Barbara Craig, Jillian Currey and Paul Richardson, ‘The extra costs of high cost heating’, Roof, October 1976, 127-9 28 LCC, Hunslet Grange, 4  29 LCC, Hunslet Grange, 4 30 LCC, Hunslet Grange Estate, Leeds 10, 1982, 6 31 Craig et al., Roof, 127; Leeds City Council, Verbatim Reports, 14 December 1978, 8-10 32 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 28 April 1982, 2 33 Craig, et al., Roof, 127; LCC, Proceedings, 14 December 1978, 8-10 34 Craig et al, Roof, 127 35 LCC, Proceedings, 23 June 1976, 30 
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The wider built environment of the estate was unpopular among tenants. Aesthetically, it 
was considered deeply unattractive: the dark grey concrete panels were seen to be bleak and 
austere and many tenants likened the estate’s appearance to Alcatraz or the nearby Armley 
Jail.37 Visiting in the late 1970s, Richard Hoggart described the estate as ‘less humane than 
the old back-to-back streets.’38 The raised decks were not, in practice, sociable spaces where 
tenants stopped to talk with each other.39 The public spaces on the estate were afflicted with 
graffiti and vandalism from the beginning.40 Sound carried easily throughout the estate. 
Residents were plagued by the noise of children playing or riding mopeds on the decks. 
This was an acute problem for the residents of flats positioned directly below the decks, 
whose ceilings joined onto the deck above.41  
Although the estate was shorter than many high rise blocks, mothers with young children on 
the upper floors and the single elderly felt ‘isolated’ in their flats.42 Even at this height, it 
was impossible to supervise the play of young children at ground level.43 The windswept 
open spaces between the blocks were considered bleak and uninviting. Piles of demolition 
material were left on the grassed expanses around the blocks and the network of footpaths 
was unkempt.44 Landscaping was perfunctory and there was very little greenery and no 
mature trees. The internal quadrangles were lifeless spaces used only for parking cars; the 
noise of a car engine starting would ‘echo and reverberates’ around the block.45 
Summarising the way many tenants felt about the environment, the Tenants Association 
noted that ‘the overwhelming impression is of dark concrete and grey, drab tones, a 
depressing and menacing atmosphere.’46 
On the estate itself and in the immediate area there were few amenities for shopping or 
recreation. No modern replacement for Hunslet’s cleared shopping streets was provided 
until 1976. Hunslet Grange estate itself had five commercial units but many of these were 
never occupied.47 The estate had only one pub and no community centre or any other social 
or cultural institutions. Facilities for children were limited: the Hunslet Boys Club provided 
a service to local children, but there was no public youth service provision. A day nursery 
                                                                                                                                                                                 36 HGHAG, Hunslet Grange, 7 37 Press Cutting: YEP, 5.5.978, BHC 38 Richard Hoggart, A Local Habitation: Life and Times, Volume 1: 1918-40 (Oxford, 1988): 13 39 YDGAG, High and Dry, 5 40 LCC, Hunslet Grange, 12 41 LCC, Hunslet Grange, 12 42 HGHAG, Hunslet Grange, 4 43 Alison Ravetz, Proposal for a Video on Hunslet Grange, 2 May 1984, 2, ALC 44 HGHAG, Hunslet Grange, 4 45 YDGTA, High and Dry, 5 46 YDGAG, High and Dry, 5 47 HGHAG, Hunslet Grange, 4 
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operated by the Social Services Department provided childcare for a small number of 
parents.48 The result was that many residents had to travel to the city centre to perform 
ordinary tasks.49 Paradoxically, though population densities were relatively high, the area 
lacked the vibrancy that might have been expected in an inner city area. Children and the 
elderly faced boredom and loneliness, respectively, since there were few institutions to cater 
for their specific needs. We shall return to this theme in more depth in Chapter 4.  
 
Resident dissatisfaction was also connected to the more intangible issues of community, 
neighbourliness and belonging. Tenants frequently complained that the estate lacked a sense 
of community. Three years separated the final clearance of back-to-backs on the site 
occupied by Hunslet Grange, so the majority of families who had once lived there had been 
‘scattered’ across Leeds by the time the first flats were let in 1968.50 The dense network of 
social ties that had constituted community in the area had been broken. Whilst many of the 
first families to inhabit the estate came from nearby clearance areas, the majority came from 
further afield, since most households who had been rehoused outside the district either ‘did 
not want to return’ to Hunslet or were deterred by Hunslet Grange.51 Public spaces designed 
to foster community spirit – the raised decks, staircases and open quadrangles – often had 
the reverse effect of driving people into the private sphere of the flats and inhibiting social 
contact. The relative dearth of useful amenities and attractive spaces for socialising meant 
there were few opportunities to meet neighbours on the estate or nearby. 
Perhaps most detrimental of all to the formation of a new community was the fact that the 
material and environmental problems discussed above made the estate extremely unpopular. 
A relatively high proportion of the first tenants were young people who did not intend to 
settle there permanently.52 When electricity conversion work took place on some of the flats 
in 1969, requiring tenants to temporarily vacate their houses, a majority of households never 
returned.53 The turnover rate remained extraordinarily high over the life of the estate as 
residents used the transfer system to move elsewhere. There were 300 changes of tenancy in 
1975.54 Under these conditions, the meaningful and long-term connections between 
residents, upon which a community might have been built, were less likely to grow. As the 
estate’s reputation deteriorated further, the council found it increasingly difficult to fill 
                                                          48 Interview with Hancock 49 Leeds Other Paper, No. 6, July 1974, 4-5 50 Michael Parkin, ‘Leeds Letter’, The Guardian, 10 January 1966, 8 51 Mr Clegg, Estate Office, 12 November 1968, ALC; LCC, Hunslet Grange, 5 52 Leek Street Notes, 29 April 1969, ALC  53 Mr Hurst, Estate Office, 16 September 1969, ALC 54 Leeds City Council, Quarterly report of the Department of Housing, 31 March 1976, 9 
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voids, which exacerbated this problem. While the estate would eventually spawn a 
community, it was different to the one the planners had imagined. 
These material, environmental and social problems were compounded by the view that the 
council and other public agencies were unsympathetic and disinterested. Council officials 
blamed individual tenants for the dampness and heating problems, even after it had become 
clear that the problem was widespread. Tenants complaining about damp were routinely 
instructed to turn up the heating and open the windows, an approach that had some technical 
basis but was extremely costly.55 Households who could not pay impossibly expensive fuel 
bills were disconnected by the Yorkshire Electricity Board. The council was unprepared to 
provide extra subsidy. Council workers were slow to attend to routine repairs and, despite 
repeated remedial works, the authority consistently failed to solve the larger structural 
problems. The Cleansing Department refused to clear rubbish from the walkways and the 
open spaces were poorly maintained.56 The sense that tenants were a politically 
marginalised group was felt more acutely on Hunslet Grange than on most other council 
estates because of the quantity of material and social problems. 
Overall, the estate had been found wanting on a number of levels. As a form of housing, it 
had failed to provide modern living accommodation. The built environment was dispiriting 
and, rather than functioning as an asset, it was the source of several problems. The wider 
setting lacked many of the desirable features of urban life, particularly spaces for shopping 
and recreation. The estate had not only failed to preserve the communities of old Hunslet, 
but its various failings had placed obstacles in the way of a new community emerging. 
Residents felt ill-treated by the public bodies responsible for the administration of the estate. 
As Shapely has shown in a study of Manchester, tenant activism was a reaction to the 
failure of the local authority to solve urban housing problems.57 
Whilst the emergence of a set of social, material and political problems explains the 
potential for community action on the estate, it does not explain how or why community 
action actually emerged on the estate. The estate’s failure to meet residents’ expectations 
might have provided a rationale for community action, but this did not make it inevitable. 
Community action depended on residents organising collectively and transforming a set of 
grievances into a list of practical demands that could form the basis of a political campaign. 
As Tony Parker’s oral history of a south London council estate suggests, the average 
                                                          55 HGHAG, Hunslet Grange, 12 56 Leeds City Council, Hunslet Grange, 12; Annie Armitage, Both Sides of the Sheets (Leicester, 2011), 235 57 Shapely, Politics of Housing, 166-176 
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council tenant was not politically active, but merely trying to get by.58 The majority of 
residents on Hunslet Grange did not respond to these problems by organising collectively. 
Indeed, the majority of tenants adopted an essentially individualist approach by applying to 
the Housing Department for a transfer to another estate on the grounds that Hunslet Grange 
was failing to meet their needs. By seeking replacement accommodation elsewhere, they 
intended to improve their housing situation and perhaps the wider social surroundings. This 
was a private exchange between the individual tenant and the Housing Department. It did 
not depend on the strength of a group and nor did it seek to improve Hunslet Grange itself. 
The initiative for organising collectively over the problems of the estate with a view to 
improving the situation for a plurality of tenants came from several individuals who 
engaged in community work on the estate and who worked together to tackle the problems 
of the estate. Some of these individuals actually lived on the estate so they were not 
technically outsiders, but their socioeconomic status and educational and occupational 
background distinguished them from the majority of tenants. They were mainly of middle-
class origin, with university degrees and other professional qualifications. In many cases, 
they had prior experience of community organising and understood the potential for 
community action on Hunslet Grange. Their intervention helped to transform a series of 
individual grievances into an organised political campaign. Crucially, they encouraged 
tenants to form a variety of groups that would represent the collective interests of residents 
and could act as a base for activism. These community groups provided a framework for 
community action throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but they owed their existence and much 
of their strength to these individuals. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Bob Shaw, a curate at the local parish church of St 
Mary’s, and Tony Addy, a member of the South Leeds Team Ministry, got involved in 
community work on the estate and helped to form the Hunslet Grange Community 
Association in 1971.59 In 1973, the Hunslet Parochial Church Council appointed Barbara 
Craig to run the Hunslet Parish Community Work Project.60 Craig had a post-graduate 
diploma in Social Administration from the LSE for which she had completed work 
placements in Islington and Peterborough where she had ‘seen first-hand how community 
action could be effective.’ 61 In Islington, she had worked briefly at Holloway Housing Aid, 
a housing rights project. Craig worked with the Community Association, before setting up a 
                                                          58 Tony Parker, The people of Providence: A housing estate and some of its inhabitants (London, 1983), Second Edition 59 Interview with Hancock 60 Barbara Craig, ‘Hunslet Parish Community Work Project’, 1978, BHC 61 Interview with Hancock 
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Damp Action Group in the winter of 1973 to 1974. As a resident of the estate and full time 
community worker, Craig remained an advocate for community action until 1978. In early 
1976, Keith Mollison, a community worker employed by the Shelter Community Action 
Team (SCAT), a national advocacy organisation, began visiting the estate for a day or two 
per week as part of his work in the Leeds and Bradford area.62 Mollison, who had a degree 
in Town Planning, had worked with community groups in Glasgow and Toronto, where he 
worked with a group influenced by Saul Alinsky’s approach to community organising, 
before he began working for SCAT in Yorkshire.63 Mollison came to Hunslet after Craig 
contacted SCAT asking for assistance.64 He was instrumental in setting up the Hunslet 
Grange Heating Action Group in February 1976 and worked with the group until 1977. 
Both Mollison and Craig were members of the Leeds Community Workers Groups, through 
which community workers across the city shared information.65 The Hunslet Grange 
Tenants Association, formed in 1978, spearheaded the next phase of community action on 
the estate; this group was formed due to the intervention of another outsider, John Gunnell, 
who moved to the estate in 1977.66 Gunnell, a lecturer in Physics at Leeds University, was 
the Labour County Councillor for Hunslet. The emergence of a new style of community-
orientated councillors will be explored later.67 
Each of these individuals brought a different style of community organising to the estate. 
They all contributed expertise and resources that were lacking among the resident 
population. Craig worked slowly and methodically, building up a web of contacts over 
several years by going door-to-door on the estate and ‘gathering groups of residents around 
shared interest and concerns.’68 In doing so she developed personal relationships with 
tenants, especially the women.69 Mollison, who did not have a permanent base on the estate, 
tended to work faster and drew on the relationships Craig had built up to legitimise his work 
and to set up the action group.70 As a SCAT worker, Mollison assisted neighbourhoods that 
were already organised, rather than developing a community groups from scratch.71 Gunnell 
used the traditional political device of the public meeting to bring tenants together to discuss 
common concerns and plan future action. Craig was able to advise tenants on how to 
                                                          62 Interview with Keith Mollison, Leeds, 2013 The Shelter Community Action Team later became Services to Community Action and Tenants 63 Interview with Mollison 64 ibid 65 Interview with Mollison 66 Yorkshire Evening Post, ‘Flats transit camp, says Merlyn,’ 18 November 1978, 1 67 Leeds Other Paper, No. 499, 2 October 1987, 9-8 68 Interview with Hancock 69 Interview with Hancock 70 ibid 71 ibid 
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negotiate with the council and gave help on practical matters such as letter-writing, surveys 
and drawing up a petition. Mollison had an extensive knowledge of the planning system and 
the workings of local government. Gunnell had a set of political contacts in the city council, 
the local Labour Party and the mainstream press.  
While these individuals acted as facilitators of community action, making suggestions and 
recommendations, offering advice and prompting action, they never made decisions for the 
groups and nor would they speak for them.72 The community action groups they helped to 
establish took responsibility for their actions. They each ensured that the groups appointed 
their own spokespersons for interactions with the media. The groups were the authors of 
their own letters and reports.73 Negotiating the boundary between facilitation and leadership 
was challenging. While Mollison called the public meetings that launched the Heating 
Action Group, he allowed the group to appoint officers and set the agenda for future 
action.74 Later that year, Mollison drove a group of tenant activists in a minibus into the city 
centre, but he did not take part in the ensuing demonstration.  
The role of these organisers was key to the rise of community action on the estate because 
spontaneous outbursts of community action were rare; when they occurred they were short-
lived because they did not produce durable organisations or target the right people.75 In 
general, the very possibility of organising collectively over the problems on the estate did 
not occur to most residents.76 However, once the community workers had primed the pump, 
they invariably found that there was sufficient energy and enthusiasm among the tenant 
population to sustain community action without their constant intervention. Despite its 
problems, the estate contained a remarkable repository of skills and a latent confidence in 
the ability of residents to effect change. 77   
A shifting group of particularly active tenants was the third pillar of community action. 
They were perhaps the most important driver of community action not only because they 
did the bulk of the organising and campaigning, but because their involvement made it 
impossible for the media or the council to dismiss community action as the product of 
external agitators. Residents had a better claim to speak for the community. Tenant activists 
came from a range of backgrounds, though most would have self-identified as working-
class. Most had little experience of formal education beyond compulsory schooling, though 
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many later continued their education as a result of their activist experience.78 Val Hooper, a 
housewife whose husband was a barrister’s clerk in Leeds, was the Treasurer of the 
Community Association and editor of the community newsletter in the early 1970s, before 
acting as a spokesperson for the Heating Action Group in 1976.79 Angela Halliday, a young 
mother, was the ‘driving force’ behind the Heating Action Group.80 Halliday’s participation 
in community action began when she attended a public meeting on electricity bills, and after 
she challenged the speaker from the Yorkshire Electricity Board for criticising the miners, 
Mollison and Craig suggested that she get involved with the action group.81 Few of the 
Hunslet Grange activists had prior experience of grassroots political activism, though a 
number had been members of traditional voluntary organisations. One activist had been a 
secretary and Treasurer of the Co-operative Congress.82  
As we have seen, women were well-represented in the most active circle of tenants and held 
key positions in the community groups in the 1970s. This continued into the 1980s when the 
Tenants Association was chaired by Marilyn Steane and, later, Pat Tallet; Margaret Kirk 
was a key spokesperson for the Association. Deputations to the city council, on behalf of 
the community groups, were dominated by women, even though men were more likely to be 
the spokespersons for these groups at deputations. Women were mainly responsible for the 
direct action. The role of women in community action on the estate is partly explained by 
the fact that women were still seen to be responsible for the domestic sphere and it was in 
the home that problems of heating and dampness were encountered. 83  Women’s encounters 
with the council and other public agencies were more frequent: they were more likely to pay 
rent, to take care of heating bills and to interact with maintenance workers. Many of the 
wider issues that animated community action on the estate – shopping facilities, the 
cleanliness of the environment, play space, nursery provision – were linked to women’s 
responsibilities for children, food and the welfare of the neighbourhood.84 Even though 
women’s participation in the labour force was increasing, women retained these 
responsibilities and they were more likely to be around in the day when much of the 
organising and planning took place, either because they worked part time, or because they 
were housewives. This was not always the case: one group of women visited Craig one night 
requesting that meetings of the action group be held in the evening because they worked during the 
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day. There were a number of activist men on the estate, but politically active men were 
likely to focus their energies on the politics of the workplace. It is significant that at least 
one of the men who was actively involved in community action in the 1970s, David 
Southwell, was on long-term sick leave. Another active man was a mature student who 
could work from home.  
Community organisation relied upon residents making contact with their neighbours and 
gradually developing personal relationships. To do this, they needed spaces and 
organisations where residents could meet or might encounter one another informally. In 
order to take collective action on behalf of the wider tenant population, activists had to feel 
connected in some way to a wider community. There were selfish reasons for participating 
in community action – individuals stood to gain from improvements to the estate – but self-
interest alone does not explain why activists were prepared to make personal sacrifices for 
and commit so much energy to campaigning. That they did not simply focus their energy on 
securing a transfer to another estate suggests that activists were at least partly motivated by 
a concern for the common good of the whole estate. However, as we have seen, in its early 
years, the estate not only lacked a sense of community, tenants had to fight for shared 
spaces where community organisations might meet. The groundwork for the community 
action campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s was laid in the early 1970s through work that 
attempted to cultivate a sense of community on the estate through institutions and spaces. 
This work was both the fourth pillar of community action and a form of community action 
in itself, since it involved groups of residents organising collectively to improve the estate 
through a combination of self-help and political lobbying.  
Central to this work was the Hunslet Grange Community Association, which was supported 
by community workers, Bob Shaw and Barbara Craig, but largely run by ordinary tenants. It 
sought to compensate for the feeling that the estate lacked a sense of community. Under the 
Community Association, a range of community groups formed on the estate during the 
1970s, including a morning playgroup for toddlers, a Senior Citizens Club and a youth club, 
each of which was run by volunteers from the estate or from neighbouring parts of 
Hunslet.85 The Association also ran social events and organised a summer play project.86 
The Community Association pressed the local authority for assistance in its efforts to build 
a community. The council was, as we have seen, vulnerable to the charge that the estate had 
failed in its stated aim of fostering community ties. In November 1971, following 
representations from the Association, the council agreed to provide play spaces for children 
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and funded a number of environmental improvements including deck lighting, street maps, 
landscaping and external painting, though activists would later report that these additions 
had little impact on the social fabric of the estate.87 In June 1973, the council granted the 
Association the lease of an unlet shop at a low rent for community use and the following 
year it provided an unused maisonette which was used for a playgroup.88 In the 1970s the 
Anglican church was rebuilt with a meeting room and a café, which was open during the 
day on weekdays.89 These spaces were also utilised by community activists. 
Community development efforts such as these were unlikely to compensate for or overcome 
the physical and social problems that plagued the estate. However, it is clear that the social 
interaction facilitated by these organisations laid the foundations for community action on 
the estate. They provided safe, informal spaces in which residents of the estate met and 
discovered that their problems were shared by others.90 Mothers at the under-fives club 
could discuss the lack of play provision; pensioners visiting the luncheon club discovered 
that many of their neighbours also suffered from high heating bills; women eating in the 
church canteen found that dampness afflicted a high proportion of flats on the estate. It was 
also in these spaces and organisations that residents met their more active neighbours and 
the community workers operating on the estate. People with little experience of activism 
began to consider that residents could take action, collectively, on shared problems. This 
raised the political consciousness of residents who had previously conceived of their 
problems in narrower terms. Moreover, the web of contacts built up in this way allowed 
activists to draw on the wider tenant body when organising petitions or planning 
demonstrations. Both the Damp Action Group and the Heating Action Group drew their 
strength from pre-existing community groups.  
As the Director of Housing observed in 1982, a community did form on the estate, but not 
‘along the lines anticipated’ by the city council: rather, the estate saw the emergence of ‘a 
community in adversity.’91 This was the product of the shared experience of difficult 
conditions, which incentivised mutual aid between tenants. A striking example of this sort 
of community emerged when families were disconnected from the electricity supply and 
their neighbours ran electric cables between the flats to help those who had been cut off.92 
This was motivated partly by the knowledge that any family could end up in such a 
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situation. This community in adversity provided the foundation for the political community 
of activists, who sought to tackle the causes of adversity. 
One of the key challenges faced by community organisers seeking to build a community 
action campaign was the relative lack of resources on the estate, in terms of finance, 
experience and contacts. As we have seen, community action derived much of its strength 
from the work of community organisers, but their presence on the estate owed much to a set 
of established institutions, based both inside and outside Hunslet, that financed community 
organising and assisted the community groups they helped to set up. These organisations 
were the fifth pillar of community action on the estate. The local Anglican parish church 
was a key sponsor of community action on the estate.93 The vicar, Tony Comber, was an 
advocate of community action. Comber believed a parish church should work with the 
entire parish, rather than focusing solely on the church attending congregation.94 He 
conceived of the church building, which was rebuilt in the mid-1970s with a canteen, as a 
meeting place for the whole neighbourhood. The Hunslet Parish Community Work Project, 
which employed Barbara Craig, was established by Comber to fulfil this mission. The 
church was a focus for people wishing to make contact with the community workers.95 The 
Project was largely funded by an Urban Aid grant under the Home Office’s Urban 
Programme.96 Comber helped to secure this funding by appealing to the MP for Leeds 
South, Merlyn Rees, who held a junior position at the Home Office at the time. 97 Rees 
himself was an advocate of community work. The Urban Aid for the Community Work 
Project grant was administered through the Social Services Department of Leeds City 
Council, which thereby lent its support to the initiative. As we have seen the local authority 
also provided spaces for community groups to meet and grant aided the Community 
Association in its early years.  
The involvement of Keith Mollison was made possible by SCAT, which reveals the role of 
a network of national organisations in facilitating the development community action on the 
estate. Founded in 1973 as a registered charity, it was supported by Shelter, the Joseph 
Rowntree Social Service Trust, the Gulbenkian Foundation and the trade union NUPE.98 
SCAT provided architectural and planning advice to working class community groups and 
tenants organisations.99 Its aim was to support groups which would otherwise struggle to 
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finance professional assistance, by providing technical and political advice.100 In Leeds, 
Mollison also worked on behalf of SCAT in Chapeltown.101 SCAT did not seek to impose a 
particular agenda on community groups and encouraged them to be controlled by their 
members. This philosophy also characterised the approach of the parish church, national 
voluntary bodies and even central government to community groups in this period. They did 
not seek to exert control over or closely monitor the workers or projects they funded. Thus, 
despite the external support it received, community action on the estate was a broadly 
autonomous local political force. This allowed community action to develop and expand in 
response to local circumstances and accordance with the wishes of tenant activists.  
This section has explored the foundations of community action on the estate. It has shown 
that the roots of community action lay in the deficiencies of the estate. It was found wanting 
as a form of housing provision, as a built environment and as an incubator for community 
life. These problems quickly became acute and caused significant hardship for residents. 
The Hunslet Grange campaign was representative of community action on scores of system 
built estates across Britain. Community campaigns on the Balloon Wood estate in 
Nottingham and the Hulme Crescents in Manchester closely resembled the Hunslet Grange 
experience.102 Dampness was a major cause of community activism on housing estates 
across Britain. This was supported by the National Anti-Dampness Campaign which held a 
conference in Leeds in April 1981.103  
The shortcomings of the estate created the conditions for community action, but the rise of 
community action was not an organic process. Tenant dissatisfaction was a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for community action on the estate. A group of active tenants and 
resourceful outsiders worked together to build a campaign around these grievances. They 
did this by forming community institutions that compensated for the lack of social 
connections on the estate and contributed to the rise of a community in adversity. These 
individuals were assisted by external organisations, from the established and innovative 
wings of civil society, who offered human resources, space and finance. Community action 
was the product of collaboration on a number of levels: between ordinary tenants and 
outsiders, between the community, the state and the voluntary sector, and between 
traditional sponsors of community work like the church and national voluntary 
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organisations. Once organised, these activists promptly targeted the roots of the estate’s 
problems. 
3. The Anatomy of a Community Action Campaign 
By the early to mid-1970s the interlinked factors discussed above had combined to produce 
community action on the estate. Tenant activists and community organisers established a 
series of community groups which co-ordinated activism. The aims of community activists 
were, firstly, to persuade the council that the estate had structural problems that required 
structural solutions. Secondly, they had to convince the council to devote the necessary 
resources to implementing these solutions. The third aim of the campaign, implicit in the 
first to goals, was to secure a greater role for the community in the governance of the estate. 
These goals highlight the fact that community action was concerned not only with the 
improvement of material conditions but with the redistribution of power. 
The Hunslet Grange Community Association’s efforts to build community in the early 
1970s quickly evolved into more overtly political work concerning the extent of dampness 
on the estate and the causes of this problem.104 This work was taken up in earnest in 1973 
by the Damp Action Group.105 In early 1976, after heating costs emerged as the major 
material consideration, the Hunslet Grange Heating Action Group led the campaign. From 
1978, the Hunslet Grange Tenants Association assumed this. These groups translated the 
grievances we explored in the last section into a set of political demands and mobilised the 
wider resident population to apply pressure on public bodies. These groups prioritised 
different issues but their basic approach was the same: namely, to leverage the collective 
strength of an organised group of tenants to influence the decision makers who governed the 
estate. Leeds City Council was the key local decision maker, responsible for allocations, 
maintenance and determining rent levels, within a nationally agreed framework. While 
councils became increasingly dependent on central government for housing finance and 
governments became more interventionist on rent policy, councils retained wide freedoms 
in housing in the 1970s.106 The council was the main focus of the community campaign. 
Other public agencies – such as the state owned Yorkshire Electricity Board (YEB) to 
which many residents became indebted – were targeted but to a lesser extent. In the 1980s, 
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activists turned their attention to national government when it became the key obstacle to 
the realisation of their goals.107 
As we have seen, the council’s response to complaints about dampness and heating costs 
was to place the blame on individual households. It was suggested that tenants’ lifestyles 
were the cause of damp, or that they had misunderstood how to use the heating system. In 
the early to mid-1970s, then, community activists sought to demonstrate that dampness and 
high heating costs had structural causes. The starting point for this community research was 
the anecdotal evidence that these problems were so widespread and severe that they must 
share a common cause. In 1973, the Community Association informed the council that 
dampness was especially common in the gable end flats, which suggested the design of the 
building was to blame.108 The council was resistant to act on these findings, but by autumn 
1973, after its own research corroborated the conclusions of the Community Association, 
the local authority agreed to a programme of remedial works.109  
Fearing the council could not be trusted to implement the works impartially, the Community 
Association formed the Damp Action Group (DAG) in the winter of 1973/74 to monitor the 
council’s remedial programme.110 DAG’s confidence in the council diminished when the 
council did not follow Department of Environment guidelines, failing to install insulation 
and focusing only on heating and ventilation.111 Moreover, DAG’s survey of the flats 
identified damp where the council claimed it did not exist. The group argued that even if the 
council’s remedial programme was technically sound it would bankrupt the tenants because 
the only way to keep the flats free of damp would be to make intensive use of the heating 
system. Dampness and heating bills were closely linked. DAG’s call for a comprehensive 
programme was eventually heeded in mid-1974, but these works took almost 18 months to 
complete, during which time the group folded.112  
By the mid-1970s, then, community activists had persuaded the council that the estate 
suffered from a series of interlinked physical problems, but the council’s response to these 
issues had been repeatedly found wanting. In early 1976, evidence emerged that even the 
comprehensive remedial programme had failed. At this time, a sharp rise in the cost of 
electricity brought the heating problem into even sharper relief. In response, the Heating 
Action Group (HAG) was formed, placing the cost of fuel at the centre of its campaign. 
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From the outset, HAG adopted a more militant approach, reflecting mounting frustration. A 
survey conducted by the group found that 43% of the flats in the remedial programme still 
suffered from damp, a similar result to a survey conducted in 1973.113 Households afflicted 
by damp usually had extortionate heating bills. When the council refused to co-operate with 
HAG to investigate the problem further, the group produced its own report based on 
professional advice and independent research. Damp: Hunslet Grange: An Experiment and 
its Victims (1976) argued that the problems of the estate had structural causes and that only 
a full structural investigation would identify whether a solution was possible. Based on the 
finding that tenants were commonly spending ten to 15 per cent of their income on heating, 
HAG recommended that the council should subsidise tenants’ electricity bills until a long 
term solution was found.114  
Later in the year, HAG commissioned two further studies by an architect and a structural 
engineer to investigate suspicions emerging from their earlier investigations that the estate 
might be at risk of collapsing. Alarmed by these allegations, the council commissioned its 
own studies from the Structural Engineer at the West Yorkshire County Council and the 
Chief Fire Officer. These reports confirmed the link between ‘deteriorating living 
conditions’ and ‘structural faults’ and identified a number of safety hazards that the council 
had hitherto denied.115 As a result, the council banned alternative fuels and conducted some 
minor alterations. However, the council’s report rejected the argument that the flats were 
structurally unstable.116 HAG refused to accept this conclusion and held that the report was 
not sufficiently independent of the city council.117 The council countered that to reject the 
conclusions of local government officers would set a dangerous precedent.118 The council’s 
assurances failed to calm anxieties that the structure was basically safe. The ban on 
alternative fuels escalated tensions on the estate because the families who had been 
disconnected from the electricity supply relied on paraffin and calor gas to heat and cook. 
The council’s refusal to subsidise electricity costs underlined the feeling that the tenants had 
been abandoned. HAG’s campaign appeared to be floundering against official resistance.   
In 1977, the council conceded that further remedial work was necessary, but a study 
conducted by John Gunnell in 1978 for the Tenants Association revealed that dampness 
remained widespread and that electricity costs amounted to 20 per cent of tenants’ wages.119 
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The average heating bill was £79.66 per winter quarter for the smaller flats and 25 per cent 
of tenants had bills of over £100. The Tenants Association argued that the council should 
accept that these burdens were inevitable because of the structural problems and 
compensate.120 As we shall see later, the work of the Tenants Association increasingly 
pointed to the fact that the problems on the estate were incurable. But in the late 1970s, the 
council continued to maintain that is own research suggested improvement was possible. 
Throughout the community action campaign activists made extensive use of research and 
specialist knowledge to challenge the council’s monopoly on expertise. It mattered to 
community activists who controlled expert knowledge. Activists were keen to ensure that, 
like community workers, these experts worked for the community group. The Heating 
Action Group noted approvingly that the professionals who undertook the original safety 
studies 
…see the campaign as being ours, and that the group is the political force to bring about change. The press…does tend to focus on them, but in reality they act as our advisers and all tactics, press releases, reports are jointly discussed and implemented.121 
On the basis of this research they constructed a set of shifting political demands, which 
crystallised in the call for a structural approach to the problems in the long term and for 
economic aid to tenants in the short term as compensation for their hardships.  
At a number of key junctures, the council was forced to concede, at least implicitly, that its 
own findings might be flawed. However, activists did not win concessions simply by 
presenting evidence and reasoned arguments to the council. Activists also had to mount a 
political campaign, applying pressure on the council, which forced it to the negotiating 
table. In the early 1980s, the activists emphasised the need for a political strategy:  
Too often it’s assumed that people act in a rational way which just isn’t true. Having a rational case is very important but you need a political case as well; you need to make a lot of nuisance or to work through the normal political channels.122 
Central to the political campaign was the need to communicate their message, both to the 
council and the wider population. The groups developed close relationships with a variety 
of local media outlets which raised awareness of their reports outside the estate and 
throughout the city. They issued press releases and invited the media to attend 
demonstrations and public meetings. Activists were frequent letter writers. This resulted in 
extensive coverage of the campaign on local radio and television, in the local press and in 
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the national newspapers like The Guardian.123 By seizing the initiative with the media, the 
groups ensured that the issues were framed in terms that supported the campaign: tenants 
who had been let down by architects, planners and their municipal landlord were 
endeavouring to find solutions to the problems that plagued their everyday lives. Engaging 
with journalists generated sympathetic newspaper coverage in which the story was told 
from the residents’ perspective.124 This was a considerable achievement given that activists 
were competing with the council’s public relations officers. Beyond the mainstream media, 
the action groups also developed links with The Leeds Other Paper, the city’s key 
alternative publication, for which Keith Mollison and Barbara Craig contributed 
information for articles about the campaign. Through this publication, the groups developed 
contacts with other activists across the city. Mollison forwarded information about the 
Heating Action Group’s campaign to the national Community Action journal.  
The groups used direct action to raise awareness of the campaign, both among councillors 
and in the media. In early 1976, the Hunslet Grange Heating Action Group organised a 
three-hour demonstration at the local rent office, which received favourable coverage from 
print, television and radio journalists.125 The demonstrators presented the council with a 
petition signed by 698 residents from the estate supporting the need for a more thorough 
investigation into the problems of damp. In October 1976, a group of women affiliated to 
the Heating Action Group partnered with activists from the Chapletown Heating Action 
Group to organise a march through the centre of Leeds.126 The demonstration ended at 
Merrion House where the group occupied the office of the Director of Social Services. 
Armed with a petition signed by over 500 residents the activists demanded a meeting with 
the Director to discuss the impact of the ban on alternative fuels on tenants who had been 
disconnected from the electricity supply.127 In another example of direct action, in 
December 1976 activists from the Leeds Anti-Freeze Campaign, which contained many 
Hunslet Grange activists, sang a satirical Christmas Carol outside the offices of the 
Yorkshire Electricity Board in the Merrion Centre in Leeds, while handing out leaflets 
documenting cases of disconnections.128 Public spectacles such as this generated media 
interest and embarrassed public bodies. 
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Direct action frequently pushed the council into a negotiating position. The occupation at 
Merrion House persuaded the Director of Social Services to meet the tenants and, following 
a 45-minute conversation, he agreed to arrange a joint meeting with the Yorkshire 
Electricity Board. The threat of direct action could often produce a similar effect. It was 
probably no coincidence that after the Heating Action Group announced that they intended 
to occupy the local rent office following the council’s failure to engage with their concerns, 
the council announced, whilst they condemned the proposed sit-in, they were preparing a 
report on the issue.  
By raising their profile in the media and in the city’s political landscape, the groups 
managed to secure meetings with the council. It was at such a meeting in 1974 that the 
Damp Action Group managed to secure the Housing Chairman’s commitment to a full 
remedial programme.129 Activists also used the more traditional, formal channels of 
communication to negotiate with the council. The groups sent deputations to full council 
meetings to present their case and the campaign generated debate in the council chamber on 
several occasions.130 Activists also attended meetings of the local Housing Consultative 
Committee. The committees were particularly well-attended in south Leeds.131 While they 
were essentially a forum for airing grievances with limited political clout, the committees 
offered activists a means of keeping an issue on the council’s agenda.  
To persuade the council to listen to them, community activists had to demonstrate that they 
enjoyed the support of the wider tenant population. The groups used petitions to 
demonstrate the extent of their support and basic public opinion surveys to confirm they 
enjoyed local support.  The groups drew on social networks orientated around the various 
self-help and recreational groups on the estate to generate support for the campaign. For 
larger actions, activists leafleted the estate and for one or two particularly significant events 
key activists went door-to-door inviting tenants to support an upcoming demonstration. As a 
result of one canvassing effort over a three hour period, activists leafleted all 1250 flats and 
collected 698 signatures.132 Since it was only ever a minority of activists who were active in 
the campaign, there was a constant danger that the action groups would become detached 
from the tenant population. Acknowledging this risk, the Tenants Association chose to hold 
meetings in public places rather than in members’ flats in an attempt to involve more 
residents.133 The Community Association ran a newsletter, Bleak Street, in the early to mid-
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1970s which informed tenants of upcoming demonstrations and the work of the action 
groups.134 The Heating Action Group posted newssheets on walls around the estate to 
inform residents of their activities and making activism a visible part of the fabric of the 
estate. These communication efforts raised residents’ awareness of issues and events that 
otherwise received little coverage in the mainstream media and helped to generate support 
for the campaign. 
Throughout this period, community action was driven as much by the refusal of the council 
to allow organised groups of tenants to actively participate in research and the formulation 
and implementation of policy as it was by material problems. As the period progressed, 
community activists increasingly began to emphasise the political dimensions of the 
struggle. Activist rhetoric stressed the ways in which tenants were the subjects of public 
policy, rather than its authors. A HAG report opened by stating bluntly that the tenants were 
‘the victims of a Council House building experiment carried out by the Building [sic] 
professions’ after which they had been ‘abandoned by the authorities and the architectural 
profession.’135 A report in the early 1980s echoed the idea that the tenants were victims of 
policies imposed from outside when they held that ‘we’ve been neglected and abused by 
officials and councillors over the years.’136 This served to emphasise the fact that the local 
community lacked agency in the management of the estate: they had been the subject of 
local and national policy, rather than the authors of those policies. As their lack of control 
was seen to be the cause of the problems, the groups increasingly began to argue that the 
long-term solution lay in changing the balance of power. 
This argument first emerged as a request for more tenant involvement in the remedial 
programmes, but it later morphed into a more radical demand for resident involvement in 
the running of the estate in general. HAG wrote to the Director of Housing in April 1976 
insisting that any report on the estate must consider structural problems and that the remedy 
must include ‘resident involvement’.137 The group’s report, in May 1976, argued that any 
remedial programme must be evaluated not only to according cost, timescale and the 
likelihood of success, but with regard to the ‘methods of implementation’ which should 
include ‘resident involvement.’138 In making such demands, the action group was asserting 
its right to influence the way the council researched and identified policy problems and 
formulated solutions. As community action on the estate matured, activists began to 
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formulate more radical proposals for the re-structuring of relationships between the tenants 
and external agents. In the early 1980s, the Tenants Association supported a set of 
recommendations with far-reaching implications for the balance of power in public housing:  
Most important of all is the control that tenants and building workers must exercise jointly over all new building, modernisation, maintenance and repair schemes. Joint tenant and worker committees need to be involved not only in planning the design of new houses but in choosing the heating system, in establishing levels of insulation to cut fuel bills and also in planning all amenities on the estate. The planning process, the building process and the subsequent management of estates needs to be taken out of the hands of professionals. There will be a role for professionals within housing…in carrying out the decisions of council tenants.139 
Community activists not only sought to solve particular housing problems, they also sought 
a permanent transfer of power to the community. This political analysis distinguished the 
community action from earlier forms of tenant activism and other community or voluntary 
organisations. 
In their efforts to change local policy, community activists on Hunslet Grange advanced on 
two fronts. First, activists sought to change the terms of the debate about the problems of 
the estate, shifting responsibility for high heating costs and dampness from individual 
tenants to the design of the estate. They did this by challenging the council’s interpretation 
of the problem and generating new information by conducting research. Second, they 
applied political pressure on the council, utilising the media, direct action and other forms 
of protest. They aimed to demonstrate that the resident population was united behind their 
campaign. The implications of the campaign transcended its local context. Community 
activists placed increasing emphasis on the political causes of the estate’s problems. They 
advanced the argument that the physical problems ultimately stemmed not from technical 
mistakes but emerged from a form of urban governance that increased the likelihood that 
such mistakes would be made. Translating this critique into tangible results was to prove 
difficult. 
4. Obstacles to Community Action 
By the end of the 1970s, community action had succeeded in raising awareness of the 
problems on the estate. Community activists had defined the nature of those problems and 
framed the terms of the debate. However, decisive action to solve those problems did not 
appear to be forthcoming. Whilst the council had accepted that the estate suffered from 
structural flaws, it seemed unwilling to address these problems systematically. Politically, 
community activists remained on the margins of the decision-making process. The council 
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was prepared to communicate with them at moments of crisis or after intensive lobbying; 
but it did not involve them in policy making as a matter of routine and the community 
action groups had no direct role in estate management. There were two major obstacles to 
successful community action in the 1970s: first, the response of the council to community 
action and, second, the strength and cohesion of the community upon which community 
action was based.  
Undoubtedly, diminishing public resources for public housing partly explains the council’s 
reluctance to implement the recommendations advanced by community activists. However, 
the subsequent history of the estate would reveal that the council retained extensive room 
for manoeuvre in housing matters. A more significant explanation for the relative lack of 
tenant input into policy making is to be found in the local political culture. Despite making 
a number of concessions on consultation, there was a lingering resistance in the council – 
both among officers and elected members – to more extensive community participation in 
policy making and administration.  
There were promising signs that a new relationship between activists and the council may 
emerge as early as April 1974 when the Labour Housing Chairman, Kevin Gould suggested 
that the tenants might nominate a member of the Community Association to act as a liaison 
between the council and the tenants, but no such consultative mechanism was ever 
implemented.140 This was perhaps because the officers feared the precedent such a policy 
might set for the management of other estates, implying that residents had a right to formal 
representation in the policy-making process. However, under Gould, the council did set up a 
citywide system of Housing Consultative Committees, which met quarterly and brought 
together ward councillors, officers and tenants’ representatives to discuss problems and 
suggest solutions which could be forwarded to the Housing Committee.141 This reflected the 
expansion of mechanisms for tenants’ participation across the country at this time.142 The 
growth of tenant participation in Leeds stalled somewhat when the Conservatives took 
control of the city council in 1976. Gould’s Conservative successor as Housing Chair from 
1976, Peter Sparling, refused to meet with HAG on several occasions, stating such a 
meeting would have ‘no useful purpose.’ On the Housing Committee, Sparling was not 
prepared to discuss Hunslet Grange in particular, but only the problems of all-electric 
estates in general. Again, it is likely that Sparling feared that making a concession to one 
organised group of tenants would unleash a flood of other demands.  
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In the late 1970s, the council continued to raise questions about the legitimacy of 
community action groups: in particular, it challenged community activists’ claim to speak 
for the tenant population. The council suggested that community groups on Hunslet Grange 
might not be representative of the wider tenant population—or merely as only 
representative of one particular faction. In February 1977, in a debate on the Hunslet 
Grange remedial programme, the Chairman of the Housing Committee, Peter Sparling, 
raised the case of one tenant who believed her ‘‘home was fit for a queen’’ and declared she 
would ‘‘not exchange [her flat] for any new house in the Leeds area.’’143 This illustrated his 
wider point that there were many ‘tenants in Hunslet Grange who are perfectly happy there 
and whose flats are all right.’ 144 The implication was that the action group was not speaking 
for the whole community, but merely one interest group within it. The council might 
therefore consult with community groups, but it could not elevate them to a policy making 
position, because their views had to be balanced against the wishes of other interest groups 
on Hunslet Grange. This charge struck at the heart of the community action campaign, since 
its authority depended on its ability to represent accurately the views of the tenant 
population. 
Of course, it was difficult for community activists to prove that they were representative, 
especially in the context of an unstable community in which active political participation 
was limited. As we have seen, the activists sought to buttress their legitimacy by conducting 
surveys of tenant opinion and organising petitions. However, since many of these research 
projects were sponsored by either Labour or the Liberals, the community groups were 
vulnerable to the council’s claim that surveys were electioneering devices, designed to drum 
up support for candidates before elections. In November 1978, Sparling dismissed the 
accuracy of one Liberal-sponsored survey, claiming that another survey might produce a 
different result.145 To counter this charge, community activists sought to distance 
themselves from party politics. In July 1976, one activist declared before councillors that we 
refuse to ‘play your political party game.’ 146 In 1979, the Chair of the Tenants Association, 
criticised a Liberal-sponsored survey, declaring the results ‘‘spurious’’ and arguing that 
there was ‘a danger of the flats becoming a party political football.’’147 This was despite the 
fact that the Liberal survey revealed support for demolition, a position the Tenants 
Association was leaning towards. Community activists had to balance their need for 
external support with their desire to be seen as politically neutral.                                                           143 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 2 February 1977, 555 144 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 2 February 1977, 584 145 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 14 November 1978, 29 146 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 21 July 1976, 159 147 YEP, 24 January 1979, 4  
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The council’s suspicion of community action was epitomised by its reluctance to accept the 
argument that the problems of the estate had structural causes, despite the mounting body of 
evidence.  The council persisted in arguing that dampness and high heating bills were still 
linked to tenants’ lifestyles, even when its own research suggested otherwise. HAG 
discussed one council report which explored a range of structural flaws, only to conclude 
that 
everything is the fault of residents for not using the heating system properly, for not cleaning the extractor fans, or generally not adapting themselves adequately to the living technology of the 1970s.148 
In February 1977, Sparling presented this argument particularly forcefully in a council 
debate on the estate:  
it is possible to reside in Hunslet Grange without any condensation of the drainer holes, providing adequate ventilation and maintenance of the drainer holes in the window frames and the usual precautions one normally associates with good housekeeping are adhered to 149 
The TA reported that, on the ground, officials offered fantastical explanations for tenants’ 
problems:  
they’ll blame it on the fact you’ve got a foam backed carpet or try and say someone has left the bath running. One YEB spokesman said the big bills were due to “housewives standing on the doorstep talking.150 
To suggest that the problems were the fault of individual tenants not only absolved the 
council of blame, it also undermined the basis for collective action by tenants. By blaming 
and stigmatising individual tenants for their poor housekeeping standards, the council was 
denying the need for estate-wide solutions. The community action campaign struggled to 
dislodge this frame. 
Throughout this period, community activists’ efforts to negotiate with the council were 
often undermined by the authority’s unwillingness to share information openly and 
transparently with the community groups. The Tenants Association described council 
officers’ as ‘defensive and secretive.’151 An opaque approach to decision-making often 
characterised the work of the Housing Committee. The Housing Chairman frequently 
transferred sensitive items to the agenda of the Housing Committee’s confidential Tenancy 
Sub-Committee, which was closed to the public. This tactic was used to conceal reports on 
structural safety and dampness, though it was thwarted at least once when a Labour member 
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raised the item outside the confidential sub-committee.152 By concealing information in this 
way, the council effectively froze activists out of the negotiations. The council was not 
averse to targeting individual activists in an attempt to remove them from the estate and 
thus the campaign. Marilyn Steane, an active member of the Tenants Association claimed 
‘the council offered her a house anywhere in Leeds in order to shut her up.’153 Activism 
remained risky: opinion on the estate was divided on whether the council used the transfer 
system to remove troublesome activists or whether it would deprioritise their transfer 
requests to punish them for campaigning.154 Either way, this suggests that the council 
viewed community action as a problem to be contained where possible, rather than an 
important part of the wider democratic process.  
If external political factors limited the capacity of community action groups to influence 
policy, the nature of the community itself constantly militated against the emergence of a 
community action campaign in the first place. This was the second key obstacle to 
community action on Hunslet Grange. The tenant population was politically inactive and 
socially unstable. Apathy on the estate, despite the existence of such acute problems, was 
widespread. Most tenants were never active in the community campaigns. Mass 
participation only ever extended to petition-signing and a handful of public meetings. The 
committed community activists were a tiny minority. The majority of tenants who took 
some form of action sought individual rather than collective solutions to the problems of the 
estate by applying for a transfer to another estate, or even, in some cases, by moving back 
into the private rented sector in an improved back-to-back.  
That so many tenants made recourse to the transfer system meant that the tenant population 
was highly transitory. As we have seen, this had been a characteristic of the estate since the 
late 1960s, but the problem became even more pronounced over the course of the 1970s. 
Social instability was the second major obstacle to community action on the estate. By 
1976, residential turnover at Hunslet Grange reached 30 to 40 per cent, far higher than on 
most other estates.155 In his June 1976 report, the South Area Housing Manager, Mr 
Peverrell, described a worsening situation: there had been 300 changes of tenancy in 1975 
and this figure had been surpassed in the first six months of 1976.156 The trend continued 
with scores of terminations every quarter until the early 1980s. Demand for housing on the 
estate was so low that not all of the empty flats were filled. In the mid-1970s there was an 
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average of 100 vacant flats on the estate and this figure spiked to over 200 in June 1978 and 
March 1982.157  Many vacancies were the result of ‘abandonments’ rather than transfers, 
which indicated a heightened level of desperation. 
Hunslet Grange might have become almost wholly depopulated, like Liverpool’s interwar 
walk-up flats, had there not been a severe housing shortage in Leeds. Families migrating to 
Leeds from other parts of Britain and students from Leeds University helped to plug the 
gap. That so many prospective tenants rejected offers of tenancies at Hunslet Grange in the 
context of a housing crisis reveals how poor its reputation had become. The Housing 
Department was driven to advertising vacancies in Hunslet Grange in the local press.158 The 
irony was that the more community activists highlighted the problems on the estate, the 
more unattractive it became in the eyes of prospective tenants, which, in turn, reduced the 
pool of potential activists. In 1977, the Housing Manager noted that 
adverse publicity…has not helped to enhance the reputation of the place in the minds of those seeking council accommodation. How many times one comes across people who will ‘go anywhere’, when what they really mean is anywhere but Hunslet Grange.159  
Generating media attention was a double-edged sword for the campaign: whilst it helped to 
place Hunslet Grange on the council’s agenda, it contributed to the erosion of the nascent 
community on which a campaign could be based.  
If community activists struggled to prompt a full appraisal of Hunslet Grange, they had 
more impact on the city’s wider housing policy. From the mid-1970s, in a tacit acceptance 
of many of the problems raised by community activists, Leeds City Council phased out the 
use of industrialised building techniques and switched to conventional methods.160 Planning 
and design reverted to more traditional approaches. Council estates constructed in the late 
1970s and early 1980s consisted of low rise flats, terraced and semi-detached houses, all 
built of brick. Density levels were lowered and many houses were provided with a private 
garden. Several estates of this type were built in Hunslet.161 As we shall see in Chapter 2, 
the clearance programme was radically scaled back in the mid-1970s as the council 
accepted that the older housing stock could play a role in meeting housing need. Two areas 
in Hunslet – the Longroyds and the Arthingtons – were removed from the clearance 
programme in the mid-1970s. The challenges of improving streets of late back-to-backs 
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paled in comparison to the difficulties the council faced on Hunslet Grange. Thus, whilst the 
problems of Hunslet Grange remained unsolved, large swathes of the district were being 
rebuilt along more traditional lines and the remainder was being rehabilitated. This 
vindicated the arguments advanced by community activists but it also also provided families 
with a clear local alternative to Hunslet Grange. In 1978, the Housing Manager reported 
strong demand among families resident on Hunslet Grange for houses on the newly opened 
estates at Pepper Lane and Royal Road, observing that ‘the demand does tend to escalate 
once a few have moved.’162 In March 1980, the normally under-stated official described 
demand for housing on the new Waterloo Road estate from Hunslet Grange families as 
‘phenomenal.’163 At least two households who moved out of the estate into improved back-
to-backs, noted that that the older housing was superior to the new estate. The tenants who 
left Hunslet Grange were not necessarily rejecting Hunslet, despite the social and spatial 
upheavals of the past decade, and nor were most of them abandoning council housing. 
Council estates in Hunslet, and in the inner city as a whole, remained ‘very popular’ in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.164  
If the shift in housing policy was, on the one hand, a triumph for community action in 
general in the city, on the other hand, it made circumstances more difficult for community 
activists still campaigning on Hunslet Grange. It was difficult to sustain the momentum of a 
campaigning community group and organise for the long term when its membership was 
constantly changing.165 Community groups on all four YDG estates struggled to retain 
active members due to transfers. That it was always possible for tenants to seek individual 
solutions to their problems through the housing transfer system undermined the basis for 
community action. Residents who concentrated their energies on trying to escape the estate 
through transfers had little vested interest in participating in a campaign designed to tackle 
the causes of the estate’s problems. This high turnover also undermined the other 
community institutions that fed into the community campaign, such as the playgroup, the 
Community Association and other voluntary groups.  
Many of the tenants on Hunslet Grange lacked the time or energy to participate actively in 
the campaigns. No matter how dire the physical and environmental problems on the estate 
became, many tenants simply had more pressing priorities, such as work, childcare or even 
other political or trade union commitments. Furthermore, that tenants had to spend such a 
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high proportion of their income on energy meant that many had to take on longer working 
hours, which left them with less time to get involved with the action groups. Those tenants 
who departed were often the most ambitious and resourceful in the community, not least 
because it required skill and determination to navigate the housing transfer system.  
While Hunslet Grange lost many of its more upwardly mobile, resourceful families, the 
tenants who replaced them were often considerably more disadvantaged. In 1976, the 
Heating Action Group commented on the social profile of many of the new tenants on the 
estate: 
It was generally only those in greatest need who would accept a flat. Typically, they were the newcomers to Leeds, the young couple trying to escape from their in-laws, the single parent families…Many saw Hunslet Grange as a place to live until they could buy a house or transfer to another estate. The proportion of young families just beginning to establish themselves has always been high…It is becoming a place of last resort.166 
Although the council policy specified that the household income of new tenants should be 
adequate to cover the cost of living on the estate, by 1981 50% of the newly housed had 
fallen into rent arrears.167 Households facing debt and other social problems were less likely 
to participate in community action. The net result of the changing social composition of the 
estate was that the pool of organisational experience and professional expertise on the estate 
began to decrease. Paradoxically, then, the potential for organising was increasingly 
undermined by the very social and material factors which had generated the need for 
organising in the first place.  
It was extremely difficult to sustain the momentum and morale of a community action 
group in the absence of concrete results. Activists needed to feel that their efforts were 
having an impact as an incentive to continued involvement. The persistence of all the major 
problems sapped morale.168 Particularly disenchanting for the more longstanding activists 
was the failure of each successive remedial programme. Activists needed to feel that they 
had some purchase on policy makers. Certainly, important concessions were made; but even 
at the end of the 1970s, the council continued to maintain a rather aloof attitude. Whilst 
certain officers and ward councillors were supportive, activists did not develop close 
relationships with senior officers or political leaders. In these circumstances, it was difficult 
to ward off despair. At a public meeting in November 1978, Merlyn Rees MP described 
Hunslet Grange as a ‘transit camp,’ observing that ‘[t]he tenants who are complaining are 
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not the same as those complaining 18 months ago.169 The body of core activists that 
constituted the campaign largely changed in this period. Most of the tenants who had been 
most active in the action groups of the early to mid-1970s had left the estate by the late 
1970s. Ultimately, even they made recourse to the transfer system when the estate became 
too much to bear. In the late 1970s, Val Hooper moved to north Leeds and Angela Halliday 
was rehoused in Middleton, south Leeds.170   
For the community workers who had supported the campaign, burnout was perhaps 
inevitable by the late 1970s. Barbara Craig left Hunslet in 1978, having worked in the 
district, full time, for five years.171 By 1977, Craig had become overwhelmed by the scale of 
the fuel debt problems of the estate and increasingly a great deal of her time had been taken 
up with casework. Bob Shaw had left in the early 1970s and Tony Comber, the supportive 
vicar, moved to another parish in 1977.172 Keith Mollison departed in that year to focus on 
other community projects.173 Although the supportive role played by these activists was 
taken up by John Gunnell from 1978, it was unclear how long anyone could work on a 
campaign that made so little progress on the key issues. It looked as if the cycle might 
repeat itself once again. That it did not was the result of a number of factors which 
illuminate, firstly, how community action evolved and adapted in the late 1970s and early 
1980s and, secondly, how the political climate in which it operated became more favourable 
to community participation, a development that was precipitated by the work of community 
activists over the previous decade.  
Community action was an inherently problematic enterprise. The problems that community 
activists sought to overcome – council intransigence and dire housing conditions – were 
themselves barriers to building a successful campaign. The council was reluctant to make 
concessions to the campaign and most residents chose individual rather than collective 
solutions to the problems of the estate. To succeed, community activists had to adapt. 
5. The Evolution of Community Action 
As the major obstacles to community action became clear, community activists began to 
develop strategies to overcome those obstacles. Thus, in the late 1970s, when the prospects 
for community action looked particularly unpromising, activists were laying the foundations 
for their successes in the early 1980s. This section will show that to compensate for the 
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relative weakness of the community’s internal resources, activists looked outside the 
community and made connections with a range of other organisations. This networking 
strategy was partly grounded in the recognition that the estate’s problems were not unique 
and could not be solved in isolation. Alliance building was necessary to strengthen the 
negotiating position of the action groups. In this period, activists became increasingly aware 
that the causes of the problems faced by community activists were often located outside the 
community, so in order to be effective community activists had to organise at a local 
regional and national level. Alliance-building began at city level in the mid-1970s and 
extended to the regional and national level in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The process of 
linking up with activists who shared their objectives was observable in 1976 when the 
Heating Action Group organised a joint demonstration in the city centre with the 
Chapeltown Heating Action Group.174  
The Hunslet Grange activists made links with tenants who were campaigning over heating 
costs and damp on estates in Osmondthorpe, Pudsey, Meanwood, Armley and Seacroft. 
This enabled tenants to share research, co-ordinate the campaigns and present a united front 
to the council through joint petitions and deputations. As we have seen the local authority 
often rejected activists’ demands on the grounds that to devote additional resources to one 
estate would expose the council to charges of favouritism. Joint organisation enabled the 
activists to overcome attempts to drive a wedge between different local campaigns. The 
Tenants Association explained the results: 
when the council turned to other areas and said you can’t have this and that done 
because Hunslet Grange is getting sorted out, there was no great outcry from [the 
other] groups. They understood our needs, so we weren’t fighting each other.175 
Citywide organisation on housing issues generated a series of umbrella groups, such as the 
Leeds Council Tenants Organisation, which lent its support to Hunslet Grange activists at 
public events. 176  The Tenants Association made links with and received support from 
institutions which were established in the city to support grassroots activism, such as the 
Trade Union and Community Resource and Information Centre (TUCRIC), an organisation 
that we will explore in more detail in Chapter 4. 
Acknowledging that the problems of industrialised building stretched beyond the city 
boundaries, the Tenants Association forged links across the north of England. Community 
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activists on the four estates constructed by the Yorkshire Development Group had very 
clear shared interests, since all these estates were plagued by similar physical, 
environmental and social problems.177 The foundations for this networking effort had been 
laid in the mid-1970s when activists like Barbara Craig and Keith Mollison had made 
contact with other activists through networks of community workers. Mollison was 
connected to community organisers across the country through SCAT. Craig attended a 
number of community work conferences and visited activists on the Yorkshire 
Development Group designed estate of Broomhall in Sheffield. In May 1981, members of 
the Hunslet Grange Tenants Association met their counterparts from the Balloon Wood 
estate in Nottingham and the Broomhall estate in Sheffield. Following a series of follow-up 
exchange visits they formed the Yorkshire Development Tenants Action Group (YDTAG) 
in November 1981. This was a cross-city action group that sought to raise awareness of the 
estates, co-ordinate joint action and support each other.178 Shortly afterwards, they linked up 
with the Hull tenants. Shortly after its foundation, YDTAG printed a leaflet containing a 
series of demands relating to dampness, heating, disconnections, social security; YDTAG 
stated that it was putting the four councils ‘on trial’ for the problems on the estate.179 The 
leaflet was issued to the media and to the four councils. Supported by Services to 
Community Action and Tenants, YDTAG produced a series of more detailed reports about 
the common problems of the estates. The group also organised joint negotiations with 
representatives of all four councils in a series of meeting in the different cities.180 The four 
councils agreed to the group’s demands and endeavoured to lobby central government for 
special assistance to solve the estates’ problems. 
The impact of this regional co-ordination on the Hunslet Grange activists was far-reaching. 
Not only did it increase their bargaining power in relation to the council, it energised their 
organisational and campaigning efforts. Members of the Hunslet Grange Tenants 
Association recalled: ‘‘It gave us a kick up the *** [sic] and we were a bit shamed when we 
saw what other cities had done. We had tended to react before YDTAG rather than have a 
strategy.’’181 As part of formulating a strategy, the Tenants Association began to think more 
clearly about the long term goals of the campaign:   
YTG gave us a focus. It was after one of these meetings that we, as a group, decided to say demolition was number one priority. We wanted other things like heating 
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allowances and rate reductions to make life easier in the meantime, but what we had to campaign for was demolition.182 
From 1981, then, the Hunslet Grange activists reoriented their campaign around 
clearance. This was a major departure from their earlier approach. In the 1970s it was 
unthinkable such a new development could be cleared, so demolition was rarely 
discussed by the tenant activists in that decade. In 1976, HAG insisted that activists were 
not jumping on the ‘knock ‘em down bandwagon.’183 Demolition was associated with the 
city’s increasingly discredited slum clearance programme. In the early 1980s to advocate 
demolition was a logical step for community activists on Hunslet Grange. Successive 
remedial programmes had failed to solve the basic physical problems. The estate’s image 
was irremediably tarnished. The turnover rate reached new heights in the early 1980s: 
there were 260 empty units in March 1982 and the estate was experiencing an ‘upsurge 
in the number of abandonments.’184 In this context, activists began to see the campaign 
for repairs and electricity subsidies as short-term expedients. Arguing for demolition 
liberated the activists from having to maintain the sometimes contradictory argument 
that, although the structural problems were severe, they could be solved with the right 
level of investment.  
The Tenants Association’s decision to lobby for demolition was inextricably linked to 
their second objective: to secure local rehousing opportunities for tenants in line with 
their wishes. They argued that the site should be used to build new council housing to 
which former residents of the estate would have priority access, if they wanted to return. 
A Tenants Association survey, which was corroborated by the reports of housing 
visitors,  estate found that 60-70 per cent of people wanted to stay in Hunslet – despite 
the problems they had endured on Hunslet Grange.185 In order to avoid the mistakes of 
the original slum clearance programme in which communities had been dispersed several 
years before new housing was built, the Association pressed for rebuilding to ‘take place 
at the same time as phased demolition.’186 The activists’ aims were more closely aligned 
with other campaigns in the city, which sought to preserve the integrity of local 
communities whilst ensuring housing need was met. As we will see in Chapter 2, 
activists in nearby Hunslet neighbourhoods were pioneering new forms of community-
based renewal in this period. 
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By 1982, a list of organisations with which the Tenants Association had links contained 
over a dozen groups.187 Their contacts extended to national organisations such the National 
Anti-Dampness Campaign, the National Federation of Community Organisations, Friends 
of the Earth and SCAT.188 Having experienced activism surrounding fuel poverty on 
Hunslet Grange, Barbara Craig attended one of the founding meetings of the National Right 
to Fuel Campaign and helped set up the Leeds branch.189 Like YDTAG, these national links 
not only furnished the campaign with information and ideas, but also emboldened the 
Tenants Association for they gave them a sense of being part of a national campaign.  
As well as making links with other community groups and pressure groups, the Hunslet 
Grange activists developed a closer relationship with the local Labour Party in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Community action had been marked by a suspicion of the Labour 
Party, which occasionally bordered on hostility. Community activists had viewed Labour as 
part of the insensitive establishment that had created the problems of Hunslet Grange in the 
first place, before presiding over the uncaring bureaucracy that managed it. Local Labour 
councillors had in the early 1970s appeared uninterested in community organising on the 
estate. Labour was also blamed for the wholesale disruption of social and community life in 
Hunslet caused by clearance and redevelopment. It was partly a result of this 
disillusionment that caused the party to lose council wards in south Leeds to the Liberals in 
the late 1960s and 1970s. Hunslet’s Liberal ward councillors supported the campaign, but 
since the Liberals had little purchase on council policy overall. The relationship between 
community activists and the Labour Party began to change in the late 1970s. A new 
generation of Labour councillors, in their thirties and forties, showed more interest in 
community organising. John Gunnell, county councillor for Hunslet, and John Battle, a 
councillor for a neighbouring ward epitomised this trend. Gunnell helped to establish the 
Tenants Association and conducted research for the new group.  
This was indicative of a wider reassessment of the role of community groups by local 
Labour parties in inner city areas across the country. Community activists were increasingly 
seen as potential allies. The party began to recognise that it could not rely on the trade 
unions alone to mobilise support in urban areas: it needed to form wider alliances with 
groups across civil society. Many of the new generation of Labour councillors that won 
seats in the late 1970s and early 1980s had themselves participated in community action 
before joining the party; others had worked for national pressure groups such as Shelter and 
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the Child Poverty Action Group. For these councillors, community action was not culturally 
alien or politically threatening. Community activists, too, began to reappraise the role of the 
Labour Party. On Hunslet Grange the action groups had always recognised that the 
community group lacked the power and resources to solve the estate’s problems alone and 
the council remained the key decision-maker. Noting that an impasse had emerged in their 
negotiations with the council by the late 1970s, the Tenants Association recognised the need 
to work more closely with local councillors as a means of applying pressure on the council 
leadership to change policy.  
The electoral fortunes of the Labour Party also explain this shift. When it was out of power 
in Leeds between 1975 and 1980, the party often allied with community action groups in 
challenging the ruling Conservatives. When Labour regained control of the council in 1980, 
the Tenants Association were in an excellent position to influence policy on the estate. 
Arthur Miller, the Labour’s housing chair was more supportive of the Tenants Association 
than his Conservative predecessor. In 1981, the Association was granted a ‘ground floor 
unit as a base for their operations.’190 John Battle, who succeeded Miller, as Housing Chair, 
was of the new generation of Labour councillors who were particularly open to working 
with community groups.  
The community action campaign mitigated its internal weaknesses by building alliances at a 
local and regional level. This increased the activists’ leverage over the council. Community 
activists also built bridges with the Labour Party as both sides began to realise that working 
together was mutually beneficial. Community action first emerged as a coalition of 
individuals and organisations from different backgrounds so making wider alliances was a 
logical step for community activists. Community activists could not achieve their goals 
unilaterally without the co-operation of public bodies. As Alison Ravetz argued in her study 
of the Quarry Hill, tenants were successful in securing change when they secured the 
support of either the local authority or other politicians.191 The result of this networking and 
alliance-building was a decision that would haven unthinkable when the campaign first 
began. 
4. Community action and the state 
On 27 April 1982, the Tenants Association achieved one of its key goals when Leeds City 
Council announced its intention to demolish Hunslet Grange.192 Symbolically, this occurred 
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the day before a scheduled delegation from the Tenants Association to the Council at which 
the activists had planned to reiterate the case for clearance, supported by a petition signed 
by 600 residents 193 In the event, this deputation praised the decision as a ‘victory for 
common sense’ and urged the council to follow up with ‘immediate action’ on local 
rehousing and rebuilding. The council delivered on its pledge and the estate was demolished 
between 1983 and 1986 [see Fig. 1.9].194 
Although the estate had undoubtedly become an administrative and financial burden for the 
council, its decision to demolish cannot simply be explained in terms of economic 
expediency. Rather, it suggests the council had been persuaded by the case put by 
community activists. Whilst the council was losing rental income from the vacant units and 
stood to save on future maintenance and management expenses, the net cost of the decision 
to demolish was estimated at £1,110,000 in 1982.195 Under the government’s new housing 
finance rules, these costs had to be born entirely by the city’s rent and ratepayers. These 
expenses did not even take the cost of new building into account. While the council hoped 
to secure special assistance from central government to cushion the blow to the city’s 
finances and fund new building, there was no guarantee that such support would be 
forthcoming. After surveying these financial implications, a report concluded demolition 
would be ‘pursued, for the simple objective of providing decent housing for the people of 
Hunslet.’196 The council had not only accepted the activists’ argument that living conditions 
on the estate were unacceptable and beyond repair, it had conceded that the wishes of the 
residents on the estate should be taken into account when determining its future. The latter 
view represented a clear departure from the ideology that had informed the development of 
the estate in the late 1960s and its management through the 1970s.  
The influence of community action was also revealed in the council’s plans for the 
reconstruction of the estate. In early 1983, Bryan North, the Chair of the Planning 
Committee, told a public meeting that ‘residents would be consulted at every stage’ of the 
planned re-development of 375 houses. In outlining the council’s plans for public 
participation, North adopted the rhetoric of community action to criticise the council’s past 
record:  
The encouraging thing is that the people in the area know exactly what they want…These residents have suffered because bureaucracy has not consulted them in 
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the past. That has been the cause of their ills – people accepting the words of so-called experts.197  The council had apparently accepted the community action argument that the estate’s 
problems were rooted not only in a particular building method but in the distribution of 
power between council tenants and the local authority.  
As the physical base of the campaign began to (literally) disappear, the Tenants Association 
naturally struggled to maintain its cohesion and momentum and many members of the 
group became ‘‘less politically active.’198 Despite this, a core group of activists continued to 
work very closely with the local authority. The council established a Liaison Committee 
which met regularly and gave the Tenants Association access to councillors and officers 
who were formulating policy. That former residents continued to play an active role in 
policy making was a testament to their tenacity: although the members of the Tenants 
Association had been scattered across Leeds  
 
they still managed to meet as a body to liaise with the council over the new housing. Public meetings were held to discuss things like the overall layout of the estate. Tenants had a say in everything down to the street names.199   
Regular monthly liaison meetings continued for five years despite a series of protracted 
delays, which the Association feared might kill the scheme.200 When the first phase of the 
new development was finally completed in September 1987, a plaque was installed on the 
site at the opening ceremony which sought to ‘acknowledge the co-operation between Leeds 
City Council and the Hunslet Grange Tenants Association.’201 Symbolically, the plaque 
displayed the name of the Chair of the Tenants Association alongside the names of 
councillors and officers. The original plaque commemorating the commencement of work 
on Hunslet Grange in April 1967, which was re-installed below, showed only the names of 
council officers and the members of the Housing Committee. 
  
Institutionalised participation was not unproblematic and the balance of power between 
community activists and the local authority remained unequal. The Tenants Association 
described the consultative committees set up by the council as ‘double edged swords.’202 
They gave the activists access to information, but the council still controlled the agenda and 
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the flow of information. While activists gained a voice in the decision-making process, they 
felt that the council sometimes side-lined dissenting views in order to ‘diffuse “difficult” 
situations.’203 Activists were aware of the danger that consultative committees ‘could very 
easily be used as a bypass, to fob us off.’ As the work of the group became increasingly 
orientated around meetings, the activists noted that they began to lose the initiative and 
formal negotiating increasingly supplanted campaigning and grassroots organising as the 
key function of the group.204  Responding to the danger of incorporation, activists sought to 
emphasise their independence. This manifested itself in an effort to ensure their role in the 
history of the estate was not forgotten. Commenting on the celebrations planned for the first 
day of demolition, the Tenants Association held, ‘The press will say it is Leeds City 
Council who are demolishing. We need to show WHY they are demolishing, to show it is 
because of us.’205 When the day arrived, activists made their presence felt and ensured they 
were included in press reports. To some extent the risk of incorporation was a symptom of 
the group’s success. If community activism became less dynamic and more bureaucratic in 
the 1980s, the new partnership with the council brought activists closer to the decision-
making process and this delivered concrete results. Community activists had progressed 
from being outsiders in the policy making process and acquired something closer to insider 
status. 
 
Once the Tenants Association’s goals had the support of the council, it became clear very 
quickly that the key obstacle to realising its objectives lay in central government. 
Community activists worked in partnership with the council to apply pressure on central 
government to fund the replacement housing for Hunslet Grange tenants. Both sides stood 
to benefit from this partnership since the tenants lacked the resources to redevelop their site 
alone and the council hoped that the active support of a body of tenants would lend 
legitimacy to its appeal. However, in the fifteen years after the estate was built, and 
especially in the years after 1979, national housing policy had changed dramatically.206 
Public funding for new council house building had been massively curtailed and the 
council’s ability to borrow money or subsidise council housing from the rates had been 
restricted. As its own autonomy waned, the council had to resort to campaigning to generate 
resources. 
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The campaign was a co-ordinated effort by community activists, councillors and the local 
MPs for government funding to meet the costs of demolition and rebuilding. In June 1982 in 
Parliament, Merlyn Rees, the MP for South Leeds, argued that the government should 
accept responsibility for the costs of replacing Hunslet Grange since industrialised building 
programme had been encouraged by central government in the 1960s.207 In July 1982 a joint 
delegation of community activists and elected politicians from Leeds travelled to Whitehall 
to make the argument directly to central government.208 The government’s response to these 
delegations was dismissive. In July 1982, George Young, the Junior Housing Minister 
informed the joint delegation that Leeds should raise rents if it wanted to fund rehousing for 
tenants.209 The government contended that responsibility for the estate’s shortcomings lay 
with the council as the local authority had chosen the industrialised building system used to 
construct it. The Leeds campaign made a major tactical error in sending its delegation to 
Whitehall before its counterparts in Nottingham, Hill and Sheffield were ready, so activists 
from all the YDG estates were unable to put their case to government with one voice. But 
the central problem remained: community activists were swimming against the tide of 
housing policy. 210 In February 1983, Joe Dean another Leeds MP attempted to table a 
Private Members Bill which sought to ‘make provision for people living in industrialised 
and semi-industrialised built housing.’211 Dean estimated that the total national cost of such 
a programme would be £3 billion. Unsurprisingly, given the government’s commitments to 
reducing the council housing stock through privatisation and other means, his bill did not 
receive government support.  
 
In December 1984, the government announced further cuts in Leeds City Council’s 
Housing Investment Programme grant and placed additional limits on councils’ ability to 
use capital receipts to fund new building.212 This jeopardised the council’s proposal to 
replace Hunslet Grange with a new estate of almost 400 houses. The Tenants Association 
lobbied central government in support of the council’s proposals. In early 1985, Marilyn 
Steane wrote directly to the Environment Secretary, Patrick Jenkin, describing the 
government’s housing policy as ‘inhuman’ and accusing the government of thwarting the 
city’s plans for the Hunslet Grange site.213 Ultimately, the new partnership between the 
local authority and community was too politically weak to persuade central government to 
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release more funds or indeed to modify national housing policy. The city council was only 
able to build 36 of 375 houses planned for the site.214 These were let in mid-1987 and 
although 20 of these houses were let to former Hunslet Grange tenants, the majority of the 
tenants who had expressed an interest in returning to the site had been rehoused and settled 
elsewhere by the time the new estate was complete.215  
 
The activists’ vision of local authority funded and owned housing, built and managed with 
the active participation of tenants, stood in stark contrast to the government’s agenda on 
housing and urban renewal. It is possible that its alliance with a Labour council even 
reduced the Tenants Association’s bargaining power, since central government was keen to 
restrict the activities of allegedly high spending Labour authorities. In Liverpool community 
activists campaigning to establish new build housing co-operatives in the city clashed with 
the centralising Militant-led Labour council, which made it politically easier for them to 
find common ground with the Thatcher administration and secure central government 
funding.216 Where Labour councils had accommodated community activists, this distanced 
community action groups from the government. 
 
Community activists from Hunslet Grange remained active in networks in the mid-1980s. 
At a conference in February 1985 in Hulme, Manchester, Marilyn Steane, spoke to 
community activists from around the country on the lessons that might be learned from the 
Hunslet Grange campaign for tenants campaigning on system built estates.217 The members 
of the Yorkshire Development Action Group had been at the vanguard of campaigning for 
the demolition of system built estates and their experiences influenced campaigners in other 
parts of the country. Scores of system built estates were demolished in the 1980s and 1990s 
and in some areas, such as Hulme in Manchester, they were replaced with social housing.218  
In the late 1980s the Hunslet Grange site was transferred from the council to the Leeds 
Development Corporation (LDC) and it was sold to a private developer. Community groups 
were consulted on the LDC’s plans, but their influence was limited to commenting on a set 
of market-led options after the key decisions had been made.219 A private estate of 
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traditional low rise dwellings was built on the site in the early 1990s with a section of the 
development reserved for housing association units.220 This outcome was not a total defeat 
for community action, but it neatly summarised the post-Thatcherite contours of urban 
policy. 
 
After almost a decade of political marginality, community action campaign shaped the 
council’s approach to the estate in the early 1980s. Just as community action attained a 
position of unprecedented influence, a series of changes in national policy made its goals 
much harder to attain. Like community activists, the New Right had elaborated a critique of 
post-war housing policy and referred to estates like Hunslet Grange as evidence of the need 
for a new approach.221 Inspired by New Right ideas, the Thatcher governments 
implemented remedies that were quite different to those community activists had advocated. 
Owner occupation and private enterprise, not grassroots democracy and municipal 
enterprise, became the new guiding principles. Without state support, community action 
was hamstrung. At the heart of community activism was a paradox: although it presented a 
fundamental challenge to the organisation of the state, it continued to view state 
intervention and public resources as essential to realising its objectives. 
*** 
The history of activism on the Hunslet Grange estate is a valuable case study in the rise, 
evolution and decline of community action. The richness of the surviving source material 
has allowed us to construct a detailed account of grassroots organising on the estate, 
focusing in detail on individuals, relationships and the local context. We have also seen that 
community action on Hunslet Grange was not unique but resembled other campaigns in 
Leeds and beyond. This case study allows us to draw three main conclusions about the 
nature of community action. Firstly, community action was often a reaction to particular 
shortcomings of post-war policy. Many state interventions that had aimed to improve living 
standards often had the reverse effect. Existing political organisations were slow to respond 
to these issues, so community action filled the gap. Community activists organised not just 
over the material problems, but over political issues. They located the origin of problems 
that plagued Hunslet Grange not in particular building technologies but in systems of 
decision-making that excluded the users of housing from the construction and management 
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of the council housing stock. This was a challenge to the traditional model of representative 
democracy. They argued for a redistribution of power from elected councillors and 
professional officers to tenants and residents. In doing so, they challenged the traditional 
model of representative democracy that vested power and authority over the state in elected 
members.  
Secondly, community action was formed of a coalition of individuals and organisations 
from different backgrounds. It was a socially and politically diverse. It fused local 
knowledge and professional expertise. As activists encountered obstacles to achieving their 
goals they responded by forming wider alliances at a local and national level. Thirdly, 
community action was not inevitable despite the existence of these problems. It had to 
overcome political apathy, social instability and official disinterest. These barriers did not 
weaken over the long 1970s: if anything, they hardened. Despite these challenges, 
community activists did eventually wield influence over the council’s approach to Hunslet 
Grange. They persuaded the council to demolish the estate and to commit to redevelop the 
site in consultation with former residents. By the early 1980s, relations between community 
activists and the council had thawed and activists secured an insider role in policy making. 
However, shifts in government policy prevented community activists from realising their 
ultimate goal of building high quality, tenant-controlled public housing. They lacked 
influence at a national level. As the 1980s progressed, community action began to lose 
momentum as the government reduced the capacity of local councils to support community 
groups and community activists found it increasingly difficult to make allies at the national 
level.  
This chapter presents the thesis in microcosm: it has explored the nature of community 
action and outlined the narrative arc that will frame the remainder of the thesis. While this 
chapter has analysed community action within clearly defined spatial boundaries subsequent 
chapters will cast the net more widely, exploring community across Leeds. If, as we have 
seen, community action developed into a coherent and potent political force on a single 
estate, did it replicate this success across the whole city? Did neighbourhood community 
action campaigns collectively form a Leeds community action movement? 
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Chapter 2 
Contesting Clearance:  
Community Action and Housing Renewal 
 
This chapter uses the campaign in Leeds in the long 1970s against housing renewal policies 
and for a different approach to housing renewal to deepen our understanding of community 
action. This campaign offers a rich insight into the nature of community action and the 
reasons for its rise and decline. The first section begins by setting the scene, outlining 
housing renewal policies in mid-century Leeds and describing the local political culture in 
which they were developed and administered. It then explores the origins of the community 
action campaign against this set of policies, investigating the local and national reasons for 
the emergence of community action at this time. The second section examines the debate 
over housing policy in this period. It deepens our understanding of why this particular issue 
animated community activists and sheds light on the underlying principles that drove 
community action. The third section analyses the composition of community action groups 
to show who participated in community action. The fourth section picks up the narrative of 
the campaign from the first section; it investigates the impact of community action on 
housing renewal policy in the city. It focuses on particular local campaigns to show how 
community activists steered policy in an innovative direction. The fifth section qualifies the 
argument in section four by examining the limits of the community action campaign on 
housing renewal. It investigates why activists were unable to achieve many of their goals in 
the long term and considers the weaknesses of community action. This section closes by 
exploring the decline of the campaign in the 1980s. Throughout the chapter makes 
connections with campaigns elsewhere in urban Britain, considering the extent to which the 
Leeds case study is representative of activism on other issues and in other places. 
1. Housing renewal and the rise of community action 
Housing renewal refers to a set of policies which sought to revitalise the housing stock. For 
most of the twentieth century, this involved the complete demolition of older housing and 
its replacement with modern buildings. In large British cities like Leeds housing renewal 
was ubiquitous and pervasive between the 1920s and the 1980s.1 It affected whole urban 
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districts and the relationships between the people who lived there. Perhaps more than any 
other area of public policy in the twentieth century, it affected the most intimate areas of 
family and community life. From the late 1960s, housing renewal became one of the most 
important issues for community activists. Almost all the community action groups that 
feature in this thesis had some link to housing renewal. For many community action groups, 
it was their primary concern. They are the focus of this chapter. Community action 
surrounding housing renewal emerged as a reactive mobilisation of local activists who 
organised in response to policies and programmes imposed on neighbourhoods by external 
bodies. In order to understand the origins of this form of community action, it is necessary 
to understand those policies and programmes and the agencies that directed them. This 
section begins by outlining housing renewal policies in mid-century Britain and the political 
culture in which they were formulated and implemented.  
Housing renewal originated in the late nineteenth century when housing reformers argued 
that working class housing had a deleterious effect on public health and social norms.2  
They held that the only appropriate remedy was to replace it with new housing constructed 
to a higher standard guided by professional expertise. Local authorities received powers to 
clear slum housing from the 1890s, but in most cities, including Leeds, clearance action was 
limited and piecemeal before 1919.3 Housing legislation passed in the interwar decades 
granted local authorities wider powers to clear housing and provided finance for larger 
municipal building programmes.4 Large-scale clearance in Leeds did not begin until 1933 
following a grassroots campaign led by the priest, housing reformer and later city 
councillor, the Reverend Charles Jenkinson.5 The problem of slum housing was seen to be 
particularly acute in Leeds because the city’s housing stock contained an unusually large 
proportion of back-to-back houses, a housing type that housing reformers considered to be 
particularly inimical to public health [see Fig. 2.1-2.2]. Between 1933 and by 1939 the 
council cleared 15,000 properties and constructed 20,000 houses and flats.6 Due to the 
Second World War and the immediate post-war housing shortage, clearance did not resume 
until the mid-1950s when it was reprioritised by government. Between 1955 and 1961, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 Renewal (London, 1982) 18-49; Andrew Cox and David McKay, The Politics of Urban Change (London, 1979): 107-158 2 Gibson and Langstaff, Urban Renewal, 19-22; Alison Ravetz, The Government of Space: Town Planning in Modern Society (London, 1986): 20-25 3 LCC, Older Housing in Leeds: An Assessment of Redevelopment Potential and Priorities, 1971-1991, Volume 1: Survey and Analysis (Leeds, 1971): 6, 8; Gibson and Langstaff, Urban Renewal, 248-49 4 LCC, Older Housing, Volume 1, 8; Cox and McKay, The Politics of Urban Change (London, 1979): 110-115 5 Gibson and Langstaff, Urban Renewal, 248-52 6 Gibson and Langstaff, Urban Renewal, 251 
74  
10,000 houses were cleared and the programme was rolled forward to 1981. By 1971, a 
further 20,000 had been demolished.7  
Until the early 1960s, clearance was usually justified on the grounds that older housing was 
unfit for human habitation according to national legislation which established criteria for 
assessing the fitness of dwellings. From these origins as a component of public health 
policy, housing renewal was gradually reimagined as a pillar of the wider urban renewal 
project. Urban renewal was embraced enthusiastically by governments across the world in 
the post-war decades.8 It was animated by the idea that cities needed to be radically 
redeveloped to meet the social and economic demands of the modern world. This entailed 
not only the replacement of buildings and infrastructure, but the wider restructuring of the 
way urban space was organised to suit new forms of living, working and mobility.9 In 
addition to housing, urban renewal affected commercial districts, factories, public buildings, 
roads, utilities and recreational facilities. The urban renewal project precipitated community 
action on a range of issues. In Chapter 3, we discuss how community activists responded to 
other parts of the urban renewal project. Urban renewal sought ‘to modernise’ the image of 
Leeds in order to entice investment and retain highly skilled workers to enable Leeds to 
compete with ‘the high growth areas of the Midlands and South.’10 Older housing combined 
with ‘run-down factories and workshops, ugly cleared sites, abandoned railway land’ 
presented ‘a depressing and neglected prospect.’11 Project Leeds, a marketing initiative 
sponsored by the city council and the Chamber of Commerce assured investors that urban 
renewal would replace such vistas with symbols of modernity. Its brochure explained that 
New buildings born of new concepts are pushing their white rectangular columns into the sky. Dilapidated out-of-date dwellings and decaying industrial premises are falling before the bulldozer and making way for well-equipped up-to-date housing project and modern factories.12 
As housing renewal was incorporated into the urban renewal project, the public health 
criteria upon which housing clearance was traditionally justified were supplemented by a 
broader set of criteria. Clearance was recommended not only because older houses were 
structurally unfit or lacking in certain amenities, but because they were seen to be 
incompatible with the modern world by virtue of their age and built form.13 Older housing 
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and the built environment in which it was situated was classified as obsolete. In 1971, the 
city council summarised its philosophy at an exhibition on its clearance plans: 
When houses grow old they become…out-of-date in design, space, amenities and layout, and unsuited to the needs of modern living…Like cars, houses are wearing out continuously, and as we repair and replace cars, we must improve and replace houses. Houses built one hundred years ago when life was very different cannot possibly meet the needs of people in the late twentieth century, and this covers not just houses now unfit but those which are likely to become obsolete…14 
According to this view, the clearance programme had to be continually rolled forward, 
incorporating ever more of the older housing stock, as people’s expectations of what 
constituted modern housing continued to evolve. The need for clearance was also justified 
on social grounds. The council maintained that redevelopment would renew communities as 
well as buildings, reducing the level of social instability in the inner core by providing 
people with homes of which they could be proud.15 Recognising that the task of clearing all 
of the city’s obsolete and unfit housing would take several decades to complete, the council 
implemented a major improvement programme in the 1950s and 1960s to extend the life of 
older housing for fifteen years until it could be replaced.16 This policy was always intended 
as a temporary expedient. 
Since one of its main goals was to improve the housing conditions, housing renewal 
provided a key impetus for the large municipal house-building programme that began in 
the interwar years. The council offered council tenancies to almost all households in 
clearance areas and they were prioritised over applicants from the general waiting list. 
By 1962, the Council owned 44,000 dwellings on 72 estates.17 By the end of 1975, the 
council owned 88,773 housing units on housing estates.18 As we saw in Chapter 1, 
cleared sites in the inner city were increasingly used to build high density estates from 
the late 1950s [see Fig 2.4]. In inner north Leeds, a network of estates built on cleared 
land between Little London and Woodhouse stretching over 260 acres housed about 
18,000 people.19 Its stock also included the outlying Seacroft estate in east Leeds, built 
between the 1930s and the 1950s, which housed some 7000 families over 1000 acres [see 
Fig. 2.3].20 On these estates, the council was the sole landlord, with responsibility for 
management, maintenance and, within a national policy framework, rent levels. Renewal 
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transformed not only the built environment but the housing market and the role of local 
government.  
Housing renewal entailed intensive state intervention in the social and economic life of 
the inner city and in the individual lives of local people. A major contemporary study of 
slum clearance argued that  
[t]he clearance and redevelopment process [put] the ordinary citizen in a position of extreme dependence relative to his local authority…the Council decided not only that people [were] to leave their homes but where and in what conditions they [were] re-housed.21   
Housing renewal was planned and administered by local government officers on the 
basis of decisions made by elected councillors. Local political culture tended to militate 
against resident involvement in housing renewal. As the elected representatives of the 
people, councillors believed they had the right to oversee the process on behalf of their 
constituents. According to this view, only elected councils had a mandate to speak for the 
ward and any direct consultation had to take place through councillors. Councillors 
tended to assume that people were not interested in discussing policy issues. A planner 
who worked for Leeds City Council in the 1960s, recalled Labour councillors telling 
officials: '“Our constituents rely on us. They won’t turn up to meetings.”’22 It was widely 
believed that clearance and rehousing was a 'noble social cause,' which did not need to be 
debated.23  The council was satisfied that any change in public attitudes to housing 
renewal would manifest itself in local election results. In 1972, a policy document noted 
that the citizens of Leeds had consistently elected parties favouring high rates of 
clearance action for the last 17 years, which suggested there was no widespread 
opposition to the policy.24 
Until the 1960s, citizens had few means of influencing housing renewal outside local 
elections. Citizens were invited to comment on the local authority’s development plan, 
which provided the framework for planning decisions, which was subjected to a public 
inquiry. This only took place at fifteen year intervals and it was difficult for individuals 
to do anything more than criticise specific parts of the plan. Citizens had the right to 
object to compulsory purchase orders which were a key part of the administrative 
machinery of housing renewal. Public objections would be heard at a public inquiry. 
However, public inquiries focused on assessing the compatibility of the order with local 
planning policy: they did not seek ascertain whether the order enjoyed local support. The 
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quasi-legal proceedings were difficult to comprehend for the average citizen.25 Once the 
government had ruled on matter, their decision could only be appealed in the courts on 
procedural grounds.  
Despite this high level of largely unchecked state intervention there was no organised 
opposition to urban renewal in Leeds until the end of the 1960s. At the public inquiry for 
the Development Plan Review in 1969 there were only a handful of objections to the 
council’s clearance proposals.26 There is little evidence of critical opinion in the media 
before the 1970s: reports in the local and national press on the progress of housing 
renewal in Leeds were laudatory.27 Until 1969, the council heard no deputations from 
groups of residents concerning aspects of urban renewal.28 Objections to the council’s 
compulsory purchase orders (CPOs) were almost always submitted by property owners 
concerned with compensation levels. The principles behind urban renewal were rarely 
contested at the scores of public inquiries held over CPOs in this period.29 The main 
political parties in Leeds did not voice dissent on the issue of housing renewal. Labour 
and the Conservatives together held almost all the seats in the council in this period and, 
mirroring their national counterparts, they competed over who would clear the most 
slums or build the most houses. In 1965, the Labour boasted that it had done more work on 
slum clearance than any other English council. 30 The Liberal Party, which would later mount 
a sustained and comprehensive critique of urban renewal, held no seats on the city 
council until 1968 and thereafter only occupied a handful until the mid-1970s.31 
While the council undertook no surveys of public opinion on housing renewal policies 
before the 1970s, a number of academic studies reinforced the view that clearance and 
rehousing was broadly popular in the city. One 1963 study, based on 1040 households in 
official clearance areas, found 82 per cent of residents were in favour of moving, mainly 
due to the nature of the house and the district. Some two thirds of the sample wanted to 
move into council-owned accommodation.32 A similar study of four clearance areas in 
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winter 1968-69 offered no evidence of organised opposition to housing renewal.33 The 
author discovered evidence of dissatisfaction with the blighting effects of clearance and the 
opaque nature of the process, but this did not translate into organised opposition or even 
formal individual complaint.34 Both studies found a begrudging acceptance of these 
hardships and residents who were were pessimistic about their capacity to influence council 
policy.35 However, there was evidence of a shift in attitudes at the beginning of the next 
decade. In 1971, a study revealed that support for clearance was declining: the majority for 
clearance was wafer thin in the most recently declared clearance areas.36 This hinted at the 
major mobilisation over the council’s housing renewal programme that would emerge in the 
following year. 
At the opening of the 1970s, the council began to plan the housing renewal programme for 
the next twenty years. In late 1971, an officer report on the housing programme for the next 
two decades recommended a clearance rate of 2,300 houses per year between 1971 and 
1977 and 1,700 per year between 1978 and 1987.37 This option, termed Strategy D, required 
the council to clear all the houses previously identified for clearance action by 1977.38 
Subsequently, the programme would incorporate 17,000 houses that had not previously 
been earmarked for clearance. This would necessitate a council building programme of 
around 2,000 units per year for two decades. In January 1972, the full city council supported 
these proposals with little debate.39 The strategy, which epitomised the traditional approach 
to housing renewal, was the catalyst for an explosion of community action across the city in 
the early 1970s. This mobilisation would crystallise into a community action campaign 
around housing renewal.  
After Liberal councillors leaked the document to their constituents in Armley, news of 
Strategy D, as it was commonly known, spread rapidly around inner city Leeds. Public 
meetings were held in most of the areas scheduled for clearance at the initiative of church 
leaders, business owners and residents. Neighbourhoods that had never been organised 
formed community groups to lobby for improvement rather than demolition. Two local 
historians estimated that ‘there were more residents’ associations and groups formed in 
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1972 than in the previous quarter of a century.’40 In Woodhouse, the local Anglican vicar 
called a public meeting with an ‘unprecedented’ turnout of 450 people to discuss the impact 
of Strategy D.41 A group of Hunslet residents marched to the Civic Hall with the local vicar 
with placards reading “Hands off Hunslet” and “Save Our Homes”.42 The Woodhouse 
Community Association emerged from this meeting. In south Headingley, where Strategy D 
affected 900 homes, 200 people attended a public meeting called by a handful of local 
residents under the slogan, “Save Your Homes.”43 A petition from the meeting signed by 
1000 local people was sent to the council and, at a further public meeting, the South 
Headingley Community Association was formed. In those areas where community 
organising predated the Strategy D mobilisation, existing community groups began 
campaigning on the issue or helped to foster new action groups. In June 1972, the 
Chapeltown Community Association held a series of street meetings in the Gathornes and 
Giptons area to assess local feeling on clearance and redevelopment.44 The meetings 
revealed substantial opposition to clearance and a local action group was formed.45 In west 
Leeds, the established Belle Vue and Burley Community Association spearheaded the 
resistance to council proposals to clear the northern half of the Burley Lodge Road area.46 
One of the local reasons Strategy D proved a trigger for community action was that it 
extended the clearance programme into many of the neighbourhoods that had benefited 
from the council’s improvement policies since the 1950s. Some 8000 of the houses 
earmarked for clearance in the strategy were still eligible for improvement grants in 1972. 
Many more had been eligible for grant aided improvement in the past. Included in the 
clearance programme was older housing of a higher standard, including many through 
terraces and comparatively modern back-to-backs, built in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Unlike the older and unmodernised back-to-backs that had been 
demolished in earlier decades, the view that these properties were inherently obsolete was 
contentious as we shall see later. 
If the Strategy D document was the catalyst for the emergence of community action over 
housing renewal, the mobilisation had deeper roots. The remainder of this section will 
explore the wider context to the rise of community action and the intersection between local 
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and national trends. From mid-late 1960s, central government had begun to evaluate the 
mainstream approach to housing renewal. A key driver for this assessment was the 
economic context. 47 Housing renewal had been premised on constant economic growth and 
rising living standards, but the economic problems of the second half of the 1960s, 
beginning with the devaluation of sterling in 1967, began to undermine the economic base 
of the policy. Clearance and rehousing was expensive due to the costs of compulsory 
purchase, compensation, demolition, land acquisition and reconstruction. Rising interest 
rates made local authority borrowing more expensive and increased the cost of servicing 
debt on existing loans, forcing local authorities to raise rents. As unemployment began to 
reappear in expanding pockets in the early 1970s and the real value wages stagnate, new 
estates with their higher rent levels and greater transport costs became less attractive to 
prospective tenants. In response to the economic problems, the government sought to 
restrain expenditure on housing in this period. In the late 1960s, the government 
commissioned studies and demonstration projects to investigate cheaper approaches to 
revitalising older urban areas.48 These studies revealed that improving older residential 
areas was feasible, even though existing statutory tools were inadequate. 49 They also 
detected considerable latent local support for preserving existing communities and 
identified dissatisfaction with the way clearance was carried out. Research conducted 
independently of government reinforced these points, contributing to a growing consensus 
in academia and central government that the model of housing renewal required reform.50 
These studies informed the Housing Act 1969, which encouraged councils to issue 
improvement grants to owners of older property.51 The act created the General 
Improvement Area (GIA) which allowed councils to issue higher grants and undertake 
environmental work in designated areas. Two years earlier the Civic Amenities Act 1967 
had given local authorities additional powers to protect the existing urban fabric from 
private redevelopment by creating Conservation Areas.52 
The government’s policy review considered not only the content of renewal policies, but 
also the way policy was formulated. This was a response to the first stirrings of community 
action. From the early 1960s, organised community groups had begun to contest urban 
                                                          47 Malpass, Housing and the Welfare State, 94-96 48 Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Central Housing Advisory Committee, Our Older Homes: A Call for Action (HMSO, 1966); Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Old Houses into New Homes (HMSO, 1968), Cmnd. 3602 49 McKay and Cox, Politics of Urban Change, 58-62 50 English, et al., Slum Clearance, 36. See also: John Cullingworth, Housing in transition: A Case Study in the City of Lancaster (London, 1963) 51 Gibson and Langstaff, Housing Renewal, 64-65 52 McKay and Cox, Politics of Urban Change, 136 
81  
renewal projects on the grounds that policy makers had ignored the wishes of local people. 
The urban conservation movement voiced this argument in campaigns to preserve historic 
buildings. Such protests were initially most common in London and historic towns like 
York and Oxford, but they became more common throughout the country.53 In response, at 
the end of the 1960s the government passed legislation that sought to extend citizen 
participation in housing and planning policy. The Town and Country Planning Act 1968 
obliged councils to consult citizens when preparing structure plans.54 Councils were 
required to consult local residents in administering GIAs. In 1969, the Skeffington 
Committee, which had been commissioned by the government to investigate ways in which 
government could facilitate public participation in planning, published its report setting out 
how councils could promote citizen engagement.55 These changes in government policy and 
state discourses on the relationship between policy makers and citizens were a stimulus to 
the growth of community action, helping to explain why it spread so rapidly across urban 
Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The new emphasis on public participation gave 
people the licence to demand a greater role in policy making and provided statutory tools 
for community groups to engage with policy makers. New institutions and administrative 
procedures for participation and consultation created a space for community action.  
If national government had attempted to initiate a new approach to housing renewal, this 
transition still appeared distant in Leeds at the beginning of the 1970s. Like many local 
authorities, Leeds City Council was slow to adapt to these changes. Community action 
groups often emerged in the gap between government rhetoric on participation and 
rehabilitation and the administrative reality. One of the first instances of this in Leeds was 
in Burley in west Leeds. In 1968, the Burley Lodge Road area, a neighbourhood of back-to-
backs and through terraces, was selected for one of the government’s pilot projects in area 
improvement.56 The pilot was also designed to trial collaborative working between the local 
authority and local people. The recently formed Belle Vue and Burley Community 
Association tried to engage with the pilot but quickly became disillusioned.57 The council 
made few attempts to identify the views of local people, conducting an opinion survey after 
the scheme had begun. The measures implemented by the council, including certain road 
closures, were unpopular with local people. The rate of housing modernisation actually 
                                                          53 Alison Ravetz, Government of Space, 85-86 54 Alison Ravetz, Government of Space, 88-89 55 Ministry of Housing and Local Government, People and Planning: report of the Committee on Public Participation in Planning (HMSO, 1969) 56 Gibson and Langstaff, Urban Renewal, 263-4 57 Terry Flynn, letter to The Other Paper, No. 9, 13 February 1970, 3; Joint Working Party of Leeds Civic Trust and Belle Vue and Burley Community Association, ‘Burley: The Lessons of Improvement,’ (1972) 
82  
stalled during the course of the scheme. In 1972, the neighbourhood remained blighted by 
unimproved houses, vacant and vandalised buildings, poor quality pedestrian areas, dead 
trees, and the emergence of new traffic problems.58 It was condemned by one activist as 
‘exhibiting planning at its most perfunctory.’ 59 In that year, part of the area was actually 
reinserted into the clearance programme.  
Burley Lodge Road was formative for the then nascent community action campaign in 
Leeds. It revealed that official rhetoric on consultation often belied a lingering reluctance to 
modify existing procedures and implied the council still viewed improvement as a 
temporary expedient. Activists held that the failure of the scheme demonstrated the link 
between effective rehabilitation and resident involvement. One activist argued that 
‘improvement is a social as well as a physical thing, depending on willing co-operation 
between residents and planners’60 The experience of activists in Burley was repeated in 
Chapeltown, an area suffering from acute housing stress, where community activists 
campaigning for the neighbourhood to be given General Improvement Area status were 
rebuffed by the authority.61 The contradiction between trends in national policy and housing 
renewal in Leeds were confirmed when the council approved Strategy D. The strategy ruled 
out widespread improvement as a viable option and it had been produced in a closed 
environment. Rather than deterring community activists, these early frustrations made them 
more determined to press for change. As central government policy shifted towards 
improvement and participation, community activists were able to claim they were holding 
the government to account for its failure to follow national policy. 
One of the key reasons people formed new community action groups was that very few 
existing organisations voiced growing public disenchantment with housing renewal. While 
the policy had been broadly popular for many decades, political organisations were slow to 
respond to shifts in public opinion. The Labour party’s network of ward organisations did 
not dissent from the Labour leadership’s line on housing renewal. Indeed, Labour 
councillors in inner city wards were usually enthusiastic proponents of clearance and 
rehousing. Voluntary organisations that were active in the inner city did not engage 
critically with housing renewal, nor voice concerns they may have encountered in their 
work with social or recreational bodies. Until the 1970s, voluntary organisations such as the 
Leeds Council for Social Service and the Leeds Council of Community Relations 
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considered such issues to be political and outside of their remit. The trade unions took very 
little interest in community issues in this period, focusing their energies on the workplace 
and the issue of housing renewal was no exception.62 The failure of political parties, 
voluntary bodies and political parties to engage critically with issues like housing renewal 
generated a need for new political organisations when popular discontent began to grow.  
Discontent with particular policies such as housing renewal was compounded by a wider 
dissatisfaction with the increasing complexity and inaccessibility of local government. This 
applied to each of the campaigns we examine in this thesis on council housing, renewal and 
transport. In 1969, Terry Flynn of the Belle Vue and Burley Community Association 
summarised this view in observing that ‘at a time when local authorities are becoming more 
remote from the people, community and tenants’ associations have a vital role to play in the 
life of the community’ by helping individuals ‘to cut through the red tape which is eroding 
confidence in the local authorities.’63 People turned to community action not only because 
other organisations were not articulating their concerns, but because they felt the council 
was unlikely to listen to them otherwise. Community action was a response to poor 
channels of communication between local government and citizens and an attempt to 
strengthen those channels. 
If community action groups filled a political vacuum they did not do so without help. The 
first community activists were supported by two more established organisations: the Leeds 
Liberal party and the Leeds Civic Trust. The Liberals were a dormant political force in 
Leeds in the post-war period until the late 1960s when the party’s fortunes were revived by 
handful of dynamic Liberal activists and councillors. This was a nationwide phenomenon 
associated with the brief Liberal revival of the period and the popularity of the Young 
Liberals.64  Michael Meadowcroft, the leader of the Liberal group in Leeds in the 1970s, 
and his colleagues were advocates of community politics, an approach to local politics in 
which party activists forged links with community groups and participated in local 
campaigns – an approach Meadowcroft defended in response to criticism from other 
parties.65 Meadowcroft supported decentralising decision-making as far as possible, arguing 
in 1975 that ‘power should be exercised as close to the people and at the lowest possible 
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level of government.’66 The party won seats in Labour heartlands like in Armley and 
Hunslet, partly by capitalising on disillusionment with housing clearance as they were able 
to present themselves as the only opponents of the policy on the council.67 As we saw 
above, in February 1972, Liberal councillors helped to ignite the grassroots mobilisation by 
leaking the Strategy D document to their constituents in Armley, an act which incensed 
Labour and the Conservatives as the document was meant to be confidential.68 While the 
Liberals did not lead community action, they acted as a political sponsor on the council 
where they gave voice to a different perspective on housing renewal. The Liberals raised 
numerous motions in the city council which sought to modify aspects of the programme. 69 
Liberal councillors also pressed the council to consult with affected communities in advance 
of making decisions on clearance.70  
 
The Leeds Civic Trust also assisted in the development of community action. Founded in 
Leeds in 1965, the Trust was part of the national urban conservation movement which 
developed in London in the late 1950s.71 During its first five years, the Trust concentrated 
its activities on campaigning to preserve prestigious historic buildings in the city centre 
from redevelopment driven by speculative office building. In the early 1970s, the Trust was 
steered in a more radical direction by some of its younger members, such as Alison Ravetz 
and Parry Thornton, who argued that the Trust should interpret its role more widely, 
broadening its focus beyond and campaigning on housing and transport issues.72 Thornton 
held that housing should concern the Trust as a conservation issue and a social issue.73 
Contact between the Trust and community groups based in inner city neighbourhoods was 
first made at Burley Lodge where activists collaborated with the Belle Vue and Burley 
Community Association to contest the council’s approach to improvement.74 The Trust co-
financed a report on Burley Lodge Road by a team of planning consultants, which lent 
weight to the activists’ case.75 Over the 1970s, the Trust, provided financial aid and 
professional advice to community activists and made 'representations to the Council' on 
their behalf, leveraging its reputation as a respectable institution. 76 In return, several 
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community action groups affiliated to the Trust. Both the Leeds Civic Trust and the Liberal 
Party helped to counteract the centrifugal forces of community action by providing a 
citywide perspective and linking groups together, as we shall explore later.  
Finally, the rise of community action should be understood in the context of a wider process 
of politicisation and the rise of new forms of political organisation in this period. The late 
1960s and early 1970s witnessed the rise of feminism, gay liberation and black power.77 It 
was also a period of intensifying trade union militancy and student radicalism. Tenants 
became increasingly politicised in this period through a series of campaigns against rent 
rises and government reforms to rental policy. London and Sheffield in particular witnessed 
major tenant mobilisations in the late 1960s over rent rises and rent rebates.78 These 
campaigns climaxed in the early 1970s in a national wave of tenant organisation against the 
government’s legislative proposals for ‘Fair Rents’.79 In Leeds there were protests against 
rent rises on several council estates in this period.80 There was also an upsurge in industrial 
militancy in the city and student protests at the University of Leeds.81 People were inspired 
by these political mobilisations to organise and take action over issues where they might 
otherwise have remained silent. The deference and pessimism, which had characterised 
social attitudes in the immediate post-war era, especially in working-class communities, 
was waning. Commenting on this trend, one Leeds activist suggested that ‘people are 
slowly getting used to the idea that they do have rights, that they can demand instead of 
beg.’82  
The city council’s initial response to the explosion of community opposition to Strategy D 
was dismissive and indicative of the municipal paternalism that angered community 
activists. Frank Marshall, the leader of the council, framed the issue in party political terms, 
accusing the Liberals of trying to ‘inflame the minds of the people by what they are pleased 
to call community politics.’83 His response suggested the council had failed to understand 
the nature of community action and the grievances that drove it. The new community 
activists did not view the debate over housing renewal in party political terms. Few action 
groups were formally affiliated with any party. Instead, the main cleavage was between the 
local political establishment, who supported the existing housing renewal policy, and 
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organised groups of people who opposed it. The leak of the Strategy D document activated 
latent public disenchantment with the secretive, top-down approach to policy-making in the 
city. Writing about the grassroots mobilisation in May 1972, a member of the Leeds Civic 
Trust observed that ‘underlying the specific issues is a deep resentment at being “left out” 
by the planners.’84  
This section has explored the broader context to the rise of community action and the short 
term causes of the explosion in community organising over housing renewal in the early 
1970s in Leeds. Housing renewal fundamentally altered the landscape of Leeds and 
transformed the lives of a significant proportion of the city’s population. The policy was 
broadly popular for several decades, but residents of affected areas began to organise 
against clearance proposals in the early 1970s. It was not only the physical effects of the 
policy that drove community action, but the political ramifications of an approach to urban 
renewal with very little popular involvement. The rise of community action must be 
understood in the context of wider political changes. New social movements were 
challenging assumptions about the relationship between the state and its citizens. Economic 
shifts undermined the assumptions of mid-century urban policy. Central government was 
remarkably responsive to these changes, but local government proved more lethargic, 
creating a conflict between popular expectations and the local reality. Leeds City Council 
chose to persist with the orthodox approach to housing renewal despite mounting opposition 
to it. Community action developed to fill a political vacuum in which dissenting views on 
housing policy and the role of local government were rarely voiced. From its inception, 
however, community action drew strength from alliances with organisations that shared its 
values. 
 
2. The case against clearance and rehousing 
The rise of community action in Leeds around housing renewal was reflective of wider 
national trends. Community action groups were formed in all large British cities affected by 
clearance programmes at this time and there were particularly significant community action 
campaigns against clearance in Manchester, Nottingham and Newcastle.85 This section will 
explore the community activists’ argument against the council’s housing renewal policies. It 
will analyse the four distinct components of this case to illustrate the issues on which the                                                           84 LCT, Outlook, No. 1, May 1972, 1 85 Sydney Jones ‘Community Action in a Glasgow Clearance Area: Consensus or Conflict?’ in Peter Leonard, The Sociology of Community Action (1975); Jan O’Malley, The Politics of Community Action: A Decade of Struggle in Notting Hill (1976) 119-163; Ray Gosling, ‘St Anne’s Nottingham,’ in Anne Lapping, Community Action (1970); S. Baine, Community Action and Local Government (1976); Peter Shapely, The Politics of Housing (2008)  
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debate turned. Examining these arguments in detail will also help us to understand the ideas 
that motivated community action more generally. It will offer insight into the different 
constituencies that constituted community action, a theme which will be explored in more 
depth in the following section. 
 
The first pillar of the argument against established renewal policies was premised on a 
positive approach to the value of the older housing stock and of older inner city 
neighbourhoods in general. Activists rejected the notion that certain types of older housing 
were automatically unfit for human habitation or obsolete, simply because of their design 
and layout. Most back-to-back housing, they claimed, was structurally sound and could be 
improved to modern standards.86 These claims were corroborated by architects 
commissioned by community action groups to investigate the older housing; one report on 
Cross Streets in Armley illustrated the ways in which back-to-backs could be modernised 
and retrofitted.87 Indoor toilets could be installed in cellars and attic could be converted into 
additional bedrooms with dormer windows. These studies also showed that rehabilitation 
was more cost-effective than redevelopment.88  Since the late 1950s, the council itself had 
demonstrated that it was possible to retrofit back-to-backs to meet modern standards of 
ventilation.89 The council’s own improvement programme had modernised thousands of 
back-to-backs and through terraces. 90 The groups accepted that selective demolition might 
sometimes be necessary but they rejected the need to clear multiple blocks simultaneously 
simply to create a more convenient development site.91  
The physical case for retaining older housing was reinforced by a social one. Activists 
turned upon its head the argument that clearance would improve the welfare of the residents 
of older areas, arguing that older housing performed a vital social function. Ravetz 
maintained that older neighbourhoods 
provide shelter, jobs, services and informal social support structures for…the aged, the infirm, the unemployed, the poor, including the poor with families of young children [and] the young, single people, particularly students.92 
Older housing was attractive to many households because it was affordable. Rent and 
heating costs were low, and back-to-backs were easy to clean.93 Low rents allowed elderly 
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households to remain financially self-sufficient without relying on supplementary benefits 
or rent rebates.94 Families on low incomes, students, recent migrants, single people and 
childless couples were drawn to older housing because it was cheap, accessible, easy to 
maintain and located in neighbourhoods with plenty of services. Council housing, which 
was generally designed for couples with children, was not readily accessible for these 
groups.95 The plight of lone parents in the 1966 film ‘Cathy Come Home’ illustrated vividly 
how it was possible for needy groups to fall through the gaps in public housing provision.96 
As smaller households constituted a growing proportion of the overall housing market, 
activists argued that older terraced housing would become more not less valuable. 97 
Clearance usually resulted in a net decrease in the overall housing stock as high density 
terraces were replaced with vacant sites and, several years later, lower density council 
estates.98 Households who did not qualify for council housing were thus forced to compete 
over an ever dwindling stock of cheaper private rental housing. 99 In their study of Burley 
Lodge Road in 1973, Hancock and McKie found that whilst families with children and 
young married couples might benefit overall from clearance and redevelopment, other 
household types in the area would not.100 For these reasons, activists argued that traditional 
housing renewal exacerbated the crisis in housing.   
The low cost of back-to-backs afforded working-class households, who could not afford a 
mortgage on a newer property, the opportunity to purchase housing. These working class 
owner-occupiers, many of whom were middle-aged or retired, were unlikely to find 
replacement private housing outside a clearance area at a price they could afford.101 When 
an area of back-to-backs was redeveloped, activists argued that 'most of the owner 
occupiers...displaced are unable to afford to purchase another property and are thus forced 
into rented accommodation.'102 For younger couples, a back-to-back could be their first rung 
on the housing ladder; as their income rose and the family expanded, they could upgrade to 
a larger property, such as a through terrace or semi-detached house.103 Underlying this 
argument was the principle that the fitness or suitability of a house or an older 
neighbourhood should be judged by the person who was living in it or who might choose to 
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live in it. The council, they argued, could not presume to understand what everyone wanted 
nor could a rigid policy cater for a diverse range of preferences.  
The second component of the case against housing renewal concerned the wider social 
impact of clearance and redevelopment. Community activists argued that housing clearance 
would destroy stable communities in inner city neighbourhoods. Whether or not we accept 
the historical reality of community in older urban areas, community activists were adamant 
that their neighbourhoods contained communities and they wanted to preserve them. It was 
this perception that informed this part of the case against official housing policy. In their 
petitions, letters and deputations, community action groups frequently referred to 
‘community spirit,’ a ‘sense of community’ and ‘our community.’ Most groups included the 
word ‘community’ in the name of their group to emphasise this point. One action group 
maintained that ‘Armley is a close knit community’ where ‘the community is a way of 
life.’104 A spokesman for a group in Hunslet spoke of the ‘well-established human 
relationships and the good neighbourliness of West Hunslet.’105 The Ebors Action Group’s 
social survey concluded that residents ‘feel a part of the community, a community which 
has roots going back many years, and in which they can have a full and rich life.’106 In 
asserting the sense of community in inner city neighbourhoods, activists rejected the 
council’s claim that the areas scheduled for redevelopment were socially unstable and in 
decline. 
Activists understood community as a dense social network of friends, neighbours and 
relatives, living in a particular geographical area often for a long period of time. A 
community group in Hunslet advised the council that the ‘community spirit’ in the area 
resulted from ‘continuity of family, relatives, friends and environmental associations.’107 A 
community group in Hyde Park explained the sense of community arose from the fact that 
‘over half the households in the area had lived there for over fifteen years.108 This point was 
echoed by a resident of the Ebors area who claimed that ‘there is a well-developed 
community spirit in among the people – many lived in the district most of their lives and 
brought up their families here.’ Community also implied supportive networks of mutual aid. 
The Woodhouse Housing Action Group quoted a longstanding resident of the area who 
described the community in the following terms: 
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Young people in the areas marrying other young people in the area and living within shouting distance of mum and dad. The young bride had someone to run to when the Yorkshire pud wouldn't rise...Grandma could feel secure and still wanted as a babysitter...There is always someone to 'look after my key, the gasman's coming today' or who will keep their eye on a sick neighbour when their family has to go to work.109   If this was a somewhat romanticised depiction of urban communities, it was nonetheless a 
powerful and emotive image, and one that resonated with many campaigners. Idealised 
images of community such as this one were frequently deployed by activists. Activists 
appealed to policy makers to consider older urban areas not simply in terms of housing 
standards and street layouts, but as living neighbourhoods. If some descriptions of 
community were couched in nostalgic accounts of bygone days, activists did not always 
depict community as static or ethnically homogenous. A longstanding resident of the Ebors 
area observed that recent commonwealth migrants in the area ‘get on well with their 
neighbours and have been gently absorbed into our community to our mutual benefit.’110 
That inner city neighbourhoods had proved to be adaptable and flexible in an era of mass 
migration was presented as another reason to preserve them. 
According to community activists, clearance not only threatened to fragment and disperse 
the people that constituted these social networks, it also destroyed the physical 
infrastructure that had aided the development of community. The intimacy of the built 
environment and the abundance of local amenities, they claimed, underpinned community 
by facilitating regular social interaction between neighbours. One report held that ‘[t]he 
design of the old terraced houses where the street was seen as common property and all 
houses were overlooked encouraged people to get to know each other.’111 Echoing this 
view, activists in Woodhouse emphasised this close link between the fabric of older areas 
and community: they described ‘neighbours chatting over back walls, thriving corner shops 
and adults and kids sitting out on door steps ‘til late in the evening.’112 A range of other 
neighbourhood institutions – pubs, shops clubs, churches and local schools – functioned as 
key nodes in the community; they were places where people, particularly elderly residents, 
met and talked.113   
The threat to community often preceded the bulldozer by several years as the blighting 
effects of zoning an area for clearance drove away many longstanding residents. The 
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clearance of neighbouring areas deprived a district of people and amenities, leaving behind 
derelict sites that were often left undeveloped for decades.114 The scale of change was too 
great and the length of time it took to clear and rehouse a neighbourhood meant it was hard 
to keep neighbours together. 115 Despite the scale of the challenge activists believed that 
community could be restored if the threat of clearance was lifted and confidence returned to 
the area. Campaigning itself had strengthened community ties in the area. Activists in south 
Headingley maintained that the formation of a Community Association to fight produced ‘a 
growing sense of community spirit involving all the different groups, including students, 
young people, old people [and] immigrants.’116 As we saw in Chapter 1, the formation of a 
community in adversity often underpinned community action as people came together to 
tackle common problems.  
The third pillar of the case against the policy emphasised the value of the structure and built 
form of the older parts of the city and contrasted this against more modern council 
developments. Community activists praised the quintessentially urban qualities of older 
neighbourhoods. Street frontages were legible with doors opening onto a clearly defined 
street. The geometric street pattern made neighbourhoods highly permeable for pedestrians. 
There was an abundance of shops, small businesses, pubs, clubs and other social facilities 
within easy walking distance of people’s homes.117 Owing to their high density, older 
neighbourhoods enjoyed high quality public transport links. Car ownership was not a 
requirement to travel around the city. Although the streets themselves usually lacked 
greenery, older neighbourhoods were usually well-served with traditional parks, recreation 
grounds or areas of common land.118 Older neighbourhoods were almost invariably located 
close to the city centre, with its abundant commercial and leisure amenities, and close to the 
city’s industrial belt where many residents worked.119 The popularity of the inner city was 
visible in the long waiting lists for tenancies on certain inner city council estates: many 
households were prepared to wait in order to gain a flat or maisonette close to the city 
centre when houses were available immediately on suburban estates.120 This was little 
consolation for community activists protesting clearance who were aware that they were 
more likely to be rehoused on peripheral estates where most council housing was located. 
                                                          114 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 8 July 1972, 396-7 115 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 8 March 1972, 396-7 116 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 2 May 1973, 546-8 117 CSHAG, Cross Streets, 24; LCC, Verbatim Reports, 8 March 1972, 391-2 118 CSHAG, Cross Streets, 4 119 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 8 March 1972, 391-2 120 LCC, Quarterly Report of the Department of Housing, 31 March 1975, 6-7  
92  
If community activists were advocates of traditional urbanism, they were also highly critical 
of the new urban landscape that was designed to replace older neighbourhoods. A key 
criticism was that most council housing was built on the city’s periphery, far away from the 
amenities of the city centre and from places of work. Since only a small minority of council 
tenants in Leeds had access to a car in the 1970s, residents became heavily dependent on the 
bus services, which were less frequent in outlying areas. Women, the elderly and low 
income families, who were even less likely have access to a car, were at a particular 
disadvantage on the peripheral estates.121 Peripheral council estates were usually built to 
much lower densities than inner city communities so they were unable to support as wide a 
range of social and commercial amenities; this problem was exacerbated by the high rents 
charged by the council in new shopping parades and the dearth of shopping units. Estates 
increasingly became dependent on large centralised district shopping centres, anchored by 
supermarkets. While most council estates contained an abundance of green space compared 
to the inner city, this was often unimaginatively laid out and not particularly attractive. One 
report argued that the peculiar combination of high rise buildings, winding roads and large 
grassy spaces on the new estates ‘makes getting to know your neighbours that much more 
difficult.’122 Tall flats were associated with loneliness and social isolation, especially among 
the elderly.123 Low rise estates designed according to Radburn principles, which segregated 
pedestrians and vehicles, were criticised for abandoning the traditional streets for a 
confusing maze of footpaths and service roads.  
The widely publicised physical and social problems on many council estates undermined 
the status of council housing. Stories of dampness, infestations, high heating costs, 
vandalism, dereliction, and child delinquency became increasingly common in the 1970s.124  
Though the media popularised these negative images, these issues were initially highlighted 
by community activists organising on council estates as we saw in Chapter 1. Social and 
physical problems not only affected the high density modernist estates of the 1950s and 
1960s, they were also endemic on many of the city’s low density interwar cottage estates 
where the housing stock was in a poor state of repair after decades of under-investment and 
many homes lacked modern electric wiring and central heating. Allocations policies which 
concentrated disadvantaged families on certain estates exacerbated social problems. The 
prestige of council housing was dealt a heavy blow in late 1973 when the council decided to 
demolish the Quarry Hill estate in central Leeds less than forty years after it had been 
                                                          121 Leeds Trades Council, Which Way, 16 122 Leeds Trades Council, Which Way, 16 123 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 8 March 1972, 391-2 124 Leeds Civic Trust, Outlook, No. 12, May 1976, 4-5 
93  
built.125 Activists drew on this body of evidence to argue that moving to council housing 
would not automatically raise their living standards. This point was underlined by stories of 
households who had moved from back-to-back housing in the inner city to council housing 
only to find the latter in a worse state of repair.126 Turning on its head the argument that the 
architecture of the new estates would have an edifying effect on their inhabitants, one action 
group held that ‘[t]he seedy Seacroft centre epitomises the sterility of new areas with their 
drug-taking, crime and delinquency.’127 The familiarity and stability of many older 
neighbourhoods was juxtaposed against the social dislocation already evident on new 
estates. 
The final component of the case against the council’s policies drew together the first three 
strands to craft a political argument against the way housing renewal was carried out. As we 
saw earlier, the policy making process and the mode of implementation did not enable 
anything more than perfunctory resident involvement. Underlying their arguments about the 
importance of older housing and inner city neighbourhoods was the view that the value of 
such areas could only be determined by those who lived there. As a petition to the council 
put it, ‘[t]he fitness of a house can be judged best by the consumer…therefore there should 
be no demolition in advance of residents’ wishes.’128 A group in Castleton developed this 
point, arguing that communities should have the ‘right to determine the housing and 
facilities in which they live.’129 As we saw earlier, for community activists the experience of 
Burley Lodge Road reinforced the view that any alternative to clearance would only 
succeed if the local people were closely involved in its implementation.130  
The democratic deficit in policy making mattered to activists because they disagreed with 
the prevailing policy. They had to challenge the council’s claim that the policy had the 
backing of the people affected by it by showing that clearance was unpopular and people 
wanted a new approach. To do this, activists undertook surveys of local opinion and 
publicised the results. The Cross Streets Housing Action Group conducted a survey with the 
assistance of students from Leeds Polytechnic, which revealed that 80 per cent of residents 
opposed clearance and wanted to remain in the area.131 Similar surveys organised by groups 
in Woodhouse, Hunslet and Park revealed majorities of between 70 and 80 per cent 
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opposing clearance. 132 While it is difficult to assess how methodologically rigorous these 
polls were, they were powerful political tools, which served to emphasise the perceived gap 
between public policy and community opinion. 
In making these arguments, community activists were rejecting the model of representative 
democracy according to which elected councillors made major policy decisions on behalf of 
their constituents without actively consulting with them. They were challenging the role of 
council officers in policy making who, according to activists, exerted undue influence over 
the urban renewal process. The Woodhouse Community Association told the council that ‘it 
is the planners who really rule.’133 Officers were often portrayed as detached from the 
experiences of inner city communities, motivated by their professional interests not the 
concerns of ordinary people. The Community Housing Working Party claimed that the 
problems encountered by community activists in Stourton were ‘a classic example of 
planners disrupting a community by applying solutions from above to problems which 
largely exist in their own eyes.’134 Since officers were ‘trained to operate and think 
according to national, generalised standards,’ they were not always sensitive to the 
particular needs of every community.135  
The argument that inner city communities should have a greater role in policy making was 
sometimes framed in terms of class and locality. Activists maintained that a largely middle-
class group of councillors and officers who mainly resided in the outer suburbs were 
attempting to impose decisions on the largely working-class populations of the inner city. 
The struggle over housing renewal was frequently presented as a contest between north and 
south Leeds or between the outer suburbs and the inner city. Remarking on the dereliction 
and neglect that characterised Hunslet, a speaker for a community group from the area 
asked: ‘Would it have been left thus in Headingley, Weetwood or Alwoodley?’136 Fractious 
encounters between community activists and councillors brought out similar grievances. 
After a meeting between councillors and the Ebors Action Group, one activist complained 
that ‘if this is the sort of person that Far Headingley, Roundhay, Alwoodley and Moortown 
breed, then they should stay there and stop vandalising delightful areas like the Ebors.’137 
The implication was that the people who actually lived and worked in inner city 
neighbourhoods, rather than those who purported to represent them, should play a greater 
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role in their governance. As community action expanded, activists explicitly called for 
greater public participation in policy-making. Below, we shall examine the ways in which 
activists endeavoured to put these ideas into practice. The key point here is that the 
community activists’ case against housing renewal was as much an argument for a different 
model of urban governance as it was a case against a particular approach to housing 
renewal.  
This section has developed three interlinked points. First, community activists constructed a 
broad range of arguments surrounding housing renewal. The case against the city’s housing 
policies valorised the city’s older housing stock and the traditional inner city 
neighbourhoods in which it was located. They stressed the material and social benefits of 
the older urban fabric. Second, community activists campaigning on housing renewal were 
concerned not only with urban preservation, but with challenging the way the city was 
governed. The way housing policy was formulated was presented as symptomatic of a wider 
democratic deficit. This, they argued, could be addressed as part of a more participatory 
approach to housing renewal. Third, community activists developed sophisticated 
arguments, based on detailed evidence and research. They conducted investigations 
themselves, commissioned professional help and made recourse to work in other cities. In 
doing so, they challenged the empirical base on which the city council defined the city’s 
problems and proposed solutions. 
3. Who were the activists? 
Having explored the debate over housing renewal and the policy making process, we can 
now examine who participated in community action campaigns. Few community action 
groups in Leeds had a formal membership system and the membership records created by 
some have not survived. As such, this discussion is based on biographical information 
contained in a range of other sources. Community action groups were organised by a 
relatively small group of core activists who drew on the support of a larger section of the 
neighbourhood, but it is not always possible to distinguish between the core activists and 
sympathetic members of the community. 
The most committed community activists were often those who felt a strong connection to 
their neighbourhood. This could be because they had lived there for several decades and in 
that time made various investments in the area. Elderly tenants, many of whom had lived in 
their area for several decades, were also particularly active in community groups. A 
deputation from the Whingate Community Association to the council consisted of activists 
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who had lived in the area for between 40 and 60 years.138 As we have seen, elderly tenants 
and owner occupiers had a clear financial incentive to remain in older property. Owner 
occupiers were particularly active in the groups. In many inner city districts, owner 
occupation rates were as high as one third, but unlike their suburban counterparts inner city  
owner occupiers owners were usually on low incomes and their property had a low market 
value.139 Working-class owner-occupiers tended to be middle-aged or retired and they had 
often invested their life savings to acquire and modernise their small property. Many had 
benefited from local authority mortgages as private finance was hard to obtain in the inner 
city.140 As long-time residents of their neighbourhoods, working-class owner-occupiers had 
made a significant financial, social and emotional investment in their area and in its future.  
Women were well-represented in community action groups. Whilst men were often selected 
as the titular leaders of the groups, women often did the bulk of the organising.141 Women 
were often more deeply immersed in the social life of their neighbourhood than local men; 
they established friendships with their neighbours and felt a greater sense of community. 
Women were responsible for maintaining the household and many women saw community 
action over housing issues as a logical extension of this role. It is no coincidence that many 
of the men who were involved with community action worked or had an economic interest 
in the immediate neighbourhood. Local shopkeepers helped to found the Belle Vue and 
Burley Community Association.142  They had a clear vested interest in preserving and 
improving the neighbourhood. Commercial streets were often cleared along with local 
housing and shopkeepers found it difficult to re-establish their business on council estates 
where rents were significantly higher and population densities lower. If their business 
survived, their consumer base would be eroded by the centrifugal effects of clearance. 
Many inner city neighbourhoods contained a mixture of households who were settled and 
relatively comfortable and those who were highly transient and very poor. As a council 
report explained ‘stability and instability are found side by side’ in the inner ‘redevelopment 
zone,’ ‘but all parts are liable to change.’143 The backbone of community action groups was 
the stable section of the community. The presence of a critical mass of such households was 
a pre-condition for community action. Community action was less common in the most 
acutely deprived areas of the inner city where social problems – overcrowding, illiteracy, 
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child delinquency, children in care – were particularly common; but it was more common in 
the ‘fringe’ or ‘marginal’ areas of deprivation in the inner city – areas with high 
concentrations of old housing and households on modest incomes but fewer social 
problems.144 The transient and acutely deprived component of the inner city population – 
families on very low incomes, young single people and other itinerant households – were 
politically apathetic. Whilst community action groups advocated for this section of the 
population in arguing for the retention of low cost, accessible housing within easy reach of 
work and services, the groups rarely received their active support. 
Ethnic minorities were poorly represented in most community action groups. Areas such as 
Burley, Harehills and Woodhouse contained large numbers of new commonwealth 
immigrants, but they do not appear to have participated in the local action groups in large 
numbers before the 1980s. While there is no evidence that the groups held racist views, 
most made few attempts to reach out to ethnic minorities. Ethnic minority participation in 
community action groups in areas such as Harehills and south Headingley did increase in 
the late 1970s and 1980s as immigrant households became more established in the area and 
perhaps began to identify with the objectives of local community action groups.145 
Chapeltown was the key exception in that ethnic minority participation in community action 
was significant from the late 1960s. The Chapeltown Community Association’s 
membership was broadly representative of the area’s ethnically diverse population: in 1972, 
on the CCA’s ruling council, one member was a Sikh, four were born in the West Indies, 
one in Ireland and nine in England.146 An action group in the Gathornes and Giptons area of 
Chapeltown, which was threatened with clearance, was ethnically diverse.147 Despite this, 
one CCA member believed some of the CCA groups needed to do more ‘to increase their 
representativeness.’148 
The community action campaign against clearance was more than a ‘working class protest 
rebellion.’149 Most community action groups in Leeds were the product of a creative 
partnership between people of working-class origin and people from a more privileged 
socioeconomic background who supported their objectives. Community action gained much 
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of its strength from the active input of confident, well-informed and well-educated citizens 
who possessed political and professional contacts and lent their expertise. Many of these 
individuals were drawn from the progressive wing of the disciplines of architecture, 
planning, social work, community work and housing management.150 They were 
professionally committed to developing a new approach to housing policy that prioritised 
resident participation and rehabilitation. They were interested in the capacity of the older 
built environment to support communities and to meet the needs of various marginalised 
social groups. They undertook research, consulted national policy documents, and wrote 
reports. Citywide groups like the Leeds Civic Trust acted as a clearing house for 
professionals wishing to support local action groups. Students from the Polytechnic on 
courses in these disciplines were often willing helpers, producing a report for activists in 
Chapeltown, for instance.151  
The emerging field of community work was a key source of middle-class support for 
community action groups in the inner city. Community workers were employed by local 
voluntary organisations, often with public funding, to support the development of 
community organisations that would support the efforts of public and voluntary agencies to 
tackle various social problems. As we shall see in Chapter 4, community workers at the Hall 
Lane Community Centre stimulated and supported community action over housing renewal 
in Armley.152  Keith Mollison, the SCAT worker whose work in Hunslet we examined in 
Chapter 2, offered planning and housing advice to community activists in Chapeltown who 
were campaigning against clearance and formulating a response to the council’s local plan 
consultation.153 Barbara Craig and her colleagues at the Hunslet Parish Community Work 
Project, whose work with the Hunslet Grange activists we analysed in Chapter 1, supported 
several action groups in Hunslet campaigning against housing clearance.154 Community 
workers also helped to link together different community action groups. Barbara Craig and 
Keith Mollison became members of the Leeds Community Workers Group, which enabled 
community workers from around Leeds to share information and co-ordinate campaigns on 
issues like housing improvement and fuel poverty.155  
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The professional, middle-class members or supporters of community action groups were not 
necessarily outsiders in the sense that they lived outside the area affected by clearance 
policies. Many inner-city neighbourhoods, especially in north Leeds, were socially mixed 
with significant pockets of middle class residents either at the fringes or closer to the centre. 
Hyde Park and Chapeltown exemplified this variety. These areas were directly affected by 
housing clearance policies and they bordered the districts that were most heavily affected by 
clearance and redevelopment. Community action flourished in socially diverse areas as 
politically motivated professionals mingled with working-class residents in opposing 
clearance (see Fig. 2.7). University lecturers, professionals and students were active in the 
Woodhouse Housing Action Group and the South Headingley Community Association. 
Smaller groups such as the Ebors Action Group and the Victoria and Consorts Housing 
Group were set up by middle-class professionals living in a largely working-class area.  
The relationship between middle-class professionals and working-class residents in 
community action groups was complex and varied. As we saw in Chapter 1, community 
workers usually adopted an enabling role, providing advice without speaking on behalf of 
the groups or making decisions for them. This approach was informed by the professional 
ethic of community work.156 Many of the planners, architects and academics who 
participated in community action played a more central role, chairing meetings, writing 
letters and leading delegations to the council. As we shall explore later, it was usually these 
professionals who introduced community activists to new approaches to housing and 
planning policy, furnishing action groups with expert knowledge. Middle-class involvement 
in community action over housing renewal was driven as much by self-interest as by 
political principle. Many middle-class residents of the inner city were personally affected by 
urban renewal schemes. In the early 1970s, streets of large through terraces in Hyde Park 
and south Headingley, within walking distance of the University, were scheduled to be 
cleared, along with nearby back-to-backs.157 The property in Hyde Park owned by one 
prominent Leeds community activist from an upper-middle-class background was inserted 
into the clearance programme in the early 1970s.158 Those middle-class activists whose 
homes were not directly affected by the published proposals still feared that the rolling 
clearance programme would eventually reach their homes. The uncertainty generated by the 
rolling clearance programme meant that aspiring owner occupiers found it difficult to 
acquire mortgages on pre-1919 property in inner city Leeds, even if they were not formally 
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scheduled for clearance.159  Research conducted by the community activists revealed that 
local building societies had designated large swathes of the older city as ‘blue zones,’ areas 
where they would not lend to home buyers.160  Blue zoning provided middle class residents 
with a vested interest to campaign against the principle that all older housing would 
eventually become obsolete.161 Prospective home owners and current middle-class and 
working-class owner occupiers were could thus unite in condemning housing clearance for 
its effects on confidence in the local housing market. In choosing to live in the inner areas, 
rather than the outer suburbs, these middle class activists constituted a distinctive segment 
of the city’s middle class population. While inner city Leeds was certainly not experiencing 
gentrification in this period, these middle class community activists resembled the men and 
women who gentrified inner London neighbourhoods in this period: they were graduates 
working in service sector with a liberal or left-wing political outlook.162 
Although they brought together a wide range of individuals, community action groups 
campaigning against clearance did not represent all the interest groups in inner city 
neighbourhood. A significant proportion of the population tacitly supported the prevailing 
model of housing renewal. Young families with children were far more likely to support 
clearance and redevelopment because it provided an opportunity for them to improve their 
housing conditions.163  Low density council estates with semi-detached houses and 
abundant open space often appealed to families with children. For families with at least one 
skilled worker in a secure job the prospect of increased housing costs was less daunting. 
Surveys conducted by community activists showed that between one fifth and one third of 
households supported clearance policy in affected neighbourhoods.164 While this 
represented a significant decline in public support for clearance compared to the 1950s and 
1960s, it indicates that community activists could not speak for the whole neighbourhood. 
As we shall see, the tensions between the opponents of clearance and its supporters became 
more pronounced as the period progressed, creating a crisis of legitimacy for many 
community action groups.  
This section has advanced the following basic arguments about the composition of the 
community action groups. First, community action was a broad, dynamic partnership of 
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people from different socioeconomic backgrounds. It was not a single-class monoculture 
and it is difficult to generalise about what the average community activist looked like. The 
success of community action hinged upon an alliance between mobile middle-class 
professionals, who often possessed a particular expertise in planning and housing issues, 
and people from a working-class background who had few formal qualifications but felt a 
strong connection to their locality. Second, self-interest was a key driver of community 
action. This applied as much to the middle-class community activists as their working-class 
counterparts. Most activists felt they stood to benefit personally from the campaign. This 
helps to explain their energy and commitment. A smaller number of community activists 
had no clear personal interest in the outcome but had made a professional or political 
commitment to a new approach to housing renewal. Third, a theme linking most of those 
who participated in community action was a feeling that they had been ignored by policy 
makers. Community action drew together a diverse range of people whose housing 
priorities and attitudes to urban living were not accommodated in the city’s approach to 
urban renewal.   
4. Community based renewal 
This section returns to the narrative we began in the first section to investigate the impact of 
community action on the city’s housing policy. Its aim is to assess the effectiveness of the 
community action.  It will begin by discussing how community activists sought to influence 
local policy before considering their achievements. Community groups had to demonstrate 
that they were representative of opinion in their neighbourhood. Lacking an electoral 
mandate, they were always susceptible to the charge that they were a minority interest 
group. The groups had to overturn an entrenched view in the council that clearance and 
redevelopment were universally popular. Organising a petition was a means of 
demonstrating that an action group was representative of neighbourhood opinion. Petitions 
with several hundred signatures were common.165 Sending a deputation of group members 
to a city council meeting was another means of raising awareness of the group’s cause and 
underlining the strength of local opinion. Since petitions and deputations could be ignored 
fairly easily, activists arranged other face-to-face meetings, away from the scripted 
encounters of the council chamber.  
While demonstrating their credibility, activists sought to apply pressure on the council and 
other public bodies. Here we are mainly concerned with the methods rather than their 
eventual outcome. Activists used the traditional channels for communication within the 
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system of local government and experimented with new approaches. Community activists 
usually made a concerted effort to develop good relationship with local councillors who 
could act as an advocate for the group in the council.166 Early in their campaign, the South 
Headingley Community Association secured the support of their ward councillors, who 
advocated for the group in the city council. Activists also arranged public meetings between 
members of the community and representatives of the council, giving activists the 
opportunity to lobby councillors and officers. These meetings contained moments of 
tension, exposing political and cultural differences between community activists and 
council representatives: at one meeting with councillors in 1974, members of the Ebors 
Action Group described the elected members as ‘“pig ignorant”’ of local issues.167 
Disparaging remarks aside, activists were often able to negotiate concessions from 
councillors at public meetings when they felt the weight of public opinion. At one such 
meeting in December 1972, the Burley and Belle Vue Community Action Group negotiated 
a reprieve for part of the neighbourhood, then in the clearance programme.168  
Community activists experimented with newer forms of protest associated with the new 
social movements of this period. Sit-ins, occupations and squats were uncommon in 
campaigns over clearance and rehousing. City centre marches and delegations to the civic 
hall were the norm. Borrowing from the trade union movement, in 1975 the Woodhouse 
Housing Action Group picketed a meeting of the Housing Committee to protest a decision 
on clearance, which they claimed had been made without public consultation.169 Groups 
also deployed less confrontational, more creative forms of protest. The Ebors Action Group 
used drama to communicate their message. When councillors came to visit the area in 
summer 1975, the group organised a mock carnival on one of the main streets complete 
with banners and a brass band.170 This dramatised the sense of community that the group 
claimed existed in the area. During their campaign The Ebors Group performed a satirical 
play, ‘The Golden City’ to parody council policy and procedure.171 After the area had been 
removed from the clearance programme, group members performed a pantomime, 
‘Eborella: A Christmas Fantasy,’ which toured pubs in Leeds in 1976 and 1977, in a light-
hearted attempt to educate other communities about the lessons they had learned.  
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Community activists needed to sustain the participation of local people in the campaign. 
This was partly to ensure they appeared legitimate in the eyes of the local authority, but on a 
more practical level, it was to secure sufficient manpower to run the action groups. Despite 
the existence of widespread disenchantment with the council’s renewal policies, apathy was 
prevalent. Many people did not believe it was possible for a community group to effect 
change in the face of council opposition. Activists in the Oldfield Lane Community 
Association remarked that  
[a] lot of people expressed the sort of feeling of pessimism and hopelessness about what was planned for them. They felt they were facing some distant impersonal machine which would do whatever it wanted to do regardless of their opinions on the subject. A typical comment was “If the council want your house…there is nothing you can do about it.”172 
One way of combatting apathy was to raise local awareness of the campaign and the issues 
at stake. Most community action groups produced and circulated regular newsletters for this 
purpose.173 Given the area over which groups operated, it was not possible to rely on face-
to-face communication alone. Community newsletters explained what the council was 
proposing for the area and outlined the alternatives. They also contained information about 
key meetings and campaigning actions. To produce these newsletters, activists made use of 
the cheap off-set lithograph printing that became widely available in this period.174 These 
publications compensated for the relative dearth of official information about housing 
renewal, which tended to reinforce pessimism that the council’s plans could not be stopped. 
Activists hoped that a more informed population would be more likely to engage in 
activism. 
Although the mainstream media could not be relied upon to cover the particulars of any 
given campaign, community activists used it at important strategic moments to raise 
awareness of their campaign. Press releases were issued to tie in with public meetings, 
petitions and deputations. Media coverage made it harder for the council to ignore 
community action. Community action impacted on the way urban renewal was discussed in 
the local media. Whereas the local press had covered clearance and redevelopment 
uncritically in the 1960s, it began to acknowledge other viewpoints in the 1970s. The 
protests surrounding Strategy D received extensive coverage in the local press and 
journalists often quoted community activists.175 The activities of the groups received more 
sustained and detailed coverage in the alternative press: The Other Paper and its successor 
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the Leeds Other Paper contained numerous stories on the community action campaign for a 
new housing policy. With a readership largely confined to the Left and the politically aware, 
these publications had a much circulation than the Yorkshire Evening Post, but they helped 
to raise awareness of local community campaigns in the wider activist community.176 
One of the most effective tools in the armoury of community activists was collaborative 
working between groups across Leeds. This helped to strengthen their negotiating position 
and ensured their voice was heard by the often aloof council.  While community action was 
born as a disparate collection of neighbourhood groups, these groups quickly coalesced to 
form a citywide campaign. By the mid-1970s, activists were routinely working together and 
they established joint organisations. As early as 1972, two of the city’s first community 
action groups, the Belle Vue and Burley Community Association and the Chapeltown 
Community Association organised meetings of community groups operating in the inner 
city to discuss shared concerns.177  These meeting exposed certain rifts between community 
action – owner occupiers were not always sure their interests were aligned with those of 
tenants – but ultimately these differences proved inconsequential until later in the decade.178 
Crucially, activists from different neighbourhoods were talking and sharing ideas. In 1974 
and 1975, community activists held a series of citywide events to discuss broader issues of 
policy and strategy.  At a conference titled ‘Housing for All’ in February 1974 at Leeds 
Polytechnic Leeds community activists spoke alongside academics, councillors and 
campaigners from other parts of the UK such as Camden and Clay Cross.179 Terry Flynn of 
the Belle Vue and Burley Community Association emphasised the need for ‘a committee to 
co-ordinate the actions of community associations and tenants associations in Leeds.’180 A 
second Housing for All conference was held in spring 1975.181 Building on these 
networking efforts, in 1976 a group of community activists concerned with housing renewal 
formed the Community Housing Working Party (CHWP). The group functioned as a 
clearing house for activists opposing the clearance programme, exchanging ideas, 
conducting research and promoting alternative approaches to housing renewal.182 The core 
group of activists who steered the CHWP were mainly drawn from the middle-class wings 
of community action groups, including community workers, academics and architects. Over 
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a dozen community action groups from all parts of the inner city had affiliated to the CHWP 
by 1980.183 
The CHWP’s major contribution to community action was to help to sponsor a viable 
alternative to existing housing renewal policies.184 The group promoted the gradual renewal 
method, developed by scholars in the fields of planning and architecture.185 According to 
this approach neighbourhoods should be renewed incrementally in response to the particular 
needs of each of its component parts. Practitioners of gradual renewal divided up an area 
into cells, as small as a single street. Each cell would be assessed independently to ascertain 
whether rehabilitation, demolition or a combination was suitable. This dispensed with the 
traditional practice of clearing large sites and making a presumption in favour of clearance 
based solely on housing type and street layout. Selective demolition would create space for 
new community facilities, green space or new housing. Resident involvement was central to 
the approach. Decisions on the form renewal should take would be based as far as possible 
on the expressed wishes of local people. The local community would be intimately involved 
in every stage of the renewal process, preparing plans and monitoring work. Professionals 
would work from an office based in the area, making them accessible to residents and 
enabling them to build up detailed local knowledge.  
In 1976 the CHWP published a report outlining gradual renewal and discussing how it 
might be applied to Leeds.186 This was circulated to councillors and members of the 
Housing Committee and it received extensive coverage in the local press. The report drew 
lessons from the Jericho area of Oxford where gradual renewal had been trialled in the early 
to mid-1970s.187 The group’s argument about the value of participation was informed by the 
experience of Byker in Newcastle where the residents had been consulted by the architect 
during the redevelopment of the area.188 The advocates of gradual renewal in Leeds were 
also influenced by Jane Jacobs who espoused similar ideas about urban revitalisation in 
America.189 In promoting gradual renewal, the CHWP provided community action groups 
with a well-researched and credible alternative to orthodox renewal policies; this gave many 
groups a clearer focus and sense of purpose, as we discuss see below. 
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Having explored how the activists operated, we will now turn to assessing their impact. The 
first major wave of community action impacted on council policy remarkably rapidly. In 
July 1972, the Housing Committee began a citywide review of clearance proposals and the 
members of the committee personally visited all of the areas scheduled for clearance under 
the housing strategy, a total of 56 visits.190 In several neighbourhoods clearance was re-
scheduled for a later period, making them eligible for improvement grants, and others were 
removed from the clearance programme completely.191 Following a public meeting held by 
the South Headingley Community Association in 1973, the council removed most of the 
scheduled area from the programme.192 In July 1973 the entire 1982-86 phase of the 
clearance programme, which affected comparatively newer housing of a higher standard, 
was deleted.193 In the same month, the council initiated a comprehensive review of its 
housing renewal policies. 194 Community activists had prompted the first major review of 
the policy in the post-war period. 
The review of urban renewal policies coincided with the election of a Labour majority on 
the city council in May 1972. That Labour had voted in favour of Strategy D as recently as 
January 1972 reveals the influence of community action on local party policy. Although 
community groups did not field candidates in local elections, Labour was anxious to shore 
up its support in inner city wards. Liberal and Conservative victories in inner south and west 
Leeds since the late 1960s had emphasised Labour’s vulnerability in areas affected by urban 
renewal.195 The new Labour council also acknowledged that community action had raised 
important questions about the legitimacy of the policy making process. In its May 1972 
manifesto the Leeds Labour Party pledged to ‘consult with the residents before any plans 
are announced’ and to plan ‘demolition and redevelopment together to preserve family life’ 
and allow ‘those who wish to remain in their familiar area.’196 The party was borrowing the 
rhetoric of community action. In late 1972, the council provided for consultation in housing 
policy by creating a set of Housing Consultative Committees for each area of the city.197 
Representatives of community and tenants groups were invited to sit alongside councillors 
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and officers, on these committees which first met in Autumn 1973 to discuss local policy 
and administration.198  
Upon the completion of its policy review in April 1975, the council adopted a new housing 
strategy.199 This reduced the clearance rate to 1,750 houses per year. A key reason cited in 
its report for reducing the clearance rate was ‘the increasing public opposition to the scale 
of clearance action.’200 The council accepted as legitimate activists’ concerns about ‘the 
effect [of clearance] on the supply of cheaper accommodation, particularly owner 
occupied.’ The rump clearance programme was to be reviewed annually by a Housing 
Working Party ‘in consultation with appropriate ward councillors and community 
groups.’201 The council committed itself to various measures designed to maximise local 
rehousing opportunities for households displaced by clearance in order to preserve 
established communities.202 In an attempt to make the administrative and legal procedures 
associated with urban renewal more transparent, the council published a booklet which 
explained the various stages of the clearance process, from officer inspection to 
rehousing.203 The booklet accepted that the process could be ‘confusing and upsetting,’ 
before outlining the procedures by which residents could object to clearance action; it even 
suggested that neighbours might form a residents group.204  
 
The impact of community action in Leeds mirrored trends in several other large British 
cities. Manchester City Council radically scaled back its clearance programme in 1974 after 
a major community campaign.205 Bimingham City Council had taken a similar decision in 
late 1972 and the authority embarked on a major housing improvement programme.206  In 
Leeds, the appraisal of housing renewal policy took place in the context of an assessment of 
several other planks of the post-war approach to urban renewal. As we saw in Chapter 1, the 
city’s approach to council house-building shifted in the mid-1970s from system-built high 
and medium rise estates to low rise estates built from traditional materials. Chapter 3 shows 
how transport policy was influenced by community protest in a similar period. Several of 
the city’s council comprehensive redevelopment proposals in the city centre and suburban 
                                                          198 LCC, Housing Committee, 14 December 1973, 30; Housing Consultative Committee, Central Area, Agenda, 2 October 1973, Max Farrar Notes, WYA: WYL564   199 LCC, Housing Committee, 17 April 1975, 4 200 Leeds City Council, ‘Leeds Housing Strategy: Report of Housing Working Party,’ April 1975, 9 201 LCC, Housing Committee, 17 April 1975, 5 202 Leeds City Council, ‘Clearance and Local Rehousing: Report of the Housing Working Party,’ November 1975 203 Leeds City Council, The Clearance   Process and You (1976) 204 ibid 205 ‘Manchester’s Bulldozer Stopped,’ Community Action, No. 16, Oct-Nov 1974, 33-34 206 Community Action, No. 4, Sept-Oct 1972, 11; Gibson and Langstaff, Urban Renewal, 225-236 
108  
district centres were either scaled back or abandoned in the mid- to late 1970s and the 
council designated several conservation areas.207  
Community action was swimming with the tide of national government policy. A 
succession of government circulars in the early to mid-1970s echoed the case made by the 
community activists that clearance often caused unnecessary social distress, disrupted 
communities and depleted the stock of useful older urban housing. 208  This argument had 
been made powerfully in numerous academic studies.209 The review of housing renewal 
policy that had begun in the late 1960s continued and government guidelines began to steer 
councils away from large-scale clearance towards housing rehabilitation. Further 
government-sponsored research demonstrated that improvement was viable.210 In 1974, new 
legislation gave councils more powers to effect housing rehabilitation in designated areas.211 
The Housing Action Area supplemented the General Improvement area in councils’ 
arsenals. As part of the 1975 strategy, Leeds City Council resolved to designate four 
General Improvement Areas (GIAs) and four Housing Action Areas (HAA) per year for 
five years.212 National funding for housing improvement was increased in the early to mid-
1970s. Housing Associations were allocated an increased share of public spending on 
housing and they were charged with playing a key role in the housing improvement drive. 
213 Like in the late 1960s, this shift in policy was motivated as much by economic 
expediency as it was a response to the explosion of community action, but it still vindicated 
the approach activists had campaigned for and it strengthened their negotiating position.  
 
In the mid-1970s the council’s new stance on improvement and participation, combined 
with the continued shift of central government policy, gave community activists an 
opportunity to lobby for more radical policy innovations. The next part of this section will 
explore how community activists capitalised on their early victories to deliver new 
approaches to housing renewal aimed at rehabilitating older housing, preserving 
communities and extending resident involvement. Recognising that it was not always 
possible to achieve all three of these goals, community activists were prepared to 
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compromise on retaining older housing if it was possible to conserve the community and 
give residents an enlarged role in the decision-making process.  
Spearheaded by the CHWP, community action groups promoted gradual renewal as a 
structural alternative to conventional policies. Though gradual renewal had been endorsed 
by the Department of the Environment in 1975, the city council initially claimed that the 
method was not suitable for Leeds.214 Community activists drew on their contacts in central 
government to bring pressure to bear on the council. In July 1976, Alison Ravetz wrote to 
one of her contacts at the Department of the Environment explaining Leeds City Council’s 
reluctance to investigate gradual renewal. The official undertook to lobby the city council to 
take gradual renewal more seriously in areas like Woodhouse (see Fig. 2.5).215 Community 
activists had conducted opinion surveys showing that 75 per cent of residents wanted at 
least part of old Woodhouse preserved and 53 per cent wished to stay in a modernised 
house; only 27 per cent favoured demolition and rehousing by the council.216  In spring 
1977, the CHWP and the Leeds Civic Trust organised a conference in the city at which 
several of its leading advocates spoke.217 Several councillors and officers attended this 
event. This lobbying paid off when the city council agreed to conduct a feasibility study on 
gradual renewal in a part of Woodhouse, which had been earmarked for clearance.218 The 
gradual renewal study was a major departure from the standard approach to policy making. 
The council organised a number of public meetings, chaired by councillors and officers, and 
distributed literature outlining the options.219 Residents were presented with several renewal 
options—ranging from total redevelopment through partial demolition to gradual renewal—
and asked to indicate their preference.220 We will return to the Woodhouse gradual renewal 
study below. 
Several of the major innovations in housing renewal in the mid- to late 1970s occurred in 
Hunslet. This was perhaps surprising since Hunslet had been subject to intense clearance 
and redevelopment since the 1930s. As we saw in Chapter 1, it was the site of some of the 
council’s more infamous innovations in housing. It was partly on account of the 
shortcomings of experiments like Hunslet Grange that Hunslet was also the location for one 
of the most intensive backlashes against conventional renewal policies. The area developed 
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a thriving community action scene, not only on the Hunslet Grange estate.221 Action groups 
in Hunslet formed across the district to contest further clearance in the early 1970s. These 
groups were assisted by the Hunslet Parish Community Work Project as we saw in Chapter 
1. 222 Responding to this grassroots pressure, in 1974 the council undertook an appraisal of 
planning policies in Hunslet.223 The report acknowledged that wholesale renewal had 
perhaps been pursued too vigorously in the past, before recommending that ‘continuous 
community involvement’ in any future redevelopment and as a result of this reappraisal 
officers were more willing to accept new approaches to old problems.224 Activists 
capitalised on the new mood.  
In 1974, the decision to demolish the Sussex Avenue area of Hunslet had been taken by the 
council, but in discussions with local residents the local community worker Barbara Craig 
found that residents remained anxious about the prospect of being rehoused in another area, 
away from their family and neighbours.225 Craig suggested that pre-allocation might offer a 
solution to this problem. Under this approach, the council would allocate houses to families 
in a clearance area before the new estate had been built. Clearance and new building would 
be phased so that households could move directly from their old homes to the new estate. 
This created an opportunity for the community to participate in the design of the new estate. 
In response to Craig’s encouragement, the residents of the Sussex Avenue Clearance Area 
formed the Rocheford Tenants Association to campaign for pre-allocation, arguing that it 
was consistent with the council’s professed commitment to securing local rehousing. 
Following negotiations with the local housing manager and the chair of the Housing 
Committee, the council agreed to pre-allocate 90 families from the Sussex Avenue 
clearance area to the planned Pepper Lane estate of 113 houses.226 All but two households 
participated in the scheme. Households were allocated a house well in advance of their 
move date. When given the freedom to swap allocated houses, many neighbours chose to 
continue living adjacent to one another on the new estate.227 The community was consulted 
through public meetings, the circulation of a booklet and evening surgeries in the Housing 
Information Centre.228 Tenants were allowed to select internal fittings as well as ‘work top 
surfaces, external colour schemes, floor tiles and fencing.’229  
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If pre-allocation reconfigured the relationship between people and the council, it did not 
remove conflict: in some areas it generated new tensions. Residents pushed for more tenant 
involvement than the council was prepared to countenance and the issue of whether tenants 
should pay for the cost of their design choices generated animosity.230 Despite these 
problems, the Rocheford Tenants Association declared the scheme ‘an unqualified 
success.’231 In 1977, a survey of residents who had been pre-allocated revealed a high 
degree of satisfaction a year later owing to the increased sense of control residents felt.232 
The Rocheford Tenants Association published a report documenting their experiences and 
they promoted pre-allocation nationally by writing about their experiences for Community 
Action.233 Their achievement motivated residents in neighbouring areas to organise 
community groups to lobby for pre-allocation. In 1975, 70 families from a clearance area in 
Leasowe Road in Hunslet won the right to pre-allocation after convincing a planning 
inspector that the council’s existing plans for them would not guarantee local rehousing.234 
This persuaded the council to export the pre-allocation model to other inner city 
neighbourhoods including Woodhouse, Stourton and Armley.235 By the late 1970s it had 
become the city’s default approach to rehousing from clearance areas. 
A second inventive campaign in Hunslet saw activists capitalise on the community activists’ 
early local victories and the shift in national policy to take more control over the process of 
housing renewal. In 1974, a dozen community groups and smaller housing associations 
formed the Leeds Federated Housing Association (LFHA), as a means of extending 
community control over inner city renewal.236 As a registered housing association, the 
LFHA had access to public grants from the Housing Corporation to improve houses and let 
them to tenants at a fair rent. The Arthingtons Group (TAG) from Hunslet was one of the 
founding members of the LFHA. They had been campaigning since 1972 to preserve their 
neighbourhood of back-to-back streets. In November 1975, the group persuaded the council 
to release the Arthingtons area from the clearance programme. The Arthingtons was 
designated as the city’s first Housing Action Area (HAA). In a HAA, property owners were 
eligible for a higher level of grant to undertake improvement work and public bodies 
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received funds to plan and co-ordinate the work. TAG also persuaded the city council to 
nominate the LFHA as the agency responsible for administering the Arthingtons HAA.237  
Through TAG’s position as a member of the LFHA, the community exerted considerable 
influence over the improvement programme. Regular consultation meetings were held with 
residents and the housing association set up an office in the area to strengthen lines of 
communication between residents and officers.238 Improvement work proceeded swiftly. 
The owner occupiers in the area began to renovate their houses with the assistance of 
grants.239 Almost all the private landlords sold to the LFHA who modernised them and let 
them to members of the community who wanted to stay in the area. 240 Households who 
needed more space – usually families with children – were rehoused by the council 
elsewhere. The Arthingtons HAA benefitted from the relative social stability of the area and 
the preponderance of owner occupiers who had a vested interest in rehabilitation. 241 TAG 
was supported by Keith Mollison, the community worker employed by SCAT who also 
supported activists on Hunslet Grange.242 For community activists, TAG’s achievement 
validated the argument that housing renewal could meet the needs of the whole community 
if local people were closely involved in the process and if adequate funding was available.  
The approach to housing renewal in the Arthingtons was the antithesis of the method the 
council had adopted in Burley Lodge Road a decade earlier and this transformation 
underlines the impact of community action on local policy making. The success of the 
Arthingtons HAA convinced the city council to roll out a programme of HAAs across the 
city. For community activists still campaigning against clearance, obtaining HAA status 
became a new objective in their campaign. The LFHA became a powerful vehicle for 
enabling community groups to effect improvement without relying wholly on the local 
authority. Other members of the LFHA in its first decade included the South Headingley 
Community Association, The Ebors Action Group alongside community action groups in 
West Hunslet and Holbeck.243 The success of these Leeds activists in implementing a 
community-led approach to renewal was mirrored in other parts of urban Britain. In North 
Kensington, a community group persuaded the Greater London Council to redevelop the 
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Swinbrook area in accordance with the wishes of local people and guarantee local rehousing 
opportunities.244  
The Arthingtons area of Hunslet was the site of a third and even more radical approach to 
housing renewal: the housing co-operative. Housing co-operatives were pioneered in the 
early 1970s in Liverpool, Islington and Coventry where they were conceived as a means of 
extending tenant control over housing in the context of disenchantment with both council 
and private landlords.245 In a housing co-operative, property was collectively owned and 
managed by the members of the co-operative who bought equity in the co-operative for a 
nominal sum. Members paid rent to the co-operative, which covered the cost of building 
work and administration. If a member left the co-operative, their equity was transferred to a 
new member. Housing co-operatives were also conceived as a means of re-building 
community in inner city areas, since managing the co-operative required members to work 
together.246 In the early to mid-1970s, the housing co-operative idea gained momentum 
nationally and eventually received cross-party support.247 In 1975, the government enabled 
housing co-operatives to receive grant aid from the Housing Corporation. In 1976, it 
established the Co-operative Housing Agency to support the formation of housing co-
operatives.248 In the mid-1970s, community workers in Hunslet discussed with local 
housing officers the viability of setting up a new build housing co-operative in the district. 
The Arthingtons Group and the Leeds Federated Housing Association supported the 
proposal. The Chairman of the city’s Housing Committee, who sat on a government 
working party on housing co-operatives, was receptive to the idea.249 A steering committee 
for a Hunslet housing co-operative was formed by a partnership of community activists and 
public officials. Local people were invited to join and other members were drawn from the 
city’s housing waiting list. In 1977 the Hunslet Housing Co-operative was formally 
constituted and in 1978 the council transferred the land on the site to the co-operative.250 
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The co-operative model gave the community a hitherto unprecedented level of influence 
over the process of housing renewal. The members of the co-operative were in control of 
developing the site and allocating families to the new houses. They demonstrated their 
independence when they chose to appoint two new architects for the building work, 
spurning the architect who originally advised them.251 Co-operative members played a key 
role in the design of the buildings, which required their chosen architects ‘to re-think their 
traditional role’ in publicly funded projects. 252 After a protracted round of negotiations over 
finance with the Housing Corporation, construction commenced and by 1980 the co-
operative had completed, houses for 18 families, including 30 children.253 The success of 
the Hunslet housing co-operative demonstrated the radical potential of community action 
when activists were able to mobilise a range of allies in support of a project. Following the 
success of this project, community activists in Harehills and Chapeltown successfully 
lobbied for council assistance to establish housing co-operatives to revitalise twilight 
areas.254 These groups received public assistance to purchase and modernise dilapidated 
older housing. The success of Leeds housing co-operatives was replicated numerous times 
across urban Britain in the late 1970s and 1980s: with public assistance thousands of older 
houses were rehabilitated by housing co-operatives. Housing co-operatives across Britain 
built scores of small housing estates, usually according to traditional design principles with 
resident participation.255 The housing co-operative movement was particularly active in 
Liverpool and the London boroughs of Islington and Haringey.256  
This section has argued that community activists were able to steer the direction of the 
city’s housing renewal policy. Community action was able to effect pioneering policy shifts 
in certain neighbourhoods that pointed towards a radical new approach to housing renewal. 
Community activists were flexible. They explored different approaches to housing renewal 
and they were not wedded to retaining the existing physical fabric if they could achieve 
their social and political goals through a new approach to redeveloping inner city areas. 
Community workers and allies in the housing and planning professions furnished 
community activists with detailed and deliverable approaches to renewal that helped them 
to achieve their aims. Key to the success of community action was the effective working 
relationship activists formed with influential local policy makers and ward councillors. The 
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intersection between central government policy and the goals of the community action 
groups lent weight to their case for a new approach. The campaign was built on negotiation, 
but activists were also prepared to apply pressure indirectly through innovative forms of 
public protest influenced by the new social movements of the period. The result was that by 
the mid- to late 1970s the outline of an alternative approach to housing renewal was 
beginning to form. 
5. Inner city decline and the limits of community action 
If the mid-1970s was a period of creative opportunity, it was to prove a brief one. The later 
part of that decade and the 1980s was an increasingly hostile climate for community action 
surrounding housing renewal and activists made fewer significant gains. The more radical 
objectives of the city’s community action groups remained largely unfulfilled in the mid-
1980s. Innovative experiments in residents control and community-led renewal were limited 
to a handful of areas. The citywide campaign on housing renewal fragmented and its 
influence diminished. This section will discuss these limitations and explore the internal and 
external obstacles community activists faced in the second half of the 1970s and the early 
1980s.  
The traditional approach to housing renewal persisted in a diminished form for almost a 
decade after the council’s policy review in the mid-1970s. The clearance programme had 
been scaled back but not abandoned: in 1975, the council still intended to clear 6700 houses 
by 1981.257 The programme was to be rolled forward every year.258 The threat of clearance 
still hung over a large proportion of the inner city. Traditional attitudes to the older urban 
fabric retained a powerful hold on many councillors and officers who remained wedded to 
the view that clearance and rehousing was the most effective form of housing renewal. 
Several experienced environmental health inspectors continued to view the back-to-back 
house as inherently unfit and beyond redemption.259 In the late 1970s, the Chair of the 
Housing Committee, Peter Sparling, frequently remarked in council meetings that the 
clearance rate was too low, which he believed was ‘storing up’ problems for the future.260  
The Cross Streets area of Armley was one neighbourhood that was retained in the clearance 
programme, despite a strong local campaign for rehabilitation by the Cross Streets Housing 
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Action Group (see Fig. 2.6]. 261 The new approaches to renewal being pioneered elsewhere 
in Leeds bypassed this neighbourhood. As one member of the group put it, ‘“We feel like 
we’re one of the last areas to go down under old ideas.”’262 At the public inquiry into the 
compulsory purchase order for the neighbourhood in 1977 the council resorted to traditional 
arguments for clearance, referring to the ‘inherent limitations of back-to-back housing’ and 
the obsolete street layout.263  Despite receiving the support of the Hall Lane Community 
Centre, Leeds Civic Trust, the Liberal Party, the Community Housing Working Party and 
over a dozen other local organisations, activists failed to persuade the Department of the 
Environment to reject the council’s compulsory purchase order, which was confirmed in 
May 1978.264  Unable to contest clearance beyond this stage, the group ran a local advice 
centre to provide housing, legal and welfare advice to families in the rehousing process, 
before disbanding in 1979.265 
Where clearance plans had been defeated activists still struggled to secure the long term 
future of the neighbourhood. Following the IMF loan crisis, cuts in public expenditure fell 
particularly hard on the housing budget. This was compounded in Leeds by the 
Conservative council’s own policy of holding down the rates by curtailing spending on 
housing and other departments.266 The improvement programme was also starved of 
financial resources and the council failed to meet its targets for declaring GIAs and HAAs 
to effect area improvement.267 Between 1975 and 1979 13 out of a planned 16 HAAs were 
declared and only 6 out of 16 GIAs. A Shelter report on Harehills found that resources 
available were insufficient to effect improvement.268 These economies undermined attempts 
to rebuild parts of the inner city and to offer displaced families the option of local 
rehousing. The council was reluctant to use its compulsory purchase powers to acquire 
unmodernised housing or to compel recalcitrant landlords to upgrade their properties. As a 
result, many inner city neighbourhoods that had been spared demolition continued to 
decline physically, eroding confidence that improvement could ever succeed. 
The effect of these policies was marked in neighbourhoods like the Ebors area of Hyde 
Park. In 1975, following a campaign by the Ebors Action Group the area had been removed 
from the clearance programme and declared a Housing Action Area. Efforts by the group to 
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establish a housing co-operative in the neighbourhood to spearhead renewal – a proposal 
which had the support of 58 per cent of surveyed residents – were rebuffed by the city 
council. 269 But the council’s own record in rehabilitating the area was poor.270 No local area 
office was opened so officers did not develop a close relationship with local people.271  The 
authority declined to use its full statutory powers to compel recalcitrant landlords to 
improve their property.272 Several council-owned properties were left vacant for years and 
few property owners applied for grants.273 The council’s decision in 1984 to demolish some 
of the houses in the Ebors was an indictment of its efforts to rehabilitate the area.274 The 
Ebors Action Group struggled to hold the council to account for this. The more complex 
process of monitoring improvement in the area and working with officers to prepare 
improvement plans was a more challenging task for the action group. The existential threat 
of clearance had bound the community together; sustaining the campaign in the next stage 
was more difficult. Another obstacle for activists was that the population became 
increasingly transient in the 1970s. Rates of owner occupation were lower than areas like 
the Arthingtons and social problems were more prevalent.275 The experience of the Ebors 
was repeated elsewhere in the city. The Gathornes and Giptons area of Chapeltown was 
declared a Housing Action Area in 1976, but it was later reinserted into the clearance 
programme after the council’s apparently lacklustre efforts to rehabilitate the area failed.276  
Shifts in official rhetoric notwithstanding, the breadth and depth of resident involvement in 
housing policy making remained limited in the late 1970s. With no formal powers, the 
Housing Consultative Committees were essentially talking shops, a fact reflected in the low 
attendance at meetings in many areas.277 Policy was still substantially made by officers and 
councillors with public involvement occurring at a late stage. Many local councillors were 
anxious about the implications of community participation. They were prepared to consult 
communities, even to co-opt local people onto committees, but baulked at more 
fundamental, structural changes in the 'style of government and the use of resources.'278 
High profile participation exercises such as the preparation of the Chapeltown Local Plan 
were roundly critiqued by community activists who argued that officers presented 
communities with a narrow range of options after the key decisions had already been 
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made.279 Participation programmes implemented by local authorities around the country in 
the 1970s were found to have similar shortcomings.280 
For many community activists, the council’s approach to participation suggested it was not 
wholly committed to the approach. In Cross Streets in Armley, officers delivered the public 
information leaflets explaining the clearance process after the date for making objections to 
the compulsory purchase order had passed.281 Activists claimed that a public inquiry would 
have been unnecessary had the action group been given the opportunity to develop ‘a 
harmonious working relationship with the council, based upon an agreed programme of 
objectives, supported by a majority of people.’282 The planning inspector at the Inquiry 
agreed that the council’s procedures for enabling public participation needed improving. 283  
Activists highlighted similar shortcomings in the way the council carried out the feasibility 
study into gradual renewal in Woodhouse.284  They rebuked the council for refusing to 
negotiate directly with the community group, preferring to work with local councillors. At 
public meetings, local councillors made no attempt to outline the different options from a 
neutral stance, but rather presented the case for clearance. 285 Activists also criticised the 
council’s methodology: the survey form distributed to local people was, they argued, 
confusing and unnecessarily complicated, but the council decided to make no changes to the 
initial draft.286 In a scene that verged on the comedic, the surveys were delivered by local 
children, hired for the job by council officers. For activists, the lack of rigour raised 
questions about the validity of the survey result. 
While community activists tended to apportion the blame for the failure of participation 
exercises on the recalcitrance of the city council, this was not entirely fair. Community 
activists had always been somewhat vague about what meaningful resident involvement 
would look like. Stopping clearance was a tangible goal. Changing the relationship between 
policy makers and citizens was rather woollier. The substance between slogans like 
neighbourhood control and local participation was not always apparent. Even the advocates 
of gradual renewal had not offered a clear model for facilitating the involvement of local 
people in policy making. As one activist observed, community activists never fully 
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answered certain basic questions.287 To what extent should communities be autonomous? 
How should conflicts within the community be resolved? Housing co-operatives and 
community-run housing associations had sought to answer these questions but they 
remained niche approaches to housing renewal. The absence of a clear model for 
institutionalising meaningful community participation across the city helps to explain why 
moves towards greater public involvement in local policy making stalled at the end of the 
1970s.  
The external obstacles to community action proved increasingly insurmountable. The 
persistence of a truncated clearance programme and the weakness of the improvement 
programme meant many inner city neighbourhoods continued to suffer from planning 
blight. This deterred private investment and drove away longstanding residents who could 
afford to relocate. In the late 1970s, the take up of house improvement grants in the inner 
city fell, suggesting that the remaining owners could not afford to pay their share of the cost 
of improvement or lacked the confidence in the area to invest.288 Owner occupation rates 
fell in inner city Leeds in the 1970s and 1980s and a growing proportion of private owners 
were landlords who were less willing to invest. 289  These problems were compounded by a 
broader flight of private capital from the inner city which drove the decline of 
manufacturing industry and other traditional sources of employment for skilled and 
unskilled manual workers. Structural unemployment rose. The net result of these changes 
was that the proportion of inner city residents who were severely deprived increased. The 
more upwardly mobile residents moved to outer areas and they were replaced by 
households on low incomes, often with social problems who could not access housing 
anywhere else. The more stable communities who had provided the backbone for inner city 
community action became less common. This weakened community action groups 
internally. It also made it harder for activists to speak optimistically about the future of 
inner city neighbourhoods.  
The effects of this spiral of inner city decline on community action were clearly illustrated 
in Woodhouse. The results of the feasibility study into gradual renewal showed that 51 per 
cent of respondents supported clearance and redevelopment, while one third supported some 
form of long term rehabilitation.290 Only 29 per cent of the sample specifically supported 
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basis of this results, the council rejected the gradual renewal option and proceeded to 
redevelop the area.291 There had been a substantial shift in public opinion since the early 
1970s when a majority of Woodhouse residents had opposed clearance. The result of the 
Woodhouse feasibility study was a major blow for the community activists. A unique 
opportunity to pioneer a new approach to renewal floundered. This shift in local opinion 
was largely the product of the blight which had swept through the area due to the 
uncertainty over its future and a dearth of public and private investment. Housing conditions 
worsened as landlords (including the council) stopped carrying out repairs. Public services 
deteriorated and local shops closed down.292 Many longstanding residents chose to depart 
and owner occupiers sold to the council before the value of their property fell further. It was 
harder for local people to imagine that the area could be successfully rehabilitated. 
Commenting on the shift in public mood in 1981, one writer noted that the ‘fierce 
opposition’ to council policy of the early 1970s had been supplanted by ‘an air of 
demoralisation, of a resentful acceptance of the inevitable.’293  
Blight had undoubtedly been exacerbated by the time devoted to consultation, but 
community activists noted that it had taken the council almost two years to actually begin 
the consultation process after it had decided to undertake the study. The delay was used by 
supporters of clearance to discredit the notion of participation.294 In an attempt to arrest the 
spread of blight, the action group opened a Housing Action Centre, offering welfare, legal 
and housing advice, but this small intervention could not reverse the tide of disinvestment 
that plagued the area.295 This situation was mirrored in Cross Streets in Armley where 
activists struggled to maintain their momentum in the context of deteriorating physical 
conditions caused by planning blight. The argument that the area could be rehabilitated 
became increasingly tenuous. By 1978, even the action group accepted that ‘the area had 
sunk almost beyond recall.’296 Organising the community and maintaining morale was very 
challenging in these circumstances.  
The rapid decline of certain inner city neighbourhoods in the late 1970s created divisions 
among the resident population. As the recovery prospects for inner city neighbourhoods 
deteriorated, it became harder to unite the neighbourhood behind a campaign for 
rehabilitation of the older housing stock. In the scramble for a share of diminishing public 
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resources, divisions emerged among community activists between staunch opponents of 
clearance and those who were prepared to accept it under certain conditions. This was most 
clearly manifest in Stourton in south east Leeds. Until the late 1960s, Stourton was a 
traditional older residential neighbourhood on the edge of the city’s southern industrial belt. 
After the construction of the M1 motorway, the council began to redevelop the area, 
replaced housing and community facilities with industrial units and warehousing.297 In 
1974, the Stourton Community Association was formed to preserve what remained of the 
community. A survey conducted by the group found that a majority of the community was 
in favour of improving the remaining houses and reinstating lost amenities, despite the 
changes of recent years.298 The council largely ignored this campaign and in 1976 it 
announced that it intended to clear the remainder of the housing in Stourton to create more 
space for industrial uses.299  
By the late 1970s, the continued deterioration of the area had eliminated the majority 
support for rehabilitating the neighbourhood: a survey of residents with a 92 per cent 
response rate found that whilst 40 per cent wanted to stay, 60 per cent wished to be 
rehoused by the council.300 Opinion in area was now essentially split between tenants, 
represented by the Idas Pre-allocation Group, who had drifted in favour of clearance and 
owner occupiers, represented by the Stourton Residents’ Association, who remained 
committed to rehabilitation and this division was manifest in two rival community groups. 
The Idas group had been won over to redevelopment in part by the council’s offer to pre-
allocate residents to a newly built estate. Its members conceived of the local community as 
portable: it could be transplanted to a new setting. For the homeowners of the Stourton 
Residents Association community was inextricably linked to the physical space in which 
they had made a social and financial investment. These divisions created a dilemma for 
local community workers, who wanted to advise both groups without favouring either, but 
such a position became increasingly impossible.301  
The Idas group prevailed at the 1978 public inquiry and thereafter all of residential Stourton 
was demolished and the residents were rehoused.302 This satisfied the aims of one group of 
community activists but disappointed another. This outcome challenged the view that it was 
possible to identify a community interest in inner city neighbourhoods. Increasingly, the 
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late 1970s, several community action groups had emerged to campaign for clearance and 
rehousing. In 1978, the East End Park Residents for New Homes Association campaigned 
for clearance and rehousing, claiming that a minority of owner occupiers were trying to veto 
clearance when this option enjoyed the support of a clear majority of residents.303 In 1979, a 
group of residents from Beeston Hill made a similar appear to the council.304 The 
emergence of pro-clearance groups reflected a growing pessimism about the prospects of 
older areas. As the public building programme stagnated and the housing waiting list 
lengthened, many working-class households saw clearance as their only chance of securing 
council housing. Although these groups were keen to influence council policy they 
appeared less interested in long-term resident participation than in improving their housing 
situation.  
As we saw in the last section, community activists succeeded when they formed 
partnerships with governmental actors. While community activists had reached an entente 
with leading Labour councillors by the mid-1970s, they had less purchase on the policies of 
the Conservative administration that ran Leeds between 1976 and 1980. Like their 
colleagues in cities like Nottingham, Conservative councillors in Leeds adopted a proto-
Thatcherite approach to housing renewal.305 The annual council building rate was reduced 
from a planned 2000 per year in April 1975 to a planned 1250 in September 1977, but only 
833 new houses were built in 1977 and 652 in 1978.306 The new approach went beyond 
cutbacks. The Leeds Conservatives privileged the role of the private sector as an agent of 
renewal, rejecting both the state-led model and the community-orientated approach 
promoted by community activists. The council sold land earmarked for public building to 
private property developers, including many former clearance areas in the inner city.307 
Prophetically, between 1976 and 1979, 2.3 per cent of the total stock was sold to sitting 
tenants.308 The direction of policy in Leeds in the late 1970s foreshadowed the shift in 
government policy in the 1980s when a market-led approach to housing renewal was rolled 
out nationally.309 Government spending on council housing was slashed, which led to a 
virtual cessation of the council building programme by the late 1980s. Housing associations 
filled a small proportion of the gap. Funding was instead targeted at private sector investors. 
Owner occupation and private housing for sale was prioritised over other tenures. The 
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council’s capacity to steer an independent course was circumscribed by rate-capping and 
borrowing limits. Planning powers over chunks of the inner city were transferred to 
unelected quangos with a narrow remit of stimulating private sector investment.310  
Under this neo-liberal approach to housing renewal, the innovative approaches to housing 
renewal that were pioneered in the 1970s became less viable. Inner city communities rarely 
had the resources to rehabilitate housing alone. Community action groups relied on the 
support of an active state that was prepared to intervene in the housing market and a 
government that was prepared to allocate adequate resources to publicly funded housing. 
The Labour-led council was more sympathetic to community action, but its room for 
manoeuvre in housing matters was progressively circumscribed by national government. 
Pre-allocation and area improvement were hamstrung by decimated housing budgets. The 
growth of innovative forms of community housing provision, such as housing co-operatives 
and community housing associations was also curtailed by new rules on housing finance.311 
For instance, efforts by the Victoria and Consort Housing Group to form a co-operative in 
Little Woodhouse were rebutted by the government in 1985.312  Local authorities and 
housing associations lacked the powers or resources to address problems like overcrowding, 
unmodernised dwellings and negligent landlords.313  Community campaigns against the 
direction of national policy were undermined as the spiral of decline accelerated in the 
1980s. When the council’s rolling clearance programme was finally wound up in 1984, it 
gave way to a very different paradigm to the one community activists had imagined.314 
In the early 1980s, the community action campaign around housing renewal was beginning 
to wane and by the mid-1980s most of the community action groups we have explored in 
this chapter had folded. The wider network of organisations that had sustained links 
between community action groups also fragmented. The Community Housing Working 
Party had dissolved by the mid-1980s. The Liberal Party was no longer an insurgent force 
on the city council, though it continued to present a challenge to Labour in parts of the inner 
city. The Leeds Civic Trust’s links to community action groups began to weaken and the 
organisation became increasingly focused on conservation issues and city centre 
regeneration.315 Activists who remained involved in housing work increasingly began to 
focus on the existential threat to council housing and on the re-emergence of slum 
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landlordism. These defensive campaigns drew attention away from the campaign for 
community-led renewal. 
For many community activists, the long-term legacy of the campaign was bittersweet. 
Whilst they had saved the physical fabric of inner city neighbourhoods, they were unable to 
check the wider social and economic forces that reshaped the inner city in the 1980s. In 
1982, a member of the Arthingtons Group lamented the social decline of her 
neighbourhood, the loss of established families and their replacement by more deprived 
households.316 She claimed she would never have got involved in community action in the 
1970s had the neighbourhood been in such a poor state then. This spoke of the 
disenchantment felt by many community activists in the 1980s. After a decade of struggle, 
marked by a number of significant achievements, many community campaigns over housing 
ended on a sombre note. 
This section has shown that community action over housing renewal had clear limits. The 
achievements we explored in the previous section did not represent the full realisation of the 
community activists’ aims. Activists enjoyed more success defeating clearance proposals 
than implementing their preferred alternatives. The council’s record on housing 
improvement and resident participation fell short of its professed aims. Radical innovation 
in housing renewal was limited to a handful of neighbourhoods. The weakness of 
community action stemmed from two basic problems. First, the social and economic 
condition of the inner city became increasingly hostile to community action in the late 
1970s and 1980s. Inner city decline robbed community action groups of some of their most 
active and talented participants and eroded public confidence in the future of the inner city. 
Community activists struggled to maintain the momentum of their organisations and many 
action groups folded. Second, community action needed state support, either from local or 
central government, in terms of public resources and administrative assistance. In the late 
1970s, the city council’s commitment to the community action’s wider goals was only 
superficial. In the 1980s, just as the council was beginning to embrace participation and 
community-led renewal more sincerely, central government policy departed from these 
principles.  
*** 
This chapter has used the campaign against housing clearance and efforts to build an 
alternative approach to housing renewal to deepen our understanding of the nature of 
                                                          316 Letter to Barbara Craig from Anon, u.d., c. 1982, BHC 
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community action. It has explored who participated in community action, what activists 
believed, how they operated and their impact on policy. It has also discussed the reasons for 
the trajectory of community action over the long 1970s. Housing renewal drove community 
action more than any other so the conclusions drawn in this chapter are particularly 
valuable.317 Community action developed because housing renewal policy no longer catered 
to the needs and aspirations of a significant proportion of those affected by it. The city 
council and the two main political parties were slow to recognise this disjuncture. 
Community action occupied this vacant political ground, though from its inception, it was 
sustained by existing political and voluntary organisations that supported its goals.  
 
The arguments mobilised by community activists against the traditional approach to 
housing renewal focused on the social, economic and environmental effects of the policy. 
Their case was buttressed by social and physical surveys which yielded extensive data. 
Community action drew support from various social groups who were disadvantaged by the 
established policy. Community activists heralded from a variety of social backgrounds, 
from working-class women to small business owners. Community action groups were 
animated by a powerful alliance between working-class people and middle-class 
professionals, many of whom were directly affected by the clearance proposals. Community 
action groups across the city were united by a sense that an entrenched policy had 
overlooked their needs and aspirations. They exposed a democratic deficit at the heart of the 
policy making process. As Davis has argued, community activists undermined the notion 
that an electoral mandate gave local authorities the right ‘to interfere in the property and 
environment of a substantial section of the community.318 
Community action groups were able to effect change remarkably rapidly: by the mid-1970s, 
the clearance programme had been scaled back. Innovative approaches to housing renewal 
were trialled across the city in the mid- to late 1970s by community activists working with 
the council. Community activists proved flexible in their attitudes to the extant urban fabric 
but they were consistent in arguing for a transfer of responsibility from the council to local 
people. The success of community action was premised on the good working relationships 
activists established with councillors and officers. Central government was a crucial ally in 
the late 1960s and 1970s, encouraging the council to heed the pressure from below to adopt 
a new approach. In the long term, community activists found effecting positive change as 
                                                          317 Mike Fleetwood and John Lambert, ‘Bringing socialism home: Theory and practice for a radical community action,’ in Gary Craig, Nick Derricourt and Martin Loney, ed., Community Work and the State: Towards a Radical Practice (London, 1982): 48 318 Davis, ‘‘Simple Solutions,’’ 273 
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harder than blocking policy. Innovation in housing renewal was limited to a handful of 
neighbourhoods and in many neighbourhoods the end of clearance gave way to a new era of 
stagnation and decline. The acceleration of the economic decline of the inner city made 
community organising more challenging and opened up rifts in communities that had once 
been broadly united on the direction renewal should take. This was compounded by a 
radical shift in central government’s approach to urban renewal in the 1980s. By this time, 
the council was more of an ally to community action groups, but its capacity to support 
activists had been curtailed. The citywide campaign began to fragment as activists were 
drawn to other campaigns and community-based renewal appeared increasingly 
unattainable.  
The speed with which community action declined sheds light on the strength of these 
citywide networks. While community activists from across Leeds campaigned together on 
housing renewal, most community activists chiefly identified with the neighbourhood action 
groups. The work of citywide bodies like the CHWP helped community activists think and 
act strategically, but the centrifugal forces in community action were more powerful. While 
some activists adopted a regional or national approach to the housing renewal question, 
most activists concentrated on problems in their locality. Even the more mobile community 
workers and the middle class activists focused on particular districts. As highly localised 
bodies, community action groups needed to win local victories to sustain their momentum. 
As this became more difficult in the 1980s their relative isolation from other activists made 
it harder for them to maintain group morale. Citywide bodies were dependent on the 
survival of the neighbourhood groups from which they drew their legitimacy. As individual 
community action groups folded the citywide bodies disappeared with them. This was the 
disadvantage of an entirely bottom-up approach to politics. The highly decentralised and 
polycentric nature of community action distinguishes it from the major social movements of 
this era, which managed to combine local self-organisation with a national framework of 
organisations and a shared identity.  
Housing was not the only issue that concerned community activists. Other issues lent 
themselves to a citywide or regional focus. In order to enrich our understanding of the 
diversity of community action and to further our understanding of its citywide organisation, 
the next chapter will explore community action surrounding transport. 
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Chapter 3   
 
Organising in the Motorway City: 
 Community Action and the Politics of Transport 
 
 
This chapter explores the ways in which community activists engaged with issues of 
transport and mobility in Leeds. It begins by outlining origins of the city’s transport strategy 
in the post-war decades and the principles informed the ‘Motorway City’ project. The 
second section begins by asking why community action was largely absent from Leeds in 
the 1960s. It then explores why community action emerged in the 1970s and discusses the 
extent to which community activists were able to shape the implementation of the urban 
motorway programme. Section three examines the way community activists challenged the 
privileged position of motorised traffic in the city, looking at campaigns for pedestrian 
crossings and against heavy good vehicles. Section four and five investigate the campaign 
against road-building on the A660 corridor in north-west Leeds, showing why community 
action was more successful there than in other parts of the city. Section fives focuses on 
how this action campaign, and its relationship with the local state, matured in the 1980s. 
This section examines the way transport policy shifted over the long 1970s in a part of the 
city where community action was most potent.  
 
1. The Rise of the Motorway City 
 
One of the key contexts to the rise community action in Leeds from the late 1960s was the 
transport policies pursued by local and national government. Much of the community action 
in the city was a reaction to a transport strategy that was seen to prioritise the road network 
and motor vehicles at the expense of public transport, pedestrians and the urban 
environment, particularly in the inner city. To contextualise community action surrounding 
transport, this section explores the policies and the principles that underpinned the transport 
strategy. 
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The policies adopted in Leeds in the 1960s and 1970s were directed by spending priorities 
and a policy framework defined by national government. After a period of stasis in highway 
building in the first post-war decade, from the late 1950s, governments began to expand of 
the capacity of the road network, building new roads and widening or improving existing 
ones.1 This was partly a response to the dramatic rise in car ownership in the 1950s and 
1960s in Britain: the number of cars in use rose from 2.2 million in 1950 to 5.5 million in 
1960 before climbing to 11.5 million in 1970.2 The shift was also influenced by the growth 
of a powerful road lobby, consisting of motoring organisation, road-builders, car 
manufacturers and road hauliers.3 By the mid-1960s, a cross-party consensus had 
crystallised that it was the role of government to satisfy rising demand for motor transport 
among private citizens and businesses.4 An efficient and comprehensive road network was 
seen to be an integral part of a modern economy and a desirable part of a modern society in 
which cars would be used for leisure and travelling to work.5 Arguments for restricting 
vehicle usage through planning controls or pricing mechanisms did not command 
mainstream political support in these years.6 Policy was governed by the assumption that 
rates of motor vehicle ownership and usage would continue to increase for the foreseeable 
future as the population became more affluent and businesses exploited opportunities 
presented by road transport. Road space had to be expanded to avoid policy makers’ deep-
seated fear: ‘nightmare possibility of total standstill.’ 7 Accordingly, public spending on 
roads increased dramatically throughout the 1960s, rising from £190 million in 1964/5 to 
£504 million in 1970/71.8 The national motorway programme, which connected major 
towns and cities by a network of hundreds of miles of wide, grade segregated roads, 
absorbed most of this budget and dramatically increased the appeal of private transport.9 
During the same period, governments oversaw a major reduction in the capacity of the rail 
network on the grounds that the demand for rail travel would continue to decline and a 
rationalised network would be more efficient.10 
 
                                                          1 David McKay and Andrew Cox, The Politics of Urban Change (London, 1979): 165 2 McKay and Cox, Urban Change, 165 3 Mick Hamer, Wheels Within Wheels: A Study of the Road Lobby (London, 1987): 37-51 4 McKay and Cox, Urban Change, 171 5 Simon Gunn, ‘People and the car: the expansion of automobility in urban Britain, c. 1955-70,’ Social History, 28:2 (2013): 223-225 6 David Rooney, ‘The Political Economy of Congestion: Road Pricing and the Neoliberal Project, 1952-2003,’ Twentieth Century British History, 25:5 (2014): 628-650 7 Alison Ravetz, Re-Making Cities: Contradictions of the Recent Urban Environment (London, 1980): 127 8 McKay and Cox, Urban Change, 171 9 David Starkie, The Motorway Age: Road and Traffic Policies in Post-war Britain (Oxford, 1982): 6-9 10 Philip Bagwell and Peter Lyth, Transport in Britain, 1950-2000: From Canal Lock to Gridlock (London, 2002): 136-137 
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Adapting urban areas to meet the needs of road vehicles was a key part of the new national 
transport strategy [see Fig. 3.1]. Towns and cities were both the origin and destination of the 
vast majority of vehicle journeys. Urban areas became congested as existing road networks 
strained to cope with increased demand.11 Central areas, upon which vehicles converged, 
became choked with traffic and blighted by vehicle noise and fumes. This congestion was 
viewed as an inhibitor to economic growth. The volume of road vehicles in urban areas 
presented a safety concern: the number of road traffic fatalities ‘increased steadily after the 
Second World War,’ rising from 133,000 in 1945 to 390,000 in 1965.12 Governments 
acknowledged that expanding urban road infrastructure would be more problematic than 
building inter-city motorways because the competition for urban space was more intense. 
New and expanded roads had to share scarce urban land with housing, commerce and 
industry, and with other modes of transport. The problem of accommodating motor vehicles 
in urban areas was the subject of an investigation commissioned by the Ministry of 
Transport by team led by Professor Colin Buchanan.13 Buchanan’s report argued that cities 
would have to be radically re-structured to meet the challenges of motor vehicles. Buchanan 
advocated building new roads, dedicated to vehicular traffic, separate from the existing 
network. In order to avoid conflict between vehicles and pedestrians, he argued that 
vehicles and pedestrians should be separated. Rejecting the multi-functional street, he 
promoted car free precincts, serviced by vehicles at their outer edges, where pedestrians 
could access urban amenities unencumbered by vehicles. In city centres, he advocated 
vertical segregation, with pedestrians and vehicles accommodated on different levels.14 
Buchanan did not propose unfettered freedom for the motorist. He maintained cities should 
ration demand for urban motoring through parking controls and maintain a comprehensive 
public transport system, but his report was biased in favour of travel by private vehicle.15 
The report had a major impact on the way transport professionals, politicians of all parties 
and the general public understood urban transport problems for at least two decades.16  
 
Leeds City Council embraced the new paradigm in transport policy with enthusiasm. At the 
beginning of the road-building drive, in the late 1950s, the city council undertook a review 
                                                          11 Simon Gunn, ‘The Buchanan Report, Environment and the Problem of Traffic in 1960s Britain,’ Twentieth Century British History, 22:4 (2011): 3-5 [Online access version] 12 Matthew Keep and Tom Rutherford, House of Commons Library, ‘Reported Road Accident Statistics,’ 24 October 2013, 2-3, www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers /sn02198.pdf, accessed 11 September 2015 13 Ministry of Transport, Traffic In Towns: A Study of the Long Term Problem of Traffic in Urban Areas (HMSO, 1963) 14 Traffic in Towns: the specially shortened edition of the Buchanan Report (Middlesex, 1964), 172-8 15 McKay and Cox, Urban Change, 168 16 Gunn, ‘The Buchanan Report,’ 11-13 [Online access version]; Traffic in Towns: the specially shortened edition of the Buchanan Report (London, 1964) 
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of transport policy and in 1962 the authority agreed the outline of a major new urban road 
network.17 The philosophy underlying the city’s strategy was elaborated in the city’s 
Development Plan Review, prepared between 1962 and 1968. In 1969, the strategy was 
summarised in a report produced by the city council in partnership with central government, 
named the Leeds Approach.18 The city council was deeply influenced by Buchanan who 
used Leeds as a case study.19 The city’s transport strategy began from the premise that the 
hitherto unforeseen increase in vehicle ownership necessitated a ‘radical’ re-formulation of 
transport policy.20 Congestion, it was argued, arose from conflicts between the different 
functions of the city’s roads.21 Commuter traffic might be held up by local traffic; long 
distance freight might be delayed pedestrians crossing the road. These conflicts could be 
circumvented by differentiating roads according to their function and minimising the 
number junctions where different types of roads intersected.22 There was also to be a major 
expansion of capacity of the city’s road network. The council estimated that there would be 
11,170 vehicles per hour travelling in one direction on the network by 2010 and argued that 
this growth must inform the construction of a new primary road network.23 The main 
function of this network was to prevent congestion and reduce journey times by enabling 
vehicles to travel in ‘free flow conditions.’24 For instance was predicted that a new inner 
ring road would ‘reduce congestion in the central area by one third.’25 The primary road 
network would be formed of different types of roads. Three urban motorways, designed 
solely for motor vehicles with full grade segregation, would connect the central area to the 
new motorways.26 Both the M1 and the M62 passed within six miles of the city centre and 
the architects of the Leeds Approach were keen to ensure that Leeds capitalised on this 
strategic position in the emerging national motorway network. Motorway distributors would 
feed traffic from the motorway onto existing city streets.27 Several of the city’s major radial 
roads linking the suburbs to the centre would be converted into expressways: wider, faster, 
wide roads with grade segregated intersections that bypassed commercial areas.28 Finally, a 
                                                          17 Leeds City Council, ‘Planning and Transport: the Leeds Approach: A Report of the Special Partnership between the Leeds City Council, the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government,’ (HMSO, 1969): 10 18 LCC, ‘Planning and Transport,’ 1 19 Ministry of Transport, Traffic In Towns, 80-111 20 Leeds City Council, First Review of City Development Plan: Report of Survey (Written Analysis, Submission Edition), July 1968, 1 21 LCC, First Review of Development Plan, 110 22 LCC, First Review of City Development Plan, 111 23 LCC, First Review of the Development Plan, 104 24 LCC, First Review of City Development Plan, 110 25 Joseph Minogue, ‘Leeds rebuilds conservatively,’ The Guardian, 11 April 1962, 8 26 Leeds, First Development Plan Review, 111-12 27 Leeds, First Development Plan Review, 112 28 ibid 
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new inner and an improved outer ring road would enable traffic to bypass the city centre 
and outer suburbs respectively. 
 
The transformation of the transport infrastructure was conceived of as a key part of the 
wider project of urban renewal. A key principle of the Leeds Approach was that road-
building would be integrated with the redevelopment of residential, commercial and 
industrial areas.29 These aspects of renewal were planned and programmed simultaneously. 
The clearance of older housing and obsolete industrial premises gave the city the 
opportunity to weave new road systems into the city’s urban fabric.30 Cleared sites 
functioned as blank slates on which city planners could reconfigure urban space in 
accordance with new planning principles.31 The intention was to improve the environment 
in residential and commercial areas while expediting the flow of traffic.32 At key nodes on 
the emerging road network, land was allocated for new industrial and warehousing 
developments.  
 
Despite its preoccupation with road infrastructure, the Leeds Approach was explicitly 
framed as a ‘balanced’ approach to transport in the city. The council judged it could not 
afford to construct a road network capable of accommodating the total potential demand 
for car use and conceded such a network would absorb too much land. To prevent the 
new network from becoming congested, the city council intended to limit car commuting 
in the peak periods to 17.5 per cent of the central area workforce and 22 per cent of those 
who worked in the industrial zone. 33 This would be implemented by limiting the supply 
of parking spaces for commuters.34 The public transport system would cater for the 
remainder of the workforce.35 Requiring the majority of workers to use public transport 
would ensure there was ‘a sufficient residual demand for public transport to make it 
possible to operate an effective service.’36 To enhance the appeal of public transport, 
which would face stiff competition from the car, the Leeds Approach advocated a system 
of express buses for commuters travelling from outlying areas, which would use the new 
network of high speed roads.37 Housing estates would be planned to ensure bus routes 
were readily accessible and percolating services would carry passengers through 
                                                          29 LCC, ‘Planning and Transport,’ 38 30 LCC, ‘Planning and Transport,’ 6 31 Ravetz, Re-making Cities, 51-2 32 YEP, 18 January 1968, 10  33 Ministry of Transport, Traffic In Towns, 98; LCC, First Review of the Development Plan, 100-103 34 LCC, ‘Planning and Transport,’ 17-18 35 LCC, ‘Planning and Transport,’ 38 36 ibid 37 LCC, ‘Planning and Transport,’ 30; LCC, First Review of the Development Plan, 107 
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residential areas.38 While the lion’s share of resources were to be devoted to road-
building, the strategy envisioned a mixed economy in transport and investment in roads 
was not solely designed to benefit private vehicles. However, city buses would have to 
share space on the road with cars since priority measures were judged to be unfair to 
motorists.39 In common with other cities in Britain and North America, Leeds had 
‘motorised’ its transport system in the late 1950s, replacing electric trams with buses, 
and the architects of the Leeds Approach judged that a dedicated rapid transit system was 
not economically feasible.40 The tension between planning for the car and the interests of 
other modes of transport would be a key driver of community action. 
 
Like other aspects of urban renewal, the transport strategy was designed to project an image 
of Leeds as a dynamic city that was utilising the latest technology and planning concepts to 
modernise its infrastructure and improve conditions for business. The Project Leeds 
marketing initiative explained the marriage of roads and advancement in the following 
terms: ‘Exciting flyovers and splendid roads twist and spiral their course around the City 
Centre and run out to join the great motorways. Everywhere there are signs of improvement 
and progress.’41 Project Leeds branded Leeds as ‘The Motorway City of the Seventies’ and 
this slogan was deployed in marketing literature and franked on letters sent from Leeds for 
much of the 1970s.42 This placed the road network at the forefront of the city’s civic 
identity. Like many other cities in the western world in this period, Leeds had embraced 
‘automobility,’ a system in which the economy, society, culture, resource use and patterns 
of consumption were orientated around the private car.43  
 
2. Motorway Politics 
 
The implementation of the transport strategy began in the early 1960s. Work commenced 
on the inner ring road in 1964 and the project was completed in 1974 at a total cost of 
£12.5 million [see Figs. 3.3-3.5].44 The inner ring road traced an arc for 2200 yards 
around the northern side of the city centre. 45 Built to motorway standards, it was sunk 
                                                          38 LCC, ‘Planning and Transport,’ 21, 30 39 LCC, First Review of the Development Plan, 105, 107 40 Gunn, ‘People and the car,’ 224; LCC, First Review of the Development Plan, 107-8 41 Leeds Chamber of Commerce, Project Leeds (Cheltenham, 1969, 1971): 3 42 David McKie, ‘Motorway city of the seventies,’ The Guardian, 17 April 1971, 9 43 John Urry, ‘The ‘System’ of Automobility,’ Theory, Culture & Society, Vol 21 (4/5), 2004; Gunn, ‘People and the car,’ 220-222 44 YEP, ‘Hole that ate the traffic,’ 16 April 2007,  http://www.yorkshireeveningpost.co.uk/news/latest-news/top-stories/hole-that-ate-the-traffic-1-2097838, accessed 23 September 2014 45 Leeds City Council, Leeds Inner Ring Road (Leeds, 1966) 
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into an open trench for most of its length with one tunnelled section. Preparation of the 
site required the demolition of 340 houses, six pubs and several cafes and industrial 
workshops, displacing hundreds of people and scores of businesses.46 At its eastern end, 
the ring road merged into the York Road, a radial road that had recently been upgraded 
to a dual carriageway. The second major road scheme, the south-east urban motorway, 
matched the inner ring road in its scale and ambition [see Fig. 3.6]. The 2.5 mile road, 
which linked the city centre and the terminus of the M1 at Stourton, consisted of ‘six 
multi-level interchanges, 12 bridges, the Hunslet motorway distributor and several other 
link roads.’47 It cost £6.9 million. Constructing the road required the ‘elimination of what 
[amounted] to a small town in terms of industry commerce and housing’ in south 
Leeds.48 The compulsory purchase order alone affected 800 people, 341 houses, 55 
shops, 15 houses above shops, 134 businesses and 53 portions of garden and in total 730 
properties were demolished before construction began in November 1968.49  
 
The transport strategy envisaged two further urban motorways.50 The south-west urban 
motorway would connect Leeds to the Lancashire-Yorkshire Motorway, later the M62. It 
would pass through the densely populated neighbourhoods of Holbeck and Beeston Hill. 
The North East Urban Motorway road would link the two southern urban motorways to 
the A1 east of the city by bypassing the city centre and crossing the inner east Leeds 
neighbourhoods of Burmantofts and Harehills.51  The decision to demolish Quarry Hill 
Flats, a council estate housing several thousand people, was partly motivated by the need 
to secure the line of the road.52 In addition to the urban motorway schemes, the council 
prepared detailed plans for converting radial roads in Headingley, Halton and 
Stanningley to expressway standard by the early 1980s.  
 
Speaking in support of the motion for the compulsory purchase order for the south-west 
urban motorway in April 1971, Alderman Frank Marshall, the leader of the city council, 
expressed his gratitude for the ‘tolerance’ shown by Leeds people on being ‘‘messed 
around’’ and coping with ‘all the dust, dirt and inconvenience’ associated with the road-
                                                          46 http://www.yorkshireeveningpost.co.uk/news/latest-news/top-stories/the-rocky-road-that-took-leeds-over-40-years-to-finish-1-2196114, accessed 23 September 2014 47 YEP, 17 November 1967,  48 YEP, 8 December 1966, 12 49 YEP, 8 December 1966, 12; YEP, 17 November 1967, 13 50 Leeds City Council, Verbatim Reports, 28 April 1971, 400-1 51 YEP, 31 January 1973, 3; The Guardian,1 February 1973, 6 52 Letter from Kevin Gould, 1973, WYA: WYL546; Alison Ravetz, Model Estate: Planned Housing at Quarry Hill, Leeds (London, 1974), 223; LCC, Verbatim Reports, 21 November 1973, 109-110; LOP, No. 661, 29 November 1990, 5-6. 
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building programme and other aspects of urban renewal.53 Marshall was not straining 
credibility. Despite the seismic impact of the new roads social and economic life of the 
inner city and the far-reaching implications of future road building proposals, there was 
no significant organised protest over the city’s urban road-building programme in the 
1960s.54 The only recorded opposition to the inner ring road emanated from a handful of 
property owners, angered that they were to receive compensation based on the ground 
area only when their property was compulsorily purchased. At the public inquiry into the 
Development Plan Review in 1969, which outlined the routes of all three urban 
motorways, there were no principled objections to the policy of constructing urban 
motorways. One resident of Harehills objected to the route of the North East Urban 
Motorway, but this was not supported by the Inspector.55 At the public inquiry into the 
South East Urban Motorway, there was only one ‘root and branch objector.’56 The local 
press did capture evidence of localised disgruntlement at the motorway programme and, 
in particular, the opaque nature of the policy making process. In 1968, a resident of 
Hunslet complained that road-building was ‘“a bureaucratic steamroller”’ and lambasted 
the council for its failure to provide detailed information to affected citizens.57 This 
dissatisfaction notwithstanding, few residents articulated principled objections to 
motorway or the wider transport strategy.58 Crucially, individual grievances did not 
translate into any collective resistance to the transport strategy or any of its component 
parts before the 1970s.  
 
The general public acceptance of urban road building in Leeds was broadly 
representative of the rest of urban Britain. In a handful of historic cities such as Oxford 
and Bath there was substantial opposition to road proposals from the 1950s. In most 
large industrial cities urban motorway projects were not the focus of grassroots 
opposition until the late 1960s or early 1970s.59 In London, significant opposition to 
urban road-building arose only in the mid-1960s when the Greater London Council’s 
proposals for a series of orbital motorways – the London ringways – were published.60 In 
                                                          53 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 28 April 1971, 402 54 Motorway Archive, ‘M621 Southern Motorway,’ http://www.ukmotorwayarchive.org/, accessed 29 January 2015 55 Leeds City Council, Development Plan First Quinquennial Review, Report of a Local Public Inquiry into Objections and Representations (1969): 43-44 56 YEP, 18. January 1968, 10  57 YEP, 18 January 1968, 10 58 ibid 59 Stephen Snowden, Towns Against Traffic (London, 1971): 58-78; Starkie, Motorway Age, 72 60 Starkie, Motorway Age, 73-75; Snowden, Towns Against Traffic (London, 1971): 110-132; John Davis, ‘‘Simple Solutions to Complex Problems’: the Greater London Council and the Greater London Development 
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Cardiff, Southampton, Portsmouth and Nottingham, community groups began contesting 
urban motorways plans in the late 1960s.61 In Leeds, significant community opposition 
to urban road-building lagged a few years behind these places, not surfacing until the 
early 1970s. Still, in most of urban Britain, road planners had almost a decade to 
progress schemes, from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, before they encountered 
grassroots resistance. In order to understand the roots of this activism, it is necessary to 
explore why community action was not present in the 1960s when the foundations of the 
Leeds Approach were laid. This section will explore the four key reasons for the dearth 
of community activism in Leeds in the 1960s over transport, before exploring why 
community action flourished in this area in the following decade. 
 
Firstly, the absence of community action in the 1960s is partly explained by the city 
council’s failure to engage the citizens in a conversation about the new transport strategy. 
Ordinary people had few opportunities to comment on the Leeds Approach as it was 
developed because the policy-making process was largely invisible to the public. 
Officers from local and national government worked with leading elected politicians to 
craft the key principles and apply them to the city. Senior officers, such as the City 
Engineer in the late 1960s, Geoffrey Thirlwall, were extremely influential within the 
council bureaucracy and spearheaded the programme of road building.62 Men like 
Thirlwall resembled powerful city engineers around the western world, such as Robert 
Moses in New York City.63 Officers and councillors firmly believed that they enjoyed 
strong public support for the key principles that informed the policy. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, councillors interpreted their electoral mandate as a broad endorsement by 
voters of the policies their party supported. The council followed the statutory process 
for consultation, but this only required local authorities to publicise plans and policies at 
a late stage, after they had effectively been agreed by officers and councillors. The 
outline of the urban motorway system was presented at an exhibition in the City Art 
Gallery in 1962 after the full council had ratified this plan. Work on the Inner Ring Road 
began in 1964, two years before the public inquiry into the road in 1966.64 When the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 Plan, 1963-1973,’ in Jose Harris, ed, Civil Society in British History: Ideas, Identities and Institutions (Oxford, 2003): 249-274 61 Starkie, Motorway Age, 77-78 62 Stan Kenyon Interview, September 2008, Leeds 63 Anthony Flint, Wrestling with Moses; How Jane Jacobs took on New York’s master builder and transformed the American city (New York, 2009) 64 Motorway Archive, ‘Leeds Inner Ring Motorway,’ http://www.ukmotorwayarchive.org/, accessed 29 January 2015 
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draft Development Plan Review went to public inquiry in 1966 all the key proposals 
regarding transport had been agreed by local decision makers.  
 
This closed and technocratic approach to policy making was both informed and 
legitimised by the expanding discipline of transport planning, which originated in the 
United States in the 1950s.65 Transport planning worked from the premise that future 
transport needs could be determined by analysing existing transport patterns and 
applying multipliers for anticipated growth.66 Transport planners collected quantitative 
data – such as the number of vehicles using a given road at a particular time – and used it 
to model existing transport patterns and to forecast long term change. As the Buchanan 
report contended, ‘[t]he necessary characteristics of a network are as capable of 
methodological evaluation as the layout and dimensions of a steel frame for a building.’67 
The expressed preferences of citizens were not part of this methodology and, despite its 
claims to technocratic neutrality, transport planning afforded a privileged position to 
motor vehicles and road-building. Transport planners rarely considered other transport 
modes and they tended to assume that increasing road capacity was the only viable 
response to rising vehicle use.68 Neither the accuracy of this method nor the desirability 
of meeting future demand was publicly debated.  
 
The opaque nature of policy making did not provide an incentive for citizens to organise 
to try to influence policy. Ignorance suppressed community organising. Hunslet residents 
interviewed shortly after the south-east urban motorway opened confessed they were 
ignorant of the council’s plans until construction work began.69 Instead of launching a 
dialogue with the public in which the the principles underlying the strategy were open to 
discussion, the council organised a public relations campaign to promote the new 
transport policy with a series of events to celebrate the opening of new roads.70 The 
Project Leeds initiative continued to advance the Motorway City brand. The council’s 
message was communicated through and amplified by a largely sympathetic press at both 
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the local and national level.71 As a consequence, the view that the new road system was a 
symbol of progress and the source of future prosperity was widely accepted. Across the 
country, the reconfiguration of space and patterns of mobility was viewed, like housing 
renewal, as integral to modernisation.72 The impacts on the environment, society and 
personal mobility were given little consideration. 
 
While the council’s approach to policy making helps to account for the dearth of 
community action in the 1960s, it does not provide a complete explanation. Basic 
information about the road plans had been available since 1962 and from the mid-1960s 
the strategy began to take a material form. The second reason for the dearth of 
community action over transport before the 1970s is linked to the political culture of the 
areas most intimately affected by road-building. In 1974, when residents of Hunslet were 
asked by a local journalist why they had not challenged the plans for the south-east urban 
motorway, the reporter was told that local people felt powerless in the face of the forces 
that re-shaped the city and the transport system. This sentiment was typified by one 
comment: ‘“I don’t think we’ve any say. These things are planned.”’73 Residents viewed 
town planning as a process by which fixed ideas were imposed from above with no space 
for popular input. Whether or not these views were justified, they were clearly deeply 
felt. Many participants raised issues of class and geography, suggesting that the working-
class people in south Leeds did not organise over transport in the 1960s because they felt 
their views would be ignored. As one participant put it, ‘“It depends on the locality. If it 
was at Roundhay [north Leeds] or somewhere like that it would carry more authority. 
But when you get lower down the scale to working people you haven’t got authority at 
all.”’74 This sentiment was echoed by another speaker who commented, ‘“we’re on the 
wrong side of the river, and it’s as simple as that. We’re just ordinary working class 
people – they don’t give a damn.”’75  
 
Many of the households who were directly affected by the road believed urban motorway 
building was an inevitable and irresistible part of the modernisation of the city. It was 
begrudgingly accepted by those who did not expect to benefit personally. In 1966, one 
resident who had to move to make way for the south-east urban motorway told the 
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Evening Post: “We knew it has to come.”76 A year later, a journalist observed the same 
passive attitude among people living on the route who ‘realise that they will have to go, 
they accept that it will cause them inconvenience and maybe even loss…’77 There is little 
evidence of working-class deference – many commentators clearly had little respect for 
those in office – but rather of a sense of fatalism, a belief that those living on or near the 
route of the urban motorways would never be able to influence policy making. The 
discourse that roads represented the city’s future was deep-seated. Community 
organising could not take root unless people believed they had a chance of influencing 
change. 
 
These attitudes were mirrored and reinforced by civil society organisations in inner city 
Leeds who raised no objections to the transport strategy. The trade unions, working 
men’s clubs, churches and other recreational bodies were silent on the issue in the 1960s. 
Consistent with the consensus that prevailed nationally, the Leeds Labour Party actively 
supported the proposals. There is no evidence of councillors in inner Leeds expressing 
reservations about the road proposals before the 1970s. When a motion confirming the 
route of the south-east urban motorway was put before the council in 1966 there was no 
debate.78 Although the Liberal Party opposed urban motorways in the 1970s, it had no 
representation in Leeds until 1968.  
 
Thirdly, the wider social context in which the transport strategy was formulated often 
militated against the emergence of community action. The transport strategy was 
prepared and implemented alongside widespread residential, commercial and industrial 
redevelopment. As we saw above, the Leeds Approach drove to link these processes. 
Large swathes of housing in the areas most affected by the new road system were 
cleared, as we saw in Chapter 2, on public health grounds and their inhabitants were 
dispersed to peripheral council estates. The social upheaval this caused was not 
conducive to neighbourhood organising. Households that no longer had a long term 
vested interest in the area were less likely to contest plans for the future of the land on 
which their condemned houses stood. Between 1961 and 1971, the city demolished 1400 
houses specifically for planning and highway reasons.79 For many residents of properties 
required for road schemes, highway construction expedited their movement from a 
                                                          76 YEP, 8 December 1966, 12 77 YEP, 16 January 1968, 6 78 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 2 November 1966, 6 79 Leeds City Council, Older Housing in Leeds: An Assessment of redevelopment Potential and Priorities, 1971-1991, Volume 2: Formulation of Strategies (Leeds, 1972): 38 
139  
declining area to a newer council house, so they had no decision to contest the scheme. 
In areas where most of the old streets had been cleared a decade in advance of the road-
building there was no urban fabric or residential community left to save. The extent of 
physical change wrought by the various planks of urban renewal reinforced the feeling 
examined above that Leeds was changing irreversibly and irresistibly.  
 
Fourthly, it is significant that most of the urban road-building programme affected 
largely working-class areas. This was partly a function of the geography of urban 
development of Leeds. Middle-class housing was concentrated on the higher ground in 
the north and west of the city over a mile from the central area. In the city’s more 
affluent suburbs there was less demand for new roads. The national motorways 
approached Leeds from the south and the city’s industrial and commercial districts were 
located in and around the city centre. The inner ring, where the council sought to expand 
road capacity, was dominated by working-class housing. Slum clearance created vacant 
sites that created opportunities for road-building. Low-income citizens often lacked the 
educational resources, professional skills and political connections to build a campaign. 
They were less likely to be informed of schemes and the means of objecting to them. As 
we argued in Chapters 1 and 2, effective community action was usually a partnership 
between working-class and middle-class citizens. As community action was still in its 
infancy in Leeds in the late 1960s, there were few middle-class community activists 
available help residents to build community groups in places like Hunslet and Holbeck.  
 
The exception for the tendency for major highway schemes to be planned for working-
class areas was inner north-west Leeds. This part of the city was more socially mixed. In 
neighbourhoods like Hyde Park and Headingley there were numerous professional 
middle-class households. In 1964, the city council revealed a proposal to build a bypass 
around the centre of Headingley as part of its wider strategic goal of upgrading the A660 
road to expressway standard [see Fig. 3.8].80 This scheme was contested by a group of 
residents, including a clergyman, an estate agent, an architect and a university lecturer. 81 
The group elaborated a sophisticated argument against the proposal based on the social 
and environmental effects of the road and they hired a solicitor to present this case at a 
public inquiry.82 The argument against the by-pass prevailed and in 1965 the government 
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refused permission for the scheme.83 This was the second time a Headingley by-pass had 
been rejected: in the late 1930s, a group of Headingley residents had organised to defeat 
similar proposals.84 In Section IV, we will explore community action and highway 
building in north-west Leeds in more depth. The key point here is that the social and 
educational background of local people helps to explain why community action was 
present in north-west Leeds in the 1960s when it was absent elsewhere in Leeds. In 
London, middle-class community activists constituted the backbone of the opposition to 
the London ringways proposals.85 
 
If Leeds people had been largely passive during the planning and construction of the 
urban motorways, the finished product provoked a different response. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the effect of emerging road network on the urban and social fabric of inner city 
Leeds was a key driver of community activism in general and around transport in 
particular. The shock of living in close proximity to the completed road motivated people 
with no previous experience of activism to begin campaigning. In London, too, the 
opening of the Westway in 1970 was a pivotal moment for anti-road protest in the capital 
because it illustrated vividly the problems associated with motorways in dense urban 
areas.86 We explored the wider context to this activism in Chapters 1 and 2: the rise of 
new social and political movements; growing militancy in trade unions and on council 
estates; the growth of the urban conservation movement; and the way in which central 
government responded to these protests by creating new mechanisms for popular input 
into the planning system. For community action around transport in the working-class 
areas of Leeds, the opening of the south-east urban motorway in 1972 was a critical 
moment.87 Local people were appalled by the noise and fumes generated by the road, by 
its severing effect on the communities of south Leeds and by the loss of local amenities 
resulting from road-building. One resident lamented that the district had been ‘split in 
two…We were one big community, but we’re isolated.’88 
 
In south Leeds, a key grievance was the loss of the greater part of Hunslet Moor – one of 
few large green spaces in inner south Leeds – to the motorway. As one resident put it, ‘“We 
had a lovely Hunslet Moor here, the football pitches, the cricket pitches, [now] we’ve 
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nothing – we’ve a bowling green and that’s all.”’89 Another noted the contradiction between 
efforts to make Hunslet a smokeless zone and the pollution caused by the new road.90 After 
the road opened, the inhabitants of south Leeds began to deconstruct and challenge the 
modernisation discourse that had been propounded to justify urban motorways. In 1972, one 
Hunslet resident lambasted the degradation of Hunslet Moor ‘to make way for the 
rampaging paths of “progress”.’91 The same writer argued that the project subjugated people 
to cars: ‘Every time I use the motorway bridge…I become almost aware of being an 
intruder…among nightmares in steel and concrete.’ Media reports convey a mounting sense 
of injustice in south Leeds that the area had borne an unfair share of physical dislocation. 
The motorway was viewed as an undemocratic imposition on the area, planned and 
implemented by people with little knowledge of the area or its people. One resident 
suggested that ‘if those that plan…got off their backsides and came to see round [here] 
before they start making plans…it’d be different.”’92  
 
In the absence of opposition from the two main political parties, the trade unions or any 
other established civil societies, community action groups were formed to campaign on 
transport issues. As we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, community action filled a vacuum. In 
Hunslet and Belle Isle, the emergence of community action came too late to exert any 
influence over the line of the motorway. Consequently, activists fought a rearguard 
action against the road, seeking to ameliorate its ill effects. In streets bordering on the 
motorway community groups applied pressure the council to reduce their rate payments 
on the grounds that the road significantly damaged local amenities.93 One group took the 
council to court and the case eventually reached the Court of Appeal in 1974.94 A group 
of residents in the Parnabys area campaigned for a barrier to be erected between their 
houses and the road.95 In the mid-1970s, there was a sustained campaign, led by the 
Moor Crescent Tenants Associations, to restore those parts of Hunslet Moor not lost to 
the road to their former condition. Activists discovered that Tarmac, the main contractor 
for the road, had received £7000 to landscape the area and replace the lost bowling 
greens but this money ‘disappeared.’96 The campaign linked up with activists in Holbeck 
who later faced an almost identical problem. These campaigns had only limited success. 
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Hunslet Moor remained unimproved in 1976.97  It was not until the early 1980s that 
public bodies agreed to pay compensation to people living in close proximity to the 
motorway.98 Community activists were unable to change the council’s priorities. Despite 
the vast sums spent on road-building, officials told activists at a public meeting in 1976 
that there was ‘no money in the kitty to bring the area back to its original condition.’99  
 
The growth of community action in south Leeds in 1972 meant that when the city 
council sought government south government approval for the compulsory purchase 
order for the south-west urban motorway it encountered organised opposition. The road 
was planned to bisect Holbeck and Beeston Hill, passing directly over Holbeck Moor, 
another significant area of green open space in inner south Leeds [See Fig. 3.11]. The 
experience of the south-east urban motorway had bred cynicism in local people, who had 
learned to deconstruct euphemistic planning terms that were deployed to assuage fears of 
blight. One resident of Holbeck lampooned the notion that the area around the urban 
motorway would be ‘landscaped,’ noting that ‘‘they haven’t landscaped a lot over at 
Hunslet yet have they?”’100 
 
Objections were raised in Holbeck and Beeston Hill, and the Holbeck Action Group was 
formed to contest the route. This group was chiefly composed of parents, pupils and 
teachers from Matthew Murray Comprehensive School and the campaign centred on the 
route of the Ingram Distributor Road – designed to covey traffic from the motorway to 
the city centre – which was scheduled to cross the school playing fields, passing close to 
the school buildings.101 At the public inquiry in July 1972, the group argued that the road 
would cause ‘excessive noise in classrooms…give rise to fumes, dust and dirt, expose 
children to the temptation of trespassing on the road and would sever the present playing 
fields.’102 This was the argument against building large roads in urban areas in 
microcosm. Pupils at the school organised a petition of 500 signatures and the group 
managed to secure the support of the Evening Post, a considerable achievement given the 
paper’s contemporary enthusiasm for the urban motorways.103 The campaign was 
supported by Vicar of the Beeston Hill who described any route affecting Holbeck Moor 
as ‘“an act of sophisticated vandalism”’ and attempted to link up objectors from Matthew 
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Murray and Beeston Hill.104 Rejecting the council’s argument that the impact of the road 
could be mitigated through soundproofing and landscaping, the Secretary of State for the 
Environment required that the Ingram Distributor Road be tunnelled to limit its impact 
on the school.105  
 
Whilst the Holbeck Action Group provides evidence of the rise of community action 
over transport in the early 1970s and the potential force of such activism, it also 
underlines the limits of community action around road-building in inner city areas. 
Although the group influenced the planning process, the group did not contest the need 
for an urban motorway. The debate concerned the routing of the distributor rather than 
whether or not there was a need for such a road. Whether this was a reflection of 
activists’ pragmatism or the views of local people at the time is unclear. The failure to 
mount a structural challenge to the transport strategy and the road-building programme 
restricted the scope of community action to engaging with the component parts of the 
overall strategy.  
There was little co-ordinated action between the handful of groups that formed to 
challenge the south-west urban motorway. 106 The council’s hostility to participation 
remained a key obstacle. A shopkeeper who organised a petition felt that local activists 
were ‘“fighting a big machine.”’107  Public ignorance of the council’s plans remained 
widespread. On the eve of the public inquiry, the Vicar of Beeston Hill observed that 
‘few people seemed to know just where the three [optional] routes ran.’108  
 
Community activists were still vulnerable to the charge that there had been few 
objections to the road plans in the decade since the outline routes had first been 
publicised. When, in 1971, a Labour ward councillor for Holbeck called for a pause in 
the preparation of the south-west urban motorway scheme to enable local people to have 
an opportunity to be more involved in the process, the leader of the council dismissed the 
idea on the grounds that there had been opportunities for communities to object since the 
plans were unveiled in the 1960s.109 Marshall remained resolutely opposed to deeper 
participation on the grounds that this would cause delays that would have ‘serious 
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repercussions’ for the overall programme. The implication was that the wider Leeds 
Approach was no longer negotiable. It had to be implemented in full and on time.  
 
The south-west urban motorway was built between 1974 and 1976 with few 
modifications at a cost of £10.5 million.110 Like in Hunslet, the impact of the road on 
Holbeck’s amenities was significant. Holbeck Moor was severed with the loss of a 
playground, flower beds, tennis courts and 78 mature trees.111 The Leeds Other Paper 
found no local support for the road. Residents protested that the area had been ‘spoiled’ 
and that they felt ‘cut off’ and the effect on Holbeck Moor caused considerable 
anguish.112 This episode cannot be characterised solely as a case study in the failure of 
community action. The negative local reaction to the South East Urban Motorway clearly 
unsettled Labour councillors and prompted a debate in the Leeds Labour Party about the 
road programme.113 Although the sceptics did not carry the argument, sufficient doubt 
had been raised for the city’s Planning Committee to withdraw its support for the 
northern section of the North East Urban Motorway in October 1973 on the grounds that 
it was ‘too damaging to housing and general environment in that area.’114 The Halton 
Expressway and a multi-level intersection at Sheepscar were scrapped for the same 
reason. 
 
The urban motorways had a significant effect on the political outlook of local people in 
inner city Leeds, which is significant for the history of community action. There is 
evidence that prior to motorway building people in places like Holbeck expected elected 
local government to act in their best interests without the need for protest.115 The 
construction of the motorways discredited this position. It deepened local distrust in 
politicians and professionals, especially planners. As one Holbeck resident remarked on 
the south-west urban motorway, ‘”I don’t care who’s planned this, but he must have done 
it with his eyes shut…Either that or he wants locking up.”116 This shift in political 
culture helps to explain why in the late 1970s and early 1980s road proposals were 
resisted, with some success, in the working-class neighbourhoods of Richmond Hill and 
Cross Green.117 These activists were more keenly aware of the effects of urban road 
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schemes. As the pace of housing renewal slowed in the 1980s, the roads threatened more 
settled communities and newer housing. 
 
While this political awakening came too late to stop the motorways in south Leeds, it 
was channelled into other forms of community organising. In 1976, the year the 
motorway opened, the Holbeck Community Association was formed to campaign for the 
interests of the neighbourhood. Writing in 1980 about the origins of the Association, one 
member recalled: 
 the advent of the motorway scourge united the remnants of the communities left, they the people rose up in anger to preserve what they could of the place called Holbeck, out of this resurgence of interest was born Holbeck Community Association dedicated to improving living conditions within the district, caring and …fostering community spirit…’118  
The Holbeck Community Association campaigned to reduce the impact of increased 
traffic and motorway blight on Holbeck, but it also worked on a wider range of local 
issues, such as housing, elderly welfare, children’s play and recreational facilities. In 
Hunslet, too, the impact of the motorway galvanised activists to form stronger 
organisations to campaign to renew the area. The Hunslet Community Forum was 
formed in the late 1970s to co-ordinate the work of community groups in the area. In 
1979, members of the Forum told the city council that it had been ‘set up to revive the 
spirit of Hunslet, which was laid to rest beneath the motorway and the redevelopment of 
large areas of Hunslet.’119 Too late to roll back the road building programme and 
comprehensive redevelopment, they hoped to compensate for its ill effects.  
 
This section has shown that there was little community opposition to the planning and 
preparation of the first urban motorways. The wider process of urban renewal and the 
associated social upheaval militated against community organising. This was reinforced 
by widespread ignorance of planning strategy, the council’s reluctance to engage with 
local people and a political culture in which modernising projects. The socioeconomic 
profile of the south Leeds neighbourhoods affected by the two urban motorways was also 
significant. Community activists did eventually organise against the urban motorways 
but they were too late to fundamentally alter the proposals. The lived experience of the 
urban motorways proved a major driver of community action and contributed to the rise 
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of a more critical political culture. The new roads were not only a focus of community 
action in the inner city but a catalyst for community organising around other issues.  
 
3. Struggling to cross the road 
 
This section continues to explore the way in which community action emerged in response 
to the implementation of the transport strategy. It broadens the focus beyond the urban 
motorways to explore how community activists engaged with the general rise in vehicular 
traffic across the city. The trends in transport and personal mobility that informed the city’s 
transport strategy in the 1960s continued over the following decades. Car ownership levels 
continued to rise and the roads were increasingly used to transport goods. The planners’ 
attempts to ration demand for car use by controlling the supply of commuter car parking 
were largely unsuccessful. 120 The expanded road network incentivised car use and the new 
roads quickly became congested during peak periods, compounding the problem of 
congestion on older roads. Consequently, the number of vehicles on the city’s roads 
continued to grow.  
 
In this context, navigating the city on foot became increasingly difficult. Walking remained 
one of the most popular means of navigating the city.121 Pedestrians had to contend with an 
increased flow of traffic and faster vehicle speeds as drivers took advantage of wider, 
straighter roads and streamlined intersections.122 While the primary road network was 
intended to remove through traffic from residential and commercial streets, in many areas it 
appeared to have the opposite effect, channelling larger volumes of traffic into particular 
areas, especially inner city neighbourhoods. Grade segregated roads were impossible to 
cross on foot at surface level and dedicated crossing facilities – bridges or underpasses – 
were not always provided. Widened roads were a major obstacle to pedestrians. The sheer 
difficulty of crossing the road was highlighted by an activist in Farnley who explained that 
the only way to cross the outer ring road was to wait on the kerb before dashing across the 
road when there was a gap in the traffic.123 Unsurprisingly, there had been 52 accidents 
involving pedestrians in 1969. Nationally, while road accident casualties began to decline 
after peaking in the mid-1960s, road accident casualties remained over 300,000 annually 
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during this period and in the early 1970s the figure was closer to 350,000.124 The fear of 
road traffic weighed heavily on the minds of pedestrians. This concern was particularly 
acute for parents of younger children.  
 
The increase in the volume of road traffic was not only a problem because it created a 
barrier to pedestrian movement: the noise and fumes produced by the traffic severely 
blighted the environment of many neighbourhoods. The impact on streets, pavements and 
houses alongside main routes were particularly severe. Sharp increases in the number of 
heavy goods vehicles on the city’s roads, a development stimulated by the growth of the 
national motorway network, intensified this problem. The average weight of freight vehicles 
increased in the 1960s and 1970s as heavier weight classes were permitted.125 Lorries used 
urban neighbourhoods to access the motorways and to reach industrial and commercial 
areas. Over 1700 heavy goods vehicles travelled through the centre of Harehills on 
Roundhay Road during the morning rush hour.126 
 
These conditions were a key driver of community action across the city. Groups of affected 
residents formed community action groups to advocate for pedestrians in their 
neighbourhoods and to remove heavy goods vehicles from local roads. The first traffic 
action groups in the city appeared in the late 1960s and their numbers grew over the 1970s 
as the problems discussed above intensified.127 There were at least fourteen separate traffic 
action groups operating in the city between the late 1960s and early 1980s. The actual 
number of groups probably exceeded this figure because, like most community action 
groups, the traffic action groups were highly localised and often short-lived, which rendered 
them invisible to journalists and many did not appear before the council. Some traffic action 
groups had close links to established community organisations and drew upon their 
networks and resources. For instance, the New Wortley Community Association sponsored 
a group lobbying for a safe crossing on Tong Lane.128 Other traffic action groups had no 
clear links to existing groups: they were simply a product of the ad hoc organising efforts 
by local people drawn together by a shared experience of everyday problems with traffic. 
The traffic action groups mainly heralded from inner city neighbourhoods where levels 
were highest and where the impact of new roads was most acutely felt, but several formed 
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in more outlying areas bisected by major roads. Generally, they formed in working-class 
areas, since as we discussed above, traffic problems were most intense in the poorer parts of 
the city and it was here that most new roads were built.  
 
To apply pressure on the council, the traffic action groups initially used the moderate 
methods deployed by community activists, organising petitions and letter writing 
campaigns, conducting research and arranging meetings with councillors and city officials. 
In Chapeltown, community activists began campaigning for safer road crossings at the 
beginning of 1972, following a spike in the number of traffic accidents in the area. The 
campaign was initiated by the Roads and Traffic Group of the Chapeltown Community 
Association. The group focused their efforts on Scott Hall Road, a radial road that carried 
traffic from the northern suburbs to the city centre, passing through the centre of an interwar 
council estate with a high child population.129 The activists placed particular emphasis on 
the city council’s failure to make proper provision for pedestrians and the threat to 
children.130 They maintained that motorists routinely broke the speed limit, driving at up to 
60mph in a 40mph zone, and did not acknowledge the existing zebra crossing. When one 
vehicle stopped to let a pedestrian cross it was common practice for a second motorist to use 
the outside lane to overtake the stationary car, endangering the crossing pedestrian. The 
group lobbied for a traffic light controlled pelican crossing to provide pedestrians with more 
robust protection and for stricter enforcement of the speed limit. They organised a traffic 
survey in February 1973 which challenged the council’s figures and suggested that traffic 
levels almost met the national criteria for a pelican crossing.131 The council was unmoved 
by this argument, citing the function of Scott Hall Road as an important radial route. Across 
the city traffic action groups usually encountered firm resistance from the public authorities 
who were feared that signalised crossings would hinder the flow of traffic and reduce the 
capacity of the road network. This was the argument the city council used to reject calls for 
a pedestrian crossing in Blenheim after a local girl had been injured by a bus.132 
 
Traffic action groups challenged the traditional approach to transport policy making. 
Transport planning methods were used to determine the need for pedestrian crossing 
facilities and to assess whether the use of roads by heavy goods vehicles should be 
restricted. Such measures would only be implemented when accident rates reached a certain 
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level and only if the regulations would have acceptable impact on traffic flow in the city 
overall. Community activists identified several flaws in this methodology. They pointed out 
that certain roads had a high accident rate, even though traffic levels were not sufficiently 
high to win government approval for a zebra or pelican crossing.133 Activists in Middleton 
argued that the government’s standardised guidelines were not applicable in their area since 
three recent fatalities pointed to a clear local need for better crossing facilities on the 
estate.134 A rigidly quantitative approach to road safety could also have perverse outcomes. 
Activists in Holbeck argued that government policy seemingly required the city council to 
wait until another accident occurred on a local road so that the accident rate cross the 
government threshold before it installed a zebra crossing.135 Activists showed that 
numerical data often failed to capture demand for new crossing infrastructure. Surveys of 
the York Road showed that few pedestrians crossed the road and the accident rate was 
low.136 Local activists held that there was plenty of latent demand for crossing facilities, but 
few pedestrians were prepared to risk crossing when cars travelled at up to 70mph.  
 
Community activists challenged the public monopoly over this information and expertise by 
conducting their own surveys of traffic flow and motorist behaviour. They used this 
research to bolster their argument for restricting traffic or providing new crossings.137 In 
1976 activists in Harehills campaigning for a ban on heavy lorries conducted research on 
Roundhay Road which found that, between 7.45am and 9am, 1779 heavy vehicles used the 
road, which equated to one heavy vehicle every eight seconds.138 In 1980, activists in 
Halton Moor lobbying for safety measures and the closure of certain roads to through 
traffic, carried out a survey which showed that 1000 out of 1342 vehicles in a given period 
were using a road through the estate as a “rat run” to reach an industrial estate.139 While 
activists held that data should not necessarily overrule the wishes of local people, they were 
not averse to using it to support their case. They were demonstrating that transport surveys 
were not neutral but could be used to serve different arguments. 
 
Owing to the intransigence of the city council and the emotive nature of the issue, traffic 
action groups frequently resorted to more militant tactics, staging demonstrations on the 
road and obstructing the flow of traffic. The catalyst for such an action was often the death 
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of a local person – usually a child – which generated intense local anger. Activists in 
Chapletown adopted more militant tactics following the deaths of three local children at the 
junction of Sholebroke Mount and Scott Hall Road in the space of one month in spring 
1973.140 The day after the deaths of two local children, 200 residents attended a ‘stormy and 
emotional public meeting’ and they formed the Scott Hall Action Committee to spearhead 
the campaign. The group organised a demonstration at the point on the road where the 
children had died: 
In pouring rain on Friday 4th May, 150 mothers, children and men stopped the traffic by marching to and fro on the [zebra] crossing waving banners saying “Stop the Traffic”, “This is our new cemetery”, “Cars kill”. 800 leaflets explaining the demonstration were handed out.141  At a subsequent meeting with local officials, the police agreed to man the zebra crossing for 
school children, but no firm commitment to install a pelican crossing was forthcoming.142 
Challenging the council’s priorities, the group asked why the council could not allocate 
£3,000 for a pelican crossing out of its £1,288,400 highways budget.143 To maintain the 
pressure on the council, the Action Committee organised a demonstration at the roadside 
during the rush hour twice a week for six weeks.144  They wrote letters to city officials, the 
local MP, the Department of the Environment and the local press, leafleted in the area and 
gave interviews with the local radio. Over time, the Action Committee struggled to maintain 
the momentum of the campaign; by June 1973 numbers at the regular demonstrations had 
dwindled to a half a dozen protestors.145 This revealed the difficulty of sustaining 
community action even in such an emotionally charged context. After the group lobbied the 
Planning Committee in late June, councillors agreed to fund a pelican crossing, as well as 
guard rails and bus bays.146 The city council remained unwilling to reduce the speed limit 
on this key radial, so crossing the road elsewhere remained hazardous. 
 
Road-blocking demonstrations were common across Leeds in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
The first recorded use of the tactic was in Farnley in 1970 where a local action group 
organised a march along part of the outer ring road to apply pressure on the council to 
install more crossings on a section of road where there had been an average of one accident 
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per week in 1969.147 In November 1976, the activists in Holbeck brandished homemade 
lollipop signs and held up the traffic on Top Moor Side to allow children to cross the 
road.148 This was in protest at the council’s failure to install a zebra crossing. The Harehills 
Traffic Action Group used direct action to promote their campaign to ban heavy goods 
vehicles on the main route through the district. One weekday afternoon in December 1975, 
50 members of the action group, supported by local residents and church members, blocked 
Roundhay Road by walking back and forth across the pedestrian crossing holding placards 
and banners.149 Leaflets were handed out to passers-by to explain the action. Although 
many drivers were reportedly ‘upset’, ‘shoppers and kids showed their support for the 
demonstration.’150 The action lasted for almost one hour before ‘the police arrived and 
waded in to renew the flow of lorries.’ From late 1970s, the city council tended to respond 
more favourably to local requests for crossing facilities, but direct action did not stop. In 
1980, community groups stopped the traffic in Halton Moor and New Wortley in support of 
their campaigns.151   
 
Road-blocking demonstrations were potentially perilous forms of political activism. 
Activists not only placed themselves in physical danger from fast-moving vehicles, they 
faced the wrath of motorists and risked prosecution for obstructing the highway. Indeed, at 
the New Wortley demonstration in 1980, several activists were arrested by the police and 
charged with obstruction. 152 On the whole, however, the police appear to have acted 
leniently, though they usually acted swiftly to remove the protestors from the highway. An 
activist from the New Wortley Community Association explained the group’s decision to 
resort to illegal tactics: ‘“We try to keep within the law. We were so het up about it after the 
boy was killed, we decided to do it. We knew it was against the law.”’153 Activists in 
Holbeck presented direct action as a proportionate response to the danger presented by 
unsafe roads: ‘We realise that what we are doing may be breaking the law but it is 
obviously a much greater crime to endanger the lives of young and old in Holbeck by not 
providing us with a crossing.’154 The Harehills Action Group resorted to using direct action 
after formal negotiations had ‘resulted in nothing more than a vague promise that something 
                                                          147 TOP, No. 10, 27 February 1970, 3 148 LOP, No. 44 Nov 27-Dec 11 1976, 5 149 LOP, No. 23, December 1975, 20 150 LOP, No. 23, December 1975, 20 151 LOP, No. 137, 22 August-5 September 1980, 1; LOP, No. 141, 10 October 1980, 1-3 152 LOP, No. 137, 22 August-5 September 1980, 1 153 ibid 154 LOP, No. 44 Nov 27-Dec 11 1976, 5 
152  
might be done in 2 years’ time.’155 Some campaigns were over a decade old before direct 
action was initiated.156 These remarks reveal the reluctance with which community activists 
chose to use direct action. They did not romanticise the approach. It was, rather, a last 
resort, driven by anger and frustration. As activists of the Scott Hall Action Committee told 
motorists whose journeys they were disrupting: ‘We have to demonstrate to be heard.’157  
 
The disruption caused by these demonstrations was one of the few ways in which the 
community could actually inconvenience and embarrass the city council. It was a form of 
community sanction against public bodies. Like strike action in the workplace, road-
blocking demonstrations sought to persuade the council return to the negotiating table. 
Indeed, threats of direct action were as common as direct action itself and Leeds Other 
Paper maintained that the council was ‘terrified’ of such threats.158 The tactic was also used 
by community activists campaigning on issues like street cleansing.159 Direct action did 
appear to influence council decision-making. As we saw above, the council was eventually 
persuaded to fund a pelican crossing on Scott Hall Road after two months of visible 
campaigning. Elsewhere the council’s response was even more rapid. In Holbeck, 
community activists spent several months lobbying for a zebra crossing through moderate 
means with no success.160 The day after activists held up a busy road, council workmen 
appeared to begin work on a zebra crossing. This prompted one resident to remark wryly, 
‘“I’ve never seen the council move so fast, have you?”’161 In 1979, activists in Harehills 
working with groups based further up the A58 secured permanent a ban on heavy goods 
vehicles using the road.162 
 
Community action over road crossings radicalised people who had no previous experience 
of activism and were ‘not normally given to demonstrating.’163 These protests were 
certainly not confined to young radicals. In 1980 in New Wortley, an 80 year-old woman 
joined the road-blocking demonstration.164 Working-class women played a central role in 
the traffic action groups. The majority of the most active members of the groups were 
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women. All the leading organisers in the Scott Hall Action Committee were women.165 The 
gender make-up of the traffic action groups was stressed condescendingly in local press 
reports, which referred to the activists ‘mums’ or ‘wives.’166 Women’s involvement was 
connected to the fact that the safety of children in the community was seen to be the 
responsibility of women. Before crossings were installed, local women accompanied 
children across the road.167 By participating in community action these women – who were 
less likely to be involved in party politics or trade unionism – made important interventions 
in urban politics.  
 
The Leeds experience of community action over road traffic issues was mirrored across 
urban Britain. The May 1976 issue of Community Action carried a feature on grassroots 
campaigns for zebra crossings with advice for community groups engaging with this 
issue.168 Direct action was particularly common, especially in London. In Hackney in April 
1974 activists in the De Beauvoir district diverted traffic on Tottenham Road in part to 
protest the use of the road as a rat run by motorists.169 In November 1976, in north London, 
community activists stopped the traffic at the busy Archway junction at rush hour as part of 
a successful campaign to veto the Greater London Council’s road proposals.170  
 
In campaigning for more robust pedestrian crossing facilities and for greater restrictions on 
the flow of traffic through urban areas, community activists were implicitly challenging the 
official view that vehicle movement should be unimpeded on major radial and orbital roads. 
They maintained that decisions over signalised pedestrian crossings and heavy goods 
vehicles bans were ultimately political. The decision turned on whether pedestrians and the 
environment should be prioritised over traffic flows and freight movements. The 
construction of new highways had actually intensified the conflict between vehicles and 
people. At the heart of the traffic action groups’ case was the contention that transport 
policy was unfair: it prioritised the needs of the car owners over citizens who walked and 
frequently used the bus.171 There appeared to be an irreconcilable tension between the 
council’s vision of a “motorway city” in which vehicles moved quickly and freely and the 
ability of citizens to traverse the city on foot and inhabit a pleasant urban environment.172 
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While these points were implicit in their words and deeds, analysis of this sort did not 
feature prominently in the campaigns mounted by the traffic action groups. Traffic action 
groups usually adopted a more short term and superficial stance. In a discussion of strategy 
at a meeting of the Roads and Traffic Group of the Chapeltown Community Association, 
one member maintained that the group should spell out the wider political issue and argue 
that ‘the car is less important than people,’ challenging the council’s argument that ‘car 
flow is more important.’173 This proposal was rejected by another member who held that the 
group need not take such a ‘radical’ stance but should instead focus on ensuring drivers did 
not break the speed limit.174 The latter view was more representative of the way most action 
groups chose to frame their campaigns. Rather than explicitly emphasising the structural 
causes of increased traffic, they tried to ameliorate the symptoms. They proposed remedies 
such as speed restrictions, regulations on certain vehicles, safety barriers, and new crossing 
facilities. Rarely did traffic action groups articulate a vision of the city in which the car was 
structurally contained.  
 
This narrower, more pragmatic approach limited the overall scope of traffic campaigns and 
militated against joint action between groups across the city facing similar problems. Traffic 
action groups tended to focus exclusively on their localities, or even single junctions. In the 
late 1970s, several activists voiced support for co-ordinated community action on traffic in 
the inner city, but this never materialised.175 The interests of different community groups 
were not always aligned: Activists on the York Road claimed that the ban on lorries on the 
A58 had cause more lorries to travel through their area and community groups from 
different neighbourhoods clashed at a public inquiry into the order.176 The failure to 
organise jointly on the traffic problem helps to explain why, despite several localised 
achievements, this form of community action had little impact on the underlying causes of 
increasing traffic levels in the city and on the emergence of an urban environment that was 
hostile to the pedestrian and inimical to the maintenance of a vibrant, convivial street life in 
inner city areas. Most inner city neighbourhoods remained blighted by congested highways 
and crossing the road continued to present a challenge for pedestrians into the 1980s and 
beyond. In 1984, the Sheepscar Interchange, a vast traffic intersection constructed in inner 
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north Leeds, opened with only token facilities for pedestrians and cyclists.177 Winning 
additional safety measures and pedestrian crossings was a useful short term expedient and 
helped to ease the problems of life for a pedestrian in the ‘Motorway City,’ but motor 
vehicles continued to take precedence over the environment and other forms of mobility at 
the close of the 1980s.  
 
This section and Section 2 showed that part of the community action movement was a 
reaction to the effects of the ‘Motorway City’ project on the everyday life of certain urban 
neighbourhoods. It was a response to the loss of amenity, environmental blight, noise and 
community severance that resulted from urban motorway building. It was also a response to 
the general rise in vehicle traffic in the inner city and in neighbourhoods bisected by major 
roads that was associated with the road-building programme. This restricted other forms of 
mobility, particularly the ability of pedestrians to navigate the city. The emergence of 
community action around these issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the first time, 
in most of the city, that the transport strategy had been challenged. This section of the 
community action movement was able to extract small concessions from the city council to 
ameliorate some of the adverse effects of road-building, but it was unable to orientate the 
city’s transport strategy in a different direction.  
 
Sections 2 and 3 have explored four key reasons for the weakness of community action 
around transport in much of Leeds. First, timing was key. The rise of community action in 
most inner city areas began too late in the policy-making process to block the construction 
of the urban motorways; it emerged after much of the transport strategy had been prepared 
and approved by government. Second, these community activists possessed limited 
financial, educational and social resources; they were drawn mainly from low income areas 
of the city. Unlike other community campaigns we explored in Chapters 1 and 2, these 
action groups received little help from middle-class professionals. Third, these groups were 
largely parochial and did not form alliances across the city. Fourth, these community 
activists did not mount a structural challenge to the ‘Motorway City’ project and nor did 
they articulate an alternative vision for the city’s transport strategy. The city council was 
able to accommodate some of their concerns without changing its basic priorities. The next 
two sections will explore more successful examples of community action around transport 
and road-building.  In order to effectively contest the Leeds Approach they transcended the 
more piecemeal approach we have explored above. 
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4. Organising against the Headingley expressway 
 
Community action was not only confined to extracting small concessions from the council 
on transport policy, and nor did activists only fight a rear-guard action against the transport 
strategy. In north-west Leeds, activists succeeded in blocking a key goal of the Leeds 
Approach, the conversion of the A660 road into an expressway. This aim of this section is 
to show why community action in this part of Leeds succeeded and to examine how it 
accomplished this. 
  
As we saw above, the A660 had been the focus of highway proposals in the 1930s and the 
early 1960s. In both of these decades, the schemes were dropped following community 
resistance. These victories proved indecisive. The A660 remained a key strategic route in 
the city’s transport strategy and the council aspired to upgrade it. This was because the road 
connected the city centre to the Polytechnic and the University. It linked several residential 
suburbs to the city centre, before intersecting with the outer ring road and running out to 
towns and villages in the commuter belt north-west of Leeds [see Figs. 3.2, 3.9].178 During 
the 1970s and 1980s, several highways schemes were promoted for the A660, first by Leeds 
City Council and later by the West Yorkshire County Council, which assumed 
responsibility for the road after 1974. They affected the first covered three miles of the 
‘A660 corridor’ from the city centre to Far Headingley. Each scheme sought to improve 
traffic flow through widening the road by adding lanes, constructing new sections of road, 
and streamlining intersections.179 The Headingley by-pass proposals were resurrected. The 
goal was to increase the capacity of the road and to eliminate conflicts between long 
distance commuters and local traffic.  
 
The publication of the 1971 proposals precipitated the formation of a community action 
movement across the whole corridor. In 1971 and 1972, community action groups were 
formed in several neighbourhoods to challenge the scheme. The mobilisation consisted of 
groups newly formed in response to the plans and pre-existing groups established over other 
issues. The Headingley Residents Association and the Weetwood Society, were formed in 
reaction to the road proposals. The North Hyde Park Neighbourhood Association and the 
South Headingley Community Association were formed in response to the city council’s 
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housing renewal strategy but also campaigned against the road plans.180  Organising around 
the A660 plans was a natural extension of their interest in community and the built 
environment. The road plans were explicitly linked to the wider project of urban renewal 
and community activists in northwest Leeds were aware of this connection. For instance, 
the Headingley Residents Association was also leading the campaign against proposals for a 
district centre scheme in Headingley, which sought to replace several traditional streets with 
45,000 square feet of new office and retail space.181 An early victory for the groups in 
October 1972 when the council abandoned its support for the district centre galvanised the 
campaign against the road.182 
 
Recognising that groups throughout north west Leeds had a shared interest in challenging 
the road proposals, in 1972 activists from six community groups formed the A660 Joint 
Council to co-ordinate the campaign.183 Managed by a group of elected officers, the Joint 
Council collected a membership fee from the member organisations and held regular 
monthly meetings. By the late 1970s, it had over 1000 members.184 By the early 1980s, 
Leeds Civic Trust, the Victorian Society, Transport 2000, Friends of the Earth and the 
Leeds Cycling Action Group had affiliated to the Joint Council.185 There was considerable 
overlap between the membership of these organisations and the community action groups 
fighting against the road plans. These organisations offered material as well as moral 
assistance to the campaign. The Leeds Civic Trust provided a secretariat for the Joint 
Council as part of its strategy for supporting neighbourhood groups that we discussed in 
Chapter 2.186 The Victorian Society helped to produce influential literature for the 
campaign.187 This alliance of neighbourhood groups across the length of the corridor and 
other pressure group was a key strength of the campaign. The groups shared information 
and, through the A660 Joint Council, engaged in collective bargaining with the council. 
This distinguished community action on the A660 to the groups we investigated in Section 
2 and 3.  
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The dynamism of the campaign against the A660 road proposals was linked to the people 
who participated in it. As we saw in Chapter 1 and 2, the identity of community activists 
can only be described impressionistically based on references to people in the sources. 
Membership records, social studies and other sources that might allow for a more 
systematic analysis of group membership either do not survive or never existed. Most of the 
community activists mentioned in the sources on the A660 corridor were professionals or 
successful business people from a middle-class background, including lawyers, doctors, 
estate agents, accountants and business people.188 This was representative of the norm in 
suburbs like Headingley, Weetwood and West Park. The written output of the groups 
suggests they were well-educated. There was a preponderance of academics, which is 
unsurprising given the proximity of Leeds University and Leeds Polytechnic. The chair of 
the A660 Joint Council in the early 1970s was a lecturer at Leeds University.189 Many 
community activists were actually planning or transport specialists. William Houghton-
Evans, who was active in the A660 Joint Council and the North Hyde Park Neighbourhood 
Association, was a Senior Lecturer in Town Planning and Architecture at Leeds 
University.190 The A660 corridor as a whole was socially diverse. Neighbourhoods like 
Hyde Park, Blenheim, south Headingley and Woodhouse contained a higher proportion of 
tenants, ethnic minorities and low income households and individuals from these 
backgrounds participated in the campaign. One leading activist observed that both the South 
Headingley Community Association and the North Hyde Park Neighbourhood Association 
had ‘an appreciable working class membership.’191 
 
Women were prominent in the campaign. One of the most influential community activists in 
the campaign was Audrey Marlow, a resident of Hyde Park, who occupied key position in 
the A660 Joint Council and the North Hyde Park Neighbourhood Association in the 1970s 
and 1980s.192 A graduate of LSE and a veteran of Bletchley Park, Marlow first became 
involved in community activism from 1964 when she bought a house in Hyde Park that was 
later threatened by the clearance programme. Another leading activist from the Hyde Park 
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area was Celia Barry, who worked as a civil servant in east Leeds.193 Living at the foot of a 
proposed flyover, Barry was typical of many activists in having a vested interest in stopping 
the road plans, but she had a wider interest in transport and environmental issues, which 
was reflected in her involvement in the campaign against a motorway proposed by the 
government which would link the M1 and the A1 via Pudsey and Harrogate.194 Several 
members of the Pudsey-Dishforth Motorway Action Group, the organisation campaigning 
against this planned motorway, were active in community groups along the A660.195 Like 
Barry, the majority of activists had a wider interest in political, social and environmental 
issues and most were involved in other local and national campaigning groups or voluntary 
organisations. Many community activists had prior experience of radical political groups. 
Both Marlow and Houghton-Evans were members of the Community Party in the 1930s and 
CND in the 1950s.196 They transferred their organising skills to the community action 
movement.  
 
This analysis of the membership of the campaign not only enriches our understanding of the 
identity of community activists, it helps to explain why community action in north-west 
Leeds was so successful. The professional, educational, political and socioeconomic 
background of key community activists was a major asset. It contrasts with the personal 
resources of most activists in inner and south Leeds. Community activists in north-west 
Leeds also derived psychological strength from the history of the campaign. That road 
proposal for the A660 had been defeated in the past emboldened activists. In July 1978, the 
A660 Joint Council held a garden party in Hyde Park to commemorate forty years of 
successful community resistance to road plans on the A660.197 The view that road-building 
was inevitable, which characterised much of inner Leeds in this period, did not take hold in 
north-west Leeds. 
 
A distinguishing feature of the A660 campaign, which differentiated it from community 
action over roads elsewhere in Leeds, was that activists in north-west Leeds developed 
compelling set of inter-linked arguments to undermine the case for road-building. The 
community activists’ case against the council’s highway proposals was composed of three 
distinct pillars. The first part of the case explored the social and environmental impact on 
north-west Leeds. As we have seen, the council contended that the scheme would improve 
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the environment along the corridor by removing traffic from areas where pedestrians 
congregated.198 Community activists countered this claim in two ways. Firstly, they argued 
that the new road would increase the problems of traffic by acting as a magnet to commuter 
traffic and freight vehicles, a point we shall return to later. As a result, the corridor as a 
whole would suffer from increased congestion, noise and pollution. The relative calm of 
roads from which through traffic was removed would be obtained at the expense of adjacent 
areas which would be blighted by the expressway. Secondly, they held that the road scheme 
would damage the built environment along the corridor by spoiling the setting of buildings 
of historic and aesthetic value along the route. Leeds Civic Trust described the A660 
corridor as a as a place ‘of unusual character and considerable beauty.’ 199 The road would 
not only require the demolition of several individually attractive buildings, it would erode 
the coherence of the urban fabric, despoiling its character. This argument drew on the 
concept of townscape, which stressed that the special quality of an urban area was derived 
from several component parts – buildings, road, trees, street furniture – each of which had 
to be preserved to maintain this distinctive atmosphere.200 Activists noted that the city 
council had recognised the value of this townscape by designating four conservation areas 
along the route in the early 1970s.201 Activists rejected the claim that the road itself would 
be aesthetically appealing, describing it as a ‘noisy, polluted and dangerous speedway.’202 
 
Community activists also held that the road would undermine the social fabric of the 
district. Like their counterparts contesting housing clearance, activists on the A660 corridor 
argued the district housed a number of unified and coherent communities.203 They 
maintained that demolition to prepare the route would physically displace many of the 
households who constituted this community. Neighbourhoods such as Blenheim were to 
lose 80 to 90 houses to a new section dual carriageway.204 The impact of environmental 
blight and disruption would encourage those with the resources to do so to leave, breaking 
up established social networks. Several of the small commercial centres along the route, 
which acted as focal points for community life, were to be cleared or reduced in size.205 The 
road would sever the neighbourhoods along the route by functioning as a physical barrier to 
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pedestrian movement.206 Unlike the existing road, the new highway would not create 
opportunities for incidental social contact for residents walking on footpaths. The net effect 
of these changes, it was argued, would be fatal to many communities.207 Activists 
maintained that the council had neglected this social dimension in formulating its proposals. 
 
In making arguments about the physical and social impact of the road proposals, community 
activists stressed the quintessentially urban qualities of the district: the density of people 
and services, the ease of navigating the area on foot and the wealth of useful amenities. 
They maintained that the road plans would undermine these distinctively urban features by 
transferring space to fast-moving road vehicles. The beneficiaries would be car users who 
lived in outer suburban areas.208 Indeed, the A660 Joint Council framed the debate over the 
road as a conflict between the interests of an urban community and those of suburban 
commuters, contending that ‘some of us like living in cities, not just commuting through 
them.’209 This was an implicit critique of the tendency for public policy to underwrite the 
costs of private motoring, which encouraged the outward movement of the population from 
inner city to the urban fringe in the post-war decades. Key to this argument was that the 
council should prioritise ‘the quality of life’ of citizens over ‘the speed at which traffic 
moves.’210 The A660 Joint Council argued that conventional transport planning 
methodology drew absurd conclusions about the value of urban spaces. The county 
council’s computerised model for assessing the quality of the environment had given the 
environment of Hunslet, with its fast roads and dearth of shops, a high rating because few 
people attempted to walk over the roads.211 The implication was that there were valuable 
aspects of urban life that transport planning methodology could not measure or had failed to 
consider. This philosophy was informed by Jane Jacobs who had critiqued modernist 
planning principles and urban expressway building in the United States.212 
 
As the new primary road network began to take shape, activists were able observe the 
effects of the city’s extant expressways and urban motorways. Hunslet, Holbeck and the 
improved York Road were presented as case studies in the danger posed by the council’s 
plans.213  In one leaflet, activists contrasted photos of the extant Headingley Lane with 
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images of the recently widened York Road in east Leeds [see Fig. 3.7].214 While the latter 
image was dominated by concrete and asphalt, showing a four lane highway passing 
through semi-derelict land, the former depicted an almost bucolic scene of a narrow 
winding road with stone pavements, flanked by mature trees and old walls. The aim was to 
enable local people to visualise the effects of the road scheme, which the council had 
portrayed only in diagrammatic form.215 Expanding on this point about the alleged 
disjuncture between official claims and reality, community activists held that the language 
used in planning documents concealed their true meaning. ‘Improved junctions’ would, they 
argued, amount to ‘expressway junction[s] complete with flyovers and slip roads.’216 
Similarly, they held the term ‘by-pass’ was a euphemism because it suggested the road 
would pass around the area when in fact, ‘Headingley is being pushed out of the way of the 
cars.’217 
 
The second pillar of the case against the road proposals was to contend that the scheme 
would be ineffective as a form of transport policy. Firstly, the community rejected the idea 
that investing in roads would ease congestion on the A660 corridor. Increasing road 
capacity, they argued, would simply attract more motorists to the route and encourage more 
commuters to use their cars. Whereas the council’s transport planners claimed that they 
were responding to the future demand for vehicle use, activists claimed that the scheme 
would stimulate demand for car travel. This would lengthen journey times for local drivers 
and bus users and, in the long term, it would not improve conditions for commuters.218 In 
addition, activists claimed that a streamlined, wider A660 would become a magnet for 
heavy goods vehicles, travelling north from central Leeds.219 Activists feared that should the 
strategic motorways planned for the north of the city in the Aire and Wharfe valleys receive 
approval, the A660 would become a ‘northern extension of the M1 motorway.’220 As we 
saw in Section 3, heavy goods traffic compounded the problem of noise and environmental 
blight.  
 
Developing this argument, activists maintained that the scheme was based on a narrow 
appraisal of the city’s transport needs. It focused almost entirely on the needs of the private                                                           214 HRA, ‘It is time’  215 The promoters argued these images were not a fair representation of the council’s plans. See: ‘Stanley Rostron says…’, Conservative Councillor leaflet, 1972 [LCT] 216 Joint Committee, ‘The Headingley Expressway’ 217 ibid 218 YEP, 7 February 1972, 15 219 R.T. Smithson to Sir Karl Cohen, 11 April 1973 [LCT] 220 Leeds Civic Trust, ‘The current situation regarding plans for the A660 and alterations to Central Headingley,’ 13 September 1972 [LCT] 
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motorist and, in particular, motorists commuting longer distances from the outer suburbs 
and surrounding towns.221 It overlooked the interests of public transport users, cyclists and 
pedestrians. Community activists represented constituencies of citizens whose preferred 
modes of transport were to receive no significant capital investment in the scheme.222 
Activists rejected the notion that other road users would benefit from the new road. For 
much of its length, the new road would present an impassable barrier to people on foot who 
would be required to use special bridges and underpasses. A wider, faster road would be 
more hazardous for cyclists.223 Buses serving residential and commercial areas would not be 
able to use much of the route.224 The activists’ challenge to the A660 scheme was grounded 
in a critique of the council’s wider transport strategy. Local transport authorities had a 
statutory duty to prepare an integrated transport plan, which would co-ordinate different 
transport modes to operate in harmony.225 While the council felt it had fulfilled its 
obligations, the Leeds Civic Trust maintained that the council’s proposals fell short of an 
‘integrated transport strategy’ because the extent of provision for the private car would be to 
detriment of other modes.226 Like their counterparts campaigning against housing clearance, 
activists underlined the disjuncture between national policy goals and local practice. 
 
The third pillar of the case was a political challenge to the way transport policy was 
prepared and implemented. Like their counterparts in the community action campaigns 
around housing renewal and council housing, activists argued that the council had neglected 
to speak directly to local people in formulating its plans.227 The council’s attempt to consult 
with the public in the early 1970s was limited to the distribution of information leaflets and 
the staging of three short exhibitions.228 Both forms of publicity set out the case for the 
scheme after they had been formally agreed by the council. No election had been fought on 
the issue prior to the publication of the plans. This position stemmed from the growing 
assertiveness among the public we explored in Chapter 2. As the chair of the Headingley 
Residents Association put it, there ‘is a healthy readiness within the community to question 
official decisions.’229 Community activists highlighted this democratic deficit in the 
subsequent iteration of the highway scheme. The plans unveiled in summer 1976 were 
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approved by the county council before consultation had taken place.230 For community 
activists, this was diametrically opposed to any legitimate means of making policy.231 As a 
member of the North Hyde Park Neighbourhood Association put it, ‘the people most 
affected by the decision have not had time to make adequate representation to you.’232 Thus, 
while activists objected to the content of the proposals, the process of governance was as 
much a target of the campaign.  
 
In 1976, the county council countered that adequate public consultation had taken place 
when the city council promoted its 1971 scheme.233 The county claimed it had modified the 
city council’s scheme in light of earlier public comment. This position only emphasised the 
cleavages between community activists and the local authority. Community activists 
believed the earlier consultations were inadequate because public comment had only been 
invited on ‘which side roads should be closed and where the bus stops should go,’ not 
whether there was support for the road itself.234 The county council’s modifications to the 
scheme, they argued, were perfunctory and did not address their core objections. The county 
council did eventually consult on the scheme as part of a participation exercise for the West 
Yorkshire Structure Plan, but this was a statutory obligation and did not imply a shift in 
local government attitudes. As we shall see, activists continued to advance the political 
argument against highway building in the 1980s in an evolving administrative context. 
 
In campaigning against the roads, community activists in the 1970s used most of the 
methods we investigated in Chapter 1 and 2. A series of public meetings were held to 
spread the word about the proposals.235 Petitions and bundles of letters were submitted to 
the city council to demonstrate the extent of public support. Drawing on public relations 
techniques, activists promoted their case through Radio Leeds, bus and cinema adverting 
and street posters.236 In April 1974, the Joint Council had a float in the Lord Mayor’s 
Parade.237 Community activists sought to negotiate with the city council over its proposals 
through written correspondence and face-to-face public meetings.238 Public meetings were 
often tense, exposing cleavages between residents and council representatives, but they                                                           230 YEP, 7 July 1976, 7; YEP, 19 July 1976, 2 231 Zinnermann and Zinnermann to Leader of WYMCC, 20 July 1976 [LCT] 232 S. Olsberg to K. Woolmer, July 1976, WYA: WYL247 233 YEP, 23 July 1976 234 Joint Council, ‘Traffic Rules OK?’ 235 LCT Press Cuttings: YEP, 14 July 1972, 3 May 1972 and 24 April 1972 [LCT] 236 A660 Joint Council, Minutes, 3 March 1973, WYA: WYL247 237 A660 Joint Council, Minutes, 28 March 1974, WYA: WYL247 238 For written correspondence, see: A660 Joint Council Minutes, 24 February 73, WYA: WYL247. For descriptions of the public meetings in summer 1976, see: YEP, 17 June 1976, 3; YEP, 19 July 1976, 2; YEP, 9 August 1976, 6 
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were an effective form of communication.239 In 1973 and 1974, community action groups 
stood candidates in local and county elections on an anti-expressway ticket in an effort to 
apply pressure on local councillors.240 Directly engaging in electoral politics was a less 
common tactic for community activists, but it proved an effective means of applying 
pressure on local politicians. Over the 1970s and 1980s, city and county councillors from 
both parties progressively declared their opposition to the road scheme.241  
The outcome of the community action campaign in the 1970s was ultimately inconclusive, 
but activists succeeded in staving off the scheme. The first phase of the community 
campaign against the road scheme failed to move the council leaders. The party submitted 
its plans for the A660 to central government largely unmodified in April 1973, confident it 
would receive funding approval.242 However, eighteen months later the government had yet 
to make a decision and this scheme effectively perished in this policy-making limbo.243 
Local government reorganisation in April 1974 extended this hiatus as responsibility for 
strategy highways in West Yorkshire was transferred to the county council. As we have 
seen, in June 1976 the county council effectively resurrected the city council’s proposals for 
the A660. 244  Pressure from community activists during the participation exercise on the 
West Yorkshire Structure Plan yielded some significant modifications to the county’s plans 
for the corridor. The proposals for demolishing Hyde Park Corner were deleted and the 
Headingley bypass proposals were deprioritised. 245 The plan to demolish most of Blenheim 
for a dual carriageway was also abandoned in November 1978.246 Though expanding the 
capacity of the A660 remained a long-term county council objective, activists had once 
again staved off the scheme. 
The community action campaign in Leeds against urban road-building was representative of 
a national trend. In the early 1970s, grassroots opposition to road proposals in urban Britain 
intensified. Community Action documented these campaigns in dozens of British cities and 
towns.247 In the towns of the Aire Valley north-west of Leeds, community activists 
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organised a militant campaign against a proposed motorway, culminating in an occupation 
of the building in which the public inquiry was being held.248 In York, community activists 
fought the city council’s plans for an inner ring road just outside the city walls, setting up 
the York 2000 group in 1971.249 In 1970, the campaign against the London ringways plan 
climaxed when the public inquiry into the Greater London Development Plan (GDLP) 
commenced.250 The public inquiry received over 30,000 objections to the GDLP, most of 
which concerned the ringways:  a large proportion of these were either lodged or endorsed 
by community groups.251 Grassroots campaigns received support from several recently 
formed national pressure groups, including Transport 2000, Friends of the Earth, the 
Conservation Society and the national Civic Trust.252 Friends of the Earth produced an 
‘action guide’ for environmental protest groups in the UK in 1971 which included two 
chapters on roads.253 
 
Building on the experience of these campaigns, a sophisticated counter-argument to the 
prevailing orthodoxy in transport policy was articulated by community activists, academics, 
journalists and planning professionals. In 1969, a critique of the case for urban motorways 
commissioned by the London Amenity and Transport Association, a coalition of opponents 
of the London ringways plan, was published.254 In 1972, Tony Aldous, a journalist at The 
Times, wrote an influential analysis of environmental policy making and argued that 
citizens needed to play a larger role.255 Towns Against Traffic (1972) by Stephen Plowden, a 
transport planner, offered a comprehensive critique of orthodox transport planning and 
advocated an alternative approach.256 These arguments began to gain currency among 
policy makers. In 1973, a report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Public 
Expenditure recommended the scrapping of all urban motorway projects, restrictions on car 
use and the expansion of public transport.257 While the government did not implement this 
set of recommendations in full it asked local authorities to reconsider their urban road 
plans.258 The OPEC oil crisis in October 1973 reinforced the wisdom of exploring 
alternatives to the private car. From the early 1970s, the media began to voice these critical 
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approaches. A Guardian report on Leeds in 1973 predicted that the Motorway City ‘will 
remain an ordinary, muddled, problem-ridden city of the seventies, left in a limbo after 
overreaching itself.’259 
 
When mounting economic problems in the mid-1970s prompted a round of spending cuts, 
the urban road-building programme was identified as a candidate for major economies. The 
capital cost of urban motorways was large and, in the context of mounting inflation and 
rising interest rates, the government judged several schemes to be unaffordable. National 
expenditure on urban roads actually declined in the late 1970s and fewer miles of roads 
were constructed than in the early 1970s.260 As we saw in Chapter 1 and 2 community 
activists found an ally in central government. The government refused to support several 
major road schemes in the mid-1970s, including the Meadows Relief Road in Oxford and 
the York Inner Ring Road.261 The weight of community opposition also moved several 
authorities to abandon major schemes. In 1972 in Nottingham the newly elected Labour 
council chose to ration demand for car travel instead of perusing two major roads schemes it 
had inherited.262 In 1973, the Labour-led Greater London Council scrapped the ringways 
proposals, influenced by the community action campaign and the Treasury’s reluctance to 
fund the scheme.263 In Leeds, the 1970s iterations of the A660 road proposals were, in part a 
casualty of government cuts. Leeds City Council was also moved by the arguments 
advanced by the opponents of the road pertaining to the impact of roads on housing and the 
environment.264 In June 1975 the North Eastern Urban Motorway was denied funding by the 
government for cost reasons.265 By the late 1970s, community activists appeared to be 
sailing with the wind of political opinion on urban road schemes. 
 
5. The evolution of anti-road campaigning in the 1980s 
 
Despite the shift in national policy over urban road building, the diminishing legitimacy of 
such projects, and the more austere climate of the 1980s, the county council made a further 
attempt to expand highway capacity on the A660 in that decade. This phase in the history of 
the campaign illuminates the way the local state adapted its approach to policy making in 
response to community action and, in turn, how activists augmented their campaigning 
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efforts. In 1982, the county council announced that it intended to draw up a highway 
scheme for the A660 corridor, but not before consulting with the public on various 
options.266 The following year, the authority distributed a questionnaire on transport options 
to 55,000 households in north-west Leeds.267 This invited households to select their 
preferred scheme for the A660 corridor from four options, labelled ‘themes.’268 The results 
of this survey were to inform the county council’s decision. This level of consultation was 
unprecedented in transport policy making in Leeds. It spoke to the influence of community 
action. As we saw in Chapter 1 and 2, participatory policy making was becoming more 
common in a range of policy areas.  
 
If the county council’s approach to consultation had evolved, the way it conceived of the 
transport problems of the corridor had not. Whereas in the 1970s, community activists had 
challenged the public authorities for failing to consult with communities, in the 1980s 
community activists focused on the perceived failings of the consultation process. The 
consultation was based on the premises that traffic congestion was a major and problem that 
would increase as traffic levels increased. Expanding the capacity of the road network was 
depicted as the only solution to congestion.269 Public comment, activists argued, was thus 
confined to selecting where on the corridor highway schemes were to be built, not whether 
they should be built. Under theme four, for instance, the A660 itself would be left largely 
untouched, but major road works would take place on other radials in north-west Leeds.270 
The consultation did not allow respondents to record a preference for other approaches: a 
public transport solution had been explicitly ruled out in the pre-consultation report.271 The 
forecast increases in traffic were presented as an unalterable fact.  
 
The political debate over the road proposals revealed a fundamental disagreement over the 
meaning of participation and consultation. The A660 Joint Council argued that because the 
county council’s approach did not allow citizens to make a meaningful choice, it did not 
correct the imbalance of power between communities and local government. They asserted 
that ‘consultation should start by asking the affected communities what they want,’ before 
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proceeding as a discussion between the council authority and citizens. 272 Activists held that 
‘a mere submission of views’ did not constitute ‘discussion.’273 This resembled the criticism 
levelled by community action groups against the city council’s consultation exercises in the 
late 1970s such as the Chapeltown Local Plan that we examined in Chapter 2.274 By 
contrast, the county council still conceived of consultation and participation in the narrower 
sense of soliciting public views on already mature policy proposals. Options would be 
discussed within clearly defined parameters.  
 
This debate was connected to a disagreement over the role of local government and 
organised community groups. The county council, like the city council before it, presented 
itself as a neutral arbiter between competing interest groups, ranging from community 
action groups to representatives of the road lobby.275 Community action groups, argued the 
council, were one sectional interest group among many others. Of course, community 
activists rejected the notion that the council began from a neutral standpoint, since they felt 
its proposals were inherently biased in favour of car users. Through petitions, letters, public 
meetings and surveys activists sought to show their views were representative of public 
opinion. One leading activist asserted that the campaign had ‘no desire to usurp the proper 
function of councillors to make decisions and take responsibility for these’ but sought to 
ensure that the views of those most intimately affected by planning proposals were ‘given 
very strong consideration.276 They did not believe that local people should dictate policy, 
but that their views had not been given sufficient weight hitherto. This debate ultimately 
reached a stalemate, since neither side could conclusively prove its approach enjoyed 
widespread support.  
 
In response to the limited terms of the 1983 consultation, the South Headingley Community 
Association and Transport 2000 boycotted the questionnaire.277 Other groups responded by 
criticising all of the themes.278 The A660 Joint Council’s response documented a litany of 
procedural and methodological failings, including one-sided public exhibitions, poorly 
publicised public meetings and the use of ‘confusing and off-putting technical terms in 
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documents.279 These they argued cast doubt on the council’s commitment to consultation, 
even on these terms, and rendered the results meaningless.280  
 
The community action movement gained an important ally in November 1983 when the city 
council declared its opposition to expanding highway capacity on the A660, a position 
endorsed by all parties.281 This shift in policy can partly be explained by the influence of the 
community action on local councillors. As we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, a new generation of 
representatives elected from the late 1970s was more amenable to the community action 
movement. On the A660 corridor, Judy Thomas, a Labour councillor for Headingley 
between 1980 and 1988, epitomised this change. Thomas was a member of the South 
Headingley Community Association. She had campaigned against the road proposals in the 
1970s and she was committed to more thorough public participation in policy making.282 In 
1982, she pronounced that any confidential road scheme should be ‘ripped up.’283 Labour 
councillors like Thomas acted as advocates for community action within local government, 
bringing more pressure to bear on the leadership.  
 
The county council received 237 letters, 1040 pro forma letters and three petitions, mainly 
from opponents of road-building who had spurned the official questionnaire.284 The 
response reveals the breadth of the coalition community activists mobilised against road-
building. Some 24 community groups and voluntary organisations responded to the 
consultation. In addition to the local action groups, objections were submitted by the North 
West Leeds Social Democratic Party, the North West Leeds Labour Party, Transport 2000, 
Friends of the Earth and the Ecology Party (the forerunner of the Green Party). Unlike some 
of the campaigns we explored earlier in the thesis, there was very little organised support 
for road-building in the 1980s. The Leeds Chamber of Commerce lent cautious support to 
‘Theme 4.’ 285 The Woodhouse Community Association, not a member of the A660 Joint 
Council, was the only community group to support upgrading the capacity of the A660.286 
 
Partly as a result of the diverse range of organisation that supported the community 
campaign against the highway proposals, the activists’ arguments matured in the 1980s. 
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Having critiqued the council’s proposals in largely negative terms in the 1970s, in the 1980s 
community activists began to articulate an alternative approach to transport policy, better 
suited to the needs of north-west Leeds. This was informed by allies in pressure groups such 
as Transport 2000, the Ecology Party and Friends of the Earth, which campaigned against 
car-orientated transport policy. In the late 1970s, activists in north-west Leeds also made 
links with the Public Transport Group (PTG), an alliance of unionised bus workers and bus 
users who were contesting rising bus fares levels.287 The PTG’s insights also informed the 
case for a new approach to transport strategy. Activists argued that the solution to 
congestion and the environmental blight caused by traffic on the A660 was to encourage 
more people to walk, cycle and use public transport.288 In their alternative strategy, these 
modes would cater for the vast majority of the city’s transport needs. To achieve this, they 
advocated an enhanced bus service, dedicated bus-only lanes and priority signalling for 
buses.289 In order to prevent above-inflation bus fare rises, they advocated high levels of 
public funding for the county’s bus service. Activists argued that capital investment in 
transport should re-orientated so that a larger share was devoted to public transport systems 
and cycling provision.290 For some activists, only a fixed-track public transport system 
could solve the city’s wider transport problems.291 They outlined plans for metro and tram 
train systems in Leeds, inspired by Tyne and Wear Metro and systems in mainland 
Europe.292  
 
Activists also argued that planning policy should be leveraged to support public transport. 
While cars could move throughout the city freely, demand for public transport would 
continue to decline, increasing the bus system’s reliance on subsidy.293 Throughout the 
1970s, activists on the A660 corridor had noted that the council had failed to enforce its 
policy of tightly restricting the on the supply of commuter car parking, a key tenet of the 
Leeds Approach.294 Over the decade, the number of city centre parking spaces, both in 
purpose built car parks and on vacant land had increased dramatically.295 Consequently, by 
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1983, 30 per cent of workers in the central area were car commuters: the Leeds approach 
had aimed to limit car commuting to the central area to almost half this level.296 Activists on 
the A660 corridor thus pushed for more robust stricter controls on city centre car parking to 
ration demand for car commuting.297 Demand for roads, they argued, was driven by the 
supply of parking. By articulating a coherent vision of another approach to transport, 
activists could present the campaign as a positive response to the city’s needs, countering 
the charge that it was a purely obstructive exercise. 
 
In outlining a new approach to transport policy, community activists contested the discourse 
of modernity and progress which had been leveraged to justify the road programme. 
Community activists turned this narrative on its head, portraying urban road-building as one 
of the follies of post-war planning – a mistake that should be confined to the past. Roads 
had ‘carved up much of South Leeds, destroying whole communities’ and transformed 
‘once pleasant shopping streets’ into ‘pure traffic arteries.’ 298 The South Headingley 
Community Association described the effects of highway schemes as akin to a ‘cancer’ in 
the inner city: 
They start with a junction alteration here, a pedestrian crossing there. They end up spreading to the whole system, turning pedestrians and public transport users (the majority of us) into something like trained mice in a car users’ playground. 299  
Like cancer, the danger had to be tackled in the early stages. Activists connected road-
building to the well-documented social and economic problems of inner city Leeds. 
Already, they argued, Headingley was suffering from the early symptoms of inner city 
decay. Empty buildings purchased by the council stood lined the A660. Derelict spaces 
became sites of crime and disorder. One report alluded to the fact that Peter Sutcliffe had 
murdered Jacqueline Hill in November 1980 on ‘a grim strip of waste land’ behind the 
Headingley Arndale Centre.300 This was presented as a chilling warning of the dangers 
posed by planning blight.  
Unsurprisingly, the outcome of the 1983 consultation exercise, which was revealed in late 
1984, did not settle the debate. Out of the 2327 respondents, 82 per cent favoured some 
                                                          296 YEP, 11 March 1983, 8 297 A660 Joint Council, 12 March 1984, Response to Consultation on A660 Corridor [Audrey Marlow to Councillor Kevin Patterson] [LCT] 298 Leeds Civic Trust and Victorian Society, ‘A660?,’ 2 299 Headline, No. 26, Autumn 1983, 1 300 Leeds Civic Trust and Victorian Society, ‘A660?’, 2; ‘Yorkshire Ripper: YEP crime reporter’s memories of a murder,’ 20 May 2011, http://www.yorkshireeveningpost.co.uk/news/latest-news/top-stories/yorkshire-ripper-yep-crime-reporter-s-memories-of-a-murder-1-3402439, accessed, 19 September 2015  
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highway improvements and the majority opted for improvements on the A660 itself.301 The 
county council claimed this revealed ‘considerable support from the public’ for road 
building ‘countered by a strong lobby against any road construction at all.’302 The 
implication was that a silent majority supported road-building. The council posed as the 
arbiter between ‘two strongly conflicting views’ in the community, downplaying its own 
preference for highway construction.303 Despite claiming a mandate to do so, the county 
council chose not to bring forward any highway works on the A660.304 Instead, in April 
1985, the authority opted for a more limited programme of capital works on the nearby 
A65.305 While the authority linked this to the difficult financial climate, but the breadth and 
strength of opposition to the road had influenced its decision to allocate its limited resources 
elsewhere.306 The defeat of the A660 road proposals at this moment was a significant 
victory for community action. However, community activists had not yet persuaded the 
county council to abandon the premise that highway engineering schemes were needed to 
cope with the predicted increases in traffic flow and car ownership. They had effectively 
displaced road-building to another road corridor, one that was less well-organised following 
extensive housing clearance. The authority dismissed the alternative approach promoted by 
activists, which centred on public transport, as not feasible due to ‘financial, practical and 
legislative limitations.’307  
 
There was evidence that local authority officers remained sceptical of the value of public 
participation.308 In 1986, a senior highways engineer suggested opponents of the road-
building did not understand why non-highway alternatives ‘were not feasible’ and 
maintained that many objectors took a ‘parochial attitude to the exercise.’309 The 
implication of this argument was that consultation should be steered by experts to help the 
public ‘to understand more fully the critical issues and choices.’310 This view reflected the 
lingering unease felt by many public officials towards public participation in policy making 
                                                          301 WYMCC, A660 Public Participation, Analysis of Public Response, October 1984, 5; WYMCC, Report of Executive Director of Traffic and Transportation, Director of Planning and Director General of the Passenger Transport Executive, 29 April 1985, 3 302 WYMCC, ‘Report of Executive Director of Traffic and Transportation,’ 10 303 WYMCC, ‘Report of Executive Director of Traffic and Transportation,’ 3 304 WYMCC, Proposals for the A660 Corridor, North West Leeds, April 1985, Joint Meeting of Public Transport and Traffic and Highways Committees, 29 April 1985 305 LCT Press Cutting: YEP, 26 April 1985 [LCT] 306 WYMCC, ‘Report of Executive Director of Traffic and Transportation,’ 9 307 WYMCC, ‘Report of Executive Director of Traffic and Transportation, ’ 3 308 A.G. Barlow, ‘Public Participation within the A660 Corridor,’ Highways and Transportation: The Journal of the Institution of Highways and Transportation, No. 5, Volume 33, May 1986, 9, 14 309 Barlow, ‘Public Participation,’ 15 310 ibid 
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in the mid-1980s.311 Community activists were also concerned about the parochialism of the 
general public, but for quite different reasons: they worried it would enable the council to 
adopt a “divide and rule” approach. An activist in south Headingley cautioned that if 
everyone focused on ‘their own patch’ rather than considering the impact on the wider area, 
the force of the campaign against road-building would be much diminished.312 Community 
activists believed it was their role to educate the public so that they would be aware of the 
‘general threat to the area.’313 This reflected a broader concern that in the absence of proper 
public education, even a more methodologically rigorous participation exercise would 
simply rubber stamp pre-existing decisions. Policy making could only be democratised if 
citizens were better informed. This also underlined the fact that effective community action 
relied on people taking a collective rather than individual approach to their problems as we 
saw in Chapter 1. 
 
The county council had little time to pursue alternative policies. It was abolished in April 
1986 as part of the government reform of local government in the metropolitan counties. 
The city council regained responsibility for strategic highways in the city. In August 1987 
the city announced that it had permanently abandoned all major highway schemes on the 
A660.314 The city council had no appetite for the scheme in the face of community 
opposition and spending cuts. In the same month, the city council announced a ‘grassroots’ 
approach to transport planning in north-west Leeds.315 A senior councillor explained this 
approach as follows:  
“Rather than coming forward right at the start with a set of detailed proposals, we want to give local people an opportunity to set the agenda for discussions and then come back to them again with ideas…”316  
This was a clear indication of the influence of community action on the way public bodies 
conceived of policy making. The extent to which the council realised these rather lofty 
goals deserves separate study but this rhetorical shift was still significant because it opened 
up space for negotiation between community groups and public bodies. As we saw in 
Chapter 1 and 2, statements such as this spoke of the council’s more positive approach to 
organised groups of residents in the 1980s. But in the field of transport policy this shift 
occurred several years later. 
                                                          311 A. Coon, ‘An expensive ritual?’ Highways and Transportation, No 10., Vol. 33, October 1986; Pat Toms, SCAR: Sheepscar-City Access Routes: Inner City Highway Design: the Local Impact of Sheepscar Intersection (Leeds, 1986) 312 Headline, No. 23, Autumn 1983, 1 313 ibid 314 A660 Joint Council: Press Release, 12 August 1987 [LCT] 315 YEP, 13 August 1987, 6 316 ibid 
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Community action also affected a shift in the balance between public and private transport 
in local policy on the A660 corridor and in the city at large. In the early 1980s, the county 
council opened bus-only lanes on the A660, a measure that had earlier been rejected for its 
allegedly adverse impact on car flow. In 1985, when the highway proposals were 
suspended, the Passenger Transport Executive (PTE) proposed enhanced bus and rail 
services on the corridor and park and ride facilities.317 In 1988, a new railway station was 
opened in south Headingley.318 Between 1981 and 1986, the county council actually 
succeeded in arresting the overall decline in public transport in West Yorkshire by 
curtailing fare rises, running more services, extending concessionary fares, branding bus 
services more effectively, and introducing flexible tickets [see Fig. 3.10].319 These policies 
were mainly achieved through higher spending on public transport, which validated the 
arguments activists made by activists. When the A660 highway expansion proposals were 
finally abandoned in 1987, the city council worked with the PTE to develop proposals for a 
rapid transit system on the A660 corridor, which represented a shift towards the view 
advocated by community activists that public transport was the most effective means of 
moving commuters on the corridor.320 Prior to this, fixed track systems had been ruled out 
as too expensive and impractical.321 The new direction culminated in the city’s 1991 
transport strategy, which elevated the role of public transport and contained a more limited 
road-building programme.322 At the heart of the new strategy was a proposed tram network, 
the Leeds Supertram, which would begin with three radial tram lines converging on the city 
centre.323 The progress of the Supertram project deserves separate investigation, but its 
inception in the late 1980s signalled a change in the city’s approach to transport.324 Over a 
decade of campaigning by community activists was a key driver of this change.  
The new approach to transport policy in Leeds never realised its full potential. With the 
exception of housing, government funding for public transport was cut more than any other 
                                                          317 WYMCC, Proposals for the A660 Corridor, North West Leeds, April 1985, Report of Passenger Transport Executive, Improvement of Public Transport – A660 Corridor, Leeds, 29 April 1985 318 A660 News, August 1988 [LCT] 319 WYMCC, A660 Corridor: Public Participation Exercise, Report of the Executive Director of Traffic and Transportation, 10 March 1983, 9 320 YEP, 23 March 1986, 1; YEP, 30 May 1987, 1; YEP,11 August 1988, 1, 4; YEP,15 July 88, 1, 8; YEP, 27 January 1989, 22; YEP, 2 August 1989, 18; YEP, 4 May 1995, 10 321 WYMCC, ‘Report of Executive Director of Traffic and Transportation,’ 1-2 322 Leeds City Council, Leeds Transport Strategy (Leeds, 1991)  323 YEP; 7 November 1991, 5; Leeds Supertram Act, 1993, c. xv; Metro, Leeds Supertram network development: Headingley (Leeds, 1995) 324 The Supertram proposals were not universally welcomed on the A660 corridor and many of those activists who had fought the A660 road proposals campaigned against the Supertram plans for the corridor.  See: YEP, 30 May 1987, 1; YEP 11 August 1988, 1, 4; YEP, 15 July 88, 1, 8; YEP, 18, 27 January 1989, 22; YEP, 2 August 1989, 18; YEP, 4 May 1995, 10 
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item of public expenditure.325 The Thatcher governments were ideologically hostile to 
public transport and their policies privileged the role of private transport.326 Over the 1980s, 
as we saw in Chapter 1 and 2, the Thatcher governments constrained the ability of local 
authorities to pursue policies that went against the grain of national policies.327 As a 
consequence, a radical embrace of new public transport systems was never possible. 
Applying its free market ideology to public transport, in 1986 the government deregulated 
local bus services outside London and promoted the privatisation of municipal 
undertakings.328 Deregulation stripped local authorities of their power to determine fares 
and service levels and opened up the market to private operators. 329 The new private 
operators focused on the most profitable routes and fare levels were determined by 
commercial imperatives. The result was that the Leeds bus system, like other provincial 
cities, deteriorated.330 The capacity of local government to control the private car was also 
eroded in the 1980s. The proliferation of car parks on private land continued and the 
government encouraged office development outside the city centre where land was cheaper 
enabling developers to provide more car parking.  
The erosion of democratic control over public transport made it significantly harder for 
community and labour activists to wield influence. The new private operators were 
accountable to their owners, not citizens or passengers. The allies of the A660 Joint Council 
such as Leeds Transport 2000 survived but they faced a more hostile climate. Finally, in 
1989, the Thatcher governments launched a major road building programme consisting of 
‘2700 miles of new and widened roads.’331 Though the new programme largely affected 
rural areas, it was a blow to community activists who had campaigned for a new transport 
strategy orientated around public transport. It would be the focus of a new generation of 
anti-road protests in the 1990s.332 
This case study discussed in sections 4 and 5 has a number of implications for activism 
surrounding transport and roads and for community activism more generally in Leeds and 
beyond. It shows that well-connected and well-organised community action groups were 
able to hold back the tide of road building that appeared irresistible elsewhere in the city. 
                                                          325 Bagwell and Lyth, Transport in Britain, 179-180 326 Bagwell and Lyth, Transport in Britain, 179-180, 205 327 WYMCC, ‘The Future of the Bus Service in West Yorkshire’ (1982) [LCT] 328 Bagwell and Lyth, Transport in Britain, 181-184 329 West Yorkshire Passenger Transport Authority, ‘Public Transport in West Yorkshire 1986/87’ (1986), WYA: WL2107 330 Bagwell and Lyth, Transport in Britain, 182-5 331 Joe Moran, On Roads: A Hidden History London (London, 2009): 211-212 332 Derek Wall, Earth First! and the Anti-Roads Movement: Radical environmentalism and comparative social movements (London, 1999) 
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North-west Leeds was a particularly fertile ground for community action. The considerable 
resources – educational, financial and social – of the city’s more affluent suburbs and inner 
city neighbourhoods helped community activism to succeed on issues where it struggled to 
make headway in more low income areas. The district had a long tradition of opposing 
road-building and activists mobilised immediately in response to each version of the road 
plan. The influenced wielded by community action on the A660 corridor was enhanced by 
the web of pressure groups and voluntary organisations that participated in campaigns 
against the roads schemes: environmentalists, cycling activists, civic conservationists and 
public transport campaigners were involved. Community activists developed a strong and 
multi-faceted counter-argument against the councils’ roads proposals. Crucially, this was 
not simply defensive. Activists developed an alternative vision for transport that challenged 
the existing strategy. 
 
Campaigners on the A660 corridor never forged strong links with community activists 
working on transport issues in other parts of the city. As a result of the failure of community 
activists to construct a citywide alliance against urban road-building, the transport strategy 
was enacted unadulterated in most other parts of the city. Although Leeds did not build any 
more urban motorways after 1976, the city continued upgrading existing roads and 
constructed several complex intersections and new urban roads in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Stages IV to VI of the inner ring road, built in the 1980s and early 1990s, carved a wide 
path through inner east Leeds. The Sheepscar Intersection, built in the early 1980s, occupied 
ten acres of council-owned land in the north inner city.333 Individually, these schemes were 
cheaper and more lightly engineered than true urban motorways, but cumulatively their 
impact on the urban and social fabric of the city was considerable. They required extensive 
demolition and blighted inner city residential areas. Activists from Richmond Hill and 
Burmantofts did campaign against these schemes, but they acted without support from other 
parts of the city.334 This localised opposition was rebuffed by a council professing to be 
acting in the interests of the city as a whole, which was becoming increasingly dependent on 
the car. In the 1980s and 1990s, as car ownership continued to rise, it became harder to 
contest highway schemes.335 To challenge road proposals, community activists had to 
mobilise high levels of concentrated support, as they did in north-west Leeds. 
 
                                                          333 LCC, Planning Committee Minutes, 19 June 1978 (v) 334 LOP, No. 192, 9 October 1981, 1, 13; LOP, No. 194, 23 October 1981, 3; LOP, No. 212, 26 February 1982, 3 335 Office for National Statistics, Social Trends 40, 2010 Edition, 174, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/social-trends-rd/social-trends/social-trends-40/social-trends-40---transport-chapter.pdf, accessed 20 September 2015 
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Having united activists across north-west Leeds, it is perhaps surprising that A660 Joint 
Council did not reach out to community groups in other parts of the city. There were several 
reasons for this. Firstly, the weakness of community action groups concerned with road-
build in other parts of Leeds militated against the formation of a citywide alliance. Even in 
the late 1970s and 1980s, outside north-west Leeds, community action over road-building 
was sporadic and groups were short-lived. Since community activists in east and south 
Leeds tended to be less articulate and adept at generating media attention, community 
activists in north-west Leeds were less aware of the existence of other campaigns. The 
population of Richmond Hill was blighted through the 1970s by highway proposals, which 
drove away many households, and the population was reduced further by later stages of the 
housing clearance programme, so fewer people remained to contest road schemes.336  
 
Secondly, community action struggled to cross class barriers. Community activists in north-
west Leeds moved in different social circles to activists in other parts of the inner city. 
Activists in Headingley and Hyde Park who worked in professional occupations were less 
likely to count activists in Burmantofts and Richmond Hill among their colleagues and 
friends. This also explains why community activists in north-west Leeds had only a limited 
awareness of anti-road activism on the other side of the city. In literature produced by 
groups on the A660 corridor, other parts of the city are depicted as places where road-
building has already run its course, when in fact, additional highway schemes were being 
prepared into the 1990s. In Chapter 2, we saw how community workers and radical planners 
functioned as a bridge between working-class and middle-class neighbourhoods, but this 
was the exception rather than the rule. There were fewer community workers operating in 
the neighbourhoods of south and east Leeds affected by highway schemes in the late 1970s 
and 1980s and these neighbourhoods were more geographically isolated from more affluent 
areas.  
 
Thirdly, while it was keen to form local alliances locally, the A660 Joint Council 
campaigned in a geographically specific area. Membership of the Joint Council was only 
open to groups operating in the A660 corridor, a wedge shaped area of the city between the 
Meanwood and Kirkstall roads, which excluded groups in east and south Leeds.337 The Joint 
Council derived its mandate from its constituent organisations. The community groups 
affiliated to it were passionately committed to their neighbourhoods but most activists’ 
                                                          336 Leeds City Council, Report of the Housing Working Party, ‘Housing Clearance Programme – Roll Forward and Publicity,’ 12 September 1978, 1-2, WYAS3715; LCC, Report of the Director of Planning, ‘Richmond Hill Appraisal,’ 7 February 1979, PBC 337 Letter from Audrey Marlow, LOP, No. 299, 4 November 1983, 8 
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horizons did not extend very far beyond their local area. Activists campaigning on the A660 
corridor did begin to articulate a new transport strategy for the whole city, in alliance with 
other citywide pressure groups, but the chief concern of most activists was opposing road-
building in the area. Community action always struggled to overcome this parochialism. 
 
*** 
 
This chapter has used community action campaigns on transport issues to develop our 
understanding of community action. Community action over transport emerged in response 
to the rise of a new transport strategy in Leeds, which was informed by shifts in national 
policy, the rise of new forms of mobility and the growth of new professional and 
commercial interests. In most of the city, the strategy was not contested for its first decade, 
but as its impact on society, the environment and mobility became clearer, people organised 
to contest it. Community activists sought to block the construction of new roads and 
ameliorate the impact of the new urban motorways. They also campaigned to defend the 
urban environment from the blighting effects of traffic levels and to protect the interests of 
pedestrians who found it harder to navigate the city. 
 
By comparing different community action campaigns the chapter has explained why 
community action had more success in some circumstances than in others. Certain pre-
existing conditions made community action more likely to flourish: the economic, social 
and educational resources of a neighbourhood were particularly important. The belief that 
road-building was inevitable or unstoppable militated against community action. 
Community activists who articulated a multi-faceted structural argument against the 
transport strategy and built alliances across the city exercised considerable leverage over the 
local councils. Community activists who worked in single neighbourhoods and focused only 
on local problems were less effective. Forging links with trade unions, civic 
conservationists and environmental pressure groups also extended the influence of 
community action.  
 
The arguments advanced by community activists over transport questions shed light on their 
attitudes to the urban environment, community, heritage and mobility. Community activists 
were, at heart, urbanists who believed the city was better served by public transport, 
walking and cycling than the motor car. They were advocates of the multi-functional, mixed 
use street, which was a community asset rather than solely a transport corridor. Community 
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activists rejected the argument advanced by transport planners in the 1960s that the car 
could be accommodated in the city without sacrificing the interests of many of its citizens. 
Community action campaigns over transport articulated the interests of particular social 
groups – inner city residents, pedestrians, bus users, women, young people, the elderly – 
whose needs, they argued, had been marginalised by the city’s transport strategy.  
 
The chapter has shown how the local state responded to the challenge of community action 
by adapting its approach to policy making. Councils began to consult local communities on 
transport policy making to a greater extent, but activists continued to question the extent of 
the council’s commitment to a new relationship with citizens. This debate not only exposed 
a basic disagreement over how the city should be governed, it also highlighted a problem 
for community activists about the sources of their own legitimacy. Community action 
wielded influence over transport policy, reducing the scope of the road-building programme 
and improving facilities for pedestrians. However, it failed to stop the construction of 
dozens of miles of new urban roads and nor was it able to prevent the car becoming the 
dominant mode of transport in the city. The alliance of activists in north-west Leeds failed 
to link up with isolated community groups in east and south Leeds. Community action 
failed to transcend class and geographical barriers to become a citywide movement on 
transport.  
 
By the mid-1980s local policy makers in Leeds had begun to chart a new direction in 
transport policy, influenced by the community activists’ arguments. As in other areas of 
policy, this new approach was ultimately eclipsed by government policy on transport, which 
re-prioritised the private car and altered the balance between state planning with market 
forces to favour the latter. Lacking allies in national government, the community action 
groups we have explored in this chapter had largely folded by the close of the 1980s. Like 
community action on council housing and housing renewal, community action over 
transport emerged in opposition to public policy. We have seen how these community 
action campaigns were deeply affected by shifts in policy. This was not the only form of 
community action. The next chapter will consider the ways in which community activists 
seized the initiative to improve their neighbourhoods and empower citizens. It will ask 
whether these institutions helped to compensate for the weakness of community action at a 
citywide level. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Building Grassroots Institutions:  
The Rise of Positive Community Action 
 
 
If much of the thesis has focused on broadly negative and reactive forms of community 
action – campaigns to block or change policies imposed from outside the neighbourhood – 
this chapter will demonstrate that community action was simultaneously a positive force. It 
investigates how community activists in Leeds organised to create and manage community-
run institutions, projects and services. The chapter begins by exploring the context to efforts 
by community activists to build community institutions, explaining what community 
activists were seeking to achieve and why there was a need for community-run services. 
The opening section also considers the main agents of positive community action. The 
following two sections explore the ways in which community activists built institutions to 
meet particular needs. The second section focuses on community campaigns for community 
centres and advice centres, while the third section concentrates on community organising 
for children’s playgrounds and childcare facilities. These sections consider the way in 
which activists drew on the resources of the community – its people, land, buildings and 
social networks – and obtained external resources by forming partnerships with the state 
and voluntary organisations. The fourth section examines one of the goals of positive 
community action in detail: the drive for greater community control over local services. It 
shows how activists sought to achieve through creating new institutions and by reforming 
existing organisation. The section then explores the various obstacles to community control 
before analysing local involvement in community institutions. Section five considers how 
community action matured and adapted to new challenges in the late 1970s. The first part 
explores the way in which community activists organised at a citywide level in order to 
channel more public resources into community institutions. The second part discusses the 
work of a community institution that functioned as a nodal point for activism in the city in 
the late 1970s and 1980s. The final section explores the reason why positive community 
action declined in the 1980s, focusing on shifts in the political climate. 
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1. The need for alternative provision 
 
Positive community action had three basic aims. Firstly, it sought to meet a need for 
particular sorts of amenities and services in urban neighbourhoods. In doing so activists 
were filling gaps in provision left by existing public, private and voluntary bodies. We will 
explore the reasons for this dearth of provision below. Secondly, by setting up new 
institutions and services and restructuring the governance of existing ones, community 
activists sought to increase community control over local services. This responded to a 
pervasive feeling that communities were not in control of the forces that were re-shaping 
urban neighbourhoods. The aim was not complete community autonomy: rather activists 
endeavoured to re-balance the political relationship between local communities, local 
government and other agencies. Thirdly, community activists hoped that by building 
community institutions they would augment help to strengthen community action across the 
city. Community institutions would function as meeting places or hubs for activists; they 
would bring people together to discuss shared problems; and they would facilitate 
networking and provide local campaigning groups with resources and a safe space in which 
to plan and organise. Positive community action thus had a wider strategic significance: as 
well as meeting local need, it would contribute to the city’s community action 
infrastructure. Over the course of the 1970s, community activists increasingly focused on 
linking up community institutions. This was part of an effort to harness the energy of the 
city’s many separate community action groups to build a community action movement in 
Leeds. The chapter will explore each of these goals in more depth, but it will begin by 
investigating the first aim in more detail.  
 
The inadequacy of existing facilities and services was the most important driver of positive 
community action. Positive community action sought to plug this gap to ensure that 
people’s needs were met. This gap was most prominent in inner city areas and on council 
estates: that is, those areas where community action flourished in the long 1970s. Here, the 
desire for better services and amenities was widespread. A survey conducted by the 
Chapeltown Study Group in April 1974 identified strong demand for facilities for children, 
especially play areas, youth clubs and childcare provision.1 Chapeltown households also 
requested ‘an advice centre, clubs for the elderly and indoor sports facilities.’ Outlying 
council estates also suffered from a dearth of local amenities. The Wyther Park estate in 
west Leeds was built in the early 1930s with almost no social facilities. There was no 
                                                          1 Leeds City Council, Planning Department, ‘Chapeltown Local Plan: Final Report,’ November 1975, 8 
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playground for children, no facilities for the elderly, except one room in a pub, and a 
problem with uncollected rubbish.2  In Seacroft, a large peripheral council estate built 
between the 1930s and 1960s housing 80,000 people, was largely devoid of leisure 
facilities. A member of the Leeds Civic Trust observed that the city council ‘provided no 
cinema, no theatre, no park, no swimming pool and above all no community centres 
scattered about the estate.’3 
One of the roots of this dearth of local provision lay in the planning policies of the post-war 
decades. From the 1950s, urban renewal, slum clearance and road-building had destroyed 
many of the historic amenities and services of the inner city, such as shops, pubs, schools, 
churches and other informal community spaces. Many of these were never replaced. 
Cleared sites were often left vacant for decades pending future development. Council 
rehousing programmes and the movement of more affluent households to newer private 
suburbs reduced population densities in inner city areas. The people who remained were 
usually poorer. With fewer people living nearby, shops, pubs and clubs had a smaller 
customer base. The services and institutions – public, private and voluntary – that survived 
the clearances became less commercially viable. The level of provision of amenities and 
services in new estates, both in the inner city and in outlying areas, did not come close to 
replicating the density of provision that older areas had once enjoyed. In the mid-1970s, this 
point was belatedly acknowledged by city planners in relation to Hunslet.4 Largely as a 
result of national policy, new housing and roads were prioritised over community, social 
and recreational facilities in public building projects. The goal of reducing population 
densities on new estates made it more difficult to justify a high level of local facilities. New 
services, shops and public institutions tended to be centralised in large district centres, 
leaving large areas of the city bereft of provision, either housing or industry. As we saw in 
chapter 3, new road infrastructure absorbed a large quantity of urban space in the inner city 
and road systems carved up the inner city, making it harder for people to access goods and 
services in neighbouring areas on foot.  
The legacy of urban re-structuring was compounded by economic shifts. From the late 
1960s, the restructuring of the economy brought about the decline of many of the traditional 
industries on which inner city areas had depended. This process accelerated over the 1970s 
and 1980s. The flight of private capital from the inner city and other poorer areas led to high 
                                                          2 Leeds Other Paper, No. 85, 21 July-4 August 1978, 1, 8; Leeds City Council, Verbatim Reports, 19 July 1978, 1-2 3 Anthony Moyes, ‘Review of Seacroft AP,’ 11 April 1972 [LCT] 4 Leeds City Council, Planning Department, ‘The Hunslet and Stourton Appraisal: A Report for Planning Committee,’ November 1975, 2 
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rates of unemployment and material deprivation. This heightened the need for new forms of 
social provision in inner city areas and council estates, but as disposable incomes fell, 
private and non-profit organisations that depended on local patronage struggled to survive. 
A report by the Hall Lane Community Centre on the state of the neighbourhood summarised 
the set of interlinked problems faced by inner city areas at the end of the long 1970s: 
Many local people have lived under blight for most of the last decade; the new local estates are not yet fully developed and they too have their social problems. In the old houses around Hall Lane many elderly people live alone, young families struggle on a low income or with a lone parent. There is a small Asian community. Local shops and facilities are closing. There is little or no provision for teenagers; demand for playgroup places is high.5 
Community-led institutions were a response to this intense social need. As Davis has 
argued, the rise of community action was linked to an increasing awareness of a set of inter-
related social problems in inner city neighbourhoods that the welfare state and local 
government were unable to solve.6 Community action leveraged a new approach to these 
problems. 
 
If state intervention had created many of the problems that drove positive community action 
in the middle decades of the twentieth century, the withdrawal of the state from the mid-
1970s deepened the crisis. In 1980, Community Action magazine argued that there had been 
a ‘major shift in the kind of demands made by tenants and action groups and other labour 
movement organisations’ over the previous decade: while the ‘demands of campaigns in the 
early 1970s were directed at ‘stopping state financed projects,’ by the late 1970s community 
campaigns were no longer ‘trying to stop state spending but aimed against the cuts and 
arguing for more state spending.’7 The reason for this was that from the mid-1970s, 
governments began to cut public expenditure. This was driven partly by the economic crises 
of the period, but from 1979 retrenchment was part of an ideological project to re-structure 
the state. Spending reductions may have diminished the threat of road-building, housing 
clearance and redevelopment, but they decimated many public services, particularly those 
provided by local government. This undermined the already fragile network of services and 
amenities in older urban areas and in other poorer parts of cities. Spending cuts thus 
generated a more urgent need for positive community action, but they also diminished the 
                                                          5 Hall Lane Community Centre, Annual Report 1983/84, 2 6 John Davis, ‘Re-shaping the Welfare State: the London Experience,’ Unpublished Paper delivered at Dundee University, September 2010. See also: John Davis, ‘Community and the Labour Left in 1970s London,’ Chris Williams and Andrew Edwards (eds.) The Art of the Possible: Politics and governance in modern British history, 1985-1997: Essays in memory of Duncan Tanner (Manchester, 2015): 207-223 7 Community Action, No. 50, Sept-October, 14 
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resources available to fund it. Community activists worked to build community institutions 
to mitigate the effects of the cuts, while simultaneously campaigning for increases in public 
spending to ensure those community institutions (and other services) were properly funded. 
The anti-state politics of the latter part of the long 1970s created as many problems for 
positive community action as opportunities. 
 
The initiative for building community services usually came from existing community 
action groups. This thesis has already investigated their role in campaigns surrounding 
housing renewal, transport and council housing. These more defensive campaigns often 
gave way to positive community action. As we saw in Chapter 2, the initial stimulus to the 
formation of the South Headingley Community Association in 1973 was the existential 
threat to the neighbourhood posed by the council’s clearance programme. Once these 
proposals had been curtailed, local activists were keen to ensure that ‘the community spirit 
shown should not be allowed to dissipate until the next crisis [comes] along.’8 In 1974, the 
SHCA adopted the broader remit of seeking  
 
to make South Headingley a better place in which to live, by looking after the interests of the people in our area, providing information and pressing for the improvement of conditions, amenities and services…9  
Consequently, activists in the SHCA organised over a range of issues, from hospital 
investment to adult education.10 Similarly, the Woodhouse Community Association was 
formed in response to housing clearance proposals in 1971, before diversifying.11  
 
A smaller proportion of community associations were founded from the outset to promote 
the general improvement of their neighbourhood and only later became involved in 
defensive campaigns. The aims of the Chapeltown Community Association, formed in 
1971, were far-reaching. According its constitution, the organisation existed 
to promote the benefit of the inhabitations of Chapeltown…by associating the local authorities, voluntary organisations and inhabitants in a common effort to advance education and to provide facilities in the interests of social welfare for recreation and leisure-time occupation with the object of improving the conditions of life…  
                                                          8 Kathy O’Carroll, South Headingley Community Association, Newsletter, No. 2, March 1974, 1,  9 ‘Secretary’s Report,’ SHCA, Newsletter, No. 3, April 1974, 5, WYA: WYL5012 10 ‘Chairman’s Report, SHCA, Newsletter, No. 12, April 1975, WYA: WYL5012 11 Woodhouse Community Association, Yapstick, Vol. 2, No.1, 1975, 2 
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The CCA formed sub-groups focused on young people, housing, roads and traffic, hospital 
workers and street cleaning.12 Although pro-actively setting up organisations and 
institutions was central to the group’s mission, the CCA quickly became involved in 
defensive campaigns, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 3. The relationship between positive and 
negative community action was dialectical: reactive campaigning over issues like transport 
and housing informed institution-building, while setting up institutions influenced the future 
direction of negative campaigns. Although the central focus of this chapter is positive 
community action, it will emphasise these connections to more defensive campaigns. 
 
2. Serving the community  
 
This section will explore campaigns for two related forms of community provision: the 
community centre and the advice centre. It will begin by focusing on the former. A key goal 
for many community activists was the establishment of permanent community facilities that 
would function as meeting places and hubs for a range of community activities and services. 
Several dozen community centres and community advice centres were set up Leeds in the 
1970s and early 1980s. The community centre was designed to compensate for the lack of 
space for non-profit, community-led activities both in the inner city and on council estates. 
Community groups had some access to rooms in pubs and clubs, religious premises and 
some public buildings, but the demand for space exceeded the supply. The city council 
constructed community centres on only a handful of its estates; plans for community centres 
were frequently excised from building programmes when council finances were squeezed.13 
Council managed centres often did not allow political or campaigning organisations to meet 
on the premises.14 By providing space for organisations to develop, activists hoped that 
community centres would strengthen the sense of community that they believed was ‘under 
pressure from several quarters.’15 The inner city community centre was not dissimilar from 
the village halls that had been established in rural England in the early twentieth century or 
the suburban community halls set up in the middle decades of that century. Several 
community associations were established by the middle-class home owners in the northern 
suburbs of Leeds in the 1930s and 1940s.16 Where they differed, as we shall see, was in 
                                                          12 CCA, ‘Some Examples of the Work of the Chapeltown Community Association,’ April 1972, WYA: WYL 2058 13 Ravetz, Council Housing and Culture, 139; Alison Ravetz, Model Estate: Planned Housing at Quarry Hill, Leeds (Abingdon, 1974): 122-23 14 LOP, No. 125, 7-21 March 1980, 2 15 Hall Lane Community Centre, Report (1979): 12 16 Graham Branston, Alwoodley, Leeds: The History of a Twentieth Century Suburb (Leeds, 2004): 48-51 
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their more overtly political orientation and in their focus on alleviating social and economic 
problems. 
  
Establishing a community centre was a demanding undertaking. Acquiring premises and 
setting up the centre was not only expensive, it required significant investments of time.  
Community activists usually sought public assistance to establish community centres. 
Capital costs were usually met with finance from council budgets or government 
programmes. A smaller number of community centres emerged from partnerships between 
community activists and other voluntary organisations. The Hall Lane Community Centre in 
Armley developed in the early 1970s when local residents asked a group of artists who had 
occupied a vacant building if they could use part of the space for meetings. The Hall Lane 
Community Centre became an autonomous part of the Interplay Trust, a community arts 
organisation.17 Even with a source of finance, the process of establishing a community 
centre could be laborious, straining relations between activists and funding bodies. Where 
the city council owned the land or buildings, the governance of community centres was a 
source of tension, an issue we shall explore in more depth below. For this reason, the 
decision to campaign for a community centre could be controversial.18 During its first 
decade, the South Headingley Community Association chose to focus on sponsoring smaller 
centres with a specific purpose rather than campaigning for one general purpose community 
centre; SHCA members decided that the latter would absorb too energy and distract the 
organisation from other important issues.19 The SHCA helped to establish a Headingley 
Community Centre, a Muslim Community Centre, the Burley Lodge Centre for the 
neighbourhood and the Brudenell Centre for adult education.20 
  
Community centres were accommodated in a mixture of purpose built premises and 
refurbished properties (see Fig. 4.1-4.2). Community activists frequently repurposed former 
religious buildings, which became available as local congregations declined or moved 
away. The Chapeltown Community Centre began life in the former Psalms of David 
Synagogue on Reginald Terrace. In Harehills and Holbeck, community centres opened in 
former churches [see Figs. 4.1-4.2]. Like religious buildings, community centres functioned 
as hubs of the community, providing a base for community groups to meet and operate on 
territory that was neither state controlled nor run for profit. Unlike religious buildings, inner 
                                                          17 Hall Lane Community Centre, Report (1979): 14 18 Parry Thornton, Community Centre Policy, January 1974 and Community Centre for South Headingley, February 1974, WYA: WYL5012 19 Headline, No. 30, Autumn 1984, 6 20 ibid 
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city community centres were highly pluralist institutions. They welcomed a diverse range of 
organisations concerned with politics, education, youth activities, the arts and religion. In 
the mid-1970s Chapeltown Community Centre was used by a playgroup, two youth clubs, 
the Chapeltown Community Association, a literacy class, the Chapeltown Women’s Group, 
the Young Socialists, the Community Relations Council and a children’s dance and drama 
group.21 The Holbeck Community Centre and the Hall Lane Community Centre in Armley 
hosted a similar range of groups.22 
 
Community centres also functioned as a base for campaigning, providing a safe and 
convenient space for activists to meet and hold events. Many of the action groups formed to 
contest housing clearance met at community centres. Cross Streets Action Group, the work 
of which we explored in Chapter 2, formed at Hall Lane Community Centre.23 The 
Headingley Community Centre hosted meetings for the A660 campaigners.24 The Editorial 
Collective of Chapeltown News met at the Chapeltown Community Centre.25 Well-
resourced community centres acted as sponsors of community action in the neighbourhood. 
The Hall Lane Community Centre employed several community workers who helped to 
facilitate community action across a wide area of west Leeds.26 In 1979, a Hall Lane worker 
organised a public meeting for residents of the recently completed Avenues estate which 
was suffering from ‘teething problems’ linked to ‘the influx of new residents’ and design 
faults.27 The meeting led to the formation of the New Wortley Community Association. The 
community worker helped the new Community Association to develop, advising on housing 
issues and helping to distribute the Association’s newsletter. In 1981, with the support of 
this community worker, the Association successfully applied for funding to build its own 
centre.28 Another major area of activity for the Hall Lane Community Centre was promoting 
community action in housing renewal areas. In the mid-1980s, Hall Lane workers helped 
residents of the Gledhow Clearance Area to negotiate with the council to obtain rehousing 
and minor repairs after the clearance order for the area was confirmed.29 As part of a 
programme of community arts, the centre worked with local groups to create murals and 
mosaics around Armley to enliven public spaces.30 It even initiated a community history 
                                                          21 CN, No. 29, October 1975, 5 22 See: Holbeck Voice, March 1980 and Hall Lane Community Centre Report, 1979, 3-5 23 Community Housing Working Party, The Effects of Clearance: Four Case Studies (Leeds): 3 24 Headline, No. 29, Summer 1984, 8 25 CN, No. 23, February 1975, 8 26 Hall Lane Community Centre, Report, 1979, 2 27 Hall Lane Community Centre, Report, 1979, 10 28 ibid 29 Hall Lane Community Centre, Annual Report, 1984/85, 15 30 Hall Lane Community Centre, Report, 1979, 7 
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group. Thus, the Hall Lane Community Centre was a key catalyst for the wider growth of 
community action and especially positive community action. Rather than leading 
campaigns, staff at the centre cultivated independent local campaigning groups helping 
‘local people to take action on their own behalf.’ 31 The achievements of community centres 
like Hall Lane were closely linked to the interventions of paid workers who possessed time, 
experience and a wide array of contacts, as we shall discuss below. 
 
If the community centre functioned as a blank slate, a resource that community groups 
could use for various ends, the community advice centre offered a more focused service. 
The community advice centre was an archetypal community action response to a gap in 
local service provision. The post-war decades had witnessed an increase in popular demand 
for information.32 This was partly driven by the expansion of social services, the planning 
system, council housing and other public services. Public institutions and bureaucratic 
procedures became more complex and harder to comprehend. Citizens gained a range of 
new entitlements, but these were not always clear. The demand for accurate and timely 
information was heightened by the rise of consumerism and the growth of a popular 
discourse of rights.33 However, citizens found it difficult to access detailed information 
from a neutral source. The mainstream media and the library service were inadequate. The 
city council established a handful of information centres in the 1970s, but these were too 
few in number to meet the demand.34 Council-run centres were not always perceived to be 
neutral, especially on inquiries pertaining to local authority services and personnel. 
Voluntary organisations, such as the Citizens Advice Bureaux, were popular but over-
stretched.35 The gap in provision had particularly significant consequences in the inner city 
and on council estates where people relied more heavily on public services, social problems 
were more acute, and state intervention, in the form of redevelopment and road-building, 
was more intensive. In low-income areas of the city, people were less likely to know people 
– personally or professionally – who could assist them in obtaining information, and they 
were less likely to have the means to purchase advice. 
 
The Armley Community Advice Centre was instigated in December 1974 by Ed Whalley, a 
lecturer at Leeds Polytechnic, and Ron Bright, the Chairman of Armley Lodge Community 
                                                          31 Hall Lane Community Centre, Report, 1979, 10 32 Peter Hain, ‘Introduction’ in Peter Hain, ed, Community Politics (1976): 11-12 33 Shapely, Politics of Housing, 13-17 34 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 14 October 1970, 5; Leeds City Council, Minutes of the Housing Services Committee, 25 January 1975, 11(e)  35 Chapeltown Citizens Advice Bureau, Housing Report, 1978-79 
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Centre Management Committee, who obtained a vacant property in a demolition area in 
Beech Road.36 They argued that the need for a centre ‘had arisen out of an increasing 
awareness of the problems residents have in obtaining information to assist them with 
everyday difficulties.’37 Several indicators of deprivation were present in Armley: the 
district had an above average share of elderly households, single parent families and 
unemployed people.38 The area was undergoing extensive housing renewal and new road-
building. Operated largely by non-experts, the Armley Lodge Centre offered basic advice 
and guided people to other agencies. In its first six months, almost 40 per cent of its 
inquiries concerned housing and 16.7 per cent related to welfare rights.39 In December 
1974, the South Headingley Community Association opened a similar advice centre in a 
former shop on Queen’s Road to provide information on housing, welfare rights, the law 
and education.40 The centre was staffed almost entirely by volunteers who dealt with up to 
twenty cases per week. The organisers argued that the centre could provide a useful service 
by drawing on the expertise of a community which contained plentiful experience of 
housing problems and the social security system.41  
The self-help approach of community advice centres was sometimes condemned by some 
professionals.42 This critique overlooked the fact that the work of lay people at community 
advice centres was almost always supplemented or supervised by experts; the South 
Headingley Advice Centre, which employed a full time worker in 1977, was no exception.43 
Whereas the Citizens Advice Bureau had developed into a service for working-class people 
staffed by middle-class people, the community advice centre sought to be a community 
service staffed, at least in part, by members of that community. This aim was largely 
fulfilled. The partnership between local people and professional volunteers or paid workers 
was key to their success.  
While most community advice centres offered a general service, community activists also 
established a smaller number of specialised advice centres, staffed by largely by paid 
professionals. The Harehills Housing Aid Centre was formed in 1974 by local activists, 
using finance from the Urban Programme.44 Operating from a shop premises on Harehills 
Lane, the Centre supported residents with housing problems, ranging from damp and repairs 
                                                          36 Armley Community Advice Centre, First Report, December 1975–May 1976, 1 37 ibid 38 ibid 39 Armley Community Advice Centre, First Report, December 1975–May 1976, 3 40 Headline, No. 8, December 1974, No. 15, April 1975 and No. 23, October 1978. 41 YEP, 2 May 1975,  11 42 YEP, 8 July 1976, 11 43 SHCA, Newsletter, No. 19, September 1977, 1 44 Chapeltown News, No. 20, November 1974, 5 
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to rents and evictions. Since it was not under direct city council control, the Centre was able 
to criticise the council in the advice it offered to council tenants and people experiencing 
problems with council services, though its workers feared this might make it a target for 
grant cuts.45 This model of specialist independent housing service was common in urban 
throughout Britain and it was particularly prevalent in London: in Islington, for instance, 
activists set up the Holloway Housing Aid Centre in the early 1970s..46  
 
In 1979, a group of activists established the Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre, the first 
neighbourhood law centre in Yorkshire. This was the outcome of a campaign started in 
1975 by a coalition of local community groups from north east Leeds who had identified an 
acute need for legal advice and representation.47 Unlike a Citizens Advice Bureau or 
community advice centre, a neighbourhood law centre employed qualified lawyers who 
could advise clients and act on their behalf through the legal system including during court 
litigation. The model originated in the United States where hundreds of neighbourhood law 
centres or legal clinics were founded in the 1960s by community organisers with support 
from the Federal Government as part of its War on Poverty.48 The idea was that giving 
deprived people the legal means to enforce their rights would help to alleviate poverty. The 
first neighbourhood law centre was established in north Kensington in 1970; there were 26 
British neighbourhood law centres by 1977.49 The Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre 
employed several lawyers and non-specialist staff and it quickly developed a large caseload. 
The vast majority of its work concerned housing, welfare and immigration, reflecting the 
needs of the local population. The centre secured funding from a range of public and 
voluntary bodies, which meant it was not beholden to any one organisation. In 1979, the 
centre had funding from Leeds City Council, the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and the 
Lord Chancellor’s Department.50 This enabled its workers to support clients who found 
themselves in an adversarial relationship with public bodies such as the city council’s 
housing department.51 In London, several of the earliest neighbourhood law centres closed 
in the late 1970s due to conflicts with the local authority upon whom they were wholly 
dependent for funding.52 Later in this chapter, we will explore the extent to which advice 
                                                          45 LOP, No. 28, 14-28 April 1978, 10-11 46 CA, No. 21 Aug-Sept 1975, 5-6; Nottingham People’s Centre 47 Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre, Interim Report, 1979, 3 48 Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre, Interim Report, 1979, 2 49 CA, No. 33, Sept-Oct 1977 50 Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre, Interim Report, 1979, 4 51 Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre, Report, 1980, 5 52 CA, No. 40, Nov-Dec 1978, 4-5 
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centres and other community institutions were able to operate independently and speak 
critically while retaining public funding.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
If the primary goal of community advice centres was to support individuals, they were also 
designed to fulfil a wider strategic purpose. Public ignorance of the wider political and 
administrative context of problems like housing, transport, the environment and legal 
procedures, was an impediment to community action. By disseminating information about 
citizens’ rights and public policy, activists hoped to raise levels of political consciousness 
and empower local people to organise collectively over common problems. As permanent, 
accessible facilities containing large repositories of information, advice centres were vital 
pillars of community action in several neighbourhoods. The Armley Advice Centre helped 
to catalyse community action on a local council estate by organising a public meeting about 
the need for repairs, which prompted tenants to approach the council as a group.53 The 
South Headingly Advice Centre functioned as a visible, street side advertisement for the 
work of the Association. Both the Harehills Housing Advice Centre and the Harehills and 
Chapeltown Law Centre became key nodes in community activist networks in north east 
Leeds. Workers and volunteers from the centres were involved in other groups and 
campaigns. The centres’ accumulated knowledge and expertise was used to support 
campaigns surrounding housing and welfare. The close relationship between advice centres 
and activism was clearly revealed in Hunslet where an advice centre evolved from a series 
of informal clinics on heating and personal debt organised by workers at the Hunslet Parish 
Community Project. The Hunslet Advice Centre served tenants on the Hunslet Grange 
estate who, as we saw in Chapter 1, were burdened with large electricity bills and debt.54 By 
1979, in response to the huge demand for information, the Centre had developed into a 
permanent advice centre, advising people from across Hunslet on a range of social and 
consumer issues.55  
Across the country, activists set up hundreds of community and advice centres in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Sited in prominent locations on high streets, shopping centres and estate 
precincts, the community advice centre was a highly visible and tangible symbol of 
community activism. In spring 1977, Community Action magazine contended that the 
flourishing of the community advice centre over the previous five years was one of the main 
achievements of community action.56 The journal published a detailed guide for activists 
                                                          53 Armley Community Advice Centre, First Report, December 1975–May 1976, 3 54 Barbara Craig, Letters, 7 November 1977 55 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 7 November 1979, 1-2 56 CA, No.30 March-April 1977, 13-16 
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setting up advice centres.57 Tony Parker’s oral history of a council estate in south London 
contains a rich description of the work of a community advice centre run by squatters in a 
vacant building.58 In Batley, an industrial town in the Spen Valley south west of Leeds, the 
Advice Centre for the Town (ACT) became a cause célèbre among community activists 
across the country for its long-running conflict with the local authority.59 In Leeds, there 
were no confrontations of this magnitude, but relations between community institutions and 
funding bodies were often fraught. Community advice centres had consciously sought to 
avoid being seen as state auxiliaries, but this resulted in a more fractious relationship with 
the state. We will develop this theme below, after we have examined another area in which 
community action responded to another unmet need. 
 
3. Children and Community Action 
 
The needs of children were among the foremost concerns of community activists and it was 
in meeting children’s needs that community action groups developed some of the most 
effective and enduring community-run services. This section will explore the ways in which 
community activists sought to cater pro-actively for children’s needs in the absence of 
suitable public and private sector services. The focus of these community campaigns was 
roughly divided between children’s play and childcare. There was a close relationship 
between the needs of children and their parents and other local adults. In providing for 
children, community activists positioned themselves as serving the whole neighbourhood.  
 
This section will begin by discussing community campaigns for play facilities. Community 
action for play was ubiquitous in urban Britain in the long 1970s and Leeds was no 
exception. Community action for children’s play flourished in neighbouring Bradford and 
most other British cities.60 It was primarily a response to the lack of play space for children 
in the city and the poor quality of existing playgrounds. Local authority and voluntary youth 
clubs were usually closed to children under the age of 14. Many of the institutions 
established by community activists in the period were not particularly welcoming to 
children. In 1976, a playleader in Chapeltown observed that community groups had 
neglected the needs of local children: he claimed that even the Chapeltown Community 
                                                          57 CA, ‘Action Notes 8: Advice for Free: Setting up an advice centre’ (1977) 58 Tony Parker, The People of Providence: A housing estate and some of its inhabitants, (London, 1983), Second Edition, 224-229 59 CA, No. 15, Aug-Sept 1974, 7-8; CA, No. 16, Oct-Nov 1974, 10-11; CA, No. 21, Aug-Sept 1975, 24; CA, No. 23 Dec-Jan 1975/76 60 For Bradford, see: CA, No. 4 Sept-Oct 1972, 10-11. For a British survey of play organising, see CA, No. 8, May-June 1973, 25-29 
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Centre would not let children use its facilities.61 Inner city areas, with their dense housing, 
industry and fast roads, had inadequate safe spaces for children to play. Parents lacked the 
resources to compensate for this. Activists in Chapeltown noted that ‘kids haven’t got large 
gardens and traffic free streets to play in. Their parents haven’t got the money for summer 
holidays and weekend outings.’62 Play facilities were often lost in older areas as a result of 
redevelopment and road-building projects. In Holbeck, a group of women began to 
campaign for a playground after their old one was lost to the south-west urban motorway.63 
Council housing estates built in the interwar and post-war decades had similar 
shortcomings. Though many council estates were built to low densities with generous 
allocations of undeveloped land, much of this open space provision was of a low quality and 
poorly managed and maintained.64 Seacroft typified the paradoxical situation on many 
council estates in that it had been furnished with large quantities of grassed open space but 
few interesting places for children to play. On the inner city Ebor Gardens estate, the 
Tenants Association noted that the official play area was ‘an undrained area of ex-
clayworks and is waterlogged for 50 [per cent] of the year.’65 Where traditional fixed 
equipment playgrounds, with swings and roundabouts, were provided they only provided 
for narrow range of experiences and did not meet children’s needs for imaginative play.66 
 
There were a multitude of reasons why community activists believed play facilities were 
important. Play was seen as a positive end in itself, as an integral part of childhood, and it 
was seen to fulfil critical educational and social functions: it would help children to develop 
practical problem solving and creative skills while teaching them how to co-operate, 
empathise and manage conflicts.67 The educational value of play was seen to be particularly 
important in deprived areas where children received less stimulation at home and attended 
challenging schools. These progressive educational ideas were received official validation 
in the Plowden report in 1967, which encouraged a ‘child-centred’ approach to learning and 
rejected the traditional emphasis on discipline and rote learning.68 This helped play 
                                                          61 CN, No. 35, June 1976, 1 62 CN, No. 29, Oct 1975, 6 63 LOP, No. 38, 4-18 Sept 1976  64 Alison Ravetz, Council Housing and Culture: the History of a Social Experiment (London, 2001): 189 65 The Other Paper, No. 10, 27 February 1970, 8 66 Eric Butterworth, Ray Lees and Peter Arnold, The Challenge of Community Work: The Final Report of the Batley CDP (York, 1981): 106-7; Community Colin Ward, ‘Adventure Playground: A Parable of Anarchy,’ Anarchy, 7, 193-4 67 Keith Cranwell, ‘Adventure Playgrounds and the Community in London, 1948-1970: an appreciation of the ideas and actions that shaped the spirit on the 1960s play movement’ in Wendy Russell, Bridget Handscombe, John Fitzpatrick, ed, Playwork Voices: in Celebration of Bob Hughes and Gordon Sturrock (London, 2007): 70 68 Department of Education and Science, Children and their primary schools: a report of the Central Advisory Council for Education (HMSO, 1967) 
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campaigners to access public funds. Play facilities were seen to have a wider social and 
environmental benefit. By providing a compelling diversion for children and an outlet for 
both creativity and frustration, they would deter vandalism and socially disruptive 
behaviour.69  This experience of the West Yorkshire Police endorsed this view.70 
Campaigns for play facilities were also connected to the community action surrounding 
road traffic we explored in Chapter 3. Efforts to limit the speed and volume of motorised 
vehicles on the roads were partly informed by the need create safer spaces for children to 
play. Activists in Harehills sought to ban vehicles from using back alleys which were a 
favoured place for children to play.71 Where the streets could not be made safe activists 
lobbied for off-street play facilities. In the late 1960s activists in west Leeds cited the high 
incident of road casualties involving children in support of their case for a playground.72  
  
Children’s play was an obvious focus for organising at the grassroots level. Because of their 
limited mobility, children’s play needs had to be met near to where they lived. Providing 
play space was a more readily achievable goal than solving the more complex problems 
encountered by community activists in the fields of housing and transport. Establishing a 
playground was a more practical proposition for local people than even setting up a 
community centre or local advice centre. The costs were lower and less specialised 
knowledge was required. Materials and tools could be donated or foraged from areas of 
waste land. Play organising offered community activists an opportunity to effect real 
tangible change, which demonstrated the potential of community action.  
 
Community campaigns for play took a variety of forms. Most basically, community 
activists lobbied for more play space in the city. The construction of new estates or the 
redevelopment of older areas created an opportunity to increase play opportunities. In 
Chapeltown, the Playspaces Group of the CCA negotiated with the City Architect and 
Housing Department to provide more dedicated play provision as part of the programme of 
rehabilitating older houses and streets. They secured a number of new play facilities in back 
street and on areas of waste land.73 Despite some noteworthy achievements, community 
activists never persuaded the council to prioritise play space in its building and 
redevelopment programmes. To some extent, the council was hamstrung by national 
funding formulae which incentivised authorities to focus on houses and roads over 
                                                          69 LOP, No. 142, 17 October 1980, 1, 5 70 A.J. Moyes to J. Hepper, 19 April 1977 [LCT] 71 LOP, No. 285, 5 August 1983, 20 72 LCC, Verbatim Reports, 16 October 1968, 1-2 and 15 October 1969, 2-3 73 CCA, ‘Some Examples of the Work of the Chapeltown Community Association,’ April 1972 [WYL 2058] 
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community facilities.74 A related problem was that no single department in the local 
authority had a duty to promote children’s play and it was the experience of activists that 
the relevant departments evaded responsibility.75  
 
Community activists therefore devoted most of their energies to creating their own play 
facilities. Sometimes these took a temporary or seasonal form. During the summer holidays 
in 1972 and 1973, the Chapeltown Playspaces Group ran play schemes for sixty local 
children in Potternewton Park for three weeks.76 The children mainly came from households 
where no adult was around to supervise them during the holiday. The play scheme received 
financial support from the city council and 14 volunteers. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
there were dozens of community summer play schemes across the city in Hunslet, Hunslet, 
Halton Moor, Armley, Hyde Park, Chapeltown and Woodhouse.77 
 
The most significant achievement of community activists in the field of play was the 
creation of adventure playgrounds. The adventure playground had its origin in Denmark in 
the 1930s and 1940s.78 The model was exported to London after the Second World War and 
the concept gradually spread throughout the country in the 1950s and 1960s.  In contrast to 
a traditional playground which was pre-designed and static, an adventure playground 
empowered children to create (and re-create) their own play facilities.79 The organisers 
would provide a range of materials tools and space and encourage children to experiment. 
Children created huts, climbing structures and dens. They played with a range of materials, 
including sand, water, soil and fire [see Figs. 4.3-4.5]. Adventure playgrounds were 
supervised by at least one paid play leader, who usually had some training or experience in 
the field accompanied volunteers.80 The philosophy behind the adventure playground was 
that the social and educational benefits of play were magnified when children had extensive 
freedom and adult support.  
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The first adventure playground in Leeds was set up in Seacroft in 1968. The Leeds Civic 
Trust, the LCVS and the vicar of Seacroft worked with local people to set up the 
playground.81  They identified a site on a patch of unused grassed space in north Seacroft 
and successfully lobbied the city council and charitable foundations for funding to meet 
capital costs and pay the salary of a play leader.82 By 1971, the playground employed a full 
time play leader who staffed the playground between 2pm and 10pm. The playground 
attracted some 50 children per day during term times and up to 150 per day during the 
school holidays.83 By 1976, up to 400 children regularly attended the playground.84 Trips to 
the Yorkshire Dales and the coast were organised in the school holidays. 85 A second 
adventure playground was established by the Chapeltown Community Association’s 
Playspaces Group in 1973 on a vacant site close to the proposed community centre on 
Reginald Terrace. By late 1974, the group had successfully lobbied the council to allocate 
the land for play space and to provide finance for materials, a building and the play leader’s 
salary.86  
 
Not all adventure playgrounds were permanent. Community activists often exploited spare 
land to set up temporary playgrounds to meet an urgent need. In Burley, activists linked to 
the Belle Vue and Burley Community Association organised seasonal adventure 
playgrounds during the summer months between the 1960s and the mid-1970s on various 
clearance sites in the district (see Fig. 4.3-4.5).87 They received permission from the city 
council to use the land but little financial assistance, relying on donated materials and local-
fund raising to build a play space consisting of ‘climbing frames, an aerial ropeway, slide 
and anything a child’s imagination can get to work on.’88 These examples of positive 
community action show how community activists sought to utilise wasted or abandoned 
urban spaces, often the products of slum clearance or road-building. This continued into the 
1980s when activists in Hyde Park transformed a small patch of waste ground in council 
ownership into a community play garden.89 Activists occupied idle ground to set up play 
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facilities across the country. In the early 1970s in De Beauvoir Town in Hackney they 
established a playground on waste land formerly occupied by prefabricated housing.90  
 
Looking beyond their immediate goal of providing for children, community play initiatives 
had a wider impact on the vitality of grassroots activism. By bringing people together, play 
organising often stimulated further community organising. Community Action journal 
observed that play projects 
 create the opportunities for parents to come together to pool problems and skills, and for everyone to discover the resources in their immediate neighbourhood. A temporary playscheme can lead not just to permanent play facilities, but also to advice centres and Food Co-Ops and a greater awareness of shared problems in housing and education. Community play is therefore a good starting point for community organisation and community power.91   
There were numerous instances of community action for play acting as a catalyst for other 
campaigns.92 Like the community centre, the adventure playground often functioned as a 
hub for other community organisations and services. They were focal points for activists 
and linked different community campaigns. Play organising politicised people with little 
previous political experience, including older children. In summer 1976, the organisers of 
the Chapeltown Adventure Playground worked with adult activists to campaign for 
continued funding for the playground.93 They presented this ‘campaign as part of the wider 
struggle against the cuts.'94 This shows that community action surrounding play supported 
community action across the city.  
 
If community campaigns for play facilities chiefly focused on children’s needs, community 
campaigns for childcare facilities concentrated on the needs of their parents. The playgroup 
and nursery were a common form of community-run service in this period. They were 
organised by established community associations and groups of activists who came together 
specifically for that purpose.95 The growth of community childcare provision was a 
response to the failure of public policy to keep pace with socioeconomic change. As 
women’s participation in the labour force rose and the number of single parent families 
increased over the 1960s and 1970s, the demand for childcare grew.96 In Leeds, in 1978 
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there were 6320 mothers with children under five who worked for at least eight hours per 
week.97 Though the main purpose of childcare was to enable women to work, a key 
secondary function was to offer mothers some relief from childcare responsibilities in their 
leisure time. The state did operate childcare facilities, but this provision almost always 
failed to meet demand.98 In Leeds, local authority childcare provision was patchy at the 
beginning of the 1970s and the cuts in public expenditure caused the council to cut the 
nursery capital building budget by 87 per cent.99 In 1977, Leeds had 51,000 children under 
five in the city, but only 504 council nursery places – fewer than in the neighbouring town 
of Dewsbury.100 Unsurprisingly, there were long waiting lists for council nurseries and 
families were subjected to rigorous means testing before places were allocated. 
 
The community playgroup and nursery was a pragmatic response to this vacuum in local 
public provision. While community activists had lobbied the council to devote more 
resources to childcare groups by forming a Playgroups Action Committee, they recognised 
that public policy change in this area would be slow.101 Grassroots interventions could help 
to ameliorate the situation more rapidly. There were strong positive reasons why childcare 
facilities would benefit from community management. Playgroups and nurseries operated 
most effectively when they were provided on a small scale close to where people lived. 
State facilities tended to be larger and more centralised. Setting up a grassroots childcare 
facility was a more viable project for community groups than, for example, building 
housing, operating a bus service or even setting up a community centre. Like playgrounds, 
the capital costs of community-run playgroups and nurseries were lower because they could 
use existing community centres, tenants’ halls or religious buildings. It was easier to find 
suitable workers in the neighbourhood.  
 
The national pre-school playgroup movement, co-ordinated by the Pre-School Playgroups 
Association, founded in 1962, was one manifestation of the community response to 
childcare needs.102 Pre-school playgroups usually catered for children between the ages of 
two and five for a few of hours during the day. They were operated by volunteers, generally 
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local parents. This was a pervasive and highly successful form of community action: in 
1977, there were 200 pre-school playgroups across Leeds.103 However, in low-income areas 
of the city the standard pre-school playgroup model did not fully meet the needs of 
parents.104 In such areas, women with young children were more likely to work than their 
counterparts in more affluent areas. There were also more single parent families who could 
not share childcare with a partner. As a result, in the inner city the demand for childcare was 
greater, but local women were less able to volunteer at playgroups, especially during the 
working day. Community activists recognised this context. While the Hall Lane Community 
Centre Playgroup ‘encouraged [parents] to participate in all activities and help regularly on 
the rota,’ its organisers acknowledged that ‘in an area like Armley a playgroup is not seen 
immediately as a self-help activity but more as a service.’105 Community activists adapted 
the playgroup model to meet this need by employing paid workers to run the playgroups, 
extending their opening hours and accommodating older children. The boundary between 
the playgroup and nursery in inner city areas was thus somewhat blurred. 
The Chapeltown Children’s Centre provides a useful case study in community action 
surrounding childcare shedding light on the way community activists sought to meet local 
needs. The Centre was founded in 1973 by a group of local activists to the widespread local 
need for affordable childcare provision.106 The child population in Chapeltown was above 
the city average and the neighbourhood contained a high proportion of single parent 
families and working mothers.107 Many mothers were relatively recent migrants who lacked 
family support networks in the area. In 1978, there were 1600 children under the age of five 
in Chapeltown, but the city council provided only 202 childcare places for this age group.108 
There were two private nurseries but these were too expensive for local people. The 
Children’s Centre began as a morning playgroup operating from a local church, but in 1975 
it moved to larger premises and began opening in the afternoons. In 1979, the centre 
extended its hours again in response to pressure from local parents, and it ran an after 
school club.109 The Centre functioned as a playgroup and a nursery, providing for mothers 
who worked during the whole day and those who needed a break of a few hours. The centre 
catered for parents who did not qualify for a place at a council nursery and those who found 
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council facilities unwelcoming.110 Weekly fees for the service were kept low. Unlike local 
authority nurseries they did not require parents to sign an attendance register, in recognition 
that many mothers had complex schedules and unpredictable working hours.111 Local 
activists understood that the Centre could not be ‘operated on a purely voluntary basis’ due 
to the work commitments of local parents. Paid staff and a manager were employed to run 
the centre. The workers’ salaries were paid by funding from the Manpower Services 
Commission, the Inner City Programme and the STEP scheme.112 This enhanced the quality 
of the service the Centre could provide to the local community, but it created organisational 
challenges. Obtaining finance and maintaining independence from funding bodies was a 
constant struggle and the Centre experienced several funding crises.113 Nevertheless, it 
sought to be a community-controlled service and, despite the presence of paid staff, the 
Centre was run by a management committee elected annually by local parents and some 
interested outsiders.114 The Centre was part of the ecology of community action in 
Chapeltown, collaborating with other community-run institutions, such as the Chapeltown 
adventure playground. The Chapeltown Children’s Centre was not unique in Leeds. The 
Hall Lane Community Centre and the Osmondthorpe Community Centre offered similar 
services. Comparable children’s centres were established by community activists across the 
country, especially in London.115 Like community playgrounds, community playgroups and 
nurseries also became a base for wider activism. In 1977, activists from playgroups in 
Holbeck, Chapeltown and Armley united to lobby against local spending cuts.116 They 
presented community facilities as a response to – but not a substitute for – public provision. 
 
Community organising around childcare reveals that community activists were able to run 
services that met a genuine local need in the absence of suitable public or private provision. 
Like play campaigners, childcare activists responded to the particular needs of inner city 
neighbourhoods. Like other forms of positive community action, the long-term success of 
campaigns for community play and childcare facilities would depend on their ability to 
secure internal and external support, and to work productively with activists across the city.  
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4. Towards community control 
If filling gaps in service provision and meeting the needs of local people was the primary 
driver of pro-active community action, extending community control over local services 
was the second objective. Community control implied that power over community facilities 
lay with local people and users. Campaigns for community control were an attempt to inject 
more direct democracy into the way local services and institutions were run. The term 
‘community control’ had its roots in the American New Left and the black liberation 
movement. Securing community control of public schools was the objective of a fiercely 
fought grassroots campaign by black activists in New York City in the late 1960s.117 In 
1973 in Britain a Community Action editorial referred to ‘the need for community control 
over organisations and activities whether set up by government, voluntary [bodies] or 
grassroots initiatives.’118 Not all activists in Leeds use this particular rhetoric, but regardless 
of the language they used, the goals of community-run groups were directed towards this 
end. One of the objectives of Hall Lane Community Centre was ‘to involve local people at 
all levels, to respond to problems which they identify and to undertake activities which they 
choose.’119 The South Headingley Advice Centre, was to be ‘not only run for local people 
but by them as well.’120 This section will explore why community activists sought to 
transfer power to the neighbourhood level before exploring how far it was realised in 
practice. 
There were several reasons why community activists were committed to community 
control. The main argument was that people felt frustrated and disillusioned with public 
services and the planning system because they were controlled by remote bureaucracies that 
were inflexible and insensitive to people’s particular needs, or even openly hostile.121 Most 
elected politicians, it was argued, were too aloof from their electorates to bridge this gap. If 
anger was one response to this situation, apathy was more common: people withdrew from 
the political process because they believed they had no purchase on it.122 In their first report, 
the organisers of the Chapeltown Children’s Centre summarised this argument:  
Many people in Chapeltown, as in other similar areas, feel alienated from and hostile to the State and all those in authority. By becoming involved with the 
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Nursery/Playgroup and being on the committee they feel at least to a certain extent in control of its destiny.123  
The same report maintained that the parents who use the Centre ‘are used to seeing the local 
authority in a punitive role, as an outside body that does not understand their needs.’ 124 
Community organisations could avoid this perception if they were locally controlled.  
There were also practical reasons for promoting community control over local institutions, 
like adventure playground and community centres. Unless local people felt community 
services were accessible and relevant to their needs, they would not use them. Involving 
local people would engender a sense of ownership and trust. It also ensured community 
organisations could ‘respond very quickly’ to changing local requirements.125 The 
organisers of the Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre explained that ‘user control’ was 
essential because  
 in areas like Harehills and Chapeltown it is only through bodies identifiable by the community as by them, of them and for them that any real advancement can take place…a lot of money seems to have been wasted in the past on providing services and agencies which the community experiences as imposed on them and to which accordingly they do not actively respond or learn from…126   Community control would not only make services more effective, it would also play an 
educative function. According to the organisers, participating in the management of the 
Chapeltown Children’s Centre gave ‘local people the chance to learn more about childcare, 
play and facilities.’127 By working with other people in the neighbourhood to manage a 
community amenity, people would develop skills – financial, administrative and social – 
and more self-confidence. This was particularly important in neighbourhoods where most 
people were granted little autonomy in their working lives. People who became more 
intimately involved would develop an understanding of public policy in the field and the 
relationship between neighbourhood organisations and the local authority. In other words, 
community institutions provided a political education.  
The main vehicle for facilitating community involvement was to create a management 
structure in which representatives of the local community or service users were in the 
majority. The Hall Lane Community Centre was ‘autonomously managed by local 
residents.’128 Local people occupied a majority of places on the management committee of 
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the Seacroft Adventure Playground.129 The Chapeltown Children’s Centre was managed by 
a committee consisting of local parents, voluntary staff and other interested local people; the 
Centre’s workers were accountable to this committee.130 As we saw in Chapter 2, the 
community housing co-operatives were run by their members rather than external funding 
bodies. This applied not only to community institutions but the community action groups 
that spearheaded the campaigns for community-run provision. The Chapeltown Community 
Association was governed by a Council composed of five members who had to be approved 
at an annual general meeting.131 All residents of Chapeltown were members of the 
Association and could vote at this meeting where policy could be changed. The convenors 
of the Association’s working groups were elected by secret ballot at ‘vigorously contested’ 
elections.132 Some community institutions sought to facilitate community control through a 
federated model. The management committee of the Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre 
was composed of representatives of ten local community organisations.133 This structure 
recognised the fact that the Law Centre served a fairly large geographical area and worked 
on a range of issues. In this context, it was less meaningful to elect committee members on 
a purely residential basis; instead, the structure allowed different interest groups into the 
local area to feed in their concerns.  
Realising meaningful community control presented several challenges in practice. A key 
variable was the quality of the relationship between the organisation and external funding 
bodies, which might limit the extent to which the institution could run its own affairs. 
Whereas some community institutions were relatively independent of external bodies, 
others were more dependent on them for land, buildings and resources. In such 
circumstances, community control could not be taken for granted. It had to be negotiated. 
As the major guardian of local funding and a powerful landowner, the city council was 
often in a position to define the limits of community control. The debate over the 
governance of the Chapeltown Community Centre illustrates this point. The local authority 
administered the grant that had been used to establish the centre, but community groups 
were to be the main users of the centre. As advocates of community control, in May 1974, 
the standing committee for the community centre asserted that ‘[t]he Community centre 
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MUST be managed by Chapeltown people.’134 Since most local people worked full time, 
community activists also requested funding for a warden to help local people to operate the 
centre. They maintained that the warden should be directly answerable to the community 
not the council.135 
 
The city council’s approach to community involvement was initially ambiguous. 
Councillors claimed to support giving Chapeltown people ‘“the utmost say in running [the 
centre].”’136 When pushed to elaborate on this principle an officer implied that local groups 
would only play an advisory role in the running of the centre.137 Eventually, activists 
negotiated a compromise position. The centre was run by a Management Committee formed 
of 15 members elected by local people, three councillors and one council officer.138 It had 
power over the internal affairs of the centre, but the council remained in control of the 
budget and building. Without an independent source of finance, community activists had to 
share power with the city council. The working relationship was often uncomfortable. The 
Chairman of the Management Committee resigned in October 1975 because he felt like he 
was in ‘a straightjacket.’139 Over the next five years activists frequently accused the council 
of squandering the potential of the community centre. In August 1975, the Management 
Committee complained that the centre was under-used due to a lack of facilities and 
restricted opening hours.140 The Management Committee had to wait until 1979, when it 
received Urban Programme funding, to appoint a warden.141 In 1980, the council again 
rejected plans for full time opening and never approved community proposals for a gym in 
the basement, drop-in services for the unemployed and discos for young people.142 While 
the centre did provide a base for a range of groups and activities, it never developed into the 
multi-functional, dynamic centre activists had hoped for. The level of council intervention 
had proved inhibiting. The Chapeltown model of community centres – local authority 
ownership with partial community group management – was replicated across the city in the 
later 1970s.143 It was a compromise on the radical demand for community control that many 
community groups were prepared to accept. 
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The city council did, however, leave many of the community institutions it supported to 
their own devices. After grant-aiding the Chapeltown Adventure Playground and allocating 
the land, the council stated that the ‘onus’ would be on local residents and it would only 
step in if there was mismanagement.144 The Management Committee of the playground was 
composed solely of Chapeltown residents with no council representatives or overseers.145 
The Seacroft Adventure Playground enjoyed a similar level of autonomy. This more laissez 
faire approach is perhaps explained by the fact that playgrounds and play schemes had 
fewer fixed capital assets than community centres based in large buildings.   
 
Campaigns for community control were not limited to setting up new organisations. 
Activists also endeavoured to democratise existing services and institutions. In Chapters 1 
and 2, we explored how activists tried to increase resident participation in the management 
of council housing. State-run institutions were not the only target of such campaigns. Many 
voluntary organisations were also managed in a way that militated against community 
involvement. The campaign to reform the governance of the Studley Grange Children’s 
Centre in Chapeltown in the early 1970s is an insightful case study into campaigns for 
community control of local non-governmental organisations. The Centre was a voluntary 
body founded by local mothers in 1967 to provide recreational and educational services for 
children and their families.146 Like the community initiatives we have explored it responded 
to the social need in the area, providing language classes, pre-school nursery courses, 
classes in woodwork, cookery, drama and a playgroup.147 Unlike the community-run 
organisations promoted by community activists, the Studley Grange Centre was governed 
on paternalistic lines. Control of the centre shifted from its founders to a committee of 
people who lived outside Chapeltown in the city’s more affluent suburbs.148 The 
management committee members were mostly white and from professional or managerial 
backgrounds. Local people were ‘discouraged from taking part in the management of the 
centre’ and instead they were encouraged to take part by helping up with menial tasks.149  
Latent tensions between the management committee and local people surfaced in September 
1972 when the Management Committee sacked the warden who was popular with parents 
and children. Supporters of the warden formed the Chapeltown Parents and Friends group to 
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call for greater community control in the running of the centre.150 In response to this 
demand, the Management Committee threatened to withdraw funds from the Centre and 
suggested that the jobs of the remaining staff would be at risk if local people took more 
control. Undaunted, Chapeltown Parents and Friends published a leaflet criticising the 
committee for being unrepresentative of the community, highlighting in particular the lack 
of black members. The Parents and Friends group was supported by other activist groups, 
including Chapeltown News, which expressed its support for ‘community control’ and 
rejected ‘paternalism from outside Chapeltown, whether from the benign ladies of 
Roundhay or from “White Liberals” from Hyde Park.’151 At the Annual General Meeting in 
November 1972, 200 people ‘crowded into the centre and demanded the right to participate 
in the administration of the centre.’152 The activists accused the committee of ‘suppressing 
parents’ feelings’ and they sought to elect new candidates to the executive committee to 
‘ensure a fairer reflection of the racial composition of Chapeltown.’153 The management 
committee sought to prevent members of Chapeltown Parents and Friends from voting on 
the grounds that they were not members of the Association. When the activists refused to 
back down, six members of the management committee, including the Secretary, walked 
out of the meeting.154 This dramatic confrontation gave way to more productive 
negotiations and the management committee eventually agreed to reconstitute itself with 
only two “external” members and six members who lived in Chapeltown of West Indian 
and Asian heritage.155 The result was a distinct shift in the balance of power from outsiders 
to local people.  
It was not, however, a wholesale revolution. Several members of the old committee 
remained active on sub-committees and the decision to remove the warden – which had 
triggered the struggle – was confirmed, leading one local commentator to contend that 
Studley Grange was still ‘suffering from the heavy hand of suburban paternalism.’156 Still, 
the partial local takeover appeared to have unsettled the city council. A grant issued on the 
eve of the community campaign by the city council to Studley Grange to set up a Mother 
and Baby Unit had still not been spent in March 1975. Community activists alleged that the 
authority did not trust the new committee to spend the money.157 For some activists, this 
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was ‘proof that the Corporation will do all it can to hinder local control.’158 The Studley 
Grange campaign took place in a period when local people in Chapeltown were seeking to 
extend community influence over several local institutions.159 In 1973, parents of children 
attending the Earl Cowper Middle School organised to demand the removal of a 
headteacher whom they considered racist.160 Following several months of protests, 
including a strike by the school’s pupils, the headteacher was transferred by the city 
council.161 The success of this campaign and others suggested that a determined community 
campaign could impact on the way local services were governed. Community control was a 
salient and emotive issue in the city in, capable of galvanising large numbers of people 
behind a cause.  
The battles for community control in Chapeltown were intensified by the politics of race as 
largely white management committees clashed with mainly black and Asian service users. 
Campaigns for self-determination also took place in more ethnically homogenous areas. The 
issue of who should control local resources and institutions was still salient. For its first two 
years, the Seacroft adventure playground was managed by a committee composed of people 
‘resident well away from Seacroft,’ many of whom had been appointed as representatives of 
established voluntary organisations.162 The Leeds Junior Chamber of Commerce, the main 
sponsor, provided the ‘moral leadership.’ In 1968, local parents took objection to the 
committee’s decision to sack the playground’s full time playleader who was popular with 
the children. The parents ‘rose in revolt,’ led by a woman who later became the chair of the 
committee.163 In the face of this pressure, the Chamber reversed its decision on the 
playleader and invited local people to occupy half the places on committee.164 Following 
this showdown, the balance of power on the committee shifted from the organisations that 
had initiated the enterprise to local people. By the early 1970s, members of the community 
held a majority of places on the committee. Local people did not sever their links with 
outside groups. Despite the change of management at Seacroft, parents continued to work 
closely with outsiders: they ‘retained the three old “squares”’ from the church, the Civic 
                                                          158 CN, Pamphlet Number 1, ‘Planning to Deceive: A Critique of Leeds Council’s ‘participation planning exercise’ (1975) 3 159 Max Farrar, The Struggle for Community in a British multi-ethnic inner city area: paradise in the making (New York, 2002) 160 CN, No. 8, June 1973, 1 161 CN, No. 12, November, 1973, 2 162 A.J. Moyes, ‘Leeds Civic Trust: Review of Activities Concerned with the Seacroft Adventure Playground,’ 11 April 1972, 2 [LCT] 163 A.J., Moyes, ‘Leeds Civic Trust: Review of Activities Concerned with the Seacroft Adventure Playground,’ 11 April 1972, 2-3 [LCT] 164 LCT Annual Report 1982, 8 
209  
Trust and the Council of Social Service as ‘advisors’.165 Several local NGOs and the city 
council retained their representatives on the management committee.166 Like at Studley 
Grange, the outcome of the campaign was a shift in the balance of power rather than a total 
community takeover.  
Some activists maintained that co-operating with government bodies or other agencies was 
incompatible with community control because it would lead to the ‘absorption of 
community strength,’ but this overlooked the fact that community-run institutions were 
always the product of a partnership between community groups and the state or other local 
voluntary organisations.167 This was true of the community-run bodies we explored above 
as well as organisations like the Hunslet Housing Co-operative, which was established with 
the support of the city council, the Leeds Federated Housing Association and the Housing 
Corporation as we saw in Chapter 2. Campaigns for community control shifted the balance 
of power in favour of local people and service users, but activists needed to maintain good 
working relationships with external bodies. Community groups could not provide services 
in isolation. 
For some community activists, the involvement of community workers and other paid 
professionals in community institutions presented another threat to community control. 168 
According to this argument, paid workers would leverage their superior skills and 
experience to take control of community projects.  Rather than acting in the interests of the 
community, workers would operate as agents of whoever paid their salary. These critics 
viewed the expansion of community work in the public sector as an attempt by the local 
state to steer the course of community action.169 If the role of community workers was 
contentious in certain publications and among particular theorists, in Leeds the issue 
generated far less controversy. As we have seen throughout this thesis, community workers 
and other professionals played a central role in the growth of community action and, far 
from limiting community control, they promoted it. In Chapter 1 we saw that community 
workers were one of the pillars of community action on the Hunslet Grange estate. Chapter 
2 demonstrated that community workers and other professionals helped to instigate 
campaigns against housing clearance and for alternative forms of housing renewal. As we 
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showed in Chapter 3, sympathetic professionals helped community action groups to 
construct strong arguments against urban road-building.  
The support of community workers and other professionals was particularly critical for 
effective positive community action. People in deprived parts of the city were less likely to 
have the skills, resources and time to operate community institutions on a full time basis, 
submit funding applications or make contacts on a citywide level. As we have seen in this 
chapter, many community institutions employed staff to undertake crucial work. 
Community advice centres employed professionals to provide legal and other forms of 
specialist advice. Adventure playgrounds were supervised by paid playleaders. Operating 
from institutions like the Hall Lane Community Centre, community workers helped to 
stimulate community action across a wide area. In Osmondthorpe in east Leeds between 
1972 and 1983 community workers funded by Dr. Barnado’s worked with local people to 
cultivate several community institutions, including a playgroup, and an advice centre.170 In 
districts like Osmondthorpe and Armley, community action would have been restricted to 
short-lived negative campaigns without the support of professional workers. The local 
population lacked the educational resources, political experience and social connections to 
influential decision-makers. In its 1979 annual report, the Hall Lane Community Centre 
outlined the difficulties faced by local community groups in Armley before arguing that ‘the 
only way such groups could take effective common action’ would be with the support of a 
full time worker.171 In its 1984 report, the Centre expanded upon this point: 
 If community action in an area is to continue to develop [and] attract new interest and tackle new areas then it is important for it to have access to an agency with a broader base to help bring issues to attention and inject information of additional community work help at key times.’172 
In a period of mounting uncertainty surrounding funding for community institutions the 
Centre’s message to funding agencies was clear: the resources and skills available in inner 
city neighbourhoods were not sufficient to sustain community action. Community action 
needed paid professionals to realise its full potential. Community action groups might have 
been distinguished by their resolutely local focus, but they needed to marshal resources 
from both ‘in and outside the community.’173  
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This position was not only advanced by professional community workers whose jobs 
depended on funding as some critics alleged. Residents of the inner city were keen to secure 
community workers. In December 1982 when the city council decided to redeploy Tony 
Hermann – one of the few community workers on its payroll – from Halton Moor to South 
Seacroft, community activists from Halton Moor campaigned to retain him.174  In a 
deputation to the council, the Halton Moor Tenants Association waxed lyrical about the way 
Hermann had helped tenants to set up services and projects, including a community centre, 
two playgroups, a good neighbours’ scheme, and a communal flat for the elderly. Three 
months later, three tenants’ associations from the Osmondthorpe lobbied the city council to 
fund a community work post on their estate after Barnardo’s withdrew their grant.175 These 
campaigns challenge the notion that working-class community activists were controlled or 
manipulated by middle-class community workers. Community activists in the inner city 
stressed that they had formed productive partnership with community workers. That the 
partnership bridged the class divide did not imply either side was being exploited.  
The role of community workers in developing community action campaigns underlines the 
point that community action was a cross-class alliance. This is perhaps why it unsettled 
some on the Left for whom such pluralism was anathema. This Leeds experience suggests it 
strengthened working-class organisations. The real problem for activists in most working-
class areas was that community workers were few in number. The radical planners and 
architects who lent their support to action groups were also in short supply. While middle-
class activists with professional skills often worked with action groups in neighbouring 
areas, they rarely ventured across the city. The cross-class alliance operated in certain 
neighbourhoods but not at a citywide level. This militated against the formation of a 
citywide community action movement. 
If complete community control was always an implausible goal, community activists did 
increase the extent to which institutions and services were managed by the local people who 
used them. New institutions were structured to promote local control. Existing public and 
voluntary organisations were reformed to achieve similar ends. Public and voluntary 
organisations did not cede control willingly, but periods of confrontation were usually short 
and community activists usually developed good working relationships with external 
bodies. Community control did not mean a community struggling in isolation. Activists 
enlisted the support of community workers and other professionals to help local people to 
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increase their effective power. Of course, community control was only possible if 
community institutions could overcome a number of internal challenges.  
Debates over community control tended to assume that local people were both willing and 
able to take part in running community institutions. This was not always the case. Although 
in the city generally there was considerable enthusiasm from local people to get involved in 
running community centres, adventure playgrounds and training centres, in certain contexts 
community organisers had to work particularly hard to facilitate community involvement. 
This was significant because community-run institutions did not simply cultivate local 
support for ideological reasons: they depended on it to survive. Although many community 
institutions employed paid staff, they relied on volunteers to perform essential tasks. Apathy 
was one of the most significant obstacles to running effective community institutions. 
Community control was irrelevant if local people did not want to control grassroots 
organisations. Volunteers were needed to prepare sites for adventure playgrounds, to staff 
advice centres, to help run play schemes, to marshal community festivals, to manage 
community centres, and to attend meetings with city council officers. The growth of 
community projects was in large part driven by the willingness of local people to give up 
their time and contribute their expertise or local knowledge. Since public and charitable 
grants were tied to capital costs or salaries, constant fundraising was required to meet basic 
running costs. Strong local support was a prerequisite for successful local fundraising 
campaigns. In 1975, the Seacroft Adventure Playground held several events to raise money 
for the playground, including a jumble sale, two galas, a medieval fair and a bingo 
session.176 In an earlier year, the playground organised cake sales, a car raffle, brass band 
concerts and a Yorkshire pudding making competition.177 Each of these initiatives had to be 
run by willing volunteers. Endless rounds of local fundraising could be wearisome, sapping 
the morale of even the most dedicated activists. It was a constant challenge.  
Community institutions had to be seen as legitimate by the local community to survive. 
Local people had to understand the purpose of the organisation and feel some sense of 
ownership over it or they would not participate. Persistent negative feedback and 
complaints to local councillors could kill a community project. This was a particularly 
salient issue for the more visible or unusual initiatives, such as playgrounds, and those that 
attracted large numbers of people to a street, such as community centres. Adventure 
playgrounds were sometimes greeted with suspicion and hostility by neighbouring residents 
who were suspicious of their anarchic spirit and unorthodox design. The organisers of the 
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Chapeltown adventure playground noted that ‘[w]e often have trouble with local people. 
They expect swings and a roundabout and are surprised by all the mess and noise.’178 
Adventure playgrounds organisers often erected fences to appease local residents and, 
crucially, they endeavoured ‘to tell local people what it’s all about,’ to encourage a sense of 
common ownership.179 Maintaining good public relations was a critical part of community 
activism. An analysis of particular local projects shows that the success of a community 
institution was closely related to the degree of public support. In the early years of the 
Seacroft Adventure Playground, when there was limited local involvement, children burned 
down the playleader’s caravan and vandalised the toilet block.180 After parental 
participation increased at the end of the 1960s, there were no further incidences of major 
vandalism.181 Reflecting on the first decade of the playground’s life in 1976, one organiser 
observed that ‘Seacroft has been the grave of many similar projects but this one has 
“stuck”.’182 This, he argued, was a testament to the strength and continuity of community 
support.183 Following the completion of major renovation work in April 1980, the 
playground managed to sustain its momentum for most of the 1980s.184  
Activists struggled in particular to encourage people to participate in the management of the 
projects. While moments of crisis and confrontation, such as the Studley Grange episode, 
generated major public participation, there was less enthusiasm for more mundane activities 
involved in governing a community institution. There were perennial complaints about poor 
attendance at committee meetings and public meetings.185 At the third AGM of the 
Chapeltown Adventure Playground the Secretary lamented that, while 100 children used the 
playground each week, ‘it is given very little support from local people. We desperately 
need an interested committee who are willing to put enthusiasm and energy into the 
organisation of the playground.’186 Not even the promise of ample resources could 
guarantee success if an institution lacked enthusiastic community support. The Meanwood 
Community Association, founded in 1976, was awarded £55,000 in Inner City Programme 
funding in 1979, but struggled to identify how to spend it.187 A local organiser at the centre 
lamented that the ‘“apathy of local people is worrying…Local people should have a say in 
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how their community centre is improving…But now we are giving them an opportunity to 
say what they think, they just aren’t interested.”’188  
In certain contexts, activists acknowledged that there were unsurmountable obstacles to 
deep participation. The activists running the Chapeltown Children’s Centre noted that many 
of the parents whose children attended the Centre were unable to attend meetings and 
certainly could not join the management committee because they worked for long hours 
during the day or did shift work; most women had domestic responsibilities in the evening. 
The organisers noted that ‘few Asian women are able to come [to meetings]’ due to cultural 
expectations surrounding the role of women.189 As a result, the Centre’s workers were 
tasked with identifying the views of local people through ‘outreach work’ in the 
neighbourhood. This work would entail talking to people in their homes or on the streets to 
ensure their opinions were still heard even though they could not attend meetings. In other 
words, the Centre’s organisers adapted the notion of community involvement to account for 
the reality of local people’s lives. All types of participation were valued equally, from 
‘helping to run the occasional jumble sale’ to ‘becoming an active officer of the 
committee.’190  
Campaigns for community control also assumed that there was a community who wished to 
take control of local institutions and services.  Setting up a community institution implied 
that residents of a particular locality shared a collective identity and so would feel a sense of 
common ownership over a community institution. This was not always the case. Like many 
inner city neighbourhoods, Chapeltown was socially diverse in the 1970s. As a key 
reception area for migrants from south Asia, the Caribbean and Europe, it was home to a 
number of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. The Chapeltown Community 
Association (CCA) was an avowedly multi-ethnic organisation and it believed that the 
Chapeltown Community Centre would act as a base for different community groups in the 
area.191 However, throughout the 1970s community groups representing particular ethnic 
and religious groups had also submitted funding applications to the council to set-up their 
own community centres.192 They rejected the claim that one centre could represent the 
different communities.193 When the Chapeltown Community Centre finally opened in 1975, 
it did attract a variety of organisations, but the demand for separate community centres for 
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different ethnic and religious groups did not disappear.194 The local Islamic Society, for 
instance, did not identify with the Chapeltown Community Centre.195 The trend in 
Chapeltown during the late 1970s and 1980s was for different ethnic and religious groups to 
establish their own community centres. In 1975, the council agreed to split a £68,000 Urban 
Aid grant for between four different Asian organisations who did not want to share the 
Asian Institute.196 Chapeltown News criticised this development, cautioning that ‘[b]y 
fighting each other we are playing into the hands of those who seek to control us,’ but the 
tide had already turned.197 In 1979, the city council awarded funding for a West Indian 
Centre for Chapeltown; an Islamic Centre opened on Spencer Place in 1983 and in that year 
a Sikh Community and Sports Centre opened on Chapeltown Road.198 The Jamaican 
Society applied for funds to open a community centre in 1986.199 The Chapeltown 
Community Centre, which moved to a new site in the 1980s, never functioned as a central 
hub of the community in the way that activists had envisaged in the early 1970s. 
 
Play campaigners in Chapeltown were also challenged on their claims to represent the 
whole community. This criticism stemmed from the ethnic cleavages in the neighbourhood. 
In 1975, the United Caribbean Association complained that whilst its appeals ‘for money 
and land for a youth club had been repeatedly turned down,’ the Chapeltown Adventure 
Playground had received £60,000 from public funds.200 The UCA believed that black-run 
groups were being discriminated against. The group lobbied for a black playleader for the 
playground and was disappointed when the first playleader was white.201 For activists who 
stressed the existence of different communities in Chapeltown, the notion of the adventure 
playground as a community facility was contentious. However, the UCA’s protests belied 
the fact that the playground’s management committee had several black representatives and 
the facility was well-used by black children. Its objections were as much a function of 
competition between different community groups rather than between different ethnic 
groups. In summer 1976, the playground employed a black playleader who lived in 
Chapeltown.202  
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Like Chapeltown, south Headingley and its environs were ethnically and socially diverse. 
The South Headingley Community Association’s efforts to establish a purpose built 
community centre to serve a range of groups underlined the difficulty of uniting people 
behind such projects. The divisive issue was not race but locality. As a condition of their 
Inner City grant for the community centre, the SHCA was required to construct community 
workshops to help alleviate local unemployment.203 A patch of land on the edge of the 
district was identified as a possible site for the workshops but a group of residents on an 
estate neighbouring the site objected, claiming that they would encroach on a local green 
space. These residents were not prepared to sacrifice this local amenity for the sake of 
community centre project because they did not identify with the south Headingley 
community. As one local resident pointed out, they fell under the orbit of a different 
community association.204 These case studies reveal that the way the community was 
defined and delineated was contentious. This was not always related to ethnic divisions: it 
could just as easily be a product of geography. Community activists never solved this 
problem. It seemed to be an inherent difficulty of organising in a socially diverse 
environment. However, intra-community division was the exception rather than the rule 
since, as we explored above, activists usually struggled to stimulate local interest of any sort 
in community projects. Consequently there was generally little scope for internal division. 
Where a neighbourhood, like Chapeltown, was internally divided over community projects, 
this was in some respects an indication of the vibrancy of local community action. In 
socially diverse neighbourhoods, community activism was prevalent, but fragmented and 
potentially fractious. In the long term, ethnic, religious and geographical cleavages militated 
against the formation of a citywide community action movement. For activists to build a 
movement they had to feel a sense of shared identity and support a set of common aims. As 
community action in Chapeltown became increasingly fragmented on ethnic and religious 
lines, the development of a community action movement became less likely. Disputes 
between neighbouring community groups had a similar effect. 
 
If local support was the first pillar of positive community action, external support was the 
second. In order to run community institutions, activists had to secure resources from public 
and non-state organisations. Activists did raise revenue in the community but local 
fundraising was never sufficient to meet the scale of their ambitions. Some community 
institutions levied modest user fees but because they served low-income areas these charges 
could never cover the full capital or running costs. As we have seen, the city council was a 
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major source of finance for community projects, despite its often frosty relationship with 
community activists. The Planning, Housing, Further Education, Education and Social 
Services Committees made contributions to various community-run institutions. Central 
government was also an important source of revenue. The city council channelled finance 
from various central government funding streams to community initiatives, a process that 
we shall explore in more detail below. The Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre secured 
finance from the Lord Chancellor’s Department, which had in 1977 identified ‘an ocean of 
unmet legal need.’205 Community advice centres derived finance for workers’ salaries from 
government programmes designed to boost employment by emphasising their commitment 
to hiring local people as workers. In 1978, the South Headingley Advice Centre employed a 
worker using Job Creation Scheme (JCS) funds.206 Workers at the Chapeltown Children’s 
Centre and the Hall Lane Community Centre were financed by the Manpower Services 
Commission (MSC) another job creation programme financed by the government.207 Hall 
Lane also employed temporary staff using funds from the Youth Opportunities Scheme 
(YOPS) which provided short term work placements for young people. Community activists 
appealed to non-state bodies for finance. Large national organisations such as the Joseph 
Rowntree Charitable Trust and the Gulbenkian Foundation were important benefactors of 
community organisations in Leeds. The Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust awarded grants 
to the Hall Lane Community Centre, the Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre, the Trade 
Union and Community Information and Resource Centre (TUCRIC) and the community 
activist Ron Weiner for an adult education class.208  
The most successful community institutions wove together funding from a diverse range of 
sources. The growth of the Seacroft Adventure Playground illustrates this point. The 
playground was initially financed by the Leeds Junior Chamber of Commerce which grant 
aided the playground its first three years. The council then picked up its salary costs. The 
playground also obtained grants from Leeds trusts like the Wades Charity and specialised 
charities such as the National Playing Fields Association. The playground was supported by 
the North Seacroft Community Association, a local community group. The Leeds Civic 
Trust issued loans to the playground and an architect member of the Trust designed a 
building for the playground.209 By the financial year 1975/76, 20 per cent of the Seacroft 
                                                          205 Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre, Interim Report, 1979, 4; Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre, 1980 Report, 1 206 Headline, No. 8, December 1974, No. 15, April 1975 and No. 23, October 1978. 207 CCP/NA, ‘The Children’s Community Centre: A Report,’ 1978; Hall Lane, Community Centre, Report, 2 208 ibid; Harehills and Chapeltown Law Centre, Interim Report, 1979, 4; JRCT Minute Books, September 1978 2468.axi; JRCT Minute Books, March 1975, 2284.n  209 A.J. Moyes, ‘Recent Activities Connected With Seacroft Adventure Playground: April 1972,’ 11 April 1972, 3 [LCT] 
218  
Adventure Playground’s revenues came from charitable donations, 30 per cent from the 
local authority and the remainder from local fund-raising.210 This underlines the point that 
effective community run institutions were founded on partnerships between the community, 
voluntary bodies and the state.211  
 
In the long 1970s, this public and voluntary funding usually came with few strings attached 
which gave groups considerable freedom. However, community institutions rarely secured 
permanent funding. Grants from charitable foundations were usually awarded for a fixed 
term, usually for no more than years. This was intended as seed funding, to help an 
institution become established. The Joseph Rowntree Rowntree Charitable Trust grant aided 
TUCRIC for three years in the late 1970s, but the TUCRIC’s application to the Trust for a 
further grant in the early 1980s was unsuccessful.212 Government programmes were also 
unwilling to agree to open-ended funding commitments. Grants from the Urban Programme 
and MSC grants were limited to no more than three years. Unsurprisingly, then, funding 
crises were a regular occurrence for community institutions and the threat of closure was 
ever-present. In August 1976, only two years after opening, the Chapeltown Adventure 
Playground came close to folding after it exhausted its charitable grants and public 
donations.213 The organisers of community institutions devoted much of their time pursuing 
funding opportunities, leaving them with less time for campaigning and developing 
services. For want of secure funding, even well-established community institutions existed 
in a perpetual state of instability and struggled to make long term plans. This problem 
became acute in the mid-1980s. 
 
5. Citywide organising 
By the mid-1970s community activists in Leeds had developed an infrastructure of service 
providing community organisations. Playgrounds, playgroups, community nurseries, 
community centres, advice centres, training schemes, play schemes and housing co-
operatives were emerging across the inner city and on council estates. Despite this 
momentum and enthusiasm, community action lacked coherence at a citywide level. It had 
not matured into a citywide movement. There were few unifying institutions that could co-
ordinate and support the work of community organisations. Citywide bodies like the 
Community Housing Working Party and district-wide alliances like the A660 Joint Council 
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helped to glue local groups together, but they did not speak to community activists across 
the whole city. The mobilisation of community action had produced a diverse but 
fragmented range of community groups campaigning on different issues. Citywide activist 
networks were comparatively weak and confined to a small proportion of activists, usually 
middle class professionals and community workers. There had been little attempt to define 
the broad aims of community action in Leeds in a way that would unite the city’s diverse 
range of community action groups. This section explores the ways in which community 
activists began to form citywide institutions in the late 1970s. The need to secure public 
funding was a key impetus for this. 
 
One of the drivers of citywide organising was the opportunity to obtain grants from the 
government’s Urban Programme. From the late 1960s, governments began targeting public 
resources at inner city areas. The term ‘inner city’ signified the ring of residential and 
industrial districts mainly dating from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which 
encircled the city centre, though became a geographically unspecific term for deprived 
urban areas. This represented a departure from the interwar and post-war decades, when 
governments had underwritten the centrifugal movement of people, housing, services and 
employment from central areas to the suburbs and new towns.214 The urban turn in public 
policy was driven by the rediscovery of poverty in the 1960s, which was found to be 
disproportionately, if not exclusively, concentrated in inner city areas.215 Another driver was 
the demise of the industrial base of inner city areas from the late 1960s which drove up 
unemployment rates and exacerbated social problems. The growth of the service sector and 
new manufacturing industries tended not to benefit the inner city.216 There was a fear 
among policy makers that, if left unattended, the inner city would become a site of racial or 
class conflict, not least because immigrants from commonwealth countries had settled 
there.217 British policy makers were keen to an acutely painful American-style experience of 
urban decline.218 The Urban Programme, launched by the Wilson government in 1968, was 
a key plank of the government’s approach to remedying inner city malaise. It allowed local 
authorities to bid for Urban Aid grants to support projects in inner city areas run by either 
public or voluntary bodies. The ‘inner city’ as defined by Leeds City Council incorporated 
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the inner ring and several large peripheral council estates.219 The Urban Programme quickly 
became a major benefactor of positive community action. Many of the initiatives we 
explored in this chapter were supported by Urban Aid between 1968 and 1977. In north-east 
Leeds alone, the Chapeltown Community Centre, Chapeltown News and Harehills Housing 
Aid received Urban Aid money.220 This financial assistance notwithstanding, community 
activists were critical of the way the city council administered Urban Aid. They alleged that 
the authority did not consult community groups about its Urban Aid bids and tended to 
favour its own departments over community groups.221 This was a common complaint. In 
Nottingham, community activists took the city council to the Local Government 
Ombudsman when it refused to support an Urban Aid bid accusing the authority of being 
biased against community projects.222  
 
In 1977, in response to the acceleration of urban decay and the continued deterioration of 
the inner city’s economic base, the government re-launched the Urban Programme and 
quadrupled its budget. Leeds became eligible for £2 million of inner city grants per year. 
The expanded Urban Programme was intended to focus on the structural economic causes 
of inner city decline and the government placed a clear emphasis on ‘the active participation 
of the people who live, work and invest in the inner areas,’ both in preparing plans and 
implementing schemes.223 This objective spoke to the criticism of Urban Aid voiced by 
community activists. As we saw in Chapter 2, governments had made recourse to a 
discourse of participation in response to the community action mobilisation since the late 
1960s, but earlier attempts to promote participation had given way to disappointment. The 
new Urban Programme seemed to offer community groups the opportunity not only to 
access a higher proportion of inner city funding but to become active partners in the process 
of urban renewal. This raised expectations among activists. 
 
In its first years, however, there was a considerable gap between the goals of the Urban 
Programme and the administrative reality. In 1978 the city council set up a working party 
composed solely of officers to prepare its submission to government. The Inner City 
Working Party spoke to the Leeds Council for Community Relations (LCCR) and Leeds 
Council for Voluntary Service (LCVS) but these discussions had little impact on the 
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eventual submission.224 There was no direct consultation with community groups. For 
community activists, this approach fell far short of the participatory spirit of the 
Programme. The Leeds Other Paper reported that the value of a bid from the Harehills and 
Chapeltown Law Centre had been reduced because Peter Sparling, the Conservative chair of 
the Policy and Finance Committee, disagreed with the Centre’s stance on council policy.225 
Even the normally cautious LCVS, accused the council of preparing its plans in secret and 
of failing to explain the process.226 The Liberals and even the Labour Party condemned the 
poor lines of communication between Conservative-run council and civil society.227 
Sparling defended the arrangement, arguing that the direct involvement of community 
groups in policy making would be too complex and bureaucratic.228 He maintained that 
there was no impartial way of deciding which community groups should join the council 
working party, of the hundreds that might want a place, so it was fairer to consult indirectly. 
 
In summer 1978 the council revealed that it had decided to concentrate the resources of the 
Urban Programme on the Meanwood Valley and Sheepscar areas to stimulate industrial 
development on vacant land.229 Grants to projects in these areas dwarfed grants to any 
single voluntary or community group project. Overall, council-led schemes absorbed 85 per 
cent the city’s bid.230 The Leeds Community Workers’ Group argued that the council had 
unfairly excluded parts of the city that were equally deserving of public funds.231 If one area 
was to be prioritised, activists argued, this should be identified in consultation with 
community groups. This debate spoke to a deeper tension between two different approaches 
to renewing the inner city. The Conservative-run council contended that it had to consider 
the relative contribution of the private sector, the council and voluntary organisations when 
setting priorities.232 This had led to a bid which privileged private industry and physical 
infrastructure such as new roads. This foreshadowed the direction of government policy in 
the 1980s, as we shall see below. For community activists, the residents of the inner city 
were key to its revival. As we saw in Chapter 2, activists promoted a community-led 
approach to renewal in housing. The LCVS maintained that the ‘best value for money will 
be obtained by supporting voluntary initiatives from people in the areas concerned’ so 
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investment ‘must be in people rather than bricks and tarmac.’ 233 They held that it was 
inappropriate to use public funds to subsidise private industry.234 Community activists 
argued that the state was one of the chief instigators of the urban crisis, citing slum 
clearance, industrialised building and motorway construction.235 These policies been carried 
out with little consultation with local people. The historic failure of public policy 
undermined the state’s claim to understand inner city problems and validated the argument 
that alternatives were needed. Summarising this perspective, a Leeds Other Paper editorial 
on the Urban Programme argued that local people should be given the power ‘to decide how 
and where the money is spent. They know their needs far better than anyone else.’236  
 
If the first year of the programme was not an unmitigated disaster for community 
institutions – groups like the Chapeltown Adventure Playground and the Chapeltown 
Community Centre received substantial grants – community activists felt that its potential 
was unrealised.237 Consequently, in March 1979, community activists across the city formed 
the Inner City Forum to represent the interests of community and voluntary organisations 
who wished to bid for Urban Programme grants. 238  The Forum hoped that by presenting 
their funding applications with ‘one voice’ community groups would exert greater influence 
over the Programme and increase the proportion of funds allocated to them.239 While the 
Leeds Community Workers’ Group initially questioned whether the Forum would represent 
the whole community, these concerned proved unfounded.240 The Inner City Forum held 
public meetings across the inner city area, enabling local groups to contribute their views 
and discuss funding priorities.241 The Inner City Forum became an important citywide 
institution for community activists. Working together towards a shared objective 
accentuated the extent to which community activists across the city felt a sense of share 
identity. Local meetings of the Inner City Forum functioned as a focal point for community 
action in particular districts of Leeds.242 In response to the challenge of a well-organised 
coalition of community activists, the city council adapted its approach to community 
consultation for the Second Inner City Programme in 1979. This included ‘regular liaison’ 
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with the LCVS and LCCR.243 The council’s submission devoted a higher proportion of 
funding to community groups and incorporated several organisations that had previously 
been excluded. The Harehills Housing Aid Centre, whose workers had forcefully criticised 
council policy on several occasions, received £15,000 per year for three years to pay staff 
salaries.244 Community groups in Armley, Holbeck, Meanwood, Chapeltown, Harehills and 
Hunslet were allocated funding. By organising collectively and thinking strategically, 
community activists had increased their leverage over the council. 
 
This shift was confirmed and extended when Labour took control of the city council in May 
1980. As we saw in Chapter 1 and 2, a new generation of city councillors developed close 
working relationships with community activists; some of these councillors were former 
community activists. Community groups were integrated more closely into the decision-
making process. Beginning with the third Urban Programme, recommendations from the 
Inner City Forum were fed directly into the council’s submissions to government. The 
council held public meetings on Programme bids and advertised funding opportunities in 
local media. The bias towards economic and industrial projects of the early years 
diminished, though such projects were certainly not excluded. In the city’s third Urban 
Programme submission, bids from community and voluntary groups collected almost half 
the total funding, a significant increase on previous years.245 Funds were awarded to 
previously spurned community institutions, such as the Chapeltown Children’s Centre, 
which directly competed with council services.246 In announcing the council’s fifth inner 
city programme in 1982, Michael Simmonds, the Chair of the Inner City Sub-Committee 
applauded the ‘determination and enthusiasm of the community groups’ and declared that 
the council wished ‘to provide every assistance to these voluntary groups’ and ‘to combine 
the efforts of the community with the work of the Council.’247 Although some community 
activists continued to highlight the gap between the council rhetoric and practice, this 
downplayed the fact that community activists had increased their leverage over the council 
through more effective joint organising. In the city’s Third Urban Programme submission, 
bids from non-statutory agencies collected almost half the total funding, a significant 
increase on just two years previously.248  
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From the late 1970s, then, national urban policy created opportunities for positive 
community action. However, funding from the Urban Programme did not automatically 
flow to community institutions. To access this finance, community activists organised at 
citywide level to increase their bargaining power. They presented themselves as key agents 
in the urban renewal project. In doing so, they challenged both the statist and market-based 
approach to urban renewal. The council was influenced by this campaign and began to treat 
community groups as partners. Using resources from the Urban Programme activists were 
able to develop the infrastructure of community-run services and institutions. 
 
The Leeds Inner City Forum was one manifestation of a growing tendency for community 
activists to organise at a citywide level. Like Leeds, in Birmingham, community activists, 
assisted by the local Council for Voluntary Service, formed the Inner City Campaign to 
promote public participation in that city’s Urban Programme.249 The Leeds Council for 
Voluntary Service (LCVS), which in the 1960s had largely eschewed community groups 
engaged in political issues began to support community action groups in the 1970s. Groups 
like the Hall Lane Community Centre, the Chapeltown Neighbourhood Group and the 
Saxton Gardens Tenants Association had joined the LCVS by 1980.250 With its secretariat, 
newssheet, library and mailing list, the LCVS became a focal point for many community 
action groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s.251 The need to make connections, within 
and between cities, was an increasingly prominent theme in activist literature as community 
action began to mature in the late 1970s.252 Seasoned community activists who had 
participated in the Community Development Projects contended that only joint organising 
would allow activists to tackle the structural causes of the problems they encountered in 
their neighbourhoods.253 In Leeds, activists sought to create new community-run institutions 
that supported grassroots organisations over a wide area. The Trade Union and Community 
Resource Centre (TUCRIC), which operated in central Leeds between 1978 and 1987 was 
both emblematic and constitutive of this trend in the city. The origins of TUCRIC lay in an 
adult education class in political economy organised by Ron Weiner at the Extra-Mural 
Department of Leeds University between 1975 and 1977. Weiner was an organiser in the 
NALGO union and a community activist in north Leeds, where he had campaigned against 
speculative office development.254 The Leeds Political Economy Class brought together 
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activists and professionals from different backgrounds, including ‘local government 
officers, community workers, and lecturers’ to consider the roots of the problems facing the 
city.255 The class published three reports on economic and social change in Leeds.256 The 
reports concluded that the causes of issues like poor housing, unemployment, inadequate 
childcare, environmental degradation and deteriorating public transport were closely 
connected. They argued that there was an urgent need for joint organising to bridge the 
political silos of the labour movement, feminism and community action to confront shared 
problems.257  
 
The Leeds Political Economy Class was not alone in reaching these conclusions. The 
Community Development Projects, funded by central government to explore the causes of 
urban decline, had made similar arguments in a series of reports in the mid-1970s.258 Across 
urban Britain, community activists were beginning to consider the structural causes of local 
problems and seeking to build alliances with trade unionists and women’s groups, as we 
saw in Chapter 2 and 3. In 1977, Community Action concluded a review of the 
achievements of community action since 1972 by arguing that linking up different struggles 
across existing organisational boundaries would be critical in the years ahead.259 In several 
large cities, activists had founded institutions to conduct research and co-ordinate 
campaigning. The Newcastle Trade Union Studies Information Unit and the Coventry 
Workshop were two pioneering examples.260 In Leeds, neighbourhood community advice 
centres were fulfilling a similar function at a local level, but the city lacked a citywide 
centre for activism, advice and research.  
 
Informed by these models and the conclusions of the Political Economy Class, Weiner 
worked with Kevin Ward, an academic, and Ursula Huws, a women’s activist, to fill this 
gap in the activist infrastructure of Leeds. TUCRIC opened in 1978 in offices near the 
University before relocating to the Kirkgate Market. TUCRIC acted as an intelligence 
service and clearing house for activists across Leeds. It helped to co-ordinate citywide 
campaigns and actively facilitated links between groups. Like many community-run 
institutions, TUCRIC provided these services by employing workers. To pay the salaries of 
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the centre’s six members of staff, the organisers obtained finance from national trusts and 
public bodies: the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, the Equal Opportunities Commission, 
the Manpower Services Commission and the Community Projects Foundation.261 When 
these grants expired, TUCRIC acquired funding from the West Yorkshire County Council 
and Leeds City Council.262 The Centre was supported by community groups, women’s 
groups and trade unions branches in the city that paid a membership subscription.263  
 
TUCRIC developed a comprehensive library of resources on subjects of interest to activists, 
such as local government, employment, housing and public health, many of which were not 
available outside specialist institutions.264 Workers at the centre offered an information 
service to activists, conducting research on subjects to support campaigns. The information 
service was extremely well-used and handled 1100 enquiries in its first year, reaching its ten 
thousandth enquiry in January 1985.265 Many of the community groups we have explored in 
this thesis utilised the service. In April 1978, TUCRIC supplied Harehills Housing Aid with 
information on housing associations in Leeds to inform its research on the North British 
Housing Association which was operating in north east Leeds.266 In September 1978, 
workers from the Hall Lane Community Centre consulted council housing committee 
minutes and reports at TUCRIC.267 TUCRIC workers also undertook long-term research 
projects for particular campaigns. Between 1979 and 1980, TUCRIC joined the Leeds 
Federated Housing Association to undertake housing condition surveys in older residential 
areas.268 The survey data was a useful tool for community action groups when negotiating 
with the council for improvement grants. As we saw in Chapter 3, TUCRIC provided 
research assistance to the Public Transport Campaign in the late 1970s, furnishing the group 
with data on local government finance, transport economics and national legislation.269 
TUCRIC wrote and published reports on the economy, planning and housing, which 
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became valuable resources for activists. 270 TUCRIC workers published a bi-monthly 
newsletter, Bulletin, to communicate these findings to a wider audience. 
 
In addition to meeting the research needs of activists, TUCRIC helped to reinforce activist 
networks. The Centre sponsored several conferences on damp and housing action between 
1979 and 1981. Following one of these meetings, the Leeds Housing Action Group was 
formed, an umbrella group for tenant activists across the city. TUCRIC also helped to build 
citywide coalitions on issues like childcare and road safety.271 TUCRIC workers helped to 
establish the Inner City Forum, the work of which we explored above. The Centre seconded 
a worker to the Forum to help community groups prepare Urban Programme funding 
applications. TUCRIC was a key sponsor of anti-cuts activism in the city, organising a 
conference on the cuts in April 1980.272 TUCRIC had some success in building links 
between community activists and trade unionists. Until the late 1970s, contact between 
community activists and trade unionists had been negligible. TUCRIC aided the Public 
Transport Group, an alliance of bus users and bus workers formed in 1977 to oppose fare 
rises, which was a model for joint organising in the city.273 In 1979, TUCRIC helped to 
establish the West Yorkshire Housing Action Group (WHAG), an umbrella group ‘made up 
of representatives of tenants associations, advice centre workers, community workers and 
members of the public works shop stewards committee’ to act ‘as a contact point for people 
seeking information or assistance on housing repairs, improvement [and] damp.’274 The 
rationale behind WYHAG was that council tenants and local authority workers would be 
able to campaign more effectively to maintain standards in the housing service if workers 
and tenants understood each other’s perspective and needs. Another innovative example of 
joint organising promoted by TUCRIC was an alliance between community activists 
campaigning against the number of juggernauts on roads in east Leeds and workers in the 
road haulage industry concerned with deteriorating working conditions.275 Looking beyond 
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Leeds, TUCRIC helped to connect the city’s community activists to national networks. By 
the early 1980s, there were dozens of resource centre like TUCRIC across urban Britain.276 
In 1980 , TUCRIC joined the Network of Labour and Community Resource and 
Information Centres, the ‘national federation of research and resource centres.’277 Members 
of the Network held conferences across the country and organised national events for 
community groups. In summer 1982, the Network met at Beechwood College in Leeds to 
discuss workers’ and users’ plans in industry and public services.278 
Just as neighbourhood advice centres, playgrounds and community centred helped to fill a 
gap in local provision, TUCRIC had met the need for a citywide research and intelligence 
service and a central hub for activists. Whereas neighbourhood institutions served people 
directly, TUCRIC chiefly served activists and not just community activists, but also trade 
unionists and feminists. It helped activists to broaden their horizons beyond the confines of 
their organisation or campaign and beyond the city boundaries. In doing so, it responded to 
calls by community activists across the country that citywide and regional networking 
would help community action to develop into a fully-fledged movement. The development 
of TUCRIC occurred during the high noon of positive community action in the late 1970s 
when community institutions were able to access funding from a range of public and private 
sources and as they developed closer relationships with local authorities. 
 
6. Crisis and decline 
 
The ascendency of community controlled institutions proved to be short-lived. The two key 
pillars of positive community action – partnerships with external bodies and local support – 
began to crumble in the 1980s. Public spending cuts undermined a major source of finance 
for positive community action and public finance became progressively harder to obtain as 
government programmes were steered towards different objectives. Over the 1980s, the 
Thatcher governments not only reduced the value of Leeds City Council’s Inner City 
Programme allocation in real terms, they also challenged the ‘social bias’ of the city’s 
submissions.279 This remark was a thinly veiled reference to those community schemes that 
were not directly linked to economic and industrial development. For the Thatcher 
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government, the function of Urban Programme was to restore private sector confidence in 
the inner city and reignite private enterprise by underwriting the risk of investing in the 
inner city. This heightened the tension between the community action approach to urban 
renewal, centred on local organisations, and the market-led approach to regeneration, 
focused on private capital. In 1980, the government rejected five voluntary sector schemes 
from Leeds, including two community worker positions, community architecture services 
and a play scheme.280 In February 1983, the Secretary of State turned down Leeds City 
Council’s entire Urban Programme submission, before later accepting an amended 
submission with its value cut by a third.281  
 
Though the Urban Programme remained a key source of community group finance 
throughout the 1980s, community groups faced greater competition from private sector-led 
bids. By the late 1960s, the Urban Programme was being used to support city centre private 
property development.282  As the decade wore on, community groups consulted less 
thoroughly on the content of the city’s Urban Programme. In 1986 the Leeds Council for 
Voluntary Service reported that it had not been consulted on the Urban Programme in the 
past year.283 The LCVS looked back longingly to the ‘good old days’ of the late 1970s when 
the government spoke in favour of public participation, noting that the network of 
consultative committees on housing, education and social services that had existed at that 
time had been abolished.284 Other central government programmes, such as the Manpower 
Services Commission, which had once furnished community groups with finance were 
phased out or directed towards other goals.  
 
Local councils were no longer in a position to compensate for the contraction of central 
government support. In the context of cuts to the rate support grant, rate capping and 
restrictions on its ability to borrow, Leeds City Council was unable to maintain the plethora 
of community institutions that had emerged during the long 1970s. The gap between the 
demand for funding and the council’s ability to finance grassroots initiatives grew over the 
1980s. In the ten months between June 1982 and March 1983 alone there were seven 
deputations to the council from community groups on this subject.285 One of these 
organisations was the Hall Lane Community Centre, which struggled through a series of 
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funding crises between 1980 and 1982 after its charitable grants expired and various council 
committees turned down its requests for support.286  In an appeal to the council for funding, 
the Centre complained that it was ‘forced to exist on a hand-to-mouth basis with no security 
for the work that we do or the workers we employ.’287 The Centre survived this crisis when 
it obtained funding from a number of agencies. Nevertheless, its 1985 annual report noted 
that the year had been one of ‘great uncertainty’ and the coming period was unlikely to be 
‘a kind one.’288 Many community projects were even less fortunate than Hall Lane 
Community Centre. Lack of external funding nipped many projects in the bud in the 1980s. 
In the early 1980s, two well-organised campaigns for adventure playground funding in 
south and west Leeds failed to secure local funding and, as a result, the groups behind them 
folded.289  
 
TUCRIC was another victim of these shifts in the political landscape. In 1986, the abolition 
of the West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council precipitated a funding crisis at the 
Centre. TUCRIC’s affiliates were unable to contribute additional support and appeals to 
charitable trusts were unsuccessful as they focused their support on new initiatives rather 
they mature organisations.290 Leeds City Council offered to fund TUCRIC’s staffing costs 
for one year but only if the Centre accepted various conditions, including allowing council 
representatives to sit on TUCTIC’s management committee.291 The Centre’s management 
committee felt this would compromise the Centre’s independence and judged it unlikely 
that TUCRIC would find an alternative source of finance in twelve months.292  In June 1987 
they reluctantly decided to close the Centre.293 TUCRIC’s relationship with the city council 
had soured somewhat in its final years, after the Centre antagonised the Labour leader and 
the local Conservative Party.294 However, TUCRIC’s demise was principally the result of 
the same budget cuts that had decimated community institutions across the city during the 
1980s. After the abolition of the metropolitan county councils in 1986, the new unitary 
district authorities did not receive the full county budget for their area, so they were unable 
to honour all of the county council’s funding commitments. Alongside TUCRIC, several 
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other voluntary and community organisations that had been supported by the county council 
were forced to close.295  
 
The council’s liberal approach to grant aid was another casualty of the austere financial 
climate. In the 1970s, the recipients of council funding were afforded considerable freedom. 
Over the 1980s, the beneficiaries of grant aid were subjected to more thorough oversight as 
councils sought to extract maximum value from their more limited resources. Local 
authorities created ever more sophisticated accountability mechanisms and monitoring 
systems. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, voluntary sector policy evolved into a 
commissioning system in which voluntary groups were invited to bid for contracts to 
provide public services; the successful bidders would then be legally obliged fulfil the terms 
of the contract.296 The city council’s final funding offer to TUCRIC in 1987 was reflective 
of this trend: the council intended to monitor TUCRIC to ensure money was spent ‘to the 
satisfaction of the council.’297 In this new political and regulatory landscape, it became 
almost impossible to operate a fiercely independent community institution, with links to 
politically sensitive campaigns, using public funding. The new ‘contract culture’ favoured 
larger, more professional voluntary organisations at the expense of community groups.298 
The demise of TUCRIC and other community institutions that had relied on public funding 
underlined a key dilemma for positive community action: community activists endeavoured 
to operate independently of the state, but without public resources they could not meet their 
basic running costs. They had no independent source of finance, like the trade union levy, to 
keep themselves afloat during the austere 1980s.  
 
The willing participation of local residents was the second key pillar of positive community 
action. Community institutions haemorrhaged local support over the 1980s. The challenging 
economic climate in the inner city in the 1980s, characterised by high rates of 
unemployment, decaying public services and societal dislocation, was not conducive to 
volunteering. This occurred at a time when it was increasingly difficult to finance the wages 
of staff to operate community-run services. In spring 1984, the South Headingley 
Community Association’s advice centre closed for the final time due to a lack of local 
support: the organisers were unable to find ten volunteers to fill the rota.299 The Seacroft 
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Adventure Playground was another victim of this decline. In the late 1980s community local 
support began to fade and by 1989 ‘the people who ran the playground association [had] 
either moved away or lost interest and nobody new came forward to run it.’300 By autumn 
1989, the site was ‘deserted, overgrown and rat-infested,’ leading to complaints by 
neighbouring residents.301 The council attempted ‘to recall the local voluntary management 
committee for meaningful discussion’ but without success. When the council decided to 
dismantle the playground in October 1989, there was no resistance from local people. 
Apathy killed the project. Two years later, the Chapeltown Adventure Playground found 
itself hamstrung by a dearth of local support. A 1991 report suggested that the community 
had come to take the playground for granted, relying on the play workers to keep it 
running.302 The playground was struggling to raise funds locally and it, too, folded a few 
years later.  
It is not always possible to date the demise of community institutions as this was not usually 
reported in the local press. Since closure often happened with limited forewarning, 
community group records often simply stop with no explanation for what had occurred. 
Most of the community institutions we have discussed gradually faded from the historical 
record over the 1980s and few survived into the 1990s. Positive community action had 
thrived during the long 1970s by building alliances between local people, professionals, the 
state and voluntary bodies. A decade later these partnerships had disintegrated as the 
political and economic conditions that had sustained them were eroded. 
*** 
 
This chapter has shown that positive efforts to build community institutions were a central 
feature of community action. Community activists did not simply campaign against public 
policy and the state. They pro-actively built the sorts of services and amenities they wanted 
to see in the city. The rise of positive community action mirrored the growth of the more 
reactionary community action campaigns, beginning quietly in the late 1960s and reaching a 
crescendo in the mid to late 1970s. These community institutions responded to range of 
urgent social and economic needs in the inner city and other deprived parts of the city. 
These problems were the result of long-term spatial, economic and political developments. 
The community centre responded to the lack of space for community activities. The 
community advice centre was a reaction to the demand for information and guidance. 
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Community play facilities met children’s need for play space. The community nursery 
answered parents’ need for accessible childcare. These institutions privileged control by 
local residents and service users. Where it was not possible to build new institutions, 
community activists sought to democratise existing ones. The experience of establishing 
institutions informed campaigns, just as institutions were influenced by earlier more 
defensive campaigns.  
 
Professionals –lawyers, community workers, housing experts – played a key role in 
community institutions. Their expertise was leveraged to solve complex problems and to 
run services on a full time-basis. The community institutions that enjoyed the most success 
did so because they forged a productive partnership with the state and other voluntary 
organisations. Public and private bodies were a source of finance and guidance. Maintaining 
community control within this relationship was challenging and community activists always 
had to compromise on the lofty goal of community autonomy. Community activists seized 
opportunities presented by national urban policy to access large amounts of funding. In 
order to exert greater influence on public bodies, community activists began to organise at a 
citywide level in the late 1970s. This helped them to channel more resources to community 
projects. As the political and economic climate presented new challenges they also began to 
form connections with other political movements, especially the labour and women’s 
movements. This joint organising assumed an institutional form in TUCRIC, which 
provided an intelligence service to a variety of campaigns and helped to strengthen links 
between activists in Leeds and beyond. Despite these achievements, the drive to build a 
community action movement was ultimately unsuccessful. Citywide institutions like 
TUCRIC and the Inner City Forum proved too weak to counter the centrifugal tendency in 
community action. While middle-class professionals were an asset to community action 
groups, few middle-class activists reached out across the class barriers in the city to work 
with activists in working-class areas. Alliances between community groups in working-
class and middle-class areas were weak. The growth of community organising on ethnic and 
religious lines in inner city areas like Chapeltown also inhibited the development of a 
unified community action movement. 
 
As the 1980s progressed, the external political climate became more hostile to community 
activists. Reflecting on this in 1982 the founders of the Advice Centre for the Town in 
nearby Batley maintained that community action worked better in the 1970s due to the 
availability of public money so councils ‘could afford to give here and there’ but ‘as the 
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cuts began to bite and authorities hardened, community action became less easy.’303 Most of 
the community institutions that had been founded in the community action boom of the long 
1970s had closed permanently by the end of the 1980s. Neither the state nor voluntary 
bodies were able to fund community institutions on a truly long-term basis. The internal 
resources of low-income, inner-city neighbourhoods were rarely sufficient to support 
community-run services, but since they were not statutory services, community institutions 
had no automatic right to tax revenue. Full absorption into the public sector would 
undermine their ability to provide an independent, community-led service. In his study of 
the Notting Hill Housing Trust, Holmes showed that as grassroots organisations evolved 
into more formal service-providing organisations, they had to balance their campaigning 
goals against the need to secure public grants.304  This was a dilemma that community 
activists never entirely resolved.  
                                                          303 LOP, No. 218, 9 April 1982, 11 304 Holmes, The Other Notting Hill 
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Conclusion 
 
I. Towards a history of community action 
In 1972, in discussions with editors of Community Action, the sociologist Peter Marris 
described community action as a ‘new [kind] of political action’ distinguished by ‘the 
attempt to find ways of mobilising people outside the traditional political processes, so that 
they now demand a voice in decisions, which affect them.’1 This thesis has shown that 
contemporaries had good reason to be so excited by community action and it has shown 
why it deserves historians’ attention. Since this thesis is the first systematic study of 
community action, its first goal was to describe community action. Community action was a 
new form of political activism that emerged in Leeds in the mid- to late 1960s. It was a 
place-based form of activism in which people organised at the neighbourhood level to 
campaign on issues that impacted on their everyday lives. Community activists were 
particularly concerned with the built environment, housing, transport, local public services 
and neighbourhood amenities. Community activists formed grassroots organisations – 
referred to variously as tenants’ associations, community associations and action groups – 
to spearhead their campaigns. Community action could be negative, designed to block 
contentious proposals, but it was often simultaneously positive, seeking to building 
community-run institutions and provide services. A core goal of community action was to 
enable people to exert more influence over the policies and economic processes that 
impacted on their everyday lives.  
A diverse range of individuals participated in community action in Leeds. It straddled class, 
gender, ethnic, tenurial, educational and generational boundaries. Private renters, council 
tenants and owner occupiers alike participated in community action. Women played a 
central role in many community action groups, often undertaking the bulk of the organising 
work, though they were less likely to speak publicly for the groups. In several inner city 
areas, community action groups were multi-cultural organisations with black and Asian 
members. Community action united together young adults born after the Second World War 
who came of age in the 1960s and middle-aged and elderly people who remembered the 
inter-war era. Many community activists had prior experience of other forms of political or 
social activism, from the trade union movement to consumer organisations, but many had 
not previously participated in politics. Among this social diversity, an underlying theme was 
                                                          1 Community Action, No. 3, July-August 1972, 38 
236  
an individual commitment to the future of the inner city. This could be a professional or 
intellectual commitment to the integrity of inner-city neighbourhoods, a personal 
attachment to a certain urban lifestyle, or a material interest in the survival of the older 
housing stock. The core alliance in community action was between working-class residents 
and middle-class professionals. The former provided local knowledge and a local mandate 
while the latter furnished action groups with expertise and social contacts.  
Community action groups were fluid with close links to other organisations with which they 
shared members and ideas. In Leeds, community action was supported by the civic 
conservation movement, radical planners, community workers, trade unionists, public 
transport campaigners, Anglican clerics, and environmentalists. These groups and 
individuals had a shared interest in housing, the urban environment, community enterprises 
and transport issues. Community action received moral and practical support first from a 
revived Liberal Party and, from the later 1970s, a new generation of Labour activists, whose 
commitment to decentralisation and democratisation was informed by community action. 
Community activists used a variety of methods, from traditional campaigning tactics to 
techniques borrowed from the social movements this period. They organised petitions and 
marches, wrote letters to the press, distributed local newsletters and staged street marches 
and demonstrations. The more militant groups organised sit-ins in council offices, road-
blocking demonstrations and picketed committee meetings. The twin goals of most of these 
activities were to force the authorities to the negotiating table and to raise public awareness 
of their campaigns. Community activists challenged the state’s monopoly on expertise by 
producing their own research and analysis of local problems, and by asserting the value of 
local experience against the views of council officers. 
The second goal of this thesis was to explain the progress of community action in Leeds 
between 1960 and 1990. Shifts in public policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s set the 
scene for the growth of community action. In Leeds, community action first emerged in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. This was a period when the post-war consensus was beginning 
to unravel in the face of economic problems and changing social attitudes in a more 
affluent, but still unequal, consumer society. New social movements were flourishing and 
industrial militancy re-emerged on a scale unseen since the 1930s. Citizens began to 
challenge the paternalism that characterised local policy making. There was a widespread 
desire for greater direct local control over policy-making and public services. In Leeds, the 
unpopularity of key council policies on planning, housing and transport and the council’s 
failure to acknowledge shifts in public opinion on these issues were key drivers of 
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community action. Existing political organisations and voluntary organisations did not act 
as conduits for this tide of feeling and community action filled the vacuum. This attracted 
both radical middle-class professionals who lived or worked in the inner city and assertive 
working-class residents to community action.  
Community action matured over the long 1970s. This was a response to the difficulty of 
organising within socially diverse and often economically deprived neighbourhoods and in 
reaction to the city council’s dismissive attitude to the first round of campaigning. To 
increase their bargaining power, community activists worked together at a city level and 
forged links with action groups in other cities. Some community activists allied with the 
labour movement while others developed a closer working relationship with the local 
Labour Party. The result was that community action achieved many of its short-term goals, 
blocking particular policies, and in the medium term, it succeeded in steering the course of 
council strategy in housing, transport and planning. Community activists were also able to 
channel resources into community-led institutions and experimental approaches to urban 
policy that prioritised neighbourhood participation. The success of community action in the 
1970s is also explained by the fact that activists were able to explain how their goals were 
conducive to the objectives of national policy. In doing so, they exposed fissures between 
local and central government policy, which they leveraged to their advantage by exhorting 
the city council to conform to national guidelines. Below, we will evaluate the challenges 
community activists faced in the 1980s and reasons for the decline of community action in 
that decade. 
The thesis has four key implications for the field of twentieth century British history. 
Firstly, it has raised our awareness of a form of political activism that has not been studied 
systematically. Community action was a significant ‘path not taken’ in the history of 
political activism in Britain. It was a form of politics that never fulfilled its early promise, 
but was influential during the long 1970s. Historians should be concerned not only with 
forms of political activism that survive today, but also in those that faltered and declined 
several decades ago. The thesis not only enriches our understanding of how and why 
political activism develops, but also of how such activism can wane. The history of 
community action is pertinent to students of feminism, environmentalism, trade unionism 
and others. No strand of political activism operates in isolation and there was always 
overlap between community action and social movements.  
Secondly, it has shown that in order to understand political change in late twentieth century 
Britain it is necessary to broaden our focus to a political realm beyond the national level, 
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outside established institutions and beyond traditional political organisations. The history of 
community action encourages historians to broaden their understanding of the political. It 
shows that a wider range of issues became the subject of politics in this period and politics 
took place in a more diverse range of places. Extra-parliamentary politics was not confined 
to the workplace and nor was it solely concerned with issues of identity. Community action 
is an example of everyday politics, located close to where people lived and worked, walked 
and shopped, played and studied. At the neighbourhood level, political organisations were 
less clearly constituted and more fluid and ephemeral than the organisations that are 
commonly the subject of political histories. Community action is harder to define, its edges 
were more blurred and it does not fit easily into the standard theoretical frameworks used to 
categorise political activism, but its contribution to political change in this period was not 
diminished as a result.  
Thirdly, it has demonstrated that conventional research methodologies are not particularly 
well-suited to studying this sort of political activism. To study community action, historians 
must probe for sources in unconventional places, contact former activists and piece together 
narratives from an unusually diverse range of sources. Fourthly, while this thesis is not a 
work of planning, transport, local government or housing history, it has shown that the 
history of these fields in the long 1970s is incomplete without an understanding of 
community action. Narratives orientated around party politics, national governments and 
national NGOs are insufficient. Community action shaped the development of public 
policy, urban governance and urban development for at least two decades. As we shall 
discuss below, even after community action had fragmented, its influence as an approach to 
politics persisted.  
Community action is a fertile area for future historical research. In describing community 
action and examining its oscillating fortunes over the period of study, the thesis has raised 
numerous questions that deserve further study. Firstly, research is needed to investigate 
community action beyond Leeds, including in other large industrial cities, smaller urban 
centres, rural areas and, of course, London. This would reveal the extent to which the 
conclusions drawn in this thesis are applicable in other contexts. Such work would also help 
to illustrate how far community action was influenced by particular local contexts and 
national trends. Eventually, a history of community action in Britain as a whole could be 
constructed from a varied set of local case studies. Secondly, this thesis began to explore the 
links between community action and the major social movements, but its conclusions were 
necessarily tentative. Community activists made strenuous efforts to forge closer 
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relationships with the trade union movement in particular and it would be useful to 
understand why these endeavours enjoyed such little success. This would nuance narratives 
of the decline of the trade union movement in this period. The relationship between 
community action and feminism, which the thesis has only touched upon in passing, 
deserves further research. Thirdly, community action was not only a British phenomenon. 
In other countries it has enjoyed a longer and more distinguished history. To understand 
why community action flourished in the United States while it proved short-lived in Britain 
will require further work. Comparative analysis of community action across Europe would 
help to highlight the distinctive aspects of British community action. From the 1960s to the 
1980s, several British activists were inspired by their experiences of community action in 
the United States. British community activists were also in contact with activists in 
Australia where links between community organisers and trade unionists were well-
developed.2 These transnational links merit further research.   
Fourthly, while this thesis has been orientated around particular campaigns, issues and 
policy areas, future research into community action might be framed by the work of 
individual community activists. This would allow historians to probe the social composition 
of community action groups in more depth and to isolate personal motivations and explore 
the background of activists in greater detail. By exploring the life trajectories of community 
activists, historians could document the relationship between community action and social 
movements. Such work could reveal how an individual’s experience of community action 
influenced their participation in other forms of activism, public policy and academic 
research beyond the 1980s. While community action declined in this decade, the people 
who participated in it endured. The interview data collected as part of this thesis could 
support such a project.  Fifthly, the thesis has shown that community action was informed 
by a multiplicity of political ideas and distinguished by its pluralism. It also argued that 
community action was the product of a 1960s and 1970s political culture distinguished by 
political radicalism, cultural innovation and social change. This thesis was not, however, 
intended to be an intellectual or cultural history of community action. Future work could 
probe more deeply into the intellectual foundations of community action, interrogating 
some of the key texts we discussed in the introductions. This would enrich our 
understanding of how contemporaries understood community action.  
 
 
                                                          2 Leeds Civic Trust, Outlook, No. 15, February 1977, 6-8; Community Action, No. 24, Feb-March 1976, 30-31 
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2. The legacy of community action 
In 1980, Community Action offered a sober assessment of the current state of community action in Britain:  
Despite several successes in some places, in many areas of the country there have been few if any gains, and what has been won elsewhere (often at the expense of weaker groups with [fewer] resources) is now threatened if not already cut. Few campaigning groups or federations have kept going for long. Many people have become worn out, disillusioned and divided frightened to risk the loss of tenancies or jobs…No powerful trade union/community alliances have developed with enough strength to fight off attacks on jobs and services…3 
The journal suggested that in order to survive in what it anticipated would be an 
even more hostile economic and political climate in the 1980s, community activists 
needed to build stronger alliances with established movements, organise at a 
regional and national level, and develop a narrative to contest the government’s 
emerging anti-state ideology. Community action did not evolve in this direction. 
From its apogee at the close of the 1970s, it declined. There was no clear moment 
that marked the demise of community action: rather, it faded slowly and 
unspectacularly. Community action groups stopped meeting, activists dropped out or 
moved on and community-run institutions closed.  
This brings us to the central question driving this thesis. Did community action ever 
amount to a movement like the other social movements of this period? In the 
introduction, we outlined the core features of a movement. Movements were 
networks of activists and organisations sharing a coherent set of ideas and methods, 
who worked together at a regional or national level to achieve common goals. 
Activists in a movement possessed a collective identity and they were aware that 
they were part of a movement. During the long 1970s, community action in Leeds 
exhibited many characteristics of a movement. Many community activists were 
sharing ideas and co-ordinating campaigns at a citywide level. Comparing two 
directories of community groups in the city published eleven years apart in 1972 and 
1983 reveals the expansion of grassroots organising in the city.4 The number of 
active community groups had more than tripled and they were active across all 
corners of the city. Community action groups across the city were supported by 
central institutions like TUCRIC, the CHWP, the LCVS and the Leeds Housing 
                                                          3 Community Action, No. 50, Sept-Oct 1980, 16 4 Leeds Polytechnic Alternative Society, Leeds and District Directory (1972); Leeds Council for Voluntary Service, Director of Social and Community Services (1983) 
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Action Group. Links to activists in other cities had been formed by groups like the 
Hunslet Grange Tenants Association. National advocacy bodies like SCAT were 
assisting community action groups in Leeds. Several Leeds-based community action 
groups had identified a wider set of objectives, beyond their short term goals, 
relating to the distribution of power in the city. Activists campaigning for gradual 
renewal and a new transport strategy were arguing for a more participatory approach 
to policy making. However, while community action in Leeds was always on the 
cusp of developing into a movement, it did not mature into a movement comparable 
to the other social movements in this period, such as feminism or environmentalism, 
or earlier social movements such as the peace movement and trade unionism. 
Community action in the city occupied a space between a chaotic mass mobilisation 
and a more focused and coherent movement. Further research is needed to assess 
whether community action was ever a movement at a national level, but the Leeds 
experience suggests this was unlikely.  
Given the speed of its growth and its numerous achievements, why did community 
action not evolve into a movement? Writing in 1984, during the twilight of 
community action, Jeremy Seabrook addressed this question: 
In the 1960s, there was a considerable surge of community action…The action groups were often extended campaigns and, although widely supported by the residents of any area, they didn’t have the impetus of long-term involvement. People moved on; the immediate reason for action disappeared – councils modified their plans, made concessions; areas were cleared; roads were constructed or the money ran out and they were postponed; people were re-housed on new estates. Action groups became institutionalised, the mass support of the early years fell away.5   
For Seabrook, community action was short-termist and bereft of long-term aims, which 
made it unsustainable. He also suggests that partnerships with local government sapped 
community action of its energy. This chimes with the Leeds experience in some respects, 
particularly since community action struggled to maintain its momentum when some of the 
key threats of the early 1970s passed, but Seabrook’s points did not apply universally in 
Leeds. Many community action campaigns were able to successfully transition from a 
defensive to a creative posture. Positive community action always existed alongside 
negative campaigns. In most cases, co-operation with the council strengthened community 
action groups, bringing them closer to achieving their goals. This thesis suggests that there 
were four core reasons for the failure of community action to mature into a movement.  
                                                          5 Jeremy Seabrook, The Idea of Neighbourhood: What local politics should be about (London, 1984): 113-4 
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Firstly, the links between community activists in different parts of Leeds and 
between activists in Leeds and activists in other cities remained weak throughout 
this period. Since community action derived much of its legitimacy and appeal from 
its intimate focus on neighbourhood problems, the centrifugal forces were always 
powerful and militated against the formation of citywide, regional and national 
organisations that might have helped to build a strong community action movement. 
Community action depended on middle class professionals to facilitate networking 
between activists in different neighbourhoods and to connect the Leeds movement to 
other parts of the country. The middle class advocates of the movement were limited 
in number and they were not in contact with all of the city’s community action 
groups. Coalitions of action groups in largely middle class areas, such as the A660 
Joint Council, were not in contact with their counterparts in working class areas. In 
certain parts of the city neighbourhoods became increasingly divided on ethnic, 
religious or geographical lines, which militated against the formation of a 
movement. Notwithstanding strenuous efforts by some activists, connections 
between community activists and the most powerful social movement in the city, the 
labour movement, remained weak. Trade unions were overwhelmingly concentrated 
on the workplace. There were no examples in Leeds of sustained joint action 
between community activists and trade unions on the scale of Australia’s Green Ban 
movement.6 
Secondly, community action in Leeds never developed a coherent ideology or clear 
methodology. For critics on the left, in order to build ‘lasting structures,’ community 
activists needed to integrate socialist theory into their practice.7 For others, 
American theories of community organising were more instructive.8 Neither 
approach was assimilated by community activists in Leeds. The heterogeneity and 
pluralism of community action was simultaneously an asset and a weakness. 
Community action was flexible, responsive and incorporated a diverse range of 
people and interest groups, but it lacked a sufficiently clear ideology or strong sense 
of identity to hold this coalition together in the long term. The leading advocates of 
community action in Leeds struggled to imprint a sense of common identity on the 
                                                          6 Jack Mundey, Green Bans and Beyond (London, 1981)  7 Mike Fleetwood and John Lambert, ‘Bringing socialism home: Theory and practice for a radical community action,’ in Gary Craig, Nick Derricourt and Martin Loney, ed, Community Work and the State: Towards a Radical Practice (London, 1982): 48-58 8 Pitt, James, Community Organising – You’ve Never Really Tried It: the Challenge to Britain from the USA (Birmimgham, 1984) 
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range of place-based community action groups and single issue campaigns. Many 
community activists were focused on achieving short-term goals and did not identify 
with a wider set of movement goals. This lack of shared identity was another reason 
why community activists struggled to build citywide, regional and national 
networks. Many of those who participated in community action did not identify as 
community activists, nor were they necessarily conscious of the fact that they were 
engaging in what had been defined as community action. Activists working at the 
neighbourhood level often did not consider this to be particularly important and 
relatively little thought was devoted to the issue in Leeds. This obstructed the 
evolution of community action into a movement.  
Thirdly, over the 1980s, the wide range of social groups and campaigning interests 
participating in community action pulled in different directions. Community activists were 
drawn into the orbit of different movements and campaigns. Many council housing activists 
increasingly identified with the tenants’ movement.9 Community activists concerned with 
planning and mobility identified with environmentalism or public transport campaigns. 
Others were drawn into the orbit of radical left groups.10 Campaigns to defend public 
services from outsourcing and marketization drew the attention of another tranche of 
community activists. In 1988, the merger of Community Action with Public Service Action, 
an anti-privatisation journal, was symptomatic of this trend.11 Community activists in 
ethnically diverse areas began to organise around particular ethnic or religious identity 
groups, while others focused on the politics of race and anti-racism. A small but significant 
cadre of community activists stood for local office, usually on a Labour Party ticket, and 
pursued their goals from within local government.12 In some respects, community action 
came full circle: in the late 1960s and early 1970s it had attracted those who were 
disillusioned with party politics, but over the 1970s community action groups had drawn 
closer to elected bodies and by the 1980s some of them had entered those institutions. As a 
result of this exodus to other campaigns and movements, community action faded as a 
distinctive form of political activism. Since so many community activists continued to 
participate in politics in another guise, the decline of community action was a process of 
evolution. Activists transmitted the ideas, insights and practices they had learned as 
community activists to their new institution and organisations.  
                                                          9 Quintin Bradley, The Tenants Movement: Resident Involvement, Community Action and the Contentious Politics of Housing (New York, 2014) 10 Interview with Max Farrar 11 Public Service Action: An Anti-privatisation Newsletter for the Labour Movement, SCAT Publication (London, 1983-1996) 12 Headline, No. 38, Spring 1988, 1-2 
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Fourthly, the political context to the decline of community action cannot be ignored. Over 
the 1980s, national policy became progressively unfavourable to community activists – 
even more so than Community Action had predicted. Community activists’ creative 
solutions to urban problems, which depended on a partnership between local government 
and community groups, were rendered impractical or illegal by a raft of Thatcherite reforms 
and spending cuts. The energy of many activists was absorbed by other struggles, such as 
the defence of trade union rights. In the inner city, economic conditions became more 
inimical to neighbourhood organising. Social networks fragmented and fewer people 
identified with a community and turned inwards. The optimism in the face of adversity that 
had characterised the long 1970s subsided over the 1980s.  
While any lingering optimism that community action might develop into a 
movement had dissipated by the end of the 1980s, community action persisted as an 
approach to politics, both in Leeds and nationally. The methods, strategies, rhetoric 
and ideas popularised by community activists left a lasting mark on public policy, 
activism and political culture. The legacy of community action was visible in the 
1980s, 1990s and the 2000s in the expansion of tenants’ participation in social 
housing, the growth of community architecture, the decentralisation of local 
government services, consultation programmes in planning and community-based 
initiatives in a range of policy areas from unemployment to education.13 Two 
political developments in particular were deeply indebted to community action. 
Firstly, the new left Labour councils of the 1980s were influenced by the community 
action critique of local government. As we saw above, many members of the Labour 
Left in this period were former community activists and others were influenced by 
community action.14 These administrations endeavoured to disperse power to the 
neighbourhood level by restructuring service provision. They brought community 
activists closer to the centre of the decision-making process and their grant-aiding 
polices transferred significant sums of public money to community groups. For 
commentators like Seabrook, this community action provided the inspiration for a 
                                                          13 Liz Cairncross, David Clapham and Robina Goodlad, Housing Management, Consumers and Citizens (London 1996); Graham Towers, Building Democracy: Community Architecture in the Inner Cities (London, 1995): 157-174; Jeremy Seabrook, The Idea of Neighbourhood: What local politics should be about (London, 1984); Danny Burns, Robin Hambleton and Paul Hoggett, The Politics of Decentralisation: Revitalising Local Democracy (London, 1994)  14 Gerry Stoker, The Politics of Local Government (Basingstoke, 1991): 45; Hilary Wainwright, Labour: A Tale of Two Parties (London, 1987): 98; Daisy Payling ‘‘Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire’: Grassroots Activism and Left-wing solidarity in 1980s Sheffield,’ Twentieth Century British History, 25:4 (2014): 8-9 [online edition] 
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new form of government centred on the neighbourhood.15 The Thatcher 
governments nipped many of these pioneering initiatives in the bud, but some of the 
democratising ideas of the New Urban Left persisted into the New Labour era.16 
Secondly, the bottom-up, political mobilisations of the 1990s around road-building, 
the environment and the Criminal Justice Bill betrayed the influence of community 
action.17 If community activists had embodied the second part of the famous 
imperative, “think globally, act locally,” their activist successors in the 1990s 
developed a stronger awareness of the global dimension to local problems, which 
helped them to build transnational networks.  
The long-term impact of community action is also evident in the fact that since the 
1980s, the notion that groups of people living in close proximity to one another 
might organise collectively to campaign on a neighbourhood issue is no longer 
considered remarkable or controversial. The idea that grassroots groups might exert 
influence over policy making is taken seriously by citizens and elected 
representatives alike. A guide book for neighbourhood activists published in 1986 
exemplified the new mood. After outlining a series of fictitious scenarios in which 
ordinary citizens faced seemingly intractable problems, it asked: 
Is it possible that Cathy Smith can beat the Transport Ministry, and the road lobbies? Can Brian Hunter through [Smithsville Housing Action Committee] force the borough to change its plans? Can Augustine Kirkwood persuade her local MPs to help the elderly? Can Marie Sheedy get the lights turned on? Of course they can. And so can you. Persuading the authorities may not be easy – but it is possible.18  
This shows that while community action did not endure as a movement, its central 
optimistic message – that people can organise in their neighbourhood to achieve change – 
left an indelible mark on British politics. Indeed, it is partly because community action as an 
approach to politics became normalised so rapidly that its history was quickly forgotten. 
Although grassroots activism is ubiquitous in contemporary Britain, contemporary 
community groups are not linked by regional or national institutions and they rarely possess 
a sense of shared identity or movement consciousness. The collective strength of 
community groups across cities or regions is rarely leveraged to steer public policy. Since 
                                                          15 Seabrook, The Idea of Neighbourhood, 114 16 Lansley, Stuart, Goss, Sue and Woolmar, Christian, Councils  in Conflict: The Rise and Fall of the Municipal Left (London, 1989): 175-206 17 George McKay, ed., DIY Culture: Party and protest in Nineties Britain (London, 1998); Derek Wall, Earth First! and the Anti-Roads Movement: Radical environmentalism and comparative social movements (London, 1999) 18 Des Wilson, ed., Citizen Action: Taking action in your community (Harlow, 1986): 3 
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the 1980s, community action has been less than the sum of its parts. It is a form of activism 
but not a movement. 
 
In exploring the limitations of community action in Britain, this thesis has shown 
why community action failed to mature into an established movement in Britain. By 
contrast, in the United States community organising had developed into a powerful 
nationwide movement by the 1970s. Community organising in the United States was 
sustained intellectually by the writings of influential community organisers, which 
provided the movement with a set of shared ideas, and it was supported 
organisationally by institutions at city, state and national level.19 While American 
community organisers enjoyed a head start of several decades, their achievements 
within a similar time period outshone their British counterparts. As a result, 
American community organising has been the subject of historical scholarship for 
several decades.20 Despite efforts to learn from their counterparts across the Atlantic 
in this period, British community activists were unable to reproduce the foundations 
of the American movement in the long 1970s.21 More recently, the continued 
success of community organising in the United States has prompted a new round of 
efforts to create a community action movement in Britain. Since the late 1990s, 
there have been renewed efforts to build networks of community organisers in 
London and other major British cities by drawing on American methods.22 In the 
early 2010s, the Labour Party consulted a leading American community organiser 
on how it might revitalise its base.23 These developments are beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but they point to the renewed salience of community action in the 
twenty-first century. This thesis has shown that grassroots politics in Britain has a 
long history and our need to understand this history is increasingly urgent. 
 
                                                          19 Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals (New York, 1971); Harry Boyte, Backyard Revolution: understanding the new citizen movement (1980); Gary Delago, Organising the Movement: the Roots and Growth of ACORN (Philadelphia, 1986); Ed Chambers, Roots for Radicals: Organising for Power, Action and Justice (New York, 2003)  20 Robert Fisher and Peter Romanofsky, Community Organizing for Urban Social Change: An Historical Perspective (1981); Wini Breines, The Great Refusal: Community and Organisation in the New Left (1989); Robert Fisher, Let the People Decide: Community organising in America (New York, 1994); Jennifer Frost, An Interracial Movement of the Poor: Community Organising and the New Left (2001) 21 James Pitt, Community Organising – You’ve Never Really Tried It: the Challenge to Britain from the USA (Birmimgham, 1984) 22 Luke Bretherton, Resurrecting Democracy: Faith, Citizenship and the Politics of a Common Life (Cambridge, 2015). See also: ‘Citizens UK,’ www.citizensuk.org, accessed 5 September 2015 23 Rowenna Davis, ‘Arnie Graf: the man Ed Miliband asked to rebuild Labour,’ The Guardian, 21 November 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/nov/21/arnie-graf-labour-party-miliband, accessed 5 September 2015 
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1.1 The site of the Hunslet Grange estate in the 1950s showing streets of back-to-back houses. Most of these streets were cleared in the early 1960s. [Ordinance Survey via Digimap, digimap.edina.ac.uk, accessed 15 September 2015] 
 
 
Fig. 1.2 Hunslet from the air in the 1950s, looking west over Church Street and the future site of Hunslet Grange. Post-war prefabricated dwellings are visible on the right. Slum clearance can be seen advancing over Hunslet from the top of the image. St Mary’s Parish Church is visible on the left. [‘the leek street flats rocked society,’ Facebook group, https://www.facebook.com/groups/333104160630/photos/, accessed 1 September 2015] 
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Fig. 1.3 Hunslet Grange in the early 1980s, revealing the transformative effect of the estate on the older built environment seen in Fig. 1.1. The rectangular blocks of the estate, arranged around courtyards, surrounded by open space, replace the traditional street pattern. [Ordinance Survey via Digimap, digimap.edina.ac.uk, accessed 15 September 2015] 
 
Fig. 1.4 A view of the Hunslet Grange estate from ground level. Undated image. [‘the leek street flats rocked society,’ Facebook group, https://www.facebook.com/groups/333104160630/photos/, accessed 15 September 2015] 
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Fig. 1.5 One of the raised walkways at Hunslet Grange in 1968, showing the entrances to the flats. [Clifford Stead, flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/cliffordstead/albums, 15 September 2015] 
 
Fig. 1.6 An internal courtyard within the estate. Undated image. [Clifford Stead, flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/cliffordstead/albums, accessed 21 September 2015] 
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Fig. 1.7 Hunslet Grange viewed from the periphery of the estate, showing the grassed open space surrounding the residential blocks. The spire of St Mary’s Church is visible. [‘the leek street flats rocked society,’ Facebook group, https://www.facebook.com/groups/333104160630/photos/, accessed 15 September 2015] 
 
 
Fig. 1.8 Hunslet old and new: Hunslet Grange rises up on raised behind a traditional shop frontage near the centre of Hunslet. Undated image. [Clifford Stead, flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/cliffordstead/albums, 15 September 2015] 
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Fig. 1.9 The demolition of one of the blocks on the estate in the mid-1980s. Undated image. [‘the leek street flats rocked society,’ Facebook group, https://www.facebook.com/groups/333104160630/photos/, accessed 15 September 2015] 
 
Fig. 2.1 Back-to-back and through terrace housing in Harehills in 1953. The junction of Roundhay Road and Rosevill Road is visible in the bottom left. The grounds of St James’ Hospital are seen in the bottom right. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 10 September 2015] 
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Fig. 2.2 Back-to-back houses in Armley in 1968. This street was later demolished in the housing renewal programme. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 10 September 2015] 
 
Fig. 2.3 Part of the council’s Seacroft estate abutting open countryside on the edge of east Leeds in 1963. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 10 September 2015]  
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Fig 2.4 An aerial view of Burmantofts in inner east Leeds in 1964, showing clearance areas and newly built inner city council housing. This was the site of major highway works in the 1960s and 1970s with the upgrading of the York Road to a dual carriageway with flyovers. The 1930s Quarry Hill estate is just visible at the bottom of the image. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 17 February 2015] 
 
Fig. 2.5 Looking north over Woodhouse towards Sugarwell Hill. The back-to-back streets in the foreground were the subject of a community campaign against clearance proposals in the late 1970s. Undated image from the 1970s or early 1980s. [Clifford Stead, flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/cliffordstead/albums, accessed 20 September 2015] 
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Fig. 2.6 The Cross Streets area of Armley in the 1970s (highlighted) consisting mainly of back-to-backs and some through terraces. The Cross Streets Housing Action Group campaigned for several years to substitute clearance for rehabilitation of the older houses. The area was cleared in the early 1980s. [Ordinance Survey via Digimap, digimap.edina.ac.uk, accessed 15 September 2015] 
 
Fig. 2.7 Parts of the south Headingley and Hyde Park neighbourhoods in north west Leeds in the 1950s, showing the mixture of back-to-backs, small through terraces, substantial terraces and interwar semi-detached houses. This area was the site of several community action campaigns in the 1970s to preserve and improve older housing. [Ordinance Survey via Digimap, digimap.edina.ac.uk, accessed 15 September 2015] 
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Fig. 3.1 Hunslet Road in 1954, showing diverse street scene made up of cyclists, pedestrians, a tram and motor vehicles. In subsequent decades, this road was transformed into a dual carriageway and all the buildings on the left were demolished. [Clifford Stead, flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/cliffordstead/albums, accessed 17 February 2015] 
 
Fig. 3.2 Headingley Lane at the junction of Cumberland Road, looking towards Headingley Hill, showing the street scene in the post-war period. The street features mature trees, stone walls and York stone paving. This section of the road was to be widened as part of the expressway plans of the 1970s. The trams had been removed by 1959. Undated image, probably dating from the 1950s. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 17 February 2015] 
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Fig. 3.3 North Street and Hartley Hill on the edge of Leeds city centre. Almost all the buildings in this image (except the old public dispensary on the far right) were demolished for the construction of the inner ring road and car parking [‘Leeds Back in the Day,’ Facebook group, https://www.facebook.com/LeedsBackInTheDay/photos_stream, accessed 10 September 2015] 
 
 
Fig. 3.4 The construction of the inner ring road on the northern fringe of central Leeds in the late 1960s. The Civic Hall and Leeds General Infirmary can be seen in the top left. To the left of the line of the inner ring road is the site of Leeds Polytechnic, while to the right is the expanding Leeds University precinct. Woodhouse Lane, the beginning of the A660, crosses the ring road on the bridges in the centre of the image. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 17 February 2015] 
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Fig. 3.5 The inner ring road under construction at its junction with Clay Pitt Lane on the eastern side of the city centre. Three newly constructed tower blocks in Little London are visible beyond the bridge. Some old industrial buildings remain in what was a densely populated residential area. Undated image from the late 1960s or early 1970s. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 17 February 2015] 
 
Fig. 3.6 The south east urban motorway close to the where it crossed Hunslet Moor, showing facilities for pedestrians wishing to walk between Hunslet and the city centre. Express buses are seen using the motorway. The two tower blocks of the Moor Crescent estate can be seen in top left of the image. [Clifford Stead, flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/cliffordstead/albums, accessed 25 February 2015] 
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Fig. 3.7 Construction of a flyover on the York Road in the late 1960s. The image is taken from the Woodpecker Junction showing the junction of the York Road with Regent Street. Part of the 1930s Quarry Hill estate can be seen on the left. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 17 February 2015] 
 
Fig. 3.8 Aerial view of central Headingley in 1937 showing the main Otley Road. Part of the line of the proposed 1930s by-pass is marked in red. The by-pass schemes of the late twentieth century followed a similar route. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 17 February 2015] 
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Fig. 3.9 The route of the A660 between the inner ring road and Beckett Park (marked). This section of the road was the subject of road-building proposals between the 1930s and the 1980s [Ordnance Survey via Digimap, digimap.edina.ac.uk, accessed 25 September 2015] 
 
 
Fig. 3.10 Top: A publicly owned Metrobus travel down the York Road towards the city centre on the eve of deregulation in 1986. Below: a Metro Saver Strip, a multi-use ticket designed to minimise passenger loading time at bus stops and make bus travel more attractive [Clifford Stead, flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/cliffordstead/albums, accessed 17 February 2015] 
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Fig. 3.11 By the 1980s, the south-west Urban Motorway (left) and the South East Urban Motorway (right) together formed a U-shaped band of grade segregated highway in south Leeds, less than a mile from the city centre. The urban motorways traversed Hunslet and Holbeck Moors and severed Holbeck, Hunslet and Beeston Hill. The Hunslet Grange is shown on the right, above ‘Hunslet.’ [Ordinance Survey via Digimap, digimap.edina.ac.uk, accessed 15 September 2015] 
 
Fig. 4.1 The Harehills Place, a community centre for Harehills, established by the Harehills Community Association, opened in 1983 in a former United Reform Church on Harehills Lane [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 20 September 2015]  
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Fig. 4.2 The Holbeck Community Centre, operated by the Holbeck Community Association, opened in a former church building on Colenso Mount in the late 1970s. Undated image. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 21 September 2015]  
 
Fig. 4.3 One of the adventure playgrounds established by the Belle Vue and Burley Community Association in the mid-1970s was situated on a clearance site on steeply sloping land at Rosebank Burley Road. Undated image. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 20 September 2015] 
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Fig. 4.4 Community activists set up a temporary summer adventure playground on clearance land at Woodsley Road in Burley in the early 1970s. Undated image. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 20 September 2015]  
 
Fig. 4.5 Children and adults build play structures using salvaged scrap materials and items donated by local firms at the Woodsley Road adventure playground. Undated image. [Leeds Library and Information Services, http://www.leodis.net/, accessed 20 September 2015] 
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List of Abbreviations 
 A list of abbreviations used in the main text and the footnotes. 
 
ALC  Alison Ravetz Collection (private) 
BHC  Barbara Hancock Collection (private) 
BSC  Bob Shaw Collection (private) 
CA  Community Action 
CCA  Chapeltown Community Association 
CCP/NA Chapeltown Community Playgroup/Nursery Association 
CHWP  Community Housing Working Party 
CN  Chapeltown News 
CSHAG Cross Streets Housing Action Group 
DOE  Department of the Environment 
EAG  Ebors Action Group 
EBC  Eric Bowen Collection (private) 
HGHAG Hunslet Grange Heating Action Group 
HRA  Headingley Residents Association 
LCC  Leeds City Council 
LCT  Leeds Civic Trust collection (private) 
LFHA  Leeds Federated Housing Association 
LLFHL Leeds Local and Family History Library 
LOP  Leeds Other Paper 
NHPNA North Hyde Park Neighbourhood Association 
PBC  Peter Baker Collection (private) 
RCC  Richard Crossley Collection (private) 
SCAT Shelter Community Action Team / Services to Community Action and 
Tenants1  
TOP  The Other Paper 
TUCRIC  Trade Union and Community Research and Information Centre 
WCA  Woodhouse Community Association 
WHAG Woodhouse Housing Action Group 
WYA  West Yorkshire Archive 
                                                          1 SCAT changed its name in the late 1970s 
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WYMCC West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council 
YDG  Yorkshire Development Group 
YDGTA Yorkshire Development Group Tenants Association 
YEP  Yorkshire Evening Post 
YP  Yorkshire Post 
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